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
ABSTRACT
OF
SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

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To the
Hon. Joseph E. Brown

President of the Board of Trustees of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary

*this book is respectfully dedicated, as a token of high personal
esteem, and in recognition of his deep interest in the cause
of education, and especially of the theological educa-
tion of the Christian ministry; as evinced, among
other generous gifts, by his endowment in the
Southern Baptist Theological Seminary
of the Chair of Systematic Theol-
ogy, with which the author is
officially connected*

PREFACE

THIS volume is published the rather as a practical text-book, for the study of the system of doctrine taught in the word of God, than as a contribution to theological science. It was originally prepared for the use of the classes taught by its author, and is indeed but a reprint, with numerous and extensive alterations and additions, of a book privately printed in 1882, exclusively for his students. He hopes that other teachers may find it useful as a text-book for class instruction. It may also be of value to the large number of pastors who have had no advantages of seminary study, or to others who may choose to take up again the subject of which it treats, after the method which is herewith suggested. The experience such pastors have already had, and the knowledge, though only partial, heretofore acquired, will make this very practicable, even without the aid of an instructor. In writing the book for his pupils, the author found it necessary, while attempting a comprehensive exhibit of Systematic Theology, to make it so brief as to be within the compass of about one hundred recitations. This was made possible by omitting extensive exegetical discussions, and by presenting theology with as little reference as possible to its polemical aspects. The separate existence of schools of exegesis and of polemic theology, in the institution in which he was teaching, made this not only practicable but advisable. For a like reason there are not here discussed such matters as belong to what is commonly known as church government.¹ These have been taught by the author in a school separate from that of Systematic Theology. The material appropriate to these other schools of instruction will, therefore, only be found in this

¹ For the same reason the doctrine of the inspiration of the Scriptures also is not discussed by the author, this being treated in the separate school of Biblical Introduction.

book when necessary for the proper presentation of some topic belonging to Systematic Theology.

It ought to be added that the study of the text-book has been accompanied by familiar talks by the professor, by free discussions with his pupils, which are always encouraged, and has been supplemented by extensive reading, in the Latin Systematic Theology class, of the works of Turretin and Aquinas and other writers in the Latin language.

The author deems it appropriate to state the method of instruction which he has always pursued. Thus will not only be exhibited the reason why this science is presented in this abbreviated form, but also suggested to private students, as well as teachers, what seems to him the most effective method of study for the mastery of any subject. There are special reasons why such thorough work should be applied to Systematic Theology.

In the use of this method the student is taught to prepare a brief but accurate analysis of each lesson. With this thoroughly memorized, every paragraph is then studied so as to fix in the mind the thoughts presented in it. It is possible to do this with great minuteness. With this preparation the recitation is made without the use of questions, not in the very words of the book, but in such as naturally proceed from the attempt to state all the thoughts of the lesson. This will be found to be quite difficult at first, and will make it necessary that the earlier lessons be very short—not more than three or four pages. But the student will very soon acquire great facility, not only in preparing these analyses, but also in reciting from them. The advance lesson of one day is repeated as an immediate review on the next. After five or six lessons in connection with the advance and immediate review, a back review is made comprising the equivalent of two advance lessons. This soon goes over the ground already covered in the advance, and permits the beginning of another back review. This is followed by another back review, and yet again by others, until the book is finished—each series of the back reviews being an increase in length of the one which had preceded it. The

student will thus be constantly advancing, and at the same time reviewing, until, on the completion of the book, he will have so fully mastered all its contents as to be perfectly familiar with every portion of it, and to be able to recall any part of it at will.

The usefulness of this method of study is not urged upon the single experience of the author of this work. It had been for some time in use when he was a student in Brown University, over forty years ago, and has not only been continued there ever since, but has been adopted by numerous other teachers, who there learned its great value. It not only accomplishes the mastery of any study, but it trains the mind in analyzing and remembering readily any book that may be read or discourse that may be heard. It cultivates the memory to a marvelous degree. It especially begets logical accuracy and arrangement of thought. It is also one of the best means of cultivating readiness of extemporaneous speech. Could the writer illustrate these points from his experience, both as pupil and instructor, he is sure that many would be led to undergo the great labor in the beginning for the greater profit in the end of pursuing this plan of study.¹

The author has aimed to make the discussions in this volume especially scriptural. He believes in the perfect inspiration and absolute authority of the divine revelation, and is convinced that the best proof of any truth is that it is there taught. He questions, indeed, whether man can know with absolute certainty any truth which is not thus uttered by God. Into all else must enter the liability to error which arises from human imperfection. So far as the Scriptures speak, and so far only, does man have certainty of knowledge. This has led, therefore, in the proofs presented, to the constant quotation of the language of Holy Writ. In this reprint these have been all taken from the Canterbury Revision as furnishing the most accurate translation into English of the inspired originals. Such proofs should always be most

¹ The reviser was a thoroughly appreciative student under the author, and bears his unqualified testimony to the great advantages of this method, both for studying and teaching.

satisfactory to pastors for their own use, and most efficacious in the proclamation of the truth to their hearers.

The presentation of truth in the Scriptures, however, is not made by mere statement only, but also by emphasis of statement. Its true aspects are, like those of a country or continent, not to be measured only by lines and angles, but by elevations and depressions; or like the execution of a piece of music, which is not sufficiently accomplished by the striking of the correct notes, but by giving each its due length of time, its due emphasis of touch, with that expression which is only possible for one whose soul enters into the harmony of sound, and to whom the music speaks thought as distinctly as would written or spoken words. The possession of such soul-sympathy with the divine word and the power to feel and express with delicate exactness the true measure and weight of its emphasis of statement would give the system of theology in all the perfection which revelation affords. The lack of this is the great cause of difference of doctrinal sentiment among those who really revere and gladly receive the Scriptures as God's word. The tendency of Calvinists, for example, is to emphasize, perhaps too strongly, the sovereignty of God, and to receive only in a guarded manner the statements as to the freedom of the human will. That of Arminians is exactly the reverse. The differences between these are due not to any contrariety of teaching in the word of God, but to human failure to emphasize correctly. It is not probable that this can ever be wholly avoided. But it is unquestioned wisdom and duty to approach as far as possible unto perfection. In order to secure unity Christians are often urged to ignore their differences and unite upon the great points of general agreement. But the better plan is to recognize these differences as starting-points for such investigations as shall result in greater nearness to the truth, and, therefore, in greater nearness to each other. To this end it is necessary that a system of theology should be mapped out before the human mind. The more correct the system the better it will be. But one had better have an incorrect system

than none at all. To this every reading of the word of God, and indeed all study of divine truth, will contribute—to verify it, to correct it, to add to it, to take away from it, and to test and adjust its emphasis of statement. It is necessary only to remember always that the system in the mind is a survey of the truth, and not the truth itself. The worst map a surveyor can obtain is better than none at all, though it gives him only a starting-point. If any of the metes and bounds can be established there will be great gain. As the land becomes more familiar the map can be made more perfect. The lines and angles having been fixed, the measurements of the elevations and depressions can be added, and the survey finally made as exact as the instruments will allow.

The map of theological science has already, in great part, been agreed upon. But it is necessary that such accepted facts be received in their exact statement and their proper emphasis, and not be magnified nor emasculated because of any special theories or any unwillingness to believe what God has taught.

Hence the value of this method of study, which, by a thorough mastery of it, maps out theology in the mind and furnishes the basis for future corrections or additions. This book is published from a desire to lead many others to such study, and to furnish a practical means of pursuing it. The author fervently prays God to bless it to this end, as well as to all other useful purposes for which it may be a fit instrument.

REVISER'S PREFACE

It has been long evident to the author's successor in the Chair of Systematic Theology that a change of some kind would have to be made in the text-book used by his class, the one in use—"Boyce's Abstract of Theology"—having proved a more difficult work to master than had been anticipated by the author. The judicial cast of his mind, his habit of seeing all sides of a question at once, and his effort to give all proper qualifying statements, led him into many parenthetical remarks, which made some of his sentences obscure and his work difficult for the more untrained students to analyze according to the method of teaching employed by both the author and his successor.

It was a serious question with the teacher, whether he should undertake to write a new text-book, or try to revise the one already in use. For several reasons it seemed preferable to revise, if satisfactory arrangements to this end could be made. First, the reviser had no special ambition to add another text-book to those that have been recently appearing with such rapidity. He preferred, if it should please God to permit him to write on theology, to give his attention to a line of special subjects rather than to the whole range of doctrines. He thought too, that he could make a revision with less of time and responsibility than would be involved in writing a book. It seemed to him, also, that a professor can give more of freshness to his teaching if he uses the book of another rather than one of his own upon which his best strength has been expended. And again, he had a deep conviction that, if it was possible to retain Dr. Boyce's book, it would be wrong to supplant this with another.

The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary was born in the big brain and even bigger heart of James Petigru Boyce. He

gave his life, with all his splendid talents, to bringing it into being. His was the master mind that guided it to its large endowment and firm establishment. His strong thinking and deep convictions gave the set to its theological teachings, and projected, and helped to provide for, the guarding of its orthodoxy. A profound admiration and reverence and love for this noblest and, in many respects, grandest man the reviser ever knew, and a sense of what the Seminary owes to him for its existence, have caused the feeling that, if by any means his book could be retained, it would be almost sacrilege to supplant it, and thus take from him the right, though dead, to speak to his students and help to mold their theological views. For these reasons and others he sought the privilege of trying to make from the book prepared by Dr. Boyce such a text-book as he felt would meet his own demands as a teacher and the demands of the Seminary. The legal representatives of Dr. Boyce very kindly granted the right to revise, and with this the large liberty that has been taken in the general plan and details of revision.

As special features of the reviser's work may be mentioned the following: 1. Special liberty has been exercised in the general arrangement and order of subjects. Some material changes have been made in this respect. 2. The entire work has been thoroughly analyzed and the analysis indicated by a rigid system of notation, thus making it much easier to see and follow the line of thought. Paragraphs or pages which could not be brought into a clear analysis have been thrown into fine print as parenthetical remarks. 3. An effort has been made to remove obscurities, either by recasting the author's sentences or by expressing in the language of the reviser what he thought was the author's meaning. Sentences or paragraphs which did not contribute to the point in hand have been omitted. 4. The reviser has inserted introductory and explanatory remarks as he has deemed wise, and this without indicating that they are by the reviser. To have so indicated would needlessly have marred the appearance of the book. 5. When the reviser has inserted

in the body of the work any matter of his own which he deemed important it has been enclosed in square brackets []. 6. Having abandoned all thought of writing a text-book of his own, the liberty has been taken of indicating in footnotes certain points of difference between the reviser's views and those of the author. 7. A students' scheme and a system of notation have been inserted, and an index has been added. The references at the bottom of the pages and the proof-texts are almost entirely those of the author, as printed in former editions.¹

If any one feels disposed to criticise the reviser for his free use of the work of another, such a one is asked to remember what has been stated as to the necessity for a change in text-book, and the strong reasons for not displacing the book of the author. An adjustment of these two conditions to each other made it seem necessary that the reviser should take large liberty in his revision. This liberty has been the more freely exercised in view of the fact that the original work of the author, with all the plates, has been left intact, and any one who wishes to use that may still secure it.

The reviser has found more defects and failures in his work than any critic will be likely to see, and these he sincerely regrets. He is glad to know, however, after a year's use of the advance sheets with his class that he has not failed of his main purpose. He indulges the hope also that the labor which he has bestowed may bring into more general use this vigorous and noble and orthodox work of the author. For students and pastors the book has, he thinks, been rendered comparatively easy.

Dr. Boyce was without doubt the greatest leader that Southern Baptists have ever had. By birth and training a gentleman, by the grace of God a Christian, courtly and courteous in bearing, strong in convictions, chivalrous and dauntless in courage, wise and safe in counsel, the people trusted him and followed where

¹ The reviser did not feel willing to sit in judgment upon the author's array of proof-texts.

he led. And now when they see him no more, they cannot follow a safer human leader in the outlining of their theological thought.

F. H. KERFOOT.

SOUTHERN BAPTIST THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,

April, 1899.

SYSTEM OF NOTATION

THERE is perhaps no other one thing which contributes more to clear thinking and to clear expression of thought than a thoroughly consistent plan of analysis with a proper and rigid system of notation. A very important feature in the teaching of the reviser is his insistence upon such analysis and notation in the study of theology. He has endeavored persistently to carry this same plan through all his work of revision. It will be helpful to the student to note carefully at the outset the system used. The general divisions and subdivisions of the book as a whole may be seen at a glance by reference to the table of contents, pp. xvii, xviii. The plan given below is that which is used in the treatment of particular topics, such as are made the subjects of the different chapters. Ordinarily the chapters are divided by *Roman numerals* into their appropriate MAIN DIVISIONS. If there is occasion to divide these again, the divisions are indicated by *Arabic numerals*. If these are to be subdivided, the Arabic numerals in parentheses are used. Subdivisions of these are indicated by *a. b. c.*, etc., and subdivisions of these by *(a) (b) (c)*, etc. If these need to be subdivided the letters are doubled, *e. g.*, *aa. bb. cc.*, etc., and subdivisions of these by *(aa) (bb) (cc)*, and so on, as may be required. The following will illustrate the plan:

- I.
1. (1) (2) (3)
 2. (1) (2)
 - a. b. c. d.
 - (a) (b) (c)
 3. (1) (2) (3) (4)
 - a. b. c. d.
 - (a) (b) (c)
 - aa. bb. cc.
 - (aa) (bb) (cc)
- II.
1. (1) (2)
 - a. b. c. d. e.
 - (a) (b)
 - (aa) (bb) (cc)
 2. (1) (2) (3) (4)
 - a. b.
 - (a) (b) (c) (d)
 - aa. bb. cc.
 - (aa) (bb) (cc)

If the divisions and subdivisions are likely to be greatly multiplied in any particular chapter, the first main division may be divided into sections. See for example the chapter on the Atonement. Then under these come the regular divisions. Sometimes it may be found necessary, in the multiplication of main divisions, to use also the Roman numerals in parentheses. The chapter on the Atonement will illustrate this also. The important thing is that each student should adopt *some* system, and then, having adopted it, should use consistently that which he has adopted, until he finds and adopts something that is better. The above is a thoroughly logical and consistent plan.

NOTE.—It is hardly possible that, in such a mass of details, there should not have occurred some errors in notation. The student can correct all such errors by referring to the above plan.


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SCHEME FOR STUDENTS

SYSTEMATIC
THEOLOGY



ABSTRACT OF THEOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

THE STUDY OF THEOLOGY

It has been said that the proper study of man is man. It may be far more truly said that the proper study of man is *God*. No study can possibly be so profound, so elevated and elevating, none so far-reaching or so practical, as the study of the Creator and Supreme Ruler of the universe. The Great Teacher declared that "This is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent." The one who studies theology is engaged in a study of God. The title of a treatise on theology might well be, "The Life and Character of God." Its proper business is to set forth the nature and activities of God. The student of theology should aim to keep this thought always prominent in his mind. He should ever feel that the ground upon which he treads is "holy ground." To this sacred subject the following treatise is devoted.

I. CURRENT USES OF THE TERM THEOLOGY.

1. SCIENCE WHICH TREATS OF GOD. The word "theology" means literally a discourse concerning God. But in analogy with other words, as geology, chronology, and biology, it means the science which treats of God.

2. ANY TREATISE ON THE SCIENCE OF GOD. The term "theology" is applied, however, not only to the science itself which treats of God, but to any treatise on that science. This is true not only of a discourse upon the one true God, but even of one upon the many false gods of the heathen. It is also true, though the treatise be not a scientific discussion, but simply an imaginative narrative or poem. Thus "Orpheus and Homer were called theologians among the Greeks, because their poems treated of the nature of the gods."¹ Even the poems of Ossian, though

¹ Charles Hodge, "Sys. Theol.," Vol. I., p. 19.

probably written in England within the past century, is a book of theology. Mythology is not less theology because it treats of false gods and in works of the imagination.

The term "theology" is, however, especially applicable to learned and scientific works upon God or the gods. Of these many are to be found connected with heathenism. Such are the Vedas, the most ancient of the sacred books of the Hindus. Such is the Zend-Avesta of the ancient Persians. The Edda, which sets forth the Scandinavian mythology, consists of poetic songs, and also of dialogues on the origin of the gods, on the creation of the world, and other like topics.¹

It is applied also to discussions among the heathen, found in the works of the Greek philosophers. The greater part of these, even when not directly upon the nature of the gods, involved questions as to the origin of the world, and the presence therein of a divine controlling Spirit, as well as upon the nature of the soul, and its duties, and its immortality. Of their works many have come down to us in fragments only, while a large portion of what they taught is found only in the records and reports made by others; but there are also many complete works which profess to have been written by the authors of these speculations. Confessedly the most important of these Greek writings are Xenophon's "Memorabilia of Socrates" and the works of Plato and Aristotle. But from the beginning of Grecian philosophy in Thales and Pythagoras to its culmination in Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, was not quite two hundred years, while its whole history covers a period of six centuries and a half before, and five centuries after, the coming of Christ. No human mind can estimate the value of these contributions, nor the influence they have exerted even over those possessed of the Christian revelation.

The Latin writers also produced several works of a theological character, pre-eminent among which is that of Cicero, "Concerning the Nature of the Gods."

3. A SPECIAL SET OF OPINIONS. Theology is also frequently used for the special set of opinions exhibited by a particular writer, or class of writers, in any one or more productions. Thus we have the theology of Calvin, or of Arminius, or of Baxter; the theology of the Reformation; also Princeton theology, and New England theology. Men also speak of the theology of the Old, or of

¹ See Gardner's "Faiths of the World," Vol. I., p. 795.

the New Testament ; the theology of the Psalms ; of the various evangelists, especially of John ; they speak also of Petrine and Pauline theology, etc.

II. THEOLOGY AS A SCIENCE.

I. PROOF THAT IT IS A SCIENCE. It lacks nothing that constitutes a science. (1) It is concerned in the investigation of facts. It inquires into their existence, their relations to each other, their systematic arrangement, the laws which govern them, and the great principles which are the basis of this existence and of these relations. (2) As in other sciences, there is much that is absolutely known, much beyond this that is little questioned, much that is still matter of speculation, and much as to which there is decided difference of opinion. New facts are constantly developing in this science, as in others, which enable us to verify the facts and principles heretofore accepted when true, and to modify them when erroneous. New theories present themselves for the better explanation of facts already known, and are tested by these facts and by others subsequently discovered ; and are received or rejected according to their ascertained correctness. The knowledge of the past is built upon for progression toward the future. (3) The discovery of the facts is conducted, as in all other sciences, by study of what the field affords. Geology examines the earth, and derives its facts from the structure of that earth. Astronomy investigates the stars. Theology, likewise, studies the sources of its knowledge. Each science seeks to arrive at the truth. The votaries of each are certain that it is to be found in their fields, either partially or completely. The perfect attainment of all facts prepares for the exactness of scientific knowledge. The absence of any must make the knowledge incomplete. The proper generalization of all is essential in this, as in all other kinds of science. A full knowledge of all the facts, and a perfect generalization of them will constitute theology an exact science. (4) Theology is also as sensitive to the absence of facts as is any other science. The astronomer finds that his calculations, based upon correct theories, are not exactly verified, and at once suspects the presence of some disturbing body as the cause of this variation. So also in theology. The omission of a single fact, however small, must affect the whole universe of doctrine. The common mind does not perceive this, and hence is not prepared to value the discovery of the new fact. But the theologian finds in the new and more exact adjustment thus made

possible, the proof of the truth of his whole system, and therefore prizes it, even sometimes beyond what he ought.

2. CLASSIFIED AS A SCIENCE. Regarded as a science, theology may be classified in various forms: (1) According to the method of revelation, into natural and supernatural theology. Natural theology embraces what man may attain by the study of God in nature. This extends not only to what is beheld of him in the heavens and the earth, but also in the intellectual and spiritual nature of man himself. Supernatural theology is that derived from such special information as God has given by what we commonly call revelation. (2) According to the purpose which it contemplates, into Systematic Theology, also called Didactic or Dogmatic; Polemic or Controversial Theology; and Practical or Experimental Theology. (3) According to the main religious idea associated with it, as Pantheistic Theology, Deistic Theology, Rationalistic Theology, etc. (4) According to the name of its founder, or the race in which it originated or flourishes, as Christian Theology, Judaistic Theology, Mohammedan Theology, etc. (5) According to the sources from which it is derived, into Biblical Theology, Christian Dogmatic Theology, and Ecclesiastical Dogmatics.

Biblical theology consists in the facts of the Bible, harmonized by Scripture comparison, generalized by scriptural theories, crystallized into scriptural doctrines, and so systematized as to show the system of truth taught, to the full extent that it is a system and no farther. As in botany one gathers all the plants of the world and arranges them without attempting to introduce new plants, even to fill up manifest gaps, so biblical theology, duly presented, shows scriptural truth in all the perfection and in all the imperfection with which God has given it.

True biblical theology should always recognize the inspired source whence come its teachings. But, as now technically used, biblical theology refers to the statement and development of doctrine by the various biblical writers, or in other words, to the development of Jewish religious thought without assuming or denying the inspiration of the Bible.

Christian dogmatics is not confined, as is biblical, to the facts and theories and statements of doctrine expressly and formally set forth in the Scriptures. It comprises in addition such philosophical explanations as seem necessary to make a complete and harmonious system. These additions are not necessarily non-scriptural, for they are often the embodiment of the very essence of Bible truth, though not of its formal utterances. They may be as much a part of Scripture as the theory of gravitation is of the revelation of nature. They should never be so far unscriptural as not to be either probable inferences from the word of God or natural explanations of its statements. The more perfectly they accord with that word, and the greater the proportion of its facts which they explain, the more clearly do they establish their own truth and the more forcibly do they demand universal acceptance. Failure

to explain all difficulties or to harmonize all facts does not deprive them of confidence, but only teaches the need of further investigation. Direct opposition, however, to any one scriptural truth is enough to prove the existence of error in any Christian dogmatic statement.

Ecclesiastical dogmatics consists of authoritative statements of doctrine put forth by some body of Christians claiming to be a church of Christ. These are to be found in creeds, symbols, decrees, apologies, and resolutions. They may also appear in the form of authoritative discussions of the creed or system of doctrine of any church.

It thus appears that a perfect system of theology will combine all of these classes. It must be based upon biblical dogmatics which shall have so collected and systematized all the teachings of a full revelation as to be concurrent with the facts and doctrines of Christian dogmatics. The ecclesiastical dogmatics will have gone no farther than fully authorized by the word of God, and therefore will concur with biblical dogmatics, while the fullness of revelation will have left to Christian dogmatics no speculative questions; but in all its discussions it will have been able to attain unto full knowledge of the facts and ascertainment of all the doctrines.

But this concurrence can only be when theology has been reduced to an exact science. This can never be looked for in this life.

What has been said will also serve to show the causes of such wide doctrinal variation. If men came to the study of biblical theology with minds entirely unprejudiced, capable of examining its truths with the same mental powers and with the same amount of study, all would agree as to its facts and doctrines. But this cannot be done. Mental capacities vary. All men have their prejudices. All have not equal time for study, and all use not equally the time that they have. Thus variety is certain even in studying biblical theology.

The same causes increase this in Christian dogmatics, because here the human element enters more largely than in biblical theology; while reverence for antiquity, opposition to change, and the influence of the learned of the past and the present, prevent the alteration of ecclesiastical creeds which embody ecclesiastical dogmatics, and thus lead men constantly to continuance in error and refusal to accept truth.

III. SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

As we have already seen, one of the divisions in the science of theology is designated as "Systematic Theology," sometimes called also Didactic, or Dogmatic, Theology. The designation, *Systematic Theology*, is the one which suggests most clearly the purposes that we have in view. It is open also to less objection than either of the other two.

I. WHY CALLED SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. This designation is given to this branch of theological study because its aim is to present the various doctrines of theology in a *systematic* form. The facts or truths concerning God, as well as those of nature, may be studied as isolated facts or truths, just as they present them-

selves to our attention ; or they may be gathered and arranged with due reference to their relations to each other, so that they will fall into a properly articulated system. Thus to present in systematized form our knowledge of God and of his dealings with his creatures is the chief aim of this work.

2. GENERAL SCOPE OR RANGE OF INQUIRY. In performing the work referred to above we shall be concerned mainly with such questions as the following: Is there a God? Can he be sufficiently known? If so, by what means? What may we know concerning him—as to his own nature, and as to his activities? We shall be especially engaged in considering his dealings with his creatures, and more particularly with his dealings toward our own race, and more particularly still with his dealings with men as sinners. In connection with this last relation we shall study man as a creature of God placed under the government of his moral law, his original condition of innocence and happiness, the manner in which he fell therefrom, and his present state of sinfulness and condemnation and inability for self-rescue. This is Anthropology.

We shall be led also to discuss the nature of the salvation which God has provided as seen in the person and character of Jesus Christ, through whom this salvation has come, and in the works of active and passive obedience, by which he has wrought out reconciliation to God. We will also, in this connection, consider the nature and work of the Holy Spirit, through whom man is led to accept the provisions of God's grace, and to attain through penitence and faith unto a salvation in Christ, which consists in freedom, not from condemnation only, but also from the dominion and defilement of sin, and in attainment of the holiness and happiness of children of the Heavenly Father. This is Soteriology.

Our study will follow man also beyond the death of the body, and take into consideration the future state of both the righteous and the wicked, as well before as after the resurrection of the body, together with the final judgment of both these classes and the heaven and hell which shall be their respective abodes forever. This is Eschatology.

3. ADVANTAGES OF SUCH STUDY. Clearly such study, pursued in a proper spirit, has certain very great advantages in helping to a mastery of the science of theology: (1) We thus ascertain all that nature and the Scriptures teach on each point. (2) We compare all these teachings one with another and are enabled to

define their mutual limitations. (3) We are brought face to face with the fact that our knowledge is bounded by God's revelation, and are led to acknowledge it as its source. (4) We are consequently warned not to omit any of the truth ascertained from any source, nor to add to it anything not properly embraced therein. A departure from this rule will lead into inevitable error. (5) The harmony and consistency which will be found in all God's teachings, from whatever source we may draw them, will become conclusive proof of the divine origin of revelation. This will result, not only from a comparison of what Reason and Nature teach with the revelations of God's word, but of each of the several books of the Bible with the others, and especially of the body of the Old Testament as one book with that of the New Testament as another. (6) We are thus led to value each of the doctrines of the word of God. Each is true. Each has been revealed that it might be believed. We cannot therefore omit any one, because of its forbidding aspect, or its seeming unimportance, or its mysterious nature, or its demand for great personal sacrifice, or its humiliating assertions or requirements, or the free terms upon which it assures of life and salvation.

4. THE SPIRIT WITH WHICH THIS STUDY SHOULD BE PURSUED. Whether the advantages referred to will be reaped or not will depend largely upon the spirit with which our study is pursued. We should come to such a study: (1) With reverence for truth, and especially for the truth taught in the word of God. (2) With earnest prayer for divine help. (3) With careful searching of heart against prejudice. (4) With timidity as to the reception and propagation of new doctrine. (5) With a spirit willing and anxious to examine and to accept whatever we may be convinced is true. (6) With teachable humility, which, knowing that God has not taught us in his word all the truth that exists, not even all the truth on many a single point, accepts with implicit faith all that he has taught and awaits his own time for that more full revelation which shall remove all our present perplexities.

DIVISION FIRST

IS THERE A GOD? OR PROOF OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

IS THERE A GOD?

THE fundamental doctrine of theology is that there is a God. If there is no God, then clearly there can be no theology, or science of God. Our first duty, therefore, will be to consider the reasons that men have for believing that such a being exists. These reasons are generally referred to as "arguments for the existence of God." They may all be grouped and considered under a few main heads, with appropriate subdivisions :

I. ARGUMENT FROM THE WELL-NIGH UNIVERSAL TRADITIONAL BELIEF.¹

Belief in the existence of a God, or gods, has been handed down from parent to child, from generation to generation, through all the known history of the human race.

I. FACT OF THIS WELL-NIGH UNIVERSAL TRADITIONAL BELIEF. (1) There can be no real doubt of the fact that in all ages, and everywhere among men, there has been a practically universal belief in the existence of a God, or gods. This fact has sometimes been called in question. Moffat, the great missionary to Africa, thought that he had found a tribe of people without any conception of a God. But Livingstone afterward corrected this idea. The best scholars are now agreed that there has never been found a race or tribe which did not have some conception of a God. The same ideal of perfection, indeed, has not everywhere been found. Some have gone no farther than to be moved by a sense of the supernatural, and to believe in a power to which they are subject and upon which they depend. But at least this much is to be found even in the lowest forms of fetich worshipers. Others have multiplied the numbers and forms of those toward whom they have felt this sense of dependence, and have accepted the existence of many gods. Some, following too closely the analogy of man's nature, have believed God to be the animating soul of the world. The highest spiritual conception of God has been found only in those nations which have been recipients of his revelation. But the most ancient records show that in the earliest

¹ This section has been almost entirely recast by the reviser.

times and among all men there has been belief in some kind of supernatural being.

So universal has been this belief, that but very few of the millions of the race in all its ages have denied the existence of God. And it has been questioned whether these few have been deceived as to their actual convictions, or have been insincere in their avowal of atheism, because it has seemed so impossible for man not to believe in a God. The firm conviction of mankind in general that this belief is unavoidable in any man in his normal condition, and that its absence is due to some crushing out or erasure of his necessary moral capabilities, is seen not only in the general horror which men have for those who profess atheism, but in the denial to such men of the right to testify in the courts of justice.

(2) There can be almost as little question that this practically universal concurrence of men ought to be ascribed primarily to tradition. Some theologians are unwilling to recognize this fact or to accept it as a cause of the universal belief in God. Some have sought that cause in the idea of God as innate in the mind. Others have simply rested upon other arguments for God's existence, and taken the universal consent of mankind as evidence that this is not an idea unnatural to them, since they have yielded ready assent to the proofs of it commonly given. But a recognition of the traditional teaching will not weaken the argument. Even if it does, it is a fact which must be acknowledged.

In favor of tradition as the primary source of this general belief it may be said: *a.* That this is the natural manner in which every child among us learns about God. Its own questionings, or its parents' convictions of the importance of this knowledge, cause it to be imparted at an early period, and by direct teaching of the fact alone without proof. *b.* Information obtained by travelers, and especially by Christian missionaries, teaches that our own customs agree with those of heathen nations, as they also do with those of Christendom in general. *c.* This accounts for the fact that, while the belief has varied at different times and places, it is held in the same form by almost every one within a single nation at a single period. *d.* The uniformity too, in which it has continued among any one people for many generations, is also proof of traditional origin. *e.* The general existence of it in a purer form the nearer we approach the origin of the race, shows that belief in a God was the primeval belief of man, and has thence been handed down from father to

son, until it has reached our own age and ourselves. *f.* This accounts also for the fact that, when that faith has been corrupted, it has continued in the corrupted form until some new mental or spiritual force has arisen to introduce change, and to give new shape to the belief for some time to come.

2. THE VALUE OF THIS TRADITIONAL BELIEF. The belief thus dependent on traditional teaching is of great value as proof of the truth of this doctrine. (1) Its general prevalence shows that this doctrine is suitable to all mankind. It is one that, though worthy of the wisest thought, is not dependent upon philosophical conceptions, or abstract or logical reasoning for its acceptance. The most ignorant of men have been able to grasp it. It is like that teaching of the Great Master, which "the common people heard gladly." There has been something in it, or connected with it, that has made all men believe it. What this is will be hereafter shown. But the fact that this simple teaching, from father to son, throughout all the ages, has been enough to make it dwell as a powerful and controlling influence in the hearts of the masses of mankind, is strong evidence not only of its truth, but also that it has come from God, whose universal gifts are of this simple nature, suitable to all. (2) That it has come down through all the ages, shows that it has come in contact with all the best thoughts of the wisest of mankind. That in its study the wisest and best, even among the heathen, have approached, in their noblest conceptions of it, to what we believe we have received through the revelation of God, affords a convincing argument, not only in favor of this noblest conception, but of the divine word which reveals it. The least that can be said is, that, after being subjected to every variety of thought and philosophical speculation, this traditional belief has maintained itself as truth, and convincingly withstood every objection that has been brought against it. (3) The continuance of this belief among those whose self-interest, because of sin, would naturally have led them to reject it, is a strong proof of the sincerity with which it has been held, and gives additional weight to each of the points just mentioned.

II. ARGUMENT FROM THE INTUITIVE BELIEF OF MANKIND.

Another, and a still stronger, reason for believing in the existence of God is the fact that belief in his existence seems very clearly to be an intuitive belief in the human mind.

I. WHAT IS MEANT BY INTUITIVE BELIEF. An intuitive belief,

or conviction, is a belief that is self-evident and necessary to the mind that possesses it. In order to be recognized by men generally as intuitive the belief must also be a matter of universal acceptance. Hence we lay down as the proper criteria for an intuitive belief that it must be self-evident, universal, and necessary. For example, the axiom that "a straight line is the shortest distance between two points," is a *self-evident* proposition. It requires no sort of demonstration in order that it be believed. All that is necessary is a simple understanding of the proposition. As soon as intelligent attention is called to it, it is instantly admitted. Its admission is *universal*. Every one who understands the proposition admits it—sees it. This instant seeing, or recognition of the truth of the proposition is also *necessary*. The human mind is so constituted that it cannot help seeing this truth if attention is called to it. Hence we say, the proposition that "a straight line is the shortest distance between two points" is an intuitive belief. It answers to the three criteria of intuitive beliefs. It is self-evident and is universally and necessarily believed.

2. THE FACT OF GOD'S EXISTENCE AN INTUITIVE BELIEF. There can be little question that the fact of God's existence is an intuitive belief or conviction of the human mind. There is indeed more ground for questioning the intuitive character of this belief than there is for questioning the intuitive character of the mathematical axioms. There may also be, as will be shown, less of certainty as to the absolute reliability of the conviction. But a careful observance of the action of the human mind as to this idea, or conviction, will show that it is really an intuitive belief. It will stand any reasonable test by the three criteria just mentioned.

(1) *Self-evident*. A normal human mind needs only to have its attention called to the idea that there is a God, and instantly there is a conviction that it must be true. It may fall into skepticism of a certain sort upon reflection, and even proclaim disbelief. Some minds have so done concerning the mathematical axioms. Yet in spite of such asserted disbelief the normal mind sees these mathematical axioms to be true, and practically it is the same with the idea that there is a God.

(2) *Universal*. Belief in the existence of God will also stand any fair test of its universal acceptance. As already seen, no nation or tribe has ever been found which did not have belief in some sort of god, or gods. It may be said that many cases have

been found of individual atheists. Certainly there have been many who declared themselves to be atheists. But even if such persons were actual atheists this would not overthrow the claim that "by any fair test as to universality the belief in the existence of God is a universal belief." A practical and universal idea of an eye is that it is an organ of vision. And yet there are very many eyes that do not see. But this does not make untrue the real universality of the idea that an eye is an organ of vision. It only shows that there are some eyes in an abnormal condition. Or again, if asked for a universal idea of man, we should say, "He is a rational being." Yet there are many men who show no sign of reason. This, however, does not argue against the universality of the idea that man is a rational being. It only proves that some men are in an abnormal state. So the fact that here and there a man may be found who shows no sign of belief in God does not argue against the claim that belief in the existence of God is a universal belief of the human mind. It only argues that there are some abnormal specimens of humanity.

(3) *A necessary belief.* There is abundant reason also for holding that this belief in the existence of God will stand the test of the third criterion of intuitive truth, that is, that it is a necessary conviction or belief. Many cases of alleged atheism on closer knowledge have proved themselves not to have been cases of atheism at all. Men have proclaimed their atheism, and have in some instances no doubt honestly thought that they were atheists. But when brought face to face with death, or suddenly into some great danger, their real nature has asserted itself, and they have called upon God for deliverance. So numerous and so marked have been cases of this kind that confidence may well be shaken in the reality of all such claims. God has so impressed upon human nature the fact of his existence that it seems impossible for any man to shake or tear himself loose from the conviction. He believes by the very necessity of his being even while he asserts his disbelief.

3. *VALUE OF THE ARGUMENT FROM INTUITIVE BELIEF.* The argument from the fact of intuitive belief in the existence of God is of somewhat different value to different casts of mind. Some are abundantly satisfied with it as proof and think that no other is needed. They say that if the human mind has such an intuitive belief this settles the matter. Nothing can be more certain than what one perceives intuitively. This is undoubtedly true as

to some kinds of intuitions. An intuition of a mathematical truth is absolutely reliable. No amount of demonstration would make one feel any more sure of the fact that "a straight line is the shortest distance between two points." But moral intuitions, or rather intuitions of moral truths or facts, are not of the same certainty. This is at least true as to some moral truths. The truths themselves may be of such a character that they cannot be discerned with the same precision and certainty. Then again, the nature of man has been so affected by sin that the power to see moral truth has been seriously affected. Just as the natural eye may be unable to see with perfect vision, so the eye of the soul may be rendered unable to see what is before it and what it was really formed to see.

At the same time, although the intuitive belief in God's existence may not be so absolutely conclusive as the intuitive belief in a mathematical axiom, there is nevertheless great force in the argument from this intuitive belief. In the first place, the one who is at all conscious of such a conviction has in it a practical proof for himself at least. He may at times question the reliability of his conviction just as one may question at times his eyesight, and wish to verify it by the additional sense of touch. But just as one cannot really help believing what is before his eyes, even though he may have misgivings as to the reliability of his vision, so one who finds himself unable to throw off the conviction that there is a God carries with himself a proof that *he* at least cannot successfully gainsay. And even with those who do not feel a consciousness of such an intuitive belief, the fact that it seems clearly intuitive with the great mass of mankind ought to make them feel strongly the probable reliability of this belief in others. No one who marks a strong instinct even in brutes ever thinks of doubting seriously whether there is an external reality which answers to that instinct. The migratory instinct that sends certain classes of birds toward the south is quite satisfactory proof that there is a condition somewhere to meet that instinct. So the fact that man, in his normal state, is clearly a religious being and has an instinctive and intuitive sense of dependence, and an intuitive idea that there is a superhuman being on whom he is dependent and to whom he owes allegiance, ought to be, even to the man who is not himself conscious of this intuitive feeling, a strong argument for believing in the actual existence of such a being. If this is not true then such a one must believe that nature, which never deceives brute instincts, exists

only to mock the most sacred human instincts, and that the highest order of beings in the world is, of all beings that we know anything about, the one most pitiably duped by his own nature.

III. THE ONTOLOGICAL, OR SO-CALLED A PRIORI ARGUMENT.

Another line of argument, which has force with some minds, is what is called the Ontological, or *a priori* argument.

I. NATURE OF THIS ARGUMENT. An argument *a priori* for the being of God is one "based upon some reason in the nature of things, or some principle cognized by the human mind, by which, independently of any examination of the works of God, we are led to infer his existence." The most celebrated of all the forms of this kind of argument for the existence of God is that which argues his existence from the idea of him in the mind. It is supposed to have been first presented by Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury, England. The following syllogism from Descartes closely resembles the statement of the argument by Anselm, and is simpler and clearer:

"To affirm that any attribute is contained in the nature or conception of a thing is to affirm that such an attribute is true of the thing, and that it is surely contained in it; but necessary existence is contained in the nature and conception of the Deity; therefore, necessary existence is a true attribute of the Deity; or God of necessity exists."

But the clearest and most complete presentation of this argument is given by Bishop Stillingfleet.¹ The following is a mere statement of the syllogistic form presented without the arguments that support it:

"That which we do clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to the nature and essence of a thing may be with truth affirmed of the thing, a clear and distinct perception of a thing in the mind being the greatest evidence we can have of its truth; but we do have a clear and distinct perception that necessity of existence doth belong to the nature of God; therefore, God must exist."

2. VALUE OF THIS ARGUMENT. (1) This argument is understood by many to mean that the mere fact that there is in the

¹ "*Origines Sacrae*," Vol. I., pp. 484-492.

mind a clear conception, or idea, of a thing as real, is proof that the thing is actually real. In other words, the fact that the mind has a clear conception of God as existent is supposed to be proof that God must exist. To any who thus argue it must be answered that the existence in the mind of a mere conception is no proof whatever of an objective reality answering to that conception. The conception of the mind ought to answer, if possible, to the objective reality. But the objective reality is under no sort of obligation to correspond with the mental conception. If so, then any whim of imagination that fastened itself upon any mind might claim that the external reality must correspond to the internal whim.

(2) Some of those, however, who lay most stress upon this kind of argument insist that they "do not contend that every subjective conception must have an objective reality, but only that certain ones must have," such, namely, as are conceived of by the mind as demanding necessarily a corresponding objective reality. It is claimed that the idea of God in the mind is proof of a corresponding objective reality, because, forsooth, this idea of God in the mind is an idea of him as necessarily existent; consequently the mind must believe in him as actually existent. In this form the argument has a value as being a restatement of the argument from intuitive belief. To say that, without any study of creation, men have in their minds a clear idea of God as a being who necessarily exists is only to say that men have an intuitive conception of God's existence. And as has been shown, where such a conviction exists, the mind at least that holds it is bound to accept the existence of God as a fact. But this we insist is only a restatement in a somewhat different form of the argument from intuitive belief. It adds nothing to the proof for God's existence. And, moreover, to the average mind the statement of these so-called *a priori* arguments, instead of being helpful, is confusing and bewildering. Preachers will do well to leave such arguments to the class-room.

IV. A POSTERIORI ARGUMENTS.

A far more helpful line of arguments for the existence of God is what is known as the line of *a posteriori* arguments. By *a posteriori* arguments we mean arguments that proceed from something that is posterior, or later, to that which is prior. An *a posteriori* argument for God's existence is then an argument from certain observed works or effects back to God, as the prob-

able or certain author or cause of these works or effects. They may therefore be briefly designated as arguments from effect to cause. We see about us in the universe certain things that impress us as effects—as having been brought about or effected. We examine these things, and are led by our study of them to believe that they are effects, and that there is somewhere an adequate cause for their existence. The many sorts of effects, or supposed effects, have caused the so-called *a posteriori* arguments, or arguments from effect to cause, to divide themselves into various branches or subdivisions, each one adding something to the preceding as we ascend from the simplest to the highest. These various branches or subdivisions that we will specially notice are the following: (I) THE ARGUMENT FROM SIMPLE CHANGE. (II) THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. (III) THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. (IV) THE ARGUMENT FROM HISTORY. All of these arguments in their last analysis are simply arguments from effect to cause. They all recognize what are clearly effects, and they lead us to believe in some kind of an adequate cause for the observed effects. For the sake of brevity and clearness we will state these arguments in syllogistic form, and observe a uniform treatment of them.

(I) THE ARGUMENT FROM SIMPLE CHANGE.

1. ARGUMENT STATED. All changes demand an adequate cause, or causes. The universe shows constant changes. Therefore, the universe demands an adequate cause, or causes.

2. ARGUMENT TESTED. (1) *The major premise*, "All changes demand an adequate cause, or causes," really needs no proof. It is an intuitive conviction. The opposite does violence to reason also. Universal experience also verifies the fact. So far as any test has ever been made, it has been found that for every change there is an adequate cause. (2) *The minor premise*, "The universe shows constant changes," will also be readily granted by every one. It is a matter of every day and constant observation. (3) The conclusion inevitably follows: For these changes there must be somewhere an adequate cause, or adequate causes.

3. VALUE OF THIS ARGUMENT. (1) It is valid as proving a cause, or causes, adequate to all the changes that occur. (2) It does not prove necessarily that there is only one great cause. So far as this argument is concerned, there may be many causes which combine for the production of these changes. (3) It does not prove an original Creator, at least not until an original creation is proved. This argument simply proves an adequate cause,

or adequate causes, for all known changes. (4) It does not prove an intelligent cause. In order to prove this we must show design in the observed changes. This design will be shown in the next argument. (5) It does not prove an infinite cause. It only proves adequate causation for the various changes. But the changes are all finite, and infinite power is not necessarily postulated for finite effects.

(II) TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

This is the argument that proves an adequate cause, not only for the changes in the universe, but also for the evident results of design that appear in connection with these changes.

1. ARGUMENT STATED. Whatever gives proof of design must have had a designer. The universe gives proofs of design. Therefore, the universe must have had a designer.

2. ARGUMENT TESTED. (1) *Major premise*. This needs no proof. It is axiomatic. It cannot possibly be otherwise. To say that anything gives proof of design is to say that it must have had a designer. (2) *Minor premise*. "The universe gives proof of design." This is of course denied by the atheist. It may be denied by certain atheistical scientists. But to any practical mind its proof is seen on every hand.

a. The marvelous order and arrangement of the universe proves it. The human mind naturally believes, when it sees things peculiarly and regularly adjusted, that there was some designing mind that so ordered it. One could not believe that millions of printed letters, or loose slips, blown by the wind, could by any means chance to fall into an orderly arranged book. It is almost as difficult for a practical mind to believe that there ever was a possibility that the countless atoms which make up the universe could have come into their marvelous order except as so arranged by a designing mind.

b. The marvelous adaptations in the universe are still stronger proof of this premise. Not only is there a wonderful order everywhere manifest, but there are in connection with this order such adaptations of the various parts, one to another, that it is practically impossible to doubt that these were designed by an intelligent mind. These adaptations are stronger proof of a designing cause than mere order or arrangement, because adaptation is a more complicated process and demands still more imperatively an explanation. True, there may be found here and there a remarkable adaptation where there was no antecedent purpose concerning it. A crooked stick may sometimes show a remarkable fit-

ness for some special use. And it may be purely accidental that it is so. But it is simply unreasonable and preposterous to a practical mind that the almost infinite and oftentimes most delicate and marvelous adaptations of such a universe could have occurred without the management of some designing cause.

3. VALUE OF THIS ARGUMENT. (1) It is for all practical minds a very convincing argument for the existence of a cause adequate to the production of everything that shows marks of design. (2) It proves also that this cause must have intelligence; for only an intelligent mind can really exercise purpose or design. (3) Hence it proves also personality in the designer. (4) It does not prove, however, an original creator of all things. For a designing mind could possibly have produced the same results if he had found the raw materials ready at hand. (5) Neither does it prove an infinite cause; for the results are all finite. (6) It does prove, however, a cause of incomprehensible greatness and wisdom, whose ways are to us past finding out.

(III) THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

This is the argument from the existence of man. It regards man as an effect and demands an adequate cause for the existence of such a being.

1. ARGUMENT STATED. Everything that has had a beginning must have had an adequate cause. Man has had a beginning. Therefore man has had an adequate cause.

2. ARGUMENT TESTED. (1) The major premise is the same practically as the major premise in the argument from "simple change," already considered. It needs no further notice. (2) The minor premise, "man has had a beginning," has as little need of proof. Our own history and the history of the race sufficiently establish this. (3) Therefore the conclusion that there must be somewhere an adequate cause for the existence of man on the earth inevitably follows.

3. VALUE OF THIS ARGUMENT. (1) It proves the existence of a cause adequate to the production of man's whole nature. (2) It involves that a cause adequate to this result must be an intelligent, personal, and moral being. For with practical minds an effect cannot be considered as greater than its cause. (3) It does not, however, involve an original creator of the materials from which man is made. (4) Neither does it prove infinity of power in the cause; for man is only a finite creature.

(IV) ARGUMENT FROM HISTORY, OR PROVIDENCE.

This argument shows that there must be an adequate cause

for the strange history of the universe in which we live—that nothing less than a superintending and overruling Providence can sufficiently account for what has occurred.

I. ARGUMENT STATED. If the affairs of the universe are too great and too complicated to be explained by natural causes, there must be somewhere a supernatural cause or supernatural causes adequate to the results.

The affairs of the universe have been and are too great and too complicated to be explained by natural causes. Therefore there must be somewhere a supernatural cause or supernatural causes adequate to the results.

2. ARGUMENT TESTED. (1) The major premise does not need proof, it is only another way of stating the axiom, "every effect must have an adequate cause." (2) The minor premise, "the affairs of the universe have been and are too great and too complicated to be explained by natural causes," requires proof. This proof, in the nature of the case, can only be moral evidence, and it will be more satisfactory to some minds than to others. Those scientists who are wedded to evolution, and who insist on being agnostic as to anything higher than the known laws of so-called nature, will not feel the force of the evidence for a constant supernatural providence over the universe. But men who allow human nature to assert itself and hold themselves open to all forms of evidence, physical, metaphysical, historical, moral, and religious, are all impressed with the belief that

There's a divinity that shapes our ends,
Rough-hew them how we will.

a. They see evidence for a superhuman management of the universe in all the realm of natural history. And this they see not only in a general responsibility for all change and in a marvelous system of design in bringing things into being, but also in a continued upholding and management of creation. In this respect, as well as in the first production of things, "the heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork." To any reasonable mind law means a lawgiver; and law in operation means an executive power; and especially does law which holds and guides to intelligent and definite ends, causing all things in a vast universe to work together in perfect system and order—such law so working compels an unsophisticated observer to believe that in God such a system moves as well as has its being.

b. But especially from the history of the human race, and more especially still from the history of individual lives, is there borne in upon any unprejudiced mind the conviction that there is a God who rules in the affairs of men. What a jumble the affairs of men must inevitably soon present if no one were looking after them, or rather, in *pro-vidence*, looking before them and for them.¹ It has been well said that even the mailing of our letters and the public travel upon the highways are proof of a supernatural regulation of the affairs of men. How does it happen that these are so distributed? "Why does it never occur that all letters are mailed on one day of the week? What if all this traveling public should be moved to go upon the same day!" So too it is almost impossible to believe that in the strange working out of the fate and destiny of nations it is not, as the very words imply, a working out of what has been decreed (*fatum*) and pre-destined, that is, *pro-vided*. But the sense of a supernatural governing power is felt most of all when we take our own personal lives into account. The stubborn and willful spirit may refuse to believe that any power except his own will and natural strength has shaped his course. But the humble spirit that reviews his past and regards his present can hardly force his mind to doubt that somehow his life has been in hands other than his own. He is fairly forced by his experience, by the fine interventions, by the shapings contrary to his own purpose, by the overpowering circumstances which he could not control, by the almost unmistakable evidence oft repeated—he is fairly forced by all these things to believe in divine supervision; to say with one who wrote more divinely far than Shakespeare: "Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea; even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me. . . Thou hast possessed my reins: thou hast covered me in my mother's womb."

3. VALUE OF THIS ARGUMENT. (1) As already suggested, this argument is very strong with some minds. It has little weight with others. Whether it has weight or not depends much on the subjective state of the one to whom it is presented. It is perhaps possible to be too partial toward it; it is certainly possible to be too biased against it. (2) To those who feel its force it

¹ *Vor-sehung* and *Fürsehung*.

argues the existence of a God of marvelous intelligence and power—little if anything short of infinite knowledge and wisdom and power. (3) It does not, however, prove absolute infinity. (4) Neither does it prove an original Creator. It only calls for a great superhuman governor.

[In addition to the foregoing argument the author presents an argument for God's existence founded upon the fact of miracles, and another founded upon the existence of the Bible.

I. In his argument from miracles he claims that, without any reference to the inspiration of the Bible, its testimony to the actual occurrence of miracles is entirely sufficient, and ought to be received. He undertakes to show the groundlessness of the objections to miracles. And believing as he does in the sufficiency of the evidence that miracles have occurred, he claims that they are a proof of the existence of God.

The value of this argument with any one depends entirely upon the question whether the testimony for the miracles is accepted. The Bible has, in all cases where it could be tested, proved itself such a reliable witness, that the author may justly claim that, apart from any thought of its inspiration, its testimony for miracles is sufficient. And to all who agree with him in this, the argument from miracles is satisfactory, and confirmatory of the other arguments. For the value of the Bible as a witness, see below.

II. The author's argument "from the contents of a book we call the Bible, which claims to have come from God," is to the effect, that the contents of the Bible show clearly a supernatural origin, and so "prove the existence of a mind above nature." The supernatural origin is shown, he thinks, especially in the prophecies of the book, events being predicted by its writers long periods before they took place. Many of these were even minutely described as to their nature, locality, persons, times, circumstances, and causes. He finds proof of its supernatural origin also more especially in its presentation of Jesus Christ as its central figure. "Perfect unity of purpose is seen throughout. In the beginning we see but dimly what is taught, and catch but feebly the outlines of the plot; but as we progress it grows upon us as a genuine creation. Whatever was at first dim is cleared up by the final record and as we begin to read it over once more, its perfect unity, its exactness of detail without superfluity, its development in the far future of the importance of facts which at first were

only casually stated, as though of no special importance, its skillful interweaving of the minor characters and events, and its use of them in all their fullness to bring on the final catastrophe and its results, the great power with which the theme is handled, the majestic simplicity which everywhere pervades it, all show a master artist creating a character and work, through the instrumentality of writers so numerous, of such different capacities, under such various circumstances, with such manifest unity, as proclaims the mind of God, which alone could conceive of such a character and work, and which alone could thus reveal it to man, as he alone could create the real persons and events which embody the idea presented." The value of this argument also will depend almost entirely upon the subjective state of the one to whom it is presented. One who feels the force of it must first have accepted these claims for the Bible. Whoever will be convinced that the Bible shows a supernatural origin will of course be convinced that there is a God.]

V. ARGUMENT FROM DIRECT TESTIMONY.

In addition to all these arguments for the existence of God, there is a line of direct testimony which ought to be considered in any fair examination of the evidence.

[(I) TESTIMONY OF THE BIBLE.

1. ITS RIGHT TO BE HEARD. Whatever may be thought of the book which is called the Bible, it at least offers itself as a witness for the existence of God. No claim is made now as to its supernatural origin. It is introduced simply as a witness that offers to testify. This idea has not had sufficient attention from those who have marshaled the evidence for the existence of God. There seems to have been a dread of the charge that to argue from such testimony would be to argue in a circle. So it would be if it were claimed that the Bible is inspired, and then an effort made to argue from its inspiration. But all that is proposed here is that, as the Bible claims to be a witness, it be put upon the witness stand and allowed to testify, and its testimony taken for just what it is worth. It is only fair that this should be done. Not to allow this would be to exclude a most positive and important witness. No witness testifies so directly and so clearly and so positively to the existence of God as does this book.

2. VALUE OF THIS TESTIMONY. With one who has observed the general trustworthiness of the Bible, its positive and clear testi-

mony ought to have great weight. No witness has ever passed through so terrible an ordeal of examination and cross-examination as has this book. Every conceivable effort has been made to impeach its veracity, and yet it is safe to say that no witness has ever gone through examination and cross-examination with better credit for veracity. No witness has ever better established a right to be heard. When, therefore, the Bible testifies as it does to the existence of God, and its writers declare that they know whereof they affirm, and show their aversion to every kind of false witness, surely fair-minded persons ought to give weight to its statement. To reject its testimony upon this point would be to condemn it utterly. For if it is false here, it is false everywhere. This is the basal fact for all that it says.]

(II) TESTIMONY OF JESUS CHRIST.

With many persons there is yet another crowning evidence for the existence of God. It is direct evidence in and from the historical Christ. He is to them God personally manifested in the flesh. There is to them no possibility of accounting for this being except that he is very God. The idea that the fishermen of Galilee could have invented or devised such a character surpasses their power of belief. It is far easier to believe in his real existence. And to believe in the fact of his real existence is to have proof of the existence of God. For as certainly as he existed, so certainly did he claim to be God.

Here we rest the case for the existence of God, so far as a marshaling of the arguments is concerned. These are not by any means all the reasons or arguments for believing in such an existence. They do seem, however, sufficient to warrant in any sane mind a settled assurance upon this point, sufficient also to enable any one to give a satisfactory "reason for the hope that is in him." It is not claimed that all of these arguments are of equal value. It is not claimed that every one of them must have force with every class of mind. It is not claimed that any one of them, or all of them combined, can be held to demonstrate with mathematical certainty the fact of God's existence. But it is claimed that the cumulative force of all these arguments together is such as to make it morally impossible for a sound mind to give them due consideration, and in spite of them *all* to say, "There is no God." The Bible, which is so given to calling things by their right names, says unhesitatingly and bluntly: "The *fool* hath said in his heart, There is no God."

DIVISION SECOND

CAN GOD BE KNOWN? AND IF SO, HOW?

CHAPTER I. CAN GOD BE KNOWN?

WE have now considered the arguments for the existence of God. We have seen that the evidence is abundant to satisfy any unprejudiced mind. The next question of importance is, *Can God be known?* It is perfectly conceivable that God might exist, and that we might have no knowledge whatever of him, and no means for gaining such knowledge. In that case we would not know anything about our relations to him, and we could not tell whether he cared for us or not, nor whether we owed anything to him except our bare existence. We should have a sense hardly short of being orphans in the universe. Strange to say, there have been some who have insisted that God cannot be known. The following objections have been urged to the possibility of knowing God :

I. GOD IS THE ABSOLUTE, THE INFINITE, THE UNCONDITIONED.

To the idea that God can be known it has been objected that, if there is a God, he must be the Absolute, the Infinite, the Unconditioned. And, therefore, he cannot be an object of comprehension to us whose nature is finite, and whose mode of existence is only relative, finite, and conditioned. To this it may be answered, that the objection presents its own refutation. How do we know that if there is a God he must be such? In whatever way we know this, we know at least this much of God, that he must be the Absolute, the Infinite, the Unconditioned. We know this much of the nature which must be his, and upon the first evidence of his existence have the right to attribute to him all that is therein contained. The characteristics thus ascribed to him, reveal him, therefore, to us as an infinite existence, without other limitations than are found in his own nature or essence, who, as Absolute, cannot be dependent, but must be the source and sovereign of all else; and, as the Unconditioned, he cannot be subject to time and space and matter, and must therefore exist without possibility of growth or increase, and without that succession of periods, such as yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow, and those measures of space and location which belong to matter. The God, therefore, who is thus proclaimed to be unknowable is

at least known as a self-existent spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in all the perfections that belong to his nature. Let but the least evidence appear that there is a God, and at once this nature may be ascribed to him.

The recognition and contemplation of such a being, though his other perfections are unknown, awaken reverence and fear and the conviction of the littleness and dependence of man which enter so largely into the sense of the supernatural and lead men everywhere, when in danger or distress, to call upon God, though not moved to prayer by any promise of answers thereto.

II. KNOWLEDGE OF GOD ONLY PARTIAL AND INSUFFICIENT.

Again it is objected that though we might learn something of God, yet we can attain to only partial knowledge of him, and that the knowledge attainable is not sufficient to make us know and comprehend him as a true object of worship and service. In answer to this objection we reply :

I. AS TO PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE. (1) If by this is meant that we cannot know the essential nature of God, it proceeds upon a principle upon which we can know nothing, for we do not know the essential nature of anything. We know not even the nature of our own essence. We cannot know that of any existent being or substance, not indeed of the smallest atom of matter. We can only judge what it must be from the qualities it is perceived to possess, or from its outward manifestations. In like manner we can discover something of the nature of God from the different ways in which he has manifested himself in ourselves and in the universe.

(2) If it is claimed that we cannot know him because his nature may be or must be wholly different from ours, the natural answer is that we do know many things which differ greatly from the mind which takes cognizance of them. Thus our own bodies, though purely material, are known through our mental faculties, and yet we believe mind and matter to be essentially diverse. We comprehend also our modes of existence, and those of other objects in time and space, though these modes are essentially different from the things which exist in them.

Besides, until we know what God is, we cannot be sure that he is in all respects different from ourselves. If there are any points of similarity, we can know him so far as these exist ; and, if it is true that we have been made, in any respect, in the likeness and image of God, our knowledge of God may approach at

least to such completeness as to enable us to recognize his more manifest perfections, and to perceive that because of these he ought to be revered and worshiped.

Guided by the analogy of our own natures, we expect to find in him a personal, conscious, intelligent, and moral being, and this expectation is confirmed by the manifestations of his presence and operations in the universe. This teaching of analogy is not worthless because it has led some to believe also that God has a material body, as has man. Analogy does not furnish proof, but only probability; in some instances only possibilities. It does not show what God is, but what he may be. That which it suggests is confirmed or denied by other sources of knowledge. But we are so far taught through its aid that we learn that God must either be a spirit, such as we are, or that he must have a higher nature to which belong all those attributes of spirit which constitute conscious personality and intelligent purpose.

(3) Does the objection mean that we cannot know God because we cannot come in contact with him through the senses as we do with our fellow-men, and cannot learn his nature through his conduct and personal action as we do theirs? But it is not only through personal contact with men that we know that they are, and what they are; we both know and judge of them by their works, though we have never seen or known them personally. In like manner through our senses are we brought into contact with God, who, though not material, is an artificer in material things, and has displayed before us, in the universe around, the evidences of his wisdom, power, and goodness. Surely so great a structure as this, which manifests a grasp of thought and a power of performance so wonderfully beyond that of any human being, and a minuteness of detail and execution and finish, the limitations of which defy discovery through the most powerful microscope that man has ever made, shows that it has been fashioned, if not created, by some being of personal purposing skill and power immeasurably beyond anything that we can possibly conceive.

(4) Is it asserted that the outward phenomena of the universe cannot give such mental and spiritual knowledge of God as is essential to our apprehension and worship of him? Even were this true, we get that knowledge through our own spiritual and mental operations. We find in ourselves consciousness of existence, of thought, and of purpose, and thus learn not only what these are in other intelligent beings, but that they must exist in every being whose nature is as high as, or higher than, that of

man. We perceive that the mind is governed by laws no less binding and effective, no less regular and permanent, than those of matter. In the study of these we learn the nature of mind and spirit, not by direct apprehension of their essences, but, as in matter, by indirectly apprehending them through their phenomena. That nature we ascribe to the Divine Mind and Spirit. The differences of mental and spiritual capacities in men convince us that there are degrees greater or less in mental and spiritual natures. Hence we assign to God mind and spirit in the highest degree, because as their author he must himself be greater than all his mental and spiritual creations.

But, in addition to this, we have a peculiar source of information. We find our minds capable of intuitive knowledge. Some abstract principles need only to be understood, and the conviction that they are true immediately follows. That "the whole is greater than any one of its parts" is perceived as soon as understood, as it is likewise that "a thing cannot be, and not be, at the same time." Whence is this knowledge? We say that the mind is so constituted that it cannot believe otherwise. Who has so constituted it? It must proceed from some one upon whose veracity we rely, when we accept what our nature teaches. But, if it proceeds from any one, then there is a creating mind, and that mind operates directly upon mind without the intervention of matter, and thus teaches us truth. When, then, we find other convictions of like nature relative to our dependence upon a higher being, our obligations of duty to him, our sense of right and wrong, and the duty to do the right and not to do the wrong, we cannot avoid believing that these intuitions come from the same source, and are his instructions to us as to his nature and our moral relations and duties to him.

2. AS TO SUFFICIENCY OF THIS PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE. While our knowledge of God must necessarily be thus partial, yet partial knowledge is actual knowledge as far as it goes. And there is no foundation for the claim that the knowledge which we may have of God is not sufficient for purposes of actual worship and service simply because it is partial. Just as a child only partially knows its parent, or a subject his sovereign, yet knows enough for the recognition of dependence and the duties of obedience and love, so also as to the Heavenly Father, the King of kings; although we can only know him in part, we know enough to lead us to revere his sovereign power and gratefully adore his fatherly affection. We say, therefore:

(1) *With the agnostics*, that God cannot be fully known. The questions of Zophar have been, with full reverence for God and earnest worship for such a one as it is believed he must be, the language of the pious of all ages: "Canst thou by searching find out God? canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is as high as heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than hell; what canst thou know?" (Job 11 : 7, 8.) Elihu is represented as saying: "Behold, God is great, and we know him not" (Job 36 : 26). And Job, after his description of God's acts of power, declared: "Lo, these are but the outskirts of his ways: And how small a whisper do we hear of him! But the thunder of his power who can understand?" (Job 26 : 14.) The psalmist, referring to the omniscience and omnipresence of God, cried out: "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high, I cannot attain unto it" (Ps. 139 : 6).

(2) *Against the agnostics*, that the partial knowledge of God which has been attained by men is actual and important knowledge, and not some mere inferior conception of him, and that it is abundantly sufficient for all the practical purposes of worship and service. God said through Jeremiah: "I will give them an heart to know me, that I am the Lord" (Jer. 24 : 7); and again: "They shall all know me from the least of them unto the greatest of them" (Jer. 25 : 34). Our Lord himself, in his prayer to the Father, referring to those given to him, that to them he should give eternal life, declares: "This is life eternal, that they should know thee, the only true God and him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ" (John 17 : 3). The apostle who recorded this prayer uses this language: "He that knoweth God heareth us" (1 John 4 : 6); and also: "He that loveth not, knoweth not God" (1 John 4 : 8).

The Bible also, therefore, plainly teaches that God may be known, and so known as to be truly worshiped.

CHAPTER II. HOW GOD MAY BE KNOWN, OR THE TWO REVELATIONS.

We have now considered the proofs for the existence of God. We have seen also that God may be sufficiently known. The next important question in our study is, How may God be known? What means have we for gaining a knowledge of him? To those who believe in the existence of God, two kinds of revelation of him are possible. The first of these is the revelation

of himself in his works, "The heavens declare the glory of God," It cannot be that God can have made such a creation as that which is about us, and not, at the same time, have shown to his rational creatures something of himself. Hence another writer has well said: "The invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and Godhead." The revelation of God thus gathered by the unaided reason from the works of God is sometimes designated as a revelation of REASON. It may be more properly called a revelation of Nature. The reason discerns it and weighs it just as it does any other kind of knowledge.

Besides this means for knowing God there is also the possibility of knowing him by means of a direct and supernatural manifestation or revelation of himself. We say here the *possibility of knowing him* thus. The *fact* of his having so revealed himself will be considered later. But whether the fact be satisfactorily maintained or not, there is clearly a possibility that God should thus make himself known by direct communication with his creatures. If not, then he must be less resourceful in imparting knowledge than are the intelligent creatures of his hand. This means for knowing God is usually designated simply as REVELATION.

I. REASON, OR THE REVELATION OF NATURE.

1. MAY GIVE THE SIMPLER FACTS. It is manifest that the knowledge of God which may be obtained from nature by our own unaided reason must be abundant to teach man the simpler facts upon which rests his duty to God, namely, that there is a God to whom he owes his existence, and consequently reverence, service, and love, and whose greatness and goodness enforce this obligation; also to show him that that duty has not been discharged and that he has not the disposition to discharge it; and consequently to render him uneasy in his relations to God, and anxious to appease him and to secure some assurance of his pardon and approval. It has also been thought by many that through reason alone man may attain to the conviction of immortality and of a future state of rewards and punishments.

2. THIS KNOWLEDGE NOT SUFFICIENT. But however abundant may be the information thus conveyed to man, it is nevertheless clear that his knowledge in these directions must still remain very imperfect. This must have been true of man even in a

state of innocence. His finite nature and the finite conditions which surrounded him must still have left him ignorant upon many desirable matters. But this imperfection must have been greatly increased by any subsequent fall from innocence. By this the perceptions of right and wrong would be dimmed, the power of conscience to enforce the right would be impaired, the desire to do the right would be diminished, prejudices against the right would be created, and affection for God would be greatly decreased, if not entirely obliterated.

Upon these grounds we may infer the necessity for some further source of knowledge of God and of his will with respect to man.

II. SUPERNATURAL REVELATION.

I. HAVE WE ANY SUCH THING? Here we are confronted by the question whether God has really given a direct revelation concerning himself. And this question ought to be settled in every one's mind before he enters upon a study of what is supposed to be revelation.¹

(1) *Antecedent probabilities.* That it is not improbable may be inferred from the fact that God has already made himself known to us in various ways in ourselves and in nature. If we need further revelation we may hope for it.

The only reason to the contrary is that we have sinned against God, and he may have chosen to abandon us to our fate. But this is not so truly understood until revelation has confirmed our conviction of our sinful estate. On the other hand, the favors which God still bestows, and the means of continued knowledge of him which he affords, indicate that he has not yet consigned us to our deserved fate, and that he may have purposes of mercy toward us.

That which renders it highly probable is the expectation seen in man, in the conceptions he has formed of God, as one to be propitiated by sacrifices and approached with prayer.

[(2) *Positive proof.* a. Existence of the Bible. There exists in the world a very remarkable book, called the Bible, which claims for itself that it is a direct, supernatural revelation from God. There can be no doubt in the mind of any one who reads

¹ There is not the same necessity for a consideration of this subject here that exists for such consideration in most text-books in theology, since the subject of inspiration, for special reasons, has been remanded in this special seminary to the department of Biblical Introduction.

this book that it makes such a claim. Always, everywhere, from beginning to end, its cry is, "Hear the word of the Lord," "Thus saith the Lord," "The Lord spake unto his servant," "The Lord hath sent his servant," "The Lord commanded his servant," etc., etc.

b. Trustworthiness of this claim. (*a*) If this claim made by the Bible is false then it is one of the worst books in existence. Its mission is only deception from beginning to end. For it bases its entire right to be heard upon its claim to be thus from God. If we cannot trust its testimony upon this point, we cannot trust its testimony or its teaching upon any point. Its pleas for truth and honesty and righteousness would have to be regarded as the vaporings of hypocrisy and wickedness. But the whole character of the book is a perfect answer against any such conception of it. No book has ever been found more reliable whenever its statements could be tested. It carries upon its face everywhere the verisimilitude of truth. Its own testimony is with most persons who read it an all-sufficient evidence of its truthfulness. (*b*) The power of those who wrote the book to impress upon their contemporaries and those who followed them, faith in this claim of supernatural origin is also very strong testimony to the reliability of the claim. If men could thus in the name of truth and honesty impose falsehood and wickedness upon mankind, with no possibility of exposure even as the ages passed by, it would indicate a practical uselessness of investigation and a possibility of imposture that would be boundless and utterly discouraging to those who cry after truth. (*c*) The best of all endorsements for the claim of the Bible to supernatural origin is that given by Jesus when he was upon earth. There can be no doubt that such a person as Jesus Christ lived. It does not need an inspired book to establish that fact any more than it does an inspired book to establish the fact that Julius Cæsar lived. It is also certain that Jesus must have been such a person as he is represented to have been. Otherwise his character was an invention of unlearned fishermen, which is harder to believe than that he actually lived. And when once the life and character of Jesus are accepted as historical then we have his endorsement of the Bible as a revelation from God as the strongest possible testimony to the fact. The Old Testament is as a check or note filled up, upon which he has written his endorsement. The New Testament is as a check or form of note, in blank, upon which he has written his signature beforehand,

with special authority given to his apostles to fill it from the "all things" which he had said to them, which things the Holy Spirit would bring to their remembrance. (*d*) The testimony of the apostles that what they wrote was the word of the Lord and spoken as directed by God assures us that what they wrote was of special divine origin. (*e*) The acceptance of the entire Bible by the churches and by the most learned and most critical of all ages as the inspired word of God, and the utter failure of skeptics and infidel critics to break it down, all this is sufficient to make us feel that we cannot be mistaken when we receive this book as a divine revelation. (*f*) Moreover, to one who will study the book, in sympathy with the high and holy doctrines which it teaches, the internal evidence that it is what it claims to be is overwhelming and carries irresistible conviction. (*g*) Unless the book is utterly false and untrustworthy those who first received it had a testimony of miracles such as is not vouchsafed to us, "God also bearing them witness both with signs and wonders and with divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost." ^{1]}

2. CHARACTER OF THIS REVELATION. (1) We may argue *a priori* as to the character of this revelation as follows: *a*. It must come from God, the source of all our other knowledge. No other could give it, and it is fit that no other should do so. *b*. It must be suited to our present condition, confirming the truth already known, and teaching what is practically useful to man as a sinner before God. *c*. It must be secured from all possibility of error, so that its teachings may be relied on with equal, if not greater, confidence than those of reason. *d*. It must come with authority, claiming and proving its claim to be the word of God, who has the right to command, and to punish those who disobey his commands; with authority also, in order that men may with confidence believe and trust the promises and hopes of pardon and peace it may hold out. *e*. It may be expected that it will be accompanied by difficulties and mysteries, since these are found frequently attending the knowledge derived from reason.

(2) It will appear, as we proceed in our study of the Bible, that it meets and more than meets all these expectations. "The law of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul: the testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple. The precepts of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart: the commandment of the

¹ We cannot undertake here to go into a consideration of the question of inspiration. This belongs to another department in the seminary course.

Lord is pure, enlightening the eyes. The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring for ever: the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether. More to be desired are they than gold, yea than much fine gold: sweeter also than honey and the honey-comb."

III. THE RELATION OF REASON AND REVELATION TO EACH OTHER.

A supernatural revelation, such as we have described, having been given and proved, another question arises: What is the relation which reason and this revelation must bear toward each other?

I. THE ATTITUDE OF REVELATION TO REASON. (1) Revelation must recognize that reason is the first revelation, and is consequently presupposed in any other. (2) It must recognize that the facts of reason cannot be denied by any subsequent revelation. No truth can destroy other truth. (3) It may, however, go far beyond reason. The doctrines of which reason may judge are those only which come within its sphere. Upon the presentation of a new doctrine reason may decide whether it agrees with former knowledge. If agreeable thereto, it must be accepted, if opposed, it must be rejected. But, if the new doctrine be above reason, it must stand or fall with the rest of the revelation. God may in his mercy refrain from trying faith by a revelation of supernatural doctrine, but if he reveals it, it must be no barrier to the reception of that doctrine itself, or of the revelation which accompanies it.¹

2. THE ATTITUDE OF REASON TO REVELATION. The office of reason with respect to revelation is: (1) To examine the evidence of the miracles upon which it rests. (2) To compare its doctrines with the teaching of the past, and recognize their correspondence with or opposition to that teaching. (3) To adopt or reject the revelation according to the evidence afforded that it is God's truth. (4) To interpret its contents according to the best light which learning affords.

¹ In an able article in the "Southern Presbyterian Review," Vol. I., pp. 1-34, on "Reason and Revelation," Dr. Thornwell puts this limitation upon reason, that it is sole arbiter within its own bounds, but no judge beyond them. He thinks that in this way only can it be applied as a test of doctrine. The theory is undoubtedly correct. It fails only in not recognizing the precise manner in which Scripture brings it in as an arbiter, not as the judge of truth as disconnected from the past, but as related to the various times and forms in which God has taught it. Reason should judge a new revelation, not by the truths taught by reason alone, but also by those which have been made known in any previous revelation.

DIVISION THIRD

WHAT MAY BE KNOWN OF GOD

PART I

CONCERNING GOD'S ESSENTIAL NATURE

WE have now considered the arguments that prove the existence of God. We have considered also the question whether it is possible for us to know God sufficiently well for us to worship and serve him intelligently. Having answered this question in the affirmative, we next asked as to the available means for thus knowing God. We saw that for this we have two revelations, one the revelation which God has made of himself in the book of nature; the other the revelation in the book called the Bible. We come next to what is the main division of our study, and proceed to ask concerning the knowledge of God that may be gained through these available means. In other words, *what may we know of God?*

All that we can know of God may be divided into two parts or sections, namely, what may be known of God's essential nature, and what may be known of his activities. Each of these, as we shall see, may be again divided and subdivided. We will take up first the study of God's essential nature. Our first inquiry will be as to his mode of existence, or general nature. We will then study his attributes, or special character.¹

¹ It is not so usual for theologians to recognize this distinction between God's "*mode of existence*" and his attributes as it is to recognize certain other distinctions. It seems proper, however, to separate between that which determines the *kind of being in general* and that which must be regarded as only *characteristic* of this generic being. It is a *being of some sort* that has *attributes*. For want of a better term we speak of that which determines the sort, or kind, or genus, of being under the heading, "*Mode of Being*."

BOOK I. GOD'S MODE OF BEING

CHAPTER I. SPIRITUALITY OF GOD

To the question, "What mode or kind of being is God?" the answer is: He is a triune spirit. 1. He is pure spirit. 2. He is the one God. 3. He has also a three-fold distinction of nature which causes him to be recognized as one God in three persons: the generic qualities of nature which cause God to be thus recognized as one, and at the same time three, are usually referred to as God's unity and trinity. We will consider each of these features in God's mode of existence, or being. This chapter will be devoted to a consideration of God's spirituality.

God's spirituality has been classified by some theologians as one of his attributes. This has possibly arisen from the two-fold sense in which the word spirituality has been used. It is sometimes used as descriptive of character, when it means that that character is exalted to an extraordinary degree above the fleshly appetites and passions, and devoted to spiritual affairs. In this sense spirituality would be an attribute of character, and therefore of the person possessing that character. But when spirituality is spoken of with reference to God, it is used in the sense in which man is spoken of as a spiritual as well as material being. It has reference to God's mode of existence. It is declarative of God as possessing a spiritual nature in the sense that his nature is that of a spirit. It is, therefore, a simple declaration of what his nature is, and not a statement of an attribute of that nature. It is, consequently, no more to be classed among the attributes of God than is his unity, or his triunity.

I. THE SPIRITUALITY OF GOD PROVED.

In proving the spirituality of God we will prove not only that God has a spiritual nature, but that he is pure spirit, without outward form, or material organization.

I. THE ONE GOD HAS UNDOUBTEDLY A SPIRITUAL NATURE.

(1) He is the creator of spirits. But spirit is the highest order of existence and its creator must himself have the nature which belongs to that order. (2) The creation and government of the

world give evidence of wisdom, skill, knowledge, and purpose; but these are attributes of spirit. God therefore must have a spiritual nature. (3) We arrive at the idea of the perfect being by the exclusion of all imperfection and the ascription of all perfection. But spiritual nature is in every respect a quality of a perfect being. Therefore we ascribe it to God. (4) The Scriptures ascribe a spiritual nature to God. It is involved in the abundant language about the Spirit of God, in which, however, reference is had distinctively to the third person in the Trinity. It is also presupposed in all the intellectual, moral, and emotional thoughts and acts ascribed to him. But it is directly asserted in two places: John 4 : 24, the language of our Lord to the woman of Sychar: "God is a spirit, and they that worship him must worship in spirit and in truth"; again in Heb. 12 : 9, where fathers of the flesh and of the spirit are contrasted: "Furthermore, we have had the fathers of our flesh to chasten us, and we gave them reverence: shall we not much rather be in subjection unto the Father of spirits and live?" Compare also Acts 17 : 24, 25 : "The God that made the world and all things therein, he, being Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands; neither is he served by men's hands, as though he needed anything," etc.

2. GOD'S NATURE IS EXCLUSIVELY SPIRITUAL. When we ascribe spirituality to God, we do not intend simply to assert that he possesses a spiritual nature, but that his nature is exclusively spiritual. By this we mean that he has no material organization, that he has neither body nor members of the body such as we have, neither shape nor form, neither passions nor limitations, but only a spiritual nature. In proving this we shall have to take for granted some of the attributes of God, which will be shown farther on to belong to his nature.

(1) It is evident from his immensity and eternity (infinity in time and space). To have an omnipresent and eternal mode of existence is possible for a spiritual nature, because spirit has not of necessity succession of time and specific limitation of location. But these of necessity belong to matter. It is of necessity that it has a here, and not an everywhere; spirit alone can combine the two, the here and the everywhere. It is also of necessity that matter exists in time; we know that it exists now, that it existed yesterday, that it may exist to-morrow. We know that it necessarily has this succession and difference of time. But with the eternal God there can be no succession of time, and

consequently he can have no material nature but must be purely spiritual.

(2) It also follows from his independence and immutability. If God has body, he is capable of being influenced from without, for all matter is thus capable of being influenced, of being moved, divided, added to, and diminished. But if thus capable of influence from without he is not independent. Therefore the independent God cannot be material. Again, if he is body, he is mutable, for all matter is capable of change. Therefore the immutable God cannot be material.

(3) This may be argued also from his absolute perfection. We realize in our own natures the necessary defects of a material organization, how it confines us, how it causes pain and suffering, how it imposes on us joy in sensual pleasures, how incapable it is of knowledge and power in itself. Hence we naturally disbelieve that in God is to be found an organism so necessarily imperfect. On the other hand we find our spiritual natures to be of wondrous power and capacity, endowed with intelligence, skill, and wisdom, capable of knowing right and wrong and the true and the false, and possessed of liberty of choice, and we therefore ascribe to God the possession of such a nature to an infinite extent, with infinite intelligence, skill, and wisdom, and a will absolutely untrammelled from without.

II. AN APPARENT OBJECTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF GOD'S ABSOLUTE SPIRITUALITY.

In apparent opposition to this doctrine of the pure spirituality of God is a large number of passages which represent God in or with bodily form. This language is partly figurative, and partly used as an accommodation to human thought, and to the incapacity of human language to express exclusively divine things. Such language is called anthropomorphic, and is generally so obviously such, as to make no false impression even upon the most ignorant.

The following is a corrected list of the passages as collected in West's "Analysis," pp. 17-19.

Those which speak of him *as having location*: Gen. 4 : 16; Exod. 19 : 17-21; 20 : 21; 33 : 14, 15.

As having motion: Gen. 17 : 22; 18 : 33; Exod. 19 : 20; Num. 12 : 5; 23 : 4; Deut. 33 : 2; Judg. 5 : 4; 1 Sam. 4 : 7; Ps. 47 : 5; 68 : 7, 8; Ezek. 11 : 23; Micah 1 : 3; Hab. 3 : 3; Zech. 2 : 13.

As using vehicles: 2 Sam. 22 : 11 ; Ps. 18 : 10 ; 104 : 3 ; Hab. 3 : 8, 15 ; Zech. 9 : 14.

He is said to dwell on the earth: Exod. 25 : 8 ; 29 : 43, 44 ; 1 Kings 6 : 13 ; 8 : 12, 13 ; 2 Chron. 6 : 1, 2 ; Ps. 132 : 14 ; Micah 1 : 2, 3 ; Hab. 2 : 20.

He dwells with man: Exod. 29 : 45 ; Lev. 26 : 11, 12 ; 2 Chron. 6 : 18 ; Zech. 2 : 10 ; Rev. 21 : 3.

He dwells in men: 1 Cor. 3 : 16, 17 ; 6 : 19.

He has face: Gen. 32 : 30 ; Exod. 33 : 11, 20 ; Deut. 5 : 4 ; 34 : 10 ; Rev. 20 : 11 ; *eyes:* 2 Chron. 16 : 9 ; Prov. 22 : 12 ; *nostrils:* 2 Sam. 22 : 9, 16 ; Ps. 18 : 15 ; *mouth:* Num. 12 : 8 ; Ps. 18 : 8 ; *lips and tongue:* Isa. 30 : 27 ; *breath:* Isa. 30 : 28 ; *shoulders:* Deut. 33 : 12 ; *hands and arms:* Exod. 33 : 22, 23 ; Ps. 21 : 8 ; 74 : 11 ; 89 : 13 ; 118 : 16 ; Isa. 52 : 10 ; Hab. 3 : 4 ; *fingers:* Ps. 8 : 3 ; *back:* Exod. 33 : 23 ; *feet:* Ps. 18 : 9 ; *voice:* Exod. 19 : 19 ; 20 : 22 ; Lev. 1 : 1 ; Num. 7 : 89 ; 12 : 4 ; 22 : 9 ; Deut. 4 : 12, 36 ; 1 Kings 19 : 12, 13 ; Ps. 29 : 3-9 ; 68 : 33 ; Jer. 25 : 30, 31 ; Ezek. 43 : 6.

His voice is spoken of as dreaded: Exod. 20 : 19 ; Deut. 4 : 33 ; 5 : 24-26 ; Joel 2 : 11 ; 3 : 16 ; Amos 1 : 2 ; Heb. 12 : 19, 26.

He is said to exercise laughter: Ps. 2 : 4.

He appears to men: Gen. 35 : 9 ; 48 : 3 ; Exod. 3 : 2-6 ; 19 : 3 ; 1 Kings 9 : 2 ; Job 42 : 5, 6 ; Amos 9 : 1.

His appearance is described: Exod. 24 : 10 ; Deut. 31 : 15 ; Isa. 6 : 1 ; Ezek. 8 : 1, 2, 4 ; 43 : 2 ; Dan. 7 : 9, 10 ; Rev. 4 : 5.

He is in human form: Gen. 18 : 1 ; Ezek. 1 : 26, 27 ; Rev. 4 : 2, 3.

III. IMPORTANCE OF TRUE IDEAS AS TO THE SPIRITUALITY OF GOD.

The importance of true ideas as to the spirituality of God may be seen from the important consequences which follow from this characteristic of his being. Upon this depends :

1. AS TO HIS NATURE. (1) The fact that he is invisible and intangible, or incapable of apprehension by the bodily senses. (2) The fact that he is unchangeable, incorruptible, and indestructible. (3) The fact that he is simple and uncompounded. (4) The fact that he is a living personal being, intelligent, moral, free, and active. (5) The fact that he is infinite and eternal.

2. AS TO HIS RELATION TO CREATION. (1) His knowledge of all events, and especially of his spiritual creatures. (2) His control of all events. (3) His purposing all things that shall come to pass.

3. AS TO OUR WORSHIP OF HIM. (1) That it should not be that of the body only. (2) Nor of the outward form. (3) Nor of pretended service. (4) But should be a spiritual worship. (5) And a worship in which he cannot be represented by outward forms or images, nor be approached by means of the bodily senses, but only with the communings of the heart. Hence the second commandment, "Thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image, nor the likeness of any form that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself unto them, nor serve them" (Exod. 20 : 4, 5).

CHAPTER II. THE UNITY OF GOD.

By the expression, *the unity of God*, we mean to convey the idea that he exists alone as God—that is, that there is no other God besides him. He exists as the one and the only true God.

I. THE UNITY OF GOD PROVED.

I. NOTHING THUS FAR INCONSISTENT WITH THIS IDEA. The proof thus far attained of God's existence, to say the least of it, is not inconsistent with the fact of God's absolute unity or oneness. Indeed, one God is all that is demanded by or involved in that proof. Only one first cause is needed; only one designer is suggested; one being alone meets all the conditions arising from our sense of dependence on another; but one is required to account for the evidences of providential care over the world; but one for the wonders in miracles; but one for the Scriptures with their prophecies and their revelation of Christ and God; and but one for the common consent of mankind.

(1) It has been held indeed by some that the idea of one God is opposed by "the common consent of mankind" as to God. This objection is really, however, only apparent. For universal consent only goes so far as to admit the existence of one God. Many have in one way or another assumed that there are more, but belief in the existence of more than one is not universal.

(2) The belief in more than one God was not the earliest type of belief, but the result of a corruption of the truth. This may be accounted for either from reverence for objects as representations of the divinity, as of the heavenly lights, or for animals or statues representing deified attributes of God; or from veneration for men after death regarded as exponents of such attributes.

(3) The belief in only one God thus found in the earliest records of all nations was maintained among most men of intelligence even in the days of heathenism. See Cudworth's "Intellectual System of the Universe," Vol. I., pp. 293-638, for ancient Latin, Greek, Persian, and Egyptian opinions.

As to Brahminism, see Maurice's "Religions of the World," p. 59. As to Buddhism, see Maurice, pp. 102, 103.

As to the classic writers, see also the testimony of Cicero, "*De Natura Deorum*," pp. 11-13 of translation in Bohn's library.

As to the mass of heathenism, we have this testimony from Tertullian, quoted by Tholuck on "Heathenism," p. 23:

"In the deepest emotions of their minds they never directed their exclamations to their false gods, but employed the words 'By God,' 'As truly as God lives,' 'God help me.' Moreover, they do not have their eyes directed to the capitol, but to heaven."

This belief in one God is true even of that dualism which arose among the Persians because of their knowledge of the struggle between good and evil connected with the presence of sin in the world. They believed in a God superior to the two contestants in this struggle, and thus they may be claimed as accepting the idea of the unity of God.¹

The argument from "universal consent" therefore does not demand more than one God.

2. WHAT WE HAVE SEEN RENDERS THIS UNITY HIGHLY PROBABLE. The proof of God's existence which we have had is not only not inconsistent with the unity of God, but renders that unity highly probable, and indeed almost certain.

The unity of the first cause and of the designer, is naturally, if not necessarily, involved in the uniformity seen in the effects produced in Creation and Providence.

That uniformity is seen: (1) In the materials which compose Creation. (2) In the qualities possessed by these materials. (3) In the nature of the forces which they evolve. (4) In the unity of design between all living forms, fishes, reptiles, birds, and mammalia in all parts of the world, whether adapted for air, water, or earth, whether in fossils of the past, or living organisms of the present; and in like unity seen in one species only as germs, and developed into perfected organs in another separated from it by a wide interval of time.

¹ See Cudworth, Vol. I., p. 411, etc.

This marvelous uniformity must be held either to prove the unity of the Creator, or else to show that the wills of several gods act in perfect agreement, and with as much singleness of purpose as if there were only one. This latter is so incredible that the mind takes refuge in the idea of one God, who is the Creator of all things.

An apparent objection to this argument for the unity of God arises from the presence of pain and ill, of sorrow and suffering, of guilt and sin, together with the violent and destructive forces of nature. But these are not inconsistent with the unity of God. For (1) if they ought not to be, and God could prevent them, they would prove lack of goodness, not of unity. (2) If they ought not to be, and God could not prevent them, then they would prove some other being to exist greater than he, and that other being would be God. (3) The evils referred to are apparently as much under uniform general laws as any other facts or events of nature. They may all be part of a system which best exists in connection with them. There is evidence that this is true.

3. OTHER ARGUMENTS MAKE THE UNITY OF GOD A MATTER OF ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY. While some of the arguments which we have had are only consistent with God's unity, and highly suggestive of the same, and others make it so highly probable as to be almost certain, there are others which establish it with absolute certainty.

(1) *The metaphysical argument.* To those who accept the *a priori* argument for God's existence, this argument alone compels belief in God's absolute unity. For the idea of God in the mind, to which is attached that of necessary existence, is the idea of one God, and one only. The notion of two or more gods is self-contradictory, for neither of them can be the absolute and perfect and independent being which is our idea of God.

(2) *The argument from the Scriptures.* The proofs that we have thus far presented from nature for the unity of God are abundantly confirmed by the statements of Scripture. *a.* Passages which declare explicitly that God is one: Deut. 6 : 4 ; Mal. 2 : 10 : "Hath not one God created us?" Mark 12 : 29, 32 ; 1 Tim. 2 : 5 ; Eph. 4 : 5, 6 ; James 2 : 19. *b.* Those that assert that there is none else or none besides him : Deut. 4 : 35, 39 ; 1 Sam. 2 : 2 ; 2 Sam. 7 : 22 ; 1 Kings 8 : 60 ; Isa. 44 : 6, 8 ; Isa. 45 : 5, 6, 21, 22 ; Isa. 46 : 9 ; Joel 2 : 27. *c.* Those which declare that there is none like him, nor to be compared with him : Exod. 8 : 10 ; 9 : 14 ; 15 : 11 ; 2 Sam. 7 : 22 ; 1 Kings 8 : 23 ;

2 Chron. 6 : 14 ; Isa. 40 : 25 ; Isa. 46 : 5 ; Jer. 10 : 6. *d.* Those which declare that he alone is God : 2 Sam. 22 : 32 ; Neh. 9 : 6 ; Ps. 18 : 31 ; 86 : 10 ; Isa. 37 : 16 ; 43 : 10, 12 ; 46 : 9 ; John 17 : 3 ; 1 Cor. 8 : 4-6. *e.* Those which declare that he alone is to be worshiped : Exod. 20 : 5 ; 34 : 14 ; 1 Sam. 7 : 3 ; 2 Kings 17 : 36 ; Matt. 4 : 10 ; Rom. 1 : 25 ; Rev. 19 : 10. *f.* Those which forbid any one else to be accepted as God : Exod. 20 : 3 ; Deut. 5 : 7 ; Isa. 42 : 8 ; Hosea 13 : 4. *g.* Those which proclaim him as supreme over all so-called gods : Deut. 10 : 17 ; Josh. 22 : 22 ; Ps. 96 : 4, 5 ; Jer. 14 : 22 ; 1 Cor. 8 : 4-6. *h.* Those which declare him to be the true God : Jer. 10 : 10 ; 1 Thess. 1 : 9.

II. OBJECTIONS TO THE UNITY OF GOD.

I. CERTAIN EXPRESSIONS OF SCRIPTURE WHICH SEEM TO CONTRADICT IT. There are in the Scriptures themselves certain expressions, or forms of statement, which seem to the casual reader to conflict with the idea of the unity of God.

(1) The gods of the heathen are spoken of as their gods. For example : In Deut. 10 : 17 : "The Lord your God, he is God of gods and Lord of lords" ; Josh. 22 : 22 : "The Lord the God of gods, the Lord the God of gods, he knoweth and Israel he shall know" ; Judg. 8 : 33 ; 9 : 27 ; 11 : 24 ; 16 : 23, 24 ; 1 Sam. 5 : 7 ; 1 Kings 11 : 33 ; 2 Kings 1 : 2, 16, and many other passages. Ps. 96 : 4, 5 : "For great is the Lord and highly to be praised ; he is to be feared above all gods. For all the gods of the peoples are idols : but the Lord made the heavens." 1 Cor. 8 : 4-6 : "Concerning therefore the eating of things sacrificed to idols, we know that no idol is anything in the world, and that there is no God but one. For though there be that are called gods, whether in heaven or on earth ; as there are gods many, and lords many ; yet to us there is one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we unto him." This language, however, is not in any sense opposed to the unity of God. For :

a. Such gods are only so-called gods, and exalted to such places by the false conceptions of men.

b. Many of them have solely imaginary existence.

c. Where there is any corresponding existence they are but creatures of God, dependent upon him for existence and even permission to exercise power and influence.

d. Many of these gods are identified in the New Testament with the devils which Christ cast out, and which were subject to

him and his disciples, and who are only the angels or messengers of Satan, and therefore fallen created angels. Some of the philosophers who met Paul at Athens said of him, "He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods (dæmons)" (Acts 17 : 18). This passage shows that the word which is constantly used in the New Testament for the devils cast out was a word properly used by these Greeks as applicable to their gods.

(2) The word "god" is also applied to Moses and others. For example: "And he (Aaron) shall be thy spokesman unto the people: and it shall come to pass that he shall be to thee a mouth, and thou shalt be to him as God" (Exod. 4 : 16). "And the Lord said unto Moses, See, I have made thee a god to Pharaoh" (Exod. 7 : 1). "Jesus answered them, Is it not written in your law, I said, ye are gods? If he called them gods, unto whom the word of God came [and the Scripture cannot be broken]" (John 10 : 34, 35). The reference is to Ps. 82 : 6, 7: "I said ye are gods (Elohim), and all of you sons of the Most High. Nevertheless ye shall die like men, and fall like one of the princes."

As to these passages referring to Moses, the idea manifestly is that he stood before Aaron and Pharaoh as the representative of God, clothed with his authority and having the right to demand confidence in his utterances and obedience to his commands. But all of this, not because of any partaking of divine nature, but because he was God's ambassador.

As to the passage in the Psalms quoted by Christ, it is equally manifest that this was a metaphorical use of the words to denote the recognition of exalted dignity and mighty power. In the psalm from which the words are taken, it is said in the first verse: "God standeth in the congregation of God; he judgeth among the gods." This language and the threat that they "shall die like men," in the sixth verse, show that it was applied to men who are only metaphorically spoken of as gods.

2. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. It is thought by some that the doctrine of the Trinity, which is so universally received by Christians, cannot be harmonized with the unity of God. This, however, is a mistake. The doctrine of the Trinity only enables us to form just conceptions as to the divine unity. It presents to us three persons who are not three gods, but one God. And, as will hereafter be seen, it shows us that the unity of God is to be found in his nature or essence, and not in the personal relations in that essence. And so it shows that there is but one

divine nature or essence, one being, one God, although there are three persons subsisting therein, who, by virtue of that subsistence, are each God.

We are not led by this doctrine of the unity of God, therefore, to adopt the Arian notion that the Father is Supreme God and the Son only a divine being in a subordinate sense. Nor is it proper to accept the Sabellian notion, that God is one person, manifesting himself sometimes as Father, sometimes as Son, and sometimes as Holy Ghost. "Neither does it at all teach tritheistic unity by which these are really three Gods, but considered one because they have the same nature, just as three men may be said to be one because of the same human nature."¹

CHAPTER III. THE TRINITY.

SECTION I. SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE.

Although the unity of God is made so clear in the Scriptures, and is so earnestly emphasized that practical disbelief in God's unity is declared to be idolatry, yet it is equally true that the Scriptures also reveal a certain threefoldness of nature in God which requires that he be worshiped and served as three in one. This Scripture doctrine is set forth in the abstract of principles of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in these words (Art. III.): "God is revealed to us as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, each with distinct personal attributes, but without division of nature, essence, or being."

The peculiarity of this definition is that it is a mere statement of the scriptural facts revealed, while at the same time it includes every point involved in the doctrine of the Trinity as held by orthodox Christians of all ages. There is no addition to the Scripture facts, but the complete exhibition which these words make of the doctrine shows that it has been correctly formulated from what God has himself revealed. As he alone can know and reveal what he is, so we must accept his statements, however mysterious and incomprehensible may be his revelation.

This definition suggests to us a method of treatment by which in the utmost simplicity and scripturalness the whole truth on this important subject may be attained.

I. "GOD IS REVEALED AS FATHER, SON, AND HOLY SPIRIT."

I. DISTINCT MENTION OF EACH. (1) *As Father.* God is revealed

¹ See Gill, Vol. I., pp. 183, 184, from which this is condensed.

to us as the Father, not merely in the general way in which he is called the Father of all created beings, nor in that in which he is the Father of those who are his sons by virtue of the adoption which is in Christ, but the Father as indicative of a special relation between him and another person whom the Scriptures call his only begotten Son. There are several classes of Scripture passages which reveal this :

a. That class in which, in recognition of this relation, Christ addresses God as "Father" : Matt. 11 : 25, 26 ; Mark 14 : 36 ; Luke 10 : 21 ; 22 : 42 ; 23 : 34, 46 ; John 12 : 26-28 ; 17 : 1, 5, 11, 24, 25.

b. That class in which Christ speaks of him as peculiarly his Father. The expression "our Father" is never used by him, except in the Lord's Prayer, when he is teaching the disciples how to pray : Matt. 10 : 32, 33 ; 15 : 13 ; 16 : 17 ; 18 : 10, 19 ; 20 : 23 ; 24 : 36 ; 25 : 34 ; 26 : 29, 39, 42, 53 ; Luke 2 : 49 ; 22 : 29 ; 24 : 49 ; John 5 : 17, 43 ; 6 : 32 ; 8 : 19, 38, 49, 54 ; 10 : 18, 25, 29, 30, 32, 37 ; 12 : 26 ; 14 : 7, 20, 21, 23 ; 15 : 1, 8, 10, 15, 23 ; 20 : 17 ; Rev. 2 : 27 ; 3 : 5.

c. That class in which the Father is spoken of as sending and giving the Son : John 3 : 16, 17 ; 5 : 37 ; 6 : 37, 40, 57 ; 8 : 16-19 ; 10 : 36 ; John 12 : 45-49 ; 14 : 24 ; 17 : 18 ; 20 : 21.

d. A fourth class represents the Father as knowing and loving the Son : Matt. 11 : 27 ; Luke 10 : 22 ; John 3 : 35 ; 5 : 20.

e. There is also a class in which Christ and the Father are said to be co-workers, or in which the works of Christ are said to be the Father's witness to him : John 5 : 17 ; 10 : 25, 32, 36-38.

f. A class in which the Father is said to put special honor on the Son : John 3 : 36 ; 5 : 23, 25-27.

g. There is yet another class in which the peculiarity of the relation is shown by such terms as : (*a*) "My beloved Son" (Matt. 3 : 17 ; 7 : 15, etc.). (*b*) "Only begotten Son" (John 1 : 14, etc.). (*c*) "His own Son" (Rom. 8 : 32).

(2) *As Son.* The passages given above as to the Father are equally declarative of God as Son. It is needless to give others.

(3) *As Holy Spirit.* In the light of the New Testament we may find very clear reference even in the Old Testament to the Holy Spirit. Gen. 1 : 2 : "The Spirit of God brooded upon the face of the deep." Gen. 6 : 3 : "My Spirit shall not always strive with man." Ps. 51 : 11 : "Take not thy Holy Spirit from me." Ps. 51 : 12 : "Uphold me with thy free Spirit." But we find our clearest and most unmistakable teaching in the

New Testament. At the baptism of Jesus we find that the heavens opened and the Spirit of God descended in the form of a dove and lighted upon him (Matt. 3 : 16, 17 ; Mark 1 : 10, 11). In John 14 : 16 Jesus says : "I will pray the Father and he shall give you another Comforter." And again, in ver. 26, "The Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost," etc. Again, John 16 : 7 : "It is expedient for you that I go away. For if I go not away the Comforter will not come." And yet again, John 16 : 13 : "When he the Spirit of Truth is come he shall guide you into all truth." And so everywhere throughout the New Testament there is as distinct and significant mention of the Holy Spirit as there is of the Father or the Son. It remains now to see whether these are all referred to as equally divine.

2. EACH OF THESE IS GOD. (1) *The Father is God.* The relation pointed out above is one borne by Christ to the Supreme God. The one to whom Christ is said to be Son is one whom the Scriptures call *God*, in the true sense of that word.

a. There are the passages which expressly call Christ "Son of God." All are here omitted where the name is given by devils, or by the centurion, or in any other way in which the authority of inspired teaching may not be claimed for its use : Mark 1 : 1 ; Luke 1 : 35 ; John 5 : 25 ; 10 : 36 ; 11 : 27 ; Acts 9 : 20 ; Gal. 4 : 4 ; 1 John 4 : 15 ; 5 : 5, 20, 21.

b. There are other passages in which the epithet "God" is ascribed to the Father in this relationship : John 1 : 18 ; 3 : 16, 17 ; 5 : 18 ; Rom. 1 : 1-4 ; 8 : 31, 32 ; 2 Peter 1 : 17 ; 1 John 4 : 9, 10 ; 2 John 3.

(2) *The Son is God.* *a.* He is expressly called God. It is not denied that this epithet, like that of Lord, is applied in an inferior sense to others. The mere use of these titles would not prove that the one to whom they are attributed has the divine nature. But the manner in which they are applied to Christ and the frequency of that application become, along with the other evidences presented, an incontestable proof that he, as well as the Father, is true God. If those titles were not ascribed to Christ in the Scriptures, their absence would be conspicuous and well fitted to cast doubt on the other evidence : Matt. 1 : 23 ; John 1 : 1 ; 20 : 28 ; Rom. 9 : 5 ; Titus 1 : 3 ; Heb. 1 : 8.

The following have been omitted from the list above as on various grounds doubtful : Acts 20 : 28 ; 1 Tim. 3 : 16 ; and 1 John 5 : 20. But an exegetical study of these passages will show, even with the text of the recent critics, that they strongly corroborate the doctrine that Christ is God.

b. Christ is also called Lord. This title is used in both the Old and New Testaments still more generally than is that of God. An examination of the texts here quoted will show that, in a peculiar sense, only suited to Christ as God, it is applied to him: Matt. 12 : 8; 22 : 41-45; Mark 2 : 28; Luke 6 : 46; 20 : 41-44; John 13 : 13, 14; Acts 10 : 36; Rom. 14 : 9; 1 Cor. 2 : 8; Gal. 1 : 3; 6 : 18; Phil. 2 : 11; 2 Thess. 2 : 16; Jude 4; Rev. 17 : 14; 19 : 13, 16.

c. He is a peculiar object of worship. The worship paid to him is not merely that reverential respect offered to kings and others in authority, but such worship as was refused by the apostles with horror, because they were mere men (Acts 14 : 13-15), and against which, when offered to him by John, even the mighty angel (Rev. 19 : 10; 22 : 9) earnestly protested. All doubtful cases of worship are here omitted, even that of the wise men (Matt. 2 : 2, 11), in which perhaps divine worship was paid: Matt. 14 : 33; Luke 24 : 52; Acts 7 : 59, 60; 2 Cor. 12 : 8, 9; Phil. 2 : 10; Heb. 1 : 6; Rev. 5 : 8-14; 7 : 9-12.

d. He is to be honored equally with the Father: John 5 : 23.

e. His relations to the Father are those of identity and unity: John 1 : 18; 5 : 17-19; 8 : 16, 19; 10 : 30; 12 : 44, 45; 14 : 7-11; 15 : 24; Heb. 1 : 3; Col. 1 : 15, 19; 2 : 9; 1 John 2 : 23, 24.

f. They are equally known to each other and unknown to all others: Matt. 11 : 27; Luke 10 : 22; John 1 : 18; 6 : 46; 10 : 15.

g. He is the creator of all things: John 1 : 3, 10; 1 Cor. 8 : 6; Col. 1 : 16; Heb. 1 : 10.

h. He upholds and preserves all things: Col. 1 : 17; Heb. 1 : 3.

i. He is the manifestation of the Divine Being in this world: John 1 : 10, 14, 18; 14 : 8-11; 16 : 28-30; Col. 1 : 15; 1 Tim. 3 : 16; 1 John 1 : 2.

j. He is greater than all others; greater than Moses, and David, and Solomon, and Jonah, and the Baptist; and not greater than man only, but than all the spiritual intelligences of the universe: Matt. 3 : 11; 12 : 41, 42; Mark 12 : 37; Luke 11 : 31, 32; John 1 : 17; Eph. 1 : 21; Phil. 2 : 9; Heb. 1 : 4, 5; 3 : 3; 1 Peter 3 : 22.

k. He is the source of all spiritual blessing. (*a*) He gives the Holy Spirit: Luke 24 : 49; John 16 : 7; 20 : 22; Acts 2 : 33. (*b*) He forgives sins: Mark 2 : 5-10; Luke 5 : 20-24; 7 : 47-49; Acts 5 : 31. (*c*) He gives peculiar peace: John 14 : 27; 16 : 33. Is not he the one who is called "God of peace"? Rom. 15 : 33; 16 : 20; 2 Cor. 13 : 11; Phil. 4 : 9; 1 Thess. 5 : 23; Heb. 13 : 20.

(*d*) He gives light: John 1:4, 7-9; 8:12; 9:5; 12:35, 46; 1 John 1:5-7; Rev. 21:23. (*e*) He gives faith: Luke 17:5; Heb. 12:2. (*f*) He gives eternal life: John 17:2; (*g*) He confers all the spiritual gifts bestowed upon his churches: Eph. 4:8-13.

l. All the incommunicable attributes of God are ascribed to him. (*a*) Self-existence. He has power over his own life: John 2:19; 10:17, 18. He has life in himself, as has the Father: John 5:26. (*b*) Eternity of existence: John 1:1, 2; 17:5, 24; Heb. 1:8, 10-12; 1 John 1:2. (*c*) Omniscience: Matt. 9:4; 12:25; Mark 2:8; Luke 6:8; 9:47; 10:22; John 1:48; 2:24, 25; 10:15; 16:30; 21:17; Col. 2:3; Rev. 2:23. (*d*) Omnipresence: Matt. 18:20; 28:20; John 3:13; Eph. 1:23. (*e*) Omnipotence: Matt. 28:18; Luke 21:15; John 1:3; 10:18; 1 Cor. 1:24; Eph. 1:22; Phil. 3:21; Col. 2:10; Rev. 1:18. (*f*) Immutability: Heb. 1:11, 12; 13:8.

m. The judgment of the world is entrusted to him: Matt. 16:27; 24:30; 25:31; John 5:22, 27; Acts 10:42; 17:31; Rom. 2:16; 14:10; 2 Cor. 5:10; 2 Tim. 4:1.

n. Absolute equality with the Father is ascribed to him. This shows that the unity and identity before referred to is not of will, but of nature, and that the names and worship and attributes of God are not bestowed on any other ground than that he is true God. (*a*) Equality in works: John 5:17-23. (*b*) Equality in knowledge: Luke 10:22; John 10:15. (*c*) Equality in nature: John 5:18; 10:33; Phil. 2:6; Col. 2:9; Heb. 1:3.

It will be seen by the foregoing statements that the Scriptures distinctly teach the existence of God in the personal relations of Father and Son, and that each of them is God. No reference has been made to the Old Testament in proof of the divinity of Christ. The New Testament is the most natural source of such instruction, because it reveals to us the fulfillment of God's purpose in sending his Son into the world, and teaches us clearly his nature and relation to the Father. What the nature of this relation of Son and Father is will be examined in the discussion of the eternal Sonship of Christ. What the Old Testament says of Christ will also be presented hereafter.

3. *The Holy Spirit is God.* So completely do the Scriptures identify the Spirit with the Supreme God that with the fact of his personality fully established his essential divinity will at once be admitted. In the discussion of the Trinity, therefore, the point of necessary proof as to the Spirit is his personality, while that as to the Son is his divinity. Abundant proof, however, of the divinity of the Spirit is found:

a. In the passages which call him "the Spirit of God" and "the Spirit of the Lord," as well as those in which God calls him "my Spirit." These are conclusive in like manner as is the divinity of Christ from those which call him the Son of God. The titles "Spirit of God" and "Spirit of the Lord" are each used about twenty-five times in the Bible. "My Spirit" is used in reference to God's Spirit in Gen. 6 : 3 ; Prov. 1 : 23 ; Isa. 44 : 3 ; 59 : 21 ; Ezek. 36 : 27 ; 39 : 29 ; Joel 2 : 28 ; Haggai 2 : 5 ; Zech. 4 : 6 ; Matt. 12 : 18 ; Acts 2 : 17, 18.

b. The writers of the New Testament declare that certain things, which in the Old Testament are ascribed to Jehovah, were said by the Spirit. Comp. Acts 28 : 25-27 and Heb. 3 : 7-9 with Isa. 6 : 9, and also Heb. 9 : 8 with Exod. 25 : 1 and 30 : 10.

c. The sacred writers of the Old Testament were the messengers of God, and spake for him, yet the influence by which they became such is called in the New Testament the Holy Ghost. Comp. Luke 1 : 70 with 2 Peter 1 : 21 ; 2 Tim. 3 : 16 and Heb. 1 : 1 with 1 Peter 1 : 11 ; also Jer. 31 : 31, 33, 34 with Heb. 10 : 15-17.

d. The creation of the world is ascribed to the Spirit : Gen. 1 : 2 ; Job 26 : 13 ; Ps. 104 : 30.

e. He is said to search, and know even the deep things of God : 1 Cor. 2 : 10.

f. He is spoken of as omnipresent : Ps. 139 : 7-10 ; and omniscient : Ps. 139 : 11 ; 1 Cor. 2 : 10.

g. The divinity of the Spirit is peculiarly proved by his influence over Christ. It having been shown that Christ the Son is God, the connection of the Spirit of God with Christ, though it were only in his human nature, is a convincing proof that the Spirit, who is not a mere power of God, but a person, as we shall see, must be also God. (*a*) In his birth : Matt. 1 : 18, 20 ; Luke 1 : 31-35. (*b*) Mental and spiritual influences from the Spirit were predicted : Isa. 11 : 2 ; 61 : 1. And these were fulfilled : *aa.* At his baptism : Matt. 3 : 16 ; John 1 : 33. *bb.* At the time of the temptation in the wilderness : Matt. 4 : 1 ; Mark 1 : 12. *cc.* In his preaching : Luke 4 : 14, 18-21. *dd.* In his casting out devils : Matt. 12 : 28. (*c*) This spiritual influence was without measure : John 3 : 34.

h. The indwelling of the Spirit in the people of God is said to make them the temple of God. Comp. 1 Cor. 3 : 16 and 6 : 19 with 2 Cor. 6 : 16 and Eph. 2 : 22.

i. The Spirit is expressly called God in connection with the falsehood of Ananias and Sapphira : Acts 5 : 3, 4, 9.

II. "EACH WITH DISTINCT PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES," SIMULTANEOUSLY.

The next point in our statement of the doctrine of the Trinity is that each of these, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is revealed as having distinct personal attributes, and hence each is a person.¹ It is meant also, of course, that all these exist as persons simultaneously.

I. EACH HAS DISTINCT PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES—IS A PERSON.
(1) *The Father and the Son are persons.* This fact is so manifest from the manner in which the Scriptures speak of each that it needs but brief discussion.

The mere use of the names Father and Son points out a relation between two persons. That to each of them is ascribed the attributes of character, such as love, hate, goodness, mercy, truth, and justice, which can only exist in, and be exercised by persons, shows separate personality. Neither, except through distinct personal relations, can mutual love be said to be exercised, as by Christ to the Father (John 14 : 31), and by the Father to Christ (John 3 : 35 ; 5 : 20 ; 10 : 17 ; 17 : 24). Manifestly, also, there must be two persons, when one is said to send, and another to be sent ; one to give, and another to be given ; one to teach, and another to be taught ; one to show, and another to perceive what is shown ; one to receive power, and another to bestow it ; and one to be declared, with respect to another, to be "the effulgence of his glory and the very image of his substance" (Heb. 1 : 2) ; and, because in the form of that other, to have "counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God" (Phil. 2 : 6).

We have here, therefore, not the one God, manifesting himself sometimes as Father and sometimes as Son, but a distinction of persons in the Godhead, in which we are taught that in that Godhead there exists a personal relation of Father to Son and Son to Father, with a distinct individuality and personality of each.

(2) *The Holy Spirit a person.* The Scriptures designate, by several very similar terms, the third personality revealed in the

¹ In one respect this personality differs from personality as generally understood. The persons of the Trinity do not have each a separate, isolated existence. The three persons, as we shall see, coexist as *one personal God*. This has led some to speak of their separate personality as a *quasi-personality*.

Godhead. He is called "the Spirit," "the Spirit of God," "the Holy Spirit," "my Spirit," "the Spirit of the Lord," "the Spirit of Christ," "thy good Spirit," "the Spirit of glory," "the Spirit of grace," "the Spirit of knowledge and understanding, the Spirit of counsel and might, the Spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord," "the Holy Spirit of promise," "the Spirit of truth," and "the Spirit of wisdom." Christ also called him "the Comforter," and "another Comforter."

The divine Spirit, thus denominated, must either be some power or influence exerted by God, or a distinct person in the Godhead. It cannot be simply the spiritual part of God, as is the spirit in man, for God is not compounded of spirit and body. This is manifest from his immateriality. Neither can it be in any way a part of his spiritual nature, as sometimes a distinction is made in man, between his mind and spirit, or his soul and spirit. The perfect simplicity of God, which forbids all composition, makes this impossible. It is therefore either God himself exercising some power or influence, or a person in the Godhead. An examination of the Scripture shows that it is the latter.

a. The evidences of personal action show that the Spirit is not merely a power or influence from God, but is either God himself or a divine person. (*a*) The Scriptures speak of the Spirit as in a state of activity: Gen. 1 : 2; Matt. 3 : 16; Acts 8 : 39. The language in these passages may be anthropomorphic, but the state of activity taught is undoubtedly real. (*b*) They declare that the Spirit teaches and gives instruction: Luke 12 : 12; John 14 : 26; 16 : 8, 13, 14; Acts 10 : 19; 1 Cor. 12 : 3. (*c*) The Spirit is also spoken of by them, as a witness of Christ to his people: John 15 : 26. (*d*) They also assert that he witnesses with believers that they are the children of God, and becomes the earnest of their inheritance: Rom. 8 : 16; 2 Cor. 1 : 22; 5 : 5; Eph. 1 : 13, 14; 4 : 30. (*e*) He is spoken of as leading the sons of God: Rom. 8 : 14. (*f*) He is also said to dwell within them in such a way that his presence is that of God: John 14 : 16, 17; Rom. 8 : 9, 11; 1 Cor. 3 : 16, 17; 6 : 19. (*g*) We are taught that he is grieved: Eph. 4 : 30. (*h*) Ananias is charged with having lied to him: Acts 5 : 3. (*i*) Blasphemy against him is the unpardonable sin: Matt. 12 : 31, 32. (*j*) He is spoken of as resisted by men: Acts 7 : 51. (*k*) Also as vexed by them: Isa. 63 : 10. (*l*) As striving with them: Gen. 6 : 3. (*m*) As inspiring men: Acts 2 : 4; 8 : 29; 13 : 2; 15 : 28;

2 Peter 1 : 21. (*n*) As interceding for them : Rom. 8 : 26, 27.
 (o) As bestowing diversities of gifts : 1 Cor. 12 : 4-11.

In all these cases there is personal activity, thought, and feeling. What is thus declared cannot be true of a mere power or influence. The only question can be, whether this person is God, distinct from any plurality of personal relations, or whether he is another personality in the divine nature.

b. The Scriptures show that he is a separate person from the Father and the Son. (*a*) It is stated that he proceeds from the Father : John 15 : 26. A personal being proceeding from a person cannot be that person himself. The proofs above given, therefore, of his personal action and emotion, show that this Spirit is another person. (*b*) He is given or sent by the Father : John 14 : 16, 26 ; Acts 5 : 32 ; and by the Son : John 15 : 26 ; 16 : 7 ; Acts 2 : 33. He that is sent cannot be identical with him that sends. (*c*) He is called the Spirit of the Father : Eph. 3 : 16 ; and also the Spirit of Christ, and of the Son : Rom. 8 : 9 ; Gal. 4 : 6 ; perhaps also 2 Thess. 2 : 8. (*d*) The Son is said to send the Spirit from the Father : John 15 : 26 ; and God is said to send the Spirit of the Son : Gal. 4 : 6. (*e*) The Spirit is distinguished from the Father and the Son in passages which directly connect them with each other : Matt. 3 : 16, 17 ; 28 : 19 ; John 14 : 26 ; 15 : 26 ; 16 : 13 ; Acts 2 : 33 ; Eph. 2 : 18 ; 1 Cor. 12 : 4-6 ; 2 Cor. 13 : 14 ; 1 Peter 1 : 2. (*f*) The personality of the Spirit is also ably argued by Dr. Charles Hodge¹ from "the use of the personal pronouns in relation to him." Not only are personal pronouns used by the Spirit and of the Spirit, but there is a departure from grammatical rule, in the use of a masculine pronoun in connection with a neuter noun, unless the masculine is warranted by the fact that a person is referred to who may be called "he."

2. ALL ARE PERSONS SIMULTANEOUSLY. The scriptural proofs of the personality and divinity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit having now been considered, it is proper to notice a few passages of Scripture in which the Three are revealed distinctly, by being mentioned or manifested together.² (1) At the baptism of Christ are seen the Son, who has just been baptized, and the "Spirit of God descending as a dove," while from heaven above (and therefore from the Father and not from the Spirit, who is thus manifested distinct from the Father) is heard "a voice," "saying, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased" (Matt. 3 : 17).

¹ "Sys. Theol.," Vol. I., p. 524.

² See others above, under *b*, (*e*).

(2) An equally plain distinction is set forth in the language of Christ (Matt. 28 : 19), in which he commanded baptism to be performed "into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost." This act of baptism is such as to involve the divinity as well as the personality of the Three, for it is an act of worship such as can be paid to God only; it is a profession of faith in God and his righteousness, which can be due to God only; and it is a pledge of fealty, such as God has plainly taught he will share with no other. (3) In our Lord's last discourse he promises to send "the Comforter," "even the Holy Spirit," "from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, which proceedeth from the Father." Here the Son sends, the Spirit is sent, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father. He is also referred to as one "whom the Father will send in my name." (See John 14 : 26; 15 : 26.) (4) The Apostle Paul evidently refers to this same Three when he writes to the Corinthians of "the same Spirit," "the same Lord," and "the same God" (1 Cor. 12 : 4-6). (5) The benediction with which Paul closes his Second Epistle to the Corinthians, also presents unitedly, yet separately, the same Three; certain blessings are invoked, but with no apparent distinction of rank among those of whom they are asked. If there is any prominence, it is given the rather to the Son than to the Father.

III. "WITHOUT DISTINCTION OF NATURE, ESSENCE, OR BEING," OR THESE THREE ONE GOD.

I. THE MEANING OF THE TERMS NATURE, ESSENCE, BEING. It is not intended to indicate, by the use of these three words, any wide distinction between them. They are nearly alike. Yet some distinction exists. By "nature" is meant that peculiar character of being which makes one kind of being differ from another. Thus we speak of the divine nature, or the angelic nature, or the human nature, or the brute nature, meaning that peculiarity of life and character and personal condition which makes a God, or an angel, or a man, or a brute. By "essence" is meant that peculiarity in the nature itself which constitutes what is necessary to its existence, so that we cannot say, in the absence of that essence, that such a nature exists. Take away from human nature that which is its essential quality, and it must cease to be human nature. By "being" is meant the nature actually existent, whatever it may be.

2. IN GOD THESE ARE PRACTICALLY IDENTICAL. In God, nature

and essence must be identical, because everything in the nature of God is necessary to his existence, and consequently the nature can be neither greater nor less than the essence; indeed, they must be the same. Neither can being be separated from the nature and essence of God. The necessity of his actual being, or existence, is something inherent in his nature.

3. AND HENCE ONLY ONE GOD. When it is affirmed, therefore, that there is no "division of nature, essence, or being," all that is meant is simply that there is but one God. The divine nature is such that it cannot be multiplied, or divided, or distributed, any more than God can be thus divided in his omnipresence with all things. The divine nature is so possessed by each of the persons in the Trinity that neither has his own separate divine nature, but each subsists in one divine nature, common to the three; otherwise the three persons would be three Gods. So also, in that divine nature, its essential quality is not divided in its relationship to each of the three persons. Were this so, there would be three separate parts of the divine nature. But that this cannot be is manifest from the identity in God of nature and essence. The Scriptures declare the same thing when they teach that there is but one God.

Thus we learn that God is *one* while he is *three* and *three* while he is *one*. He is one in nature, essence, and being, while in this one nature, or being, he has a three-fold personality. The unity of the nature and essence does not forbid plurality of persons. There can be no doubt that the Scriptures reveal this to us as the mode of God's being or existence. They emphasize persistently the truth that God is one. They teach us also just as explicitly that there are three divine persons.¹ It is this peculiar two-fold teaching which is expressed by the word "trinity." The revelation to us is not that of tritheism or three Gods; nor of triplicity, which is threefoldness, and would involve composition and be contrary to the simplicity of God; nor of mere manifestation of one person in three forms, which is opposed to the revealed individuality of the persons; but it is well expressed by the word "trinity," which is declarative, not simply of threeness, but of three-oneness. That this word is not found in Scripture

¹ It is said that on one occasion Daniel Webster and a friend of his listened to a sermon upon the Trinity. As they walked from church the friend said: "Mr. Webster, is not that doctrine a mathematical impossibility?" Said Mr. Webster: "According to the mathematics of earth it seems to be; but I am not acquainted with the mathematics of heaven."

is no objection to it when the doctrine expressed by it is so clearly set forth.

SECTION II. PERSONAL RELATIONS IN THE TRINITY.

The Scripture doctrine of the Trinity, as we have seen, presents three persons occupying mutual relations to each other. There consequently arise certain questions as to these relations. What is their nature? What has originated them? When did they begin? In what respects do the persons differ from each other? Is there perfect equality between them? If there is any kind of subordination, in what does it consist?

These questions will be best answered, first by some general statements applicable to all the relations, next by special consideration of the Sonship of Christ and of the Procession of the Spirit, followed by an examination of the equality and subordination of the Son and Spirit.

I. GENERAL STATEMENTS APPLICABLE TO ALL THE RELATIONS.

I. MUST DEPEND UPON THE SCRIPTURES FOR OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THESE RELATIONS. The nature of these relations can be indicated in no other forms than those set forth in Scripture. They are matters of pure revelation. The fact of their existence is beyond the attainment of reason. Nor, after the revelation of the doctrine, has that fact been strengthened by any philosophical speculations, or its difficulties removed by any arguments or illustrations from analogy.¹ We are constrained to fall back upon the simple Scripture statements. The only explanations of these which are justifiable are such as arise from recognizing that, as the persons, transactions, and relations are divine, there must be separated from them all that belongs to human conditions and imperfections. This, however, must not lead us so far as to deny the reality of these things or the existence in the highest degree of relations of the nature indicated, of which our best conception is gained from the terms which are used. For example, no physical generation, nor any that could begin or end or be measured by succession, can be ascribed to the divine Father. No dependent existence nor previous lack and subsequent attainment of being can be true of a Son who is himself God. No communication nor reception of a portion of the divine essence or nature is possible between two divine persons. If the term "begotten"

¹ See statements of some of these in Hodge's "Systematic Theology," Vol I., pp. 478-482.

is intended to teach a communication of the divine essence to the Son by the Father, it must, be one of the whole essence ; otherwise there would no longer be only one God, one divine nature or essence. So also, when the Spirit proceeds from the Father there can be no breathing out of a part of the divine nature, nor can that breathing begin or end or exist in successive moments of time. These internal acts in God necessarily conform to that eternity and unity of the nature of God which exist even in his purposes toward all things which are without. All human imperfections must be removed. But, while all this is true, this being done, the Scripture teachings must be accepted with unquestioning belief that certain relations corresponding to these titles exist in God and that they and the causes assigned for them are duly expressed by the language of his word.

2. THESE RELATIONS EXIST IN THE VERY NATURE OF GOD. They are revelations to us of what God actually is. It is because God is one in three persons, and because the three persons are one God, that he thus makes himself known to us. Though it is true that the Father wills to beget the Son, and the Father and Son will to send forth the Spirit, yet the will thus exercised is not at mere good pleasure, but it results necessarily from the nature of God, that the Father should thus will the begetting, and the Father and the Son the sending forth. The will thus exercised is not like that of his purposes, in which God acts of free pleasure, choosing between various purposes which he might form, but like that by which he necessarily wills his own existence. Otherwise these relations might or might not have existed. But if this were possible the Son and the Spirit would only have been creatures of God, however exalted might have been their nature or extraordinary their faculties. Theirs would only have been contingent existence until made certain by the will of God. None of the incommunicable attributes of God could have been ascribed to them. In no sense could they have had self-existence, or eternity of existence, or independent existence, or immutability of nature. When, therefore, we find the Scriptures assigning such attributes to any other persons than the Father we have conclusive evidence that the divine nature of these persons is perfectly equal to that of the Father ; and when it is also asserted that God is but one, and yet that each of the three is God, we are plainly taught that all have the same undivided divine essence or nature. That of the Son or of the Spirit is identical with that of the Father. It is not simply a similar

nature, but even numerically the same. Were it otherwise, there would be three Gods. If, however, this be true, the relations belong to the very nature of God and are not something super-added to that nature.

3. THESE RELATIONS MUST ALSO BE ETERNAL. The nature being eternal, so also must be the relations which are in and of that nature. Moreover, if not eternal they must have had a beginning, and there must have been a time when they did not exist. But this argues changeableness in God, in virtue of which he, who once was one person only, has now become three. It is no reply to this to say that the expressions "begotten" and "proceedeth from" involve the idea of the antecedent existence of him who begets, and from whom there is procession. For these are terms of human language applied to divine actions, and must be understood suitably in reference to God. There is no greater difficulty here than in other cases in which this principle is readily recognized. We cannot speak of the eternity of the life of God without using language which implies beginning and succession. Neither can we think of his eternal purpose except as numerous determinations formed and thought out in successive moments and following upon God's infinite knowledge, which, by placing before him all things possible, has presented various objects and plans from which he has chosen. Nor yet can we talk of his presence divested of the ideas and language that belong to space, nor conceive of his immensity without the fiction of infinite space. This has not been done even by the inspired authors of the Scriptures. Dealing, therefore, with the terms expressive of the divine relations, it is natural and right that we treat them after the same fashion and divest them of those ideas of time and succession, which are known to have no place in God. When this is done nothing forbids the belief that, as these relations are in and of the nature of God, they are eternal.

4. THE PERSONS ARE EQUAL IN POINT OF DIVINITY. So far as true divinity is involved, the persons must be absolutely equal. As each possesses the undivided divine essence, so neither can, as God, be superior or inferior to the others. No difference in the mode or order of subsistence in that essence can make an inequality in the divinity of either of them, inasmuch as that subsistence makes either of them a partaker of the same essence and undividedly of all of it. Even if there be inequality relative to each other as persons because of the respective relations, this would no more require one to be a God inferior to the others

than do the three separate persons make necessary such a three-fold distinction in the divine nature as to constitute them three Gods.

These general statements will shorten and simplify the separate discussions as to the Sonship of Christ and the Procession of the Spirit. So far as these have elements in common a statement and explanation of these points in each case is rendered unnecessary. They are also more plainly exhibited as to both the relations than they could be separately. Moreover, we have in them answers to most of the questions suggested at the beginning. The nature of the relations is perceived to be properly indicated by the Scripture language which expresses them and to be such as belongs to the essence and nature of God. They have originated in that essence, acting through the person of the Father and the persons of the Son and the Father. The perfect equality in that divine nature has been seen. It remains simply to inquire in what respects they differ from each other, and whether, with the equality relative to the divine essence, there co-exists any inequality of person or any kind of subordination. These points will be appropriately presented in the separate discussions of the Sonship of Christ and of the Procession of the Spirit, which discussions will also throw still further light upon the questions already answered.

II. SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE ETERNAL SONSHIP OF CHRIST AND OF THE PROCESSION OF THE SPIRIT.

(1) THE ETERNAL SONSHIP OF CHRIST.

I. MEANING OF THE EXPRESSION. By this expression it is meant to declare that paternity and filiation in God are not mere names for something which does not exist, nor for some relation different from that of father and son, to which these titles were first applied in connection with Christ's creation, or birth, or resurrection, or exaltation; but are realities which exist eternally in his nature and are as properly described by the names which express them as are his attributes by the various terms of wisdom, power, truth, justice, and love.

No attempt is made by those who accept this doctrine to state the nature of this generation. Some are even content to suppose that nothing more may be meant than to express by sonship what would be the result of such a relation. As human sonship is accompanied by earnest love between father and son, and implies likeness of character and similarity of nature, so they have been willing to rest at this point and accept the divine sonship as

meaning no more than the existence of perfect likeness and infinite mutual love. But manifestly, if nothing more than this is meant, the Father might equally be called Son and the Son, Father. The Scriptures, on the contrary, indicate that the likeness is the result of the relation, and not that the terms of the relation are given because of the likeness. It is not the resemblance of Christ to the Father which is set forth as the reason he is called the Son, but it is because he is the Son that this resemblance exists.

But, even if these titles could be ascribed because of the likeness, we still have to account for the use of the peculiar word "begotten." This is evidently intended to tell us something of a great mystery. It proclaims some kind of activity in the divine Father and passivity in the Son. We cannot tell what it is, but it at least resembles, in some way, that impartation of nature which occurs in the act of human begetting and conveys to us the idea of the communication of the essence of God by the Father, through this act, to the Son. The continued unity of God shows that it is a communication of the whole essence, in which, however, the Father still continues to subsist, while imparting to the Son subsistence also in the same. Such impartation must partake of the nature of the "Eternal Now" in God. It never began and will never end. It has no succession, no past, and no future. It is the ever present, having no reference even to a past or to a future. It is such a generation as constitutes eternal Sonship and Fatherhood.

2. PROOF OF THIS ETERNAL SONSHIP. (1) *Proof involved in what we have already seen.* In the previous lecture it was shown that Christ is Son of God in a sense peculiar to himself. The Father called him, at his baptism, "My beloved Son"; and he is spoken of by the sacred writers as God's "only begotten Son," and "his own Son." The Scripture proofs were also presented, that this Son is not only called "God," but possesses all the incommunicable attributes of God, together with such unity and identity with the Father as make him truly God; that he is equal with the Father in his works and knowledge and nature, and that not only to him are all the acts of creation, providence, and judgment to be ascribed, but that he is to be honored and worshiped equally with the Father, he being indeed the manifestation in the world of the divine Father, "the image of the invisible God" (Col. 1 : 15), in whom "dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily" (Col. 2 : 9), "being the effulgence of his glory and the very image of his substance" (Heb. 1 : 3).

(2) *Additional proof.* These proofs of this Eternal Sonship may be strengthened by further reference to the Scripture teaching both as to the *nature* and the *eternity* of the relationship.

a. By passages which declare that the Son is so "from God" and "in God," as to have perfect knowledge of him: John 1 : 18; 7 : 29; 16 : 27-30; 17 : 25. He is here spoken of as proceeding

from God, not merely being sent as a messenger. The claim asserted is one of intimate fellowship in, and participation of, the divine nature. It is made of him in the capacity of God's Son. Consequently it betokens a sonship of nature, not one of mere office or name, and so the sonship must have been from eternity.

b. Still more clearly such passages as the following: (*a*) Christ's existence before birth in this world is taught: *aa.* In such passages as show that Christ, of his own will, assumed this life: John 6:38; Phil. 2:7; Heb. 2:14, 16; 10:5, 9. *bb.* Such as show peculiar coming into the world: John 3:13; 6:33, 38, 62. *cc.* Where it is said that he had seen and known the Father, which implies a previous state of existence: John 6:46. *dd.* Such passages as declare that he, the Son, was sent into the world by the Father. (See p. 52, *c.*) (*b*) His existence when creation occurred is announced in John 1:3, 10; Col. 1:16; Heb. 1:10. (*c*) The Scriptures also declare that he was in the beginning, before all things (when time began), which shows clearly eternal existence: John 1:1; 17:5, 24; Col. 1:17; Heb. 1:10. (*d*) They expressly state also that his sonship was eternal: 1 John 1:1-3.

3. OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE. Many have refused to accept this doctrine of the eternal sonship of Christ. Objections to it have been urged upon various grounds.

(1) Some have objected to the idea of *sonship* itself.

a. They have urged that sonship implies inferiority, and, therefore, that the Son cannot be truly God equal with the Father.

But how can we know what is and what is not possible in this matter with God? If the Scriptures assert the divine generation and the equality of the Son and the Father, why should any deny their consistency with each other?

After all, however, does sonship imply inferiority of nature? There may be subordination of rank or office. But surely there is none of nature. Even human sonship results from the impartation of the same nature by the father; not the same numerically, but the same in kind and degree, the same partitively. The son of any man partakes alike, and equally, with his father, in human nature. The divine communication differs from the human in not so dividing the nature that two Gods result, as in human generation do two men.

That sonship may imply inferiority of official rank and personal relation is readily admitted. But it does not always do this. Such subordination of person, indeed, seems to be taught of the Son of

God to his Father. But it is equality and sameness of nature, not of office, which makes the Son truly God. He is such because he is a true subsistence in the divine essence. He does not cease to be such because the Father is officially greater than he, nor even because the Father bestows and the Son receives the communication of the divine essence.

b. It has also been objected that fatherhood implies priority of existence, and that this is impossible toward another divine person. But this is based upon a forgetfulness of the nature of eternal acts. Though we may not be able to explain how they are so, we nevertheless know that, in such acts, there is no beginning nor end, no first nor second, no antecedent nor consequent—indeed, no succession of any kind. Were it otherwise, God would exist in successive moments. He would have had a beginning. He would form new purposes, and would increase in knowledge from day to day.

Arguing from the nature of eternal acts in God, we therefore judge that the eternal generation of the Son is not a single act, which was accomplished at a definite moment in the divine nature, but one ever continuing. With God there may be such definitely completed acts, when they are performed outside of himself, as in creation; but not when they are purely within. Such an act must be ever continuing, and completed only in the sense of its being always perfect, though not ended. Even the expression “continuing” is imperfect so far as it involves the idea of successive moments in God. It is only “ever continuing” as viewed by man. Sonship in God, therefore, does not imply priority of existence. Even in man paternity and filiation are coexistent. One becomes a father only when another becomes his son. Priority of existence is necessary, as a mere accident of human birth, because of the necessity of growth and maturity in a man before he can become a father. But even here the sonship and fatherhood exist at the same moment. In God, however, priority, even of the existence of one person before another, can have no place, since he is self-existent and eternal, who never began to be, and whose perfect maturity is not attained by growth or increase.

c. Again it is said, “If Christ is Son—if he is God of God—he is not self-existent and independent. But self-existence, independence, etc., are attributes of the divine essence, and not of one person in distinction from the others. It is the triune God who is self-existent and independent. Subordination, as to the mode of subsistence and operation, is a scriptural fact; and so also is

the perfect and equal godhead of the Father and the Son, and therefore these facts must be consistent. In the consubstantial identity of the human soul there is a subordination of one faculty to another, and so, however incomprehensible to us, there may be a subordination in the Trinity consistent with the identity of essence in the Godhead.”¹

(2) Again, objections are made also to the *eternity* of this relation. These are based upon Scripture statements, and are, on that account, even more worthy of consideration.

a. Before taking up these objections in detail, it may be said in general concerning them that it is well to remember that Christ is revealed to us in the Scriptures as one person in two natures, by virtue of which he is frequently called the Theanthropos, or Godman. The doctrine of his person will be hereafter discussed. It is sufficient here to state that, while the two natures are distinct, and preserve their respective attributes and qualities, yet, because of the one personality in both natures, whatever belongs to the person as person may be attributed to either nature. Thus the Spirit is not only called the Spirit of Christ, “but also the Spirit of Jesus” (Acts 16 : 7). So the title Son of God may be applied to Christ in his *mere human relations*. That this is sometimes done does not, however, destroy the force of its *much more frequent application to him in his divine nature*, and especially of such an application, when it is accompanied by the ascription to him of divine titles, attributes, acts, and worship, together with assertions of equality, identity, and unity with the Father.

“Bishop Pearson, one of the most strenuous defenders of eternal generation, and of all the peculiarities of the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity, gives four reasons why the Theanthropos, or Godman, is called the Son of God. First, his miraculous conception. Second, the high office to which he was designated: John 10 : 34-36. Third, his resurrection according to one interpretation of Acts 13 : 33. ‘The grave,’ he says, ‘is as the womb of the earth; Christ, who is raised from thence, is as it were begotten to another life, and God, who raised him, is his father.’ Fourth, because after his resurrection he was made the heir of all things: Heb. 1 : 2-5. Having assigned these reasons why the Godman is called Son, he goes on to show why the Logos is called Son. There is nothing, therefore, in the passages cited inconsistent with the church doctrine of the eternal sonship of our Lord.”²

¹ Charles Hodge, “Systematic Theology,” Vol. I., p. 474.

² *Ibid.*, p. 476.

b. Let us now examine more in detail this class of objections to the *eternity* of the sonship.

(a) It is said the title *Son* is given to Christ only because of his *birth*. This is based upon Luke 1 : 35 : "And the angel answered and said unto her, The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee : wherefore also that which is to be born shall be called holy, the Son of God."

Upon this passage it may be remarked, as the foundation of all just interpretation, that no relation to the Holy Ghost which constitutes a personal relation in the Godhead can refer to the Sonship, because this relation is one of Christ to the Father, and not to the Holy Ghost. Some other reason then than the act of the Spirit in his conception must be found for the ascription here of the title "Son of God."

Again, it must be recognized that the title "Son" is not here prophesied of in connection with the divine nature of our Lord, but is declared of that "which is to be born," which was undoubtedly his human nature, or himself in his human nature.

One interpretation of the passage affixes to the term "power of the Highest" a personal sense, explaining it as a title of the divine Logos. According to this, it is the overshadowing and permanent abiding of the divine Son, in union with the human nature conceived under the influence of the Holy Ghost, which will cause that "holy thing" to be "called the Son of God." Instances are quoted of the use of "power" in a divine sense from Philo and other Jewish writers. The early Christian Fathers are stated to have applied generally the word "power" to the divine nature of Christ, and many of them are quoted as maintaining this interpretation of this passage. Acts 8 : 10 and 1 Cor. 1 : 24 are referred to as illustrating this use of the word power.¹ If this is the interpretation, then it is the coming of the Eternal Son upon this human nature, and his presence with it, that causes it to be called the Son of God.

This is, therefore, perfectly consistent with both the requirements before mentioned as necessary to the true interpretation. The Spirit is not associated with the ascription of the title "Son of God," and that title is appropriately given to the human nature, and yet the eternity of the divine sonship is not affected. If this use of the word "power" can be fully verified, no valid objection

¹ See "Treffry on the Doctrine of the Eternal Sonship," third edition, pp. 120-133, and 142-144.

can be made to the interpretation. Treffry gives very strong proof that it is so used.

If, however, we should adopt the more generally received interpretation, which supposes that "the power of the Highest" is either descriptive of the Holy Ghost, or of the divine power which accompanied his coming upon Mary, there will still be no difficulty in ascribing the title "Son of God" to the presence of the Eternal Son, who in his divine personality "became flesh, and dwelt among us" (John 1 : 14). Such an explanation of the title would still be consistent with his relation both to the Father and the Holy Ghost. The text would then still teach that the title "Son of God" is to be given to Christ as man, in like manner as that of Lord, because we have not here a mere human person, but simply a human nature, in which the divine Person, the Son, subsists without ceasing also to subsist in the divine nature. As that divine Person, and not the divine nature, is the Son, so also the divine Person in his human nature, and not that human nature, or a mere man, is called Son of God. The title, therefore, though given to him as man, arises not from his birth, but from his eternal sonship.

The Holy Ghost is therefore set forth here merely as the originator of the human nature of Christ. That nature is from God, not acting through the divine essence, which is never affirmed of God in any of his acts, but through a person in the Godhead, according to the usual mode as revealed to us, and as exhibited in creation, providence, and redemption, and even in the eternal acts within the Godhead. The Scriptures make known no influence nor action of the Spirit on the Son in his divine relations. On the contrary, the Son acts through the Spirit, but not the Spirit through the Son. But the instances of the influence of the Spirit on the human nature are abundant. At his birth (Luke 1 : 35), at his baptism (Matt. 3 : 16), in leading him to be tempted (Matt. 4 : 1), in the working of his miracles (Matt. 12 : 28), in his return from temptation "in the power of the Spirit into Galilee" (Luke 4 : 14), and in his giving commandments through the Holy Spirit to the apostles (Acts 1 : 2), we have express mention of this influence. Was it not to this that the author of Hebrews referred, "A body didst thou prepare for me"? (Heb. 10 : 5.)

(b) Again, it is objected that Christ did not become Son of God until the day of his resurrection. Two passages are quoted in favor of this objection: *aa.* That in Rom. 1 : 4: "Who was de-

clared to be the Son of God with power, according to the Spirit of holiness, by the resurrection of the dead." The word translated "declared" in this passage means "determined," "marked out as." It has no reference to a new ascription of title. All that is taught is that the resurrection of Christ plainly and distinctly evinced that "Jesus Christ our Lord" (ver. 5) is "Son of God." Of this fact the resurrection from the dead of him who had constantly claimed to be the Son of God is an unquestionable proof. *bb.* The other passage is Acts 13 : 32, 33. This reads in the King James version : "And we declare unto you glad tidings, how that the promise that was made unto the fathers, God hath fulfilled the same unto us their children, in that he hath raised up Jesus again ; as it is also written in the second psalm, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee."

Upon this objection, Dr. Charles Hodge justly says : "Here there is no reference to the resurrection. The glad tidings which the apostle announced was not the resurrection, but the advent of the Messiah. That was the promise made to the fathers, which God had fulfilled by raising up—*i. e.*, bringing into the world—the promised deliverer. Comp. Acts 2 : 30 ; 3 : 22, 26 ; 7 : 37 ; in all which passages where the same word is used, the 'raising up' refers to the advent of Christ ; as when it is said, 'A prophet shall the Lord God raise up unto you from among your brethren, like unto me.' The word is never used absolutely in reference to the resurrection, unless as in Acts 2 : 32, where the resurrection is spoken of in the context. Our translators have obscured the meaning by rendering it 'having raised up again,' instead of simply 'having raised up,' as they render it elsewhere."¹ The Canterbury revision has simply "raised up," omitting the word "again."

We might then rest the reply to this objection upon the denial that the sonship is spoken of as given in connection with the resurrection. But, on the other hand, we might admit it to be thus given, and yet the doctrine of the Eternal Sonship would not be affected. For so long as we may justly confine any such declaration to the Theanthropos, it might still be true that to the Godman the name could thus be given, and yet all the teachings of Scripture relative to the eternity and nature of the divine sonship remain true. The truth is that it would be more difficult to establish positively that the title "Son of God" ever was be-

¹ Dr Charles Hodge, "Sys. Theol.," Vol. I., p. 475.

stowed upon Christ in consequence of any event connected with his humanity than that it is confined to him in his human relations. At least it is manifest from the Scriptures that, if ever applied to this divine person because of his birth or resurrection, that was not the first period of such application; for the title is given to him in connection with the acts of creation, and he is said to have been before all things, their creator, in whom they consist, as the one who laid the foundations of the world, the existence of which is perishable, while his is eternal.

(c) A further objection is made by Arians, and others, who deny the proper divinity of Christ, and claim that he is but a creature. These assert that the title "Son of God" was given to Christ by virtue of his creation. The obvious reply to this objection is to produce the Scripture teachings which prove the true deity of the Son, especially such as assert that he is God and Lord, and to be honored and worshiped, and that he performs all the divine acts of creation, providence, and redemption, and has all the incommunicable attributes of God, together with perfect equality, exact resemblance, absolute unity, and sameness of nature with the Father.

The passage in Col. 1 : 15 has been claimed in support of this objection; Christ being there called, according to the King James version, "the first born of every creature." But the true rendering is "the first born of all creation," and it is so translated in the Canterbury revision. There is a similar passage in Rev. 3 : 14, where Christ calls himself "the beginning of the creation of God." The word translated "beginning" in this passage means also "the origin." It is also used for "the first place, that of power, or sovereignty." The "first born" in the former passage is the same word used in Heb. 1 : 6, and there translated "first begotten." The "first created" would have been differently expressed in the Greek. The fact that this is a begotten Son, and not a created being, and that he is not said to be born at the time of creation, but before it, actually shows that the eternal generation of the eternal Son, which took place before all things, is here spoken of. Such pre-existence is plainly taught in the context of Hebrews, but it is directly asserted in that of Colossians.

(II) THE PROCESSION OF THE SPIRIT.

The Holy Spirit is described in the Bible as proceeding from the Father.

I. TERM PROCESSION. This relation of the Spirit to the divine Father has been generally expressed by the term "procession." This is admissible if it is recognized as a term merely declarative of such a procession from the Father as is not exclusive of a procession also of the Son. For it must be remembered that Christ uses a similar word as to himself, though not the same word, in John 16 : 28 : "I come out from the Father, and am come into the world." The disciples use this last word in John 16 : 30. The verb in these two passages means sometimes "came out," and sometimes "went out," and in the latter signification is precisely equivalent to the other verb, which in a different tense appears in John 15 : 26. From the "proceeding from" of the Spirit, therefore, we cannot argue a difference in his mode of procession from that of the Son. The terms applied to both are general, and cannot express a difference. The mode of the procession of the Son, however, is especially designated by the generation which is asserted of him. That of the Spirit appears likewise to be pointed out by the name given to him. He is the breath of God, which fact, already expressed in his name, was taught by our Lord when, on the evening of his resurrection, he breathed upon his apostles, saying unto them : "Receive ye the Holy Ghost" (John 20 : 22). It is not unlikely, however, that the human breath of the Theanthropos was, on that occasion, used as a symbol of the divine outbreathing of the Spirit by the divine Son. This may be well assumed as true, even if the Spirit proceeds from the Son as well as from the Father.

This outbreathing of God is even more difficult to interpret and the nature of the relation thus indicated even more incomprehensible than that of the generation of the Son. In this, therefore, as in that, we must be content to accept the statement just as it is revealed, being only careful to separate from it all ideas inconsistent with acts of God. This would exclude everything like a physical breathing, or several acts of breathing at various times, which may be successive. The procession of the Spirit must therefore be regarded as eternal action, completed only because perfect, and continuing only in the sense of not ended.

It may be said further, that this procession of the Spirit as well as that of the Son is from within God. The preposition with which the verbs are compounded in each of these three passages of John is the same, and shows a procession from within God.

Wherever the terms "Spirit of God" and "Spirit of Christ" appear, the simple genitive is used without a preposition, but this same preposition is found with the genitive of God in 1 Cor. 2 : 12 and Rev. 11 : 11. In this latter passage, however, the Holy Spirit is probably not meant. The procession is, therefore, taught as being from within God, which shows that the coming from and the going forth from are both in and of the divine nature, and not to be limited to such action as occurs when an ambassador is sent from a king, or one man simply proceeds from the presence of another.

2. WHETHER FROM THE FATHER ALONE OR FROM FATHER AND SON. Eastern and Western Christians have divided upon this question. The procession of the Spirit is said by the East to be from the Father only, as is the generation of the Son; but by the West to be from both the Father and the Son.

Eastern Christians have urged that the Scriptures only actually declare procession from the Father. It must be acknowledged that this is true, inasmuch as there is but one passage of Scripture which speaks of his procession (John 15 : 26), the language of which is "which proceedeth from the Father." But in 1 Cor. 2 : 12 the Spirit is said to be "of God," which may mean of the Father alone, or as of God, so of the Son also. The Spirit is also spoken of as the Spirit of Jesus (Acts 16 : 7), and of Christ, and of the Lord, and of the Son (Gal. 4 : 6), as well as the Spirit of the Father and the Spirit of God. Our Lord also declared that he would send the Spirit. More than this, the action of Christ, when he breathed upon the disciples and said, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost" (John 20 : 22), is very significant and strongly indicates the procession of the Spirit from him. (See also Acts 16 : 7.) This act of Christ, however, may have been no more than giving the Spirit to his disciples without intending to teach any procession from himself. The breathing, which in any event was symbolical, may have been so only of the divine act of the Father, from whom alone the Spirit may truly proceed. In this event, may we not also believe that the relation of the Son to the procession differs from that of the Father? Would it not be a more exact statement of the Scripture teaching to say that the Son, or Christ, sends the Spirit and gives the Spirit, which is his, because the right to bestow it is his, either essentially or as given him in his office as Messiah, and that the Spirit thus sent proceeds from the Father? In this event the Father would be the source of the procedure and the Son the agent in sending him

forth. Is not this bestowment on the Messiah of this right to send the Spirit suggested by Christ's declaration, "If I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you" (John 16 : 7), as well as by the language, "The Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified" (John 7 : 39). These points are presented for consideration, while it is admitted that the assertion that the Spirit proceeds also from the Son is less objectionable than the denial. The Scriptures seem to leave it so doubtful as to forbid any positive statement about it. But the preponderance of evidence is in favor of a procession from both Father and Son.

III. SUBORDINATION AMONG THE PERSONS.

I. THE FACT OF SUBORDINATION OF SOME KIND. The absolute equality in nature, essence, and being of each of these persons as God has already been pointed out; and the possibility of inferiority in other respects was then intimated. There are many scriptural statements which seem to indicate this. Christ said expressly of himself, "The Father is greater than I" (John 14 : 28). He also not only taught that the Father had sent him, but compared with that his own sending of his disciples (John 17 : 18), and declared that he came, not to do his own will but that of him that sent him (John 6 : 38); that he came not of himself (John 7 : 28); that he spoke not of himself, but that the Father had given him a commandment what he should say and speak (John 12 : 49); that his teaching was not his own (John 7 : 16); that the word they heard was not his, but the Father's (John 14 : 24); that he had given and spoken the words given him by the Father (John 8 : 26; 17 : 8); that the Father had given him to do the work he had accomplished (John 17 : 4); that he could do nothing of himself, but what he saw the Father doing (John 5 : 19); that the Father was with him, and had not left him alone (John 8 : 29), and that the Father had sanctified (consecrated) him (John 10 : 36). The climax of these statements is reached when we find that not only did Paul say that "the head of Christ is God" (1 Cor. 11 : 3), and call the Father "the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of Glory" (Eph. 1 : 17), but our Lord himself spoke of him to Mary Magdalene as "my Father and your Father," and "my God and your God" (John 20 : 17).

The following passages may also be noted in this connection : "Jesus of Nazareth . . . God anointed him with the Holy Ghost, and with power." It is said that he performed beneficent and miraculous acts because "God was

with him" (Acts 10 : 38). Christ also denied the goodness of any but God (Matt. 19 : 17 ; Mark 10 : 18 ; Luke 18 : 19) ; and as to the day of judgment asserted that "of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father" (Mark 13 : 32, ["but the Father only," Matt. 24 : 36]) ; and that to sit on his right hand and on his left was not his to give, but that these positions shall be given to those for whom they are prepared of his Father (Matt. 20 : 23 ; Mark 10 : 40). We are told also of his prayers to God, of which the remarkable statement is made, that "in the days of his flesh" he "offered up prayers and supplications with strong crying and tears unto him that was able to save him from death, and having been heard for his godly fear" (Heb. 5 : 7). Christ also speaks of the power he had over all flesh as given him by the Father (John 17 : 2), and Paul in Eph. 1 : 17, 20, assigns his exaltation over all things, and as head of the church, described in ver. 19-22, to "the Father of glory." While it is said that the Father "put all things in subjection under his feet," we are told that "he is excepted who did subject all things unto him" (1 Cor. 15 : 27), and that "then cometh the end, when he shall deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father" (ver. 24) ; and "when all things have been subjected unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subjected to him that did subject all things unto him, that God may be all in all" (ver. 28).

2. THE NATURE OF THE SUBORDINATION. This subordination is a subordination of persons and not of nature. An examination of these and of all similar statements in the Scriptures shows that they are in no respect inconsistent with the perfect equality of the persons as to the divine nature. The subordination that is taught is a subordination of the persons in their relation to each other, and not a subordination or inferiority of actual nature. (1) Most of the passages quoted refer to the subordination of Christ as the God-appointed Redeemer. He who was in the form of God counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, etc. (Phil. 2 : 6, 7). This explanation may be thought by some insufficient to account fully for the subjection of the Son referred to in 1 Cor. 15 : 28, or for the superior greatness ascribed to the Father in John 14 : 28. But if so we are still not under any necessity of supposing that there is an inferiority of one of them *as God* to another as God, or of the Godhead of one to the Godhead of another. It can only be an inferiority, or rather a subordination, *as a person* of one *person* in the Trinity to another. (2) This leads us to notice the fact that there is most likely in the Trinity an actual subordination of office or rank among the persons. And by virtue of this the Father sends the Son and the Father and Son send the Spirit. This could exist between persons in all respects equal to each other, both in nature and

relation. In God, however, it is probable that the official subordination is based upon that of the personal relations. It corresponds exactly with the relations of the persons, from which has probably resulted their official subordination in works without, and especially in the work of redemption.

This personal inferiority or subordination, in so far as it is natural, is doubtless due to the difference in the modes of subsistence in the divine essence. The Father thus subsists independently of the will or the action of any other person. He is thus simply God; not originated, not begotten, not proceeding from. The Son is originated, his filiation is willed, though necessarily, by the Father, and he is begotten and is, as the Athanasian creed asserts, "very God" of "very God." The Holy Spirit is also originated; he is not however begotten, but proceeds from the Father or from the Father and the Son. His procession is also willed, though necessarily, and he likewise is "very God" of "very God." In this mode of subsistence, therefore, inferiority of the person of the Son to the Father and of the Spirit to the Father and Son may be said to exist. Without any superiority as God, therefore, the Father may be said to be greater than the Son because of the personal relations in the Trinity.

3. THE ORDER OF THE SUBORDINATION. The order of this subordination is plainly apparent from the scriptural names and statements about the relations. The Father is unquestionably first, the Son second, and the Holy Spirit third. This is their rank, as well because of the mode of subsistence as of its order. Hence they are commonly spoken of in this order as the First, Second, and Third Persons of the Trinity.

IV. THE INHABITATION OF THE PERSONS.

"As the essence of the Godhead is common to the several persons, they have a common intelligence, will, and power. There are not in God three intelligences, three wills, three efficiencies.¹ The Three are one God, and therefore have one

¹ It seems strange that so many theologians will thus hold to the doctrine of three persons in the Godhead, and then, *at the critical point*, draw back. If there are not three wills and three self-consciousnesses, then there cannot be three persons. For the very essence of personality is will and self-consciousness. Moreover, the whole teaching of the Bible concerning the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is calculated to make the impression that each of these three has a personal will peculiar to himself. Jesus, addressing the Father, says: "Not my will but thine be done" (Luke 22 : 42). The will of the Saviour here is not simply the will power of his human nature. It is his God-man will, his divine-human will. Paul speaks in Rom. 8 : 27 of "the mind of the Spirit." The Bible nowhere shrinks from speaking of the three as if each had all the essential elements of personality. Of course, as the author says, it is to the last degree unreasonable to expect "that we, who cannot

mind and will. This intimate union was expressed in the Greek church by the word 'περιχώρησις,' which the Latin words *inexistentia*, *inhabitatio*, and *intercommunio* were used to explain. These terms were intended to express the scriptural facts that the Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son; that where the Father is there the Son and Spirit are; that what the one does the others do. . .

"This fact—the intimate union, communion, and inhabitation of the persons of the Trinity—is the reason why everywhere in Scripture, and instinctively by all Christians, God as God is addressed as a person, in perfect consistency with the Tri-personality of the Godhead. We can and do pray to each of the Persons separately; and we pray to God as God, for the three Persons are one God, one not only in substance, but in knowledge, will, and power. To expect that we who cannot understand anything, not even ourselves, should understand these mysteries of the Godhead, is to the last degree unreasonable. But as in every other sphere we must believe what we cannot understand, so we may believe all that God has revealed in his word concerning himself, although we cannot understand the Almighty unto perfection."¹

understand even ourselves, should understand those mysteries of the Godhead." But it is no more difficult to believe that the Father and the Son and Holy Spirit each has a will of his own, and that these wills are somehow *three in one*, and *one in three*, than it is to believe the other triune features of this mysterious doctrine.

¹ Charles Hodge, "Systematic Theology," Vol. I., pp. 461, 462.

BOOK II. GOD'S ATTRIBUTES

IN our study of the essential nature of God we have considered God's mode of being. We have seen that he is a triune Spirit. We must bear in mind always, however, that whatever there may be of threeness in God's nature, he is always and ever the one personal God. God impressed this idea upon his ancient people at the apparent expense, for a long time, of practical or, at least, comparative ignorance on their part concerning the tri-personality of the divine nature. We will, therefore, for the present continue our study of the nature of God, regarding him as the one personal God. Our inquiry now will be concerning his personal attributes. By attributes we mean those peculiarities or qualities which mark or characterize the nature—in other words, those qualities which constitute or determine the character.

These attributes of God are not separate nor separable from his essence or nature, and yet they are not that essence or nature. They simply have the ground or cause of their existence in it. Neither are these attributes to be regarded as so many different powers and peculiarities or faculties, which so belong to God that he is "composed of different elements."¹ This would take away the simplicity of the divine nature and make it compound, and therefore divisible and changeable.

On the other hand, however, they are not simply our different conceptions of God. They have existence independently of his creatures, and so of any conceptions that a creature may have of them. There is some true foundation in God himself for the distinctions between them. So that when we speak of God as wise we do not only say that we conceive of him differently from what we do when we call him just, but we mean that there is some quality in God which makes it proper that we should conceive of him under the different aspects of wisdom and justice.

In the classification of the divine attributes there has been considerable difference of opinion. Various divisions have been made.

1. One is into *communicable* and *incommunicable*.

The communicable attributes are those which, to a limited de-

¹ Hodge, Vol. I., p. 369.

grec, he can also bestow upon his creatures. Such are power, knowledge, wisdom, love, holiness, etc.

The incommunicable are those which cannot be thus bestowed, but which of necessity exist only in God. Such are self-existence, immutability, and infinity, including immensity and eternity.

2. Another division is into *relative* and *absolute*. The relative are those which may be exercised toward objects which are without, the absolute those which exist only in connection with God.

3. Still another division is into *transient* attributes, or such as pass over to his creatures, and *immanent*, or such as ever remain in God alone.

4. A fourth division is into *positive* and *negative* attributes, the positive being those which ascribe perfections to God, and the negative those which deny imperfections.

These four divisions are, however, identical. The attributes ranked under the communicable are also placed among the relative and the transient and the positive, and those defined as incommunicable are classified as absolute and immanent and negative.

5. A further division has been made into the *natural* and *moral* attributes.

By the natural attributes are meant those which describe the mode of his existence, without respect to personal character ; by the moral, those which describe his character.

Dr. Charles Hodge justly objects to this division because the "word natural is ambiguous. Taking it in the sense of what constitutes or pertains to the nature, the holiness and justice of God are as much natural as his power or knowledge. And on the other hand, God is infinite and eternal in his moral perfections, although infinity and eternity are not distinctively moral perfections. In the common and familiar sense of the word natural the terms natural and moral express a real distinction." ¹

In the discussion of the divine attributes, those which belong to the incommunicable, or absolute, or immanent, or negative class will first be considered. These are simplicity, which denies composition ; infinity, which, either as eternity denies limitation as to time, or as immensity denies it as to space ; and immutability which rejects all possibility of change in God. After these will be taken up in the order named, the communicable, relative,

² "Sys. Theol.," Vol. I., pp. 375, 376.

transient, or positive attributes : power, knowledge, wisdom, holiness, goodness, love, truth, and justice.¹

A. COMMUNICABLE ATTRIBUTES

CHAPTER I. POWER OF GOD.

We derive our conception of power from the consciousness of our will or purpose to effect an end, and from our experience that we have accomplished that end.

Power in God, therefore, may be defined to be the effective energy inherent in his nature by which he is able to do all things. The exercise of that power is dependent upon his will or purpose, and is, as we shall see, limited, not by what he can do, but by what he chooses to do.

I. PROOF THAT POWER IS AN ATTRIBUTE OF GOD.

It is evident that God is a being of power because :

1. AN ELEMENT OF PERFECTION. We perceive that its possession is an element of perfection, and is therefore to be attributed to the all-perfect being.

2. UNIVERSE DEMANDS IT. We cannot account for the existence and phenomena of the universe without ascribing to God the power which has produced them.

3. OUR DEPENDENCE DEMANDS IT. Our own sense of dependence assures us that there must be power to create, preserve, and protect us, in Him in whom we live and move and have our being.

4. THE SCRIPTURES TEACH IT. The Scriptures also teach us

¹ The attributes are presented by the author in the order indicated above. It has always seemed to the reviser, however, that the natural order in which to treat the attributes is to consider first those which find some likeness within us. Thus we begin with those which are easiest of comprehension. We study God in his resemblances to man, who was made in his image. Then from these we may proceed to consider, as well as we can, those which have no resemblances in any of God's creatures, those which are properly called incommunicable. We begin the ascent of the mountain at its base, and by paths that are easiest to climb, and ascend higher and higher, until we recognize our inability to proceed farther, and simply stand and gaze in wonder and admiration and awe at the glorious summits that are far above us, forever hidden in ineffable light. After several years in the effort to guide classes in these studies, this plan of taking up the communicable attributes first has proved itself both more natural and more satisfactory. A change from the author's order is therefore made in the following presentation of the attributes. We take up the communicable attributes first, and then those that are regarded as incommunicable. The order will be as follows :

A. THE COMMUNICABLE ATTRIBUTES : Power, Knowledge, Wisdom, Holiness, Goodness, Love, Truth, Justice, Will.

B. THE INCOMMUNICABLE ATTRIBUTES : Simplicity, Infinity, Immutability.

to ascribe power to God: (1) In such passages as directly ascribe power to him: Jer. 32 : 17; Ps. 115 : 3; Eph. 1 : 19; 3 : 20. (2) By reference to his unlimited works: Jer. 10 : 12; John 1 : 3; Acts 17 : 24. (3) By declaring that what he does is done by mere will without labor, by his word; as in the whole account of creation in the beginning of Genesis and in Ps. 32 : 9. (4) By denying the necessity of great means and asserting that what he does can be done with the many or the few: 1 Sam. 14 : 6; 2 Chron. 14 : 11. (5) By figurative or anthropomorphic expressions, as "the hand," "the right hand of God," "the strong hand," "the arm," "the arm not shortened": Exod. 15 : 6; Num. 11 : 23; Josh. 4 : 24; Neh. 1 : 10; Job 40 : 9; Ps. 98 : 1; Isa. 50 : 2; 59 : 1.

II. GOD'S POWER DESCRIBED.

I. AS ABSOLUTE AND ACTUAL. God's power is *absolute*, in the sense that there is no limitation upon it except that of his own nature. (See below). The *actual* power of God is the power which he really exercises; it is the absolute power of God under the limitations of his will.

Knapp makes a division of absolute and ordinate, making the absolute that by which he created the world out of nothing, and the ordinate that by which he continues to create or produce according to the laws he has established, as by secondary causes, as in the production of plants, animals, etc. But these are different kinds of exercise of power, not different kinds of power.

2. AS CONTRASTED WITH OUR POWER. God's power differs from ours in three particulars: (1) We cannot do whatever we choose, even if it be right. (2) We cannot do it without intermediate means. (3) We cannot do it at any moment we please, but only when the circumstances favor. Whatever may be the power of man, it is evident that it is marked by limitations, not only as to what can be done, but also as to the way in which it may be done. In ascribing power to God, however, we must exclude all such limitation.

3. AS LIMITED BY HIS OWN NATURE. But while God is, indeed, not subject to the limitations which thus affect us, he is limited in his power. These limitations, however, are such as arise, not from without, but from the excellence and perfection of his own nature. Hence the limitations are concurrent with his will, which can never desire to do what his nature does not permit. For example: (1) God cannot create a being or world

to which his essential incommunicable attributes can be given, viz.: Infinity, embracing eternity and immensity and self-existence. (2) He cannot create a being whose nature is sinful. The nature he bestows on any creature becomes the law of that creature, so that for any nature to be sinful it must have been changed from conformity to the law of its creation. (3) He cannot deal with any of his creatures unjustly, nor can he in any way commit sin. (4) He cannot change his own nature nor his decrees or purpose. (5) He cannot do impossibilities of any kind.

If it be asked why he can do none of these things, the answer is, because his own nature is to him the law of what he does as well as of what he wills and of what he is. He is not just and holy because he wills to be so, but he wills to be just and holy because he is so. His will does not make his nature, but his nature controls his will.

III. APPARENT OBJECTION TO GOD'S INFINITE POWER.

An apparent objection to the infinite power of God is the presence of sin in the universe. The holiness, justice, and even goodness of God render it impossible that sin can be either created or permitted as something indifferent to God. He must hate it and punish it wherever it appears. Its presence, therefore, is due either to the fact that he could not prevent it or that he has permitted it for some wise purpose. That its presence is due to such purpose, and not to lack of power in God, appears from two considerations:

1. HE COULD HAVE PREVENTED IT. This he could have done: (1) By not creating beings capable of sinning. (2) By not allowing them to be placed in circumstances which would lead to sin. (3) By sustaining and fortifying them in those circumstances, so as to counteract the temptation and keep them from sinning. (4) By the immediate destruction of those who have sinned. The objection is to the continuance of sin rather than to its origin.

2. IT HAS SERVED ONLY THE MORE SIGNALLY TO DISPLAY THAT POWER. (1) Over sin itself, in its destruction and punishment. (2) Over its final victims by causing them to feel and acknowledge the terrible power of his wrath. (3) Over others by their signal deliverance through his power, not only from the penalty but from the presence of sin. (4) In the sin itself, by exhibiting that restraining and conquering power by which God makes evil itself to work out his purposes of good and glory.

CHAPTER II. KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.

The next attribute of God which we consider is the attribute of knowledge, or intelligence. It is one of the qualities or characteristics of man, made in the image of God, that he is able to take cognizance of things and to form an estimate or appreciation of them. We are sure that God has this same attribute also, only in a vastly greater degree.

SECTION I. ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE.

I. THE PROOF OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE.

This may be proved :

1. FROM HIS SPIRITUALITY; for intelligence is an essential element of spiritual existence.

2. FROM HIS PERFECTION; for the perfect one must have intelligence as one of his perfections.

3. FROM HIS CAUSAL RELATIONS to other beings and things. (1) As the cause of mental power and action in others he must himself be possessed of mind. As the Scriptures aptly inquire, "He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? he that formed the eye, shall he not see?" (Ps. 94 : 9) so may we ask, he that made the mind and gave the power of thought and knowledge, shall he be without intelligence? (2) The effects he has produced show that they are the result of conscious action in the fulfillment of purpose which he has formed. His causation is not like that of mechanical or chemical forces, which operate with blind productiveness or effective operation toward ends unknown to them and not predetermined. This is possible to secondary causes, because they are the instruments of some other cause, itself intelligent and purposing. But intelligence and purpose are necessarily present in him who is the great First Cause, the prime mover and designer of all else that exists. All the evidences of design in creation, therefore, prove the intelligence of him who bears to it the relation of its first cause. (3) It is sometimes argued from his omnipresence, but omnipresence alone would not prove intelligence. His intelligence, however, having been established, his omnipresence enables us to determine the extent of his knowledge.

II. THE METHOD OF GOD'S KNOWING.

The question arises as to the method of God's knowing. How does God know? In what way does he possess knowledge?

1. NOT AS WE GAIN IT, BY USING FACULTIES FITTED TO ACQUIRE IT. There is in God nothing corresponding to observation, comparison, generalization, deduction, processes of reasoning by which we pass from one step to another, or the contemplation or conjecture of suppositions or theories by which we account for facts.

2. NOT BY INCREASE. The knowledge of God, therefore, not being acquired, cannot be increased. Time does not add to it. Succession of events does not bring it before God. All the objects of his knowledge are to him eternally present and known.

3. NOT BY INTUITION. It is even improper to speak of his knowing by intuition, as is frequently done.

4. BY A POWER PECULIAR TO HIMSELF. God has in his nature a power of knowing altogether peculiar to himself. The real nature or character of this power and the method of its exercise are both beyond our comprehension. We only know, as we have said above, that the knowledge which God has through this power or attribute is not something acquired; it is with him, so to speak, an eternal vision of the divine intelligence.

III. THE OBJECTS OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE.

What now are the objects of God's knowledge? They are:

1. HIMSELF. God knows himself—his nature or essence; the personal relations subsisting in that essence; all that that nature is and all that it can appear to be in its manifestations; all that the purposes of God include and all that might be purposed by him, whether to be done or to be permitted.

2. HIS CREATION. He knows his creation in all its fullness; in its whole extent, whether marked by magnitude, or minuteness, or variety. The whole universe, with its innumerable worlds, is ever before him, while not an atom of dust or the most microscopic of sensitive existences is unperceived thoroughly. He knows not merely inanimate matter and simple animal natures, but all spiritual beings; their very essences, which to them remain unknown, and even the very intents and thoughts of their hearts. "When Thales was asked if some of the actions of men were not unknown to God he replied, 'not even their thoughts.'"¹ An inspired writer has taught us that God knows us even better than we know ourselves. "Hereby shall we know that we are of the truth, and shall assure our heart before him, whereinsoever

¹ Knapp's "Theology."

our heart condemn us ; because God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things" (1 John 3 : 19, 20). His knowledge is not limited to the manifestations and operations of spiritual beings, but extends to their essences, and includes not only what they are, but also those tendencies which indicate what they may be.

3. THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE. He knows all the past, present, and future of all things, knowing the future with the same certainty and accuracy with which he knows the present and past ; for that future is already as present to him as though actually existing with the creatures and time belonging to it, and is as distinctly perceived as it shall be then. Still more specifically as to his knowledge of future events it may be said : (1) That he knows all events that are certain or fixed. The certainty that they will come to pass is based upon his decree. He therefore knows all things that shall come to pass. (2) He knows all events that could possibly come to pass. This is based upon his infinite knowledge of himself and of all his creatures, by which all things or events which could at any time or under any circumstances occur are known to him. In these two classes are necessarily included all objects of knowledge.

SECTION II. SCIENTIA MEDIA—SO CALLED.

In addition to these kinds of knowledge which God has of events a new sort of knowledge has been attributed to him by some theologians. It is called *Scientia Media*, that is, a middle sort of knowledge, which is supposed to be different from either of the kinds mentioned above. This so-called *Scientia Media* has been attributed to God in at least three different forms :

I. THE FIRST FORM.

1. THEORY STATED. Knapp lays down a kind of knowledge which he calls a knowledge of contingent events, or events which might take place under certain circumstances ; for example, that God foresees that if James lives until he is grown he will commit murder ; he therefore determines to prevent this by removing him from life. The knowledge of the murder is here claimed to be that of a contingent event. And hence it is claimed to be another kind of knowledge.

2. THEORY ANSWERED. It is readily admitted that such murder does not come under the classification of things certain or decreed,—for it will not take place,—yet it does come under the

head of "things possible," which, as we have seen above, are known to God; and between it and all other possible things no distinction can be made.

II. A SECOND FORM.

I. THEORY STATED. Another form of *Scientia Media* is held by some. According to this some future events are known to God as events that will take place, but his knowledge of these events is attained, not through his decree, but through his foreknowledge that under certain circumstances a man will pursue one course of action rather than another. This kind of *Scientia Media* teaches: (1) That the future event is certain. (2) That God knows it as such. (3) That his knowledge, however, does not arise from his decree. (4) But from his knowledge of the nature of the man, together with that of the circumstances that will surround him, he knows that he will act in a particular way. This theory agrees with the usual orthodox statement in saying, first, that the events are certain, and secondly, that God knows them as such. It also admits as to some events that God brings them about according to his decrees, and hence that his knowledge of them rests upon his decrees. It differs from the orthodox theory in points (3) and (4) in asserting that the knowledge on God's part concerning some events does not arise from his decree, but is simply the result of his foreknowledge as to how a man will act under certain circumstances.

2. THEORY ANSWERED. This theory does not make a place for any knowledge on God's part additional to the two kinds mentioned in (1) and (3). It admits the continued preservation of all things with all their powers. This, however, can only result from God's providential action, and involves all that concurrence with events on the part of God through which alone they preserve and exercise effectively the powers he has given them. But if this is true, then there is a decree, determination, intention, purpose, or whatever else men may call it,—in the broadest language, *a will* or *volition* on God's part,—to leave these things so to operate. And upon this will or decree is based his knowledge that these things will be; for without the knowledge of such a purpose, how could he know that he will not at some time choose to change the circumstances or prevent their accomplishment of the event? The orthodox distinction between absolute and permissive decrees meets all the requirements of the case, and there is no need to postulate any kind of knowledge in God other than that which

rests upon his eternal decree or purpose, to *bring about* or to *permit* everything that comes to pass. It may be remarked, however, as to these two forms of *Scientia Media* that in neither of them is there any serious disagreement from the truth. The objection to them is more the lack of accuracy and the mistaken notion that some new idea is involved. Or rather the great objection is the purpose by which men have been led, viz., a desire to lay down the distinction of conditional decrees in salvation. According to these so-called conditional decrees: First, God offers salvation to every man. Secondly, he does not decree any man's salvation or damnation. Thirdly, he only decrees one's salvation *if he believes*, or his damnation *if he does not believe*. Fourthly, the knowledge which God is admitted to have had of the event, it is claimed, arises from foresight that under the circumstances in which the man is placed he will exercise or will not exercise belief.

The *Scientia Media* is, therefore, introduced to show how an event can be known as something that will actually take place, and yet as something not fixed by a decree of God, and consequently known upon some other ground than because decreed. This we have shown to be a mistaken conception in the forms already examined.

III. A THIRD FORM.

I. THEORY STATED. A third kind of *Scientia Media* is by no means so harmless as the two already presented, although its absurdity is readily seen. It is given in Dr. J. Pye Smith's "First Lines of Christian Theology," p. 145, as follows:

God foresees all future events depending upon the will of his voluntary agents (*i. e.*, all possible beings and all possible actions of all possible beings), under a position of antecedents endlessly varied; and that, then, in every case certain consequents will follow. But he does not certainly know which of these, in the endless number of possible antecedents, a voluntary creature will choose and practise. He only knows what will be the result under every possible variation of these antecedents. When, therefore, the creature has made his election and fulfilled his course of action the Deity may say that he foreknew the whole.

2. THEORY ANSWERED. The objections to this scheme are manifest: (1) It makes God, whose purposes we see constantly manifested to us, a God of no purpose at all. He can have no end; he can only know that at any time given in the universe some one end of many myriads may be the one attained. (2) It

is contrary to the power to prophesy the actual events which shall happen at a given time, which God has exercised through his prophets. (3) It is opposed to his independence, for it makes him dependent upon the will of his creatures, and not their actions dependent upon him. (4) It is opposed to his perfection, for that perfection forbids the idea of increase or addition from without ; yet, according to this view, his knowledge is constantly increasing as to what is done by his creatures. Every moment that which heretofore has been only one of many possibilities becomes a certain event. (5) As there can be no reason for God's will not being effective at least in some respects in man, this *Scientia Media*, which rests upon the idea that God ought not thus to operate on the mind even by a purpose, must be a misconception. Else how could God bestow influences upon intelligent creatures which are fitted to affect their minds, as in the gift of Christ or of the Spirit. Even the conscience within ought not to exercise its powers, nor even to exist in man. If it be said that these would only operate with the free consent of the party, it may be replied that such is the case with all the influences arising in connection with God's decrees. Is it said that these are influences for good only? So also is it in connection with his decrees. The effective decrees of God, by which he changes in any respect the will of his creatures, are altogether connected with influences for good. In all other respects men are left to act as they please. But their action is known, and known because of God's decree to leave them thus to act. (6) That God should exert no influence over his intelligent creatures also involves that he be excluded from the physical universe. The very circumstances under which, according to *Scientia Media*, men are supposed to act, are circumstances arising from things around them as well as within them. Neither can he who can control these circumstances be shut out from the control of those physical events which he knows will affect the will of a voluntary agent. If it be necessary to responsible freedom of the will that man shall not be influenced at all, God must be excluded from the universe ; yea, every other being and thing except man. Every man must be completely isolated from all others, even so far that he shall suppose that he owes no obligations of obedience, and that none shall know his action. These absurd conclusions might even be further extended. (7) The passages in Scripture supposed to support *Scientia Media* do not sustain it. These are Gen. 3 : 22 ; Exod. 4 : 8 ; 1 Sam. 23 : 5-14 ; Jer. 38 : 17-20 ; Matt. 11 : 21, 23 ; Acts 27 : 22. 31.

CHAPTER III. WISDOM, HOLINESS, GOODNESS,
LOVE, AND TRUTH.

I. WISDOM.

Closely akin to the attribute of knowledge is the attribute of wisdom. By many the distinction between these is not clearly perceived. The two are, however, essentially different.

Wisdom is that power which enables one to put to practical use the knowledge and skill which he possesses, to choose wise ends of action, and to attain these ends by wise means. It is that guidance of the understanding under which the will determines wisely its pleasure, and puts forth power to accomplish it.

Wisdom in God is infinite and unerring, choosing always the best end and the best means of attaining it. It is seen in creation and in providence, but is most signally manifested in redemption.

II. HOLINESS.

Holiness, although usually classed among the attributes of God, is strictly speaking not a distinct attribute at all, but rather the combination of all the moral attributes. We may suppose a being in whom there may be love without justice, or truth, or any one of these to the exclusion of the other two; but no being can be holy who does not combine in himself all of these, and all other moral perfections. Nor, when we have such a combination, is there anything to be added to constitute holy character. It is evident, therefore, that holiness is the sum of all excellence and the combination of all the attributes which constitute perfection of character.

III. GOODNESS.

It is doubtful also whether goodness may be properly classified as a distinct attribute. In one aspect of the word, it is merely equivalent to holiness. If we look at it as marking the excellence of God's nature, as we often use it with reference to man, we mean by it simply holiness. Thus, when we say of any one, he is a good man, we mean to assert the combination of traits of character, such as have just been pointed out as constituting holiness. This is the goodness which terminates in God himself. On the other hand, the goodness of God may be spoken of as kindness, benevolence, or beneficence toward others, in which it is seen to terminate outside of himself. Thus we speak of him as being very good to us. Thus the psalmist says: "Surely good-

ness and mercy shall follow me all the days of my life" (Ps. 23 : 6). On account of this ambiguity in the word it is perhaps best to consider goodness, in its first aspect, as merely holiness, and therefore as disposed of in what we have said of that ; and to refer it in this second respect to one of the divisions into which the love of God naturally falls.

IV. LOVE.

Of this there are five kinds, which vary according to the object upon which love is exercised. The attribute in God is the same ; but it is in its exit, or in its termination, that it assumes these different forms.

I. LOVE OF COMPLACENCY OR APPROBATION. This is exercised toward a worthy object in which excellencies are perceived. It is of the nature of the love of the beautiful, or the good, or the useful in us. It complacently or approvingly regards, because there is in the object something worthy of such regard. This is exercised by God in its highest degree in the love of himself, of his own nature and character, because the infinitely excellent must be to God the highest object of complacent love. Were God but one person, in this way only could such love be exercised. But in the trinity of the Godhead there is found in the love of the separate persons toward each other another mode in which this love of complacency may in this highest sense be exercised. Such love is also felt by God for his purposes. As he perceives them to be just, wise, and gracious, he approves and regards them with complacent love.

But this love extends itself also to the creations which result from this purpose. This is true of inanimate creation. It is perfect, as far as conformed to his will, and fitted to accomplish his end, and as such God can regard it and pronounce it good. This we find he did in the creation (Gen. 1 : 10, 12). The same record is made in ver. 25 as to the animal creation, before that of man ; and after the creation and investiture of man with the dominion over the earth, with its plants and animals, we are told (ver. 31), "And God saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it was very good." The complacent love of God, therefore, extends not only to himself and his will, but to all his innocent creation and even to inanimate nature. This love of complacency, however, as it is exercised in its highest degree toward himself, so also is it exhibited, in the nearest approach to that, toward those beings who are most like himself, having been made in his nature and

likeness. An innocent angel, or an innocent man, is therefore by nature a joy to God, as is the child to the father who sees in it a peculiar likeness to himself.

But the guilty cannot thus be loved. Sinful man cannot receive such love, so long as sinful. Even the penitent believer in Jesus, until the time of his perfect sanctification in the life to come, and doubtless even then, has access to God only through Christ, and of himself can in no respect secure the approbation of God.

2. LOVE OF BENEVOLENCE. This corresponds to the idea of God's goodness toward his creatures. It is the product of his wishes for their happiness. It is not dependent on their character, as is the love of complacency, but is exercised toward both innocent and guilty. It is general in its nature, not special, and exists toward all, even toward devils and wicked men; because God's nature is benevolent, and therefore he must wish for the happiness of his creatures. That that happiness is not attained, nor attainable, is due not to him, but to their own sin. When the benevolence of God is exercised actively in the bestowment of good things upon his creatures, it is called his beneficence. By the former he wishes them happiness, by the latter he confers blessings to make them so. This is done to the wicked also, as well as to the righteous. It is to this that Christ refers (Matt. 5 : 45): "He maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust."

3. LOVE OF COMPASSION. This corresponds with our idea of pity. It is benevolent disposition to those who are suffering or in distress. This also may be exercised toward the guilty or the innocent, if it be possible to suppose that guilt and suffering are separable. It has been very commonly held that they are inseparable. Pain, suffering, and distress have been believed to be the result of sin, and consequently inseparable from guilt. But this is a mistaken notion. Man in a state of innocence was made capable of physical suffering. That capacity was necessary to the protection of his physical organism. The lower animals also suffer. Whatever addition to the capacity of suffering has therefore been made by the fall, and is the consequence of sin, we are not on account of that forced to the conclusion that there can be no suffering where there has been no sin. The capacity to suffer may so belong to a higher organism that we would naturally choose that organism with that capacity, rather than a lower one without it. If so, God can justly so create us. If misery then

may be the lot of the innocent, God's love of compassion can be exercised toward such. It can be and is also exercised toward the guilty. We see this in the forbearance with which he delays their punishment, in his constant offers of mercy, in his yearnings after their salvation, and most signally in the gift of his only begotten Son, "that whosoever believeth on him should not perish but have eternal life" (John 3 : 16).

4. MERCY. This can be exercised only toward sinners. Its very nature contemplates guilt in its objects. It consists not only in the desire not to inflict the punishment due to sin, and the neglect and refusal to do so, but in the actual pardon of the offender. It cannot be exercised toward a righteous being, because in him is no sin or guilt to be pardoned. It is, however, no new attribute in God which has arisen because of the existence of sin, and which is therefore an addition to his attributes. It is a virtue inherent in his nature, and is especially only one form in which his love exhibits itself, the same love as that benevolence which innocent creatures call forth, and the same love which in another form of complacency has been eternally exercised in the Godhead.

When we say that this mercy must be exercised in accordance with the truth and justice of God, we say no more than is true of every attribute of God. No one can be exercised in such a way as to destroy another. Every one must be in harmony with the others. Or, remembering what we have before stated, that these attributes are not separate faculties, all that is meant in this case, as in all others, is that God must act in harmony with his nature.

The objects of the exercise of this attribute are all those to whom God pardons offenses of any kind. They are not to be confined to redeemed sinners, although this is the most signal exhibition. Under the ancient economy God ruled as theocratic ruler over Israel. Sins of the nation and sins of individuals in their capacity of citizens of the nation were pardoned. Under that dispensation God occupied to that people the position of an earthly ruler, and consequently could pardon sins against his government at will upon repentance, and upon merely governmental principles—that is, such as would secure obedience to the law, and peace and order and the welfare of the nation. These were offenses against the mere person of the king or the laws of his State, and not against the fundamental principles of holiness and righteousness; hence sovereignty and expediency

could decide in each case what might be done, and mercy was exercised and justice dispensed accordingly.

But this is very different from the case of God, the righteous judge, the dispenser, not of arbitrary law, but of a law based upon his own nature and that of man, essential obedience to which is necessary, not for maintaining government, but for preserving and maintaining the right and preventing the violation with impunity of eternal law. In both cases God must act in harmony with his whole nature. But in that of Israel no obstacle was presented by that nature to the pardon of individual and national sins against the theocratic king. Hence mercy was extended, apparently at least, without compensation to justice. Yet amid it all, there was, in the sacrificial offerings with which the people were required to approach God seeking pardon for both individual and national political sins, such a typical relation to the atonement made by Christ as shows that in some way in that atonement, after all, may be found the reason why God, even in those cases, could be just and yet justify the offenders.

5. AFFECTION. This differs from that of complacency inasmuch as it does not always demand a worthy object. This is exhibited in the parable of the "Prodigal Son." It differs from that of benevolence, inasmuch as its object is not viewed in general with all others, but is one of special interest. It differs from that of compassion and that of mercy, because the object may be neither in distress nor sinful. It arises from, (1) Mutual relationship: as of the Father to the Son, and of all the persons in the Trinity toward each other; of God to Israel, of Christ to his apostles, his disciples and his church, and of the adopted sons to God the Father. (2) From dependence: as of creatures on the Creator, and of the redeemed upon the Redeemer. (3) From ownership: as of God over man, of God over Israel, and of Christ over the redeemed. This is illustrated in the lost coin in Luke 15 : 8, 9.

This kind of love originates in each of these ways in man, and as the Scriptures show, is also found in God. It is from this aspect of God's love that grace proceeds, which is to be distinguished from love and pity and mercy. Love, as we have seen, is the general characteristic, exhibiting itself in these five different forms. Mercy is one of these, but is given to the guilty only. Pity is given to guilty or innocent, who may be in distress, pain, or suffering. Grace is also given to guilty or innocent, and does not necessarily suppose distress in the object, but involves

an affectionate interest in it, arising either from a peculiar relation to it, or ownership of it, or from compassion for its dependence. Grace is undeserved favor to innocent or guilty, arising from affection. Mercy is undeserved compassion to the guilty only.¹

V. TRUTH.

The expression, "truth of God," is ambiguous. When used to designate an attribute of God it is understood to express the idea of God's veracity. It refers to God's absolute reliability and entire faithfulness to his word and to his nature. Says the sacred writer, "Let God be true and every man a liar." "It is impossible that God should lie." God is incapable of deceiving.

This is an attribute of God's nature, which, like his power, exists and makes him what he is, even though there be no outward relation to it. By virtue of it he is the source of all truth, not moral only, but even mathematical.

In its relation to God's creatures it is the foundation of their confidence in the knowledge obtained through the use of their own faculties, whether by intuition, observation, or reason. Whatever imperfection there is in such knowledge is perceived to be due to the creature, and not to God the Creator. Upon it is also based belief in the revelations God makes to man of facts beyond the attainment of merely human power.

The Scriptures affirm the veracity of God in the strongest terms. In addition to its assertion in numerous passages we are told (Ps. 108 : 4) that his "truth reacheth unto the skies." In Titus 1 : 2, he is called "God, who cannot lie."

CHAPTER IV. JUSTICE OF GOD.

By justice is meant that rectitude of character which leads to the treatment of others in strict accordance with their deserts.

¹ The reviser is accustomed to substitute, with his classes, quite a different presentation of love. He regards love as the principle of willing self-impartation, or devotion. The best characterization of this principle is found in the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians. This principle of self-impartation, or self-giving, has its natural emotions. These emotions will vary much according to the object upon which the love exercises itself. If the object loved is lovely, then the emotion of loving is that of complacency. If the object loved is one needing kindness or beneficence, the emotion is that of benevolence. If the object is in distress, the emotion is that of compassion, or pity, etc. Just as the active principle of fire is the same, whatever may be the character of the material upon which it lays hold, so the principle of love is always essentially the same. There are not, as the author says, "several kinds of love." But as the flame upon the fire depends much upon the material used, so the emotions of love depend largely upon the character and condition of the object loved. The emotions of love vary ; the principle of love is always the same.

The justice of God differs in no respect from this attribute as seen among his rational creatures, except that his justice must be perfect, while theirs is imperfect, and his must be impartial, while theirs is partial. These differences, however, exist in the exercise of justice, and not in the thing itself. They rise from the limited knowledge, reason, and perception of right and wrong among men, and from the extent to which they naturally yield to their prejudices and passions. In the all-perfect Being, however, justice has none of these deficiencies and must be exercised according to its strictest nature and in every conceivable form of perfection. To all, therefore, he must deal out absolute justice, whatever they deserve, only what they deserve, and the full measure of what they deserve.

I. DIFFERENT FORMS OF JUSTICE.

Inasmuch as the justice of God may be considered as a principle or attribute which exists in himself, or as it is manifested toward his creatures, a distinction has been made as it is viewed in these aspects, between God's absolute and relative justice.

1. ABSOLUTE JUSTICE. By absolute justice is meant that rectitude of the divine nature, in consequence of which God is infinitely righteous in himself. This rectitude is essential to him and existed before there was a creation in which to exhibit it.

2. RELATIVE JUSTICE. By the relative justice of God is meant that justice as exhibited toward and exercised upon his creatures in the dispensation of the universe. It is seen in the nature of the laws he gives, in his impartiality in dealing with those subjected to them, and in his maintenance of right and virtue; by the threats and promises which he attaches to them, and his punishment of those who violate them. To this form of justice is often applied the name of rectoral justice, inasmuch as it is justice exercised by a ruler, in the form of government and by means of laws.

3. COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE. There is a form of justice known among men as commutative justice, which consists in giving to each one his due in the barter and exchange of commerce, or in any other of the mutual relations of life. As this is based upon the ground of mutual obligation, and therefore is not suited to a being entirely independent of others, it cannot properly be ascribed to God. The blessings given in consequence of his promises to man are not matters of obligation, but of grace. The only aspect in which this form of justice could be connected

with God would be as between the Father and the Son in conferring upon his people those blessings which the Son had purchased through his sufferings. It is in this sense that the Scripture says that God is "faithful and righteous to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness" (1 John 1 : 9).

II. PUNITIVE JUSTICE ESPECIALLY CONSIDERED.

Under the head of "relative justice" there is a form of justice which is known as punitive or vindicatory justice. This has reference to the infliction of punishment upon those who have violated God's laws. Especially is it understood as applying to those who have violated moral laws. The ground upon which such offenders against God's law are punished is not simply the fact that a law of God has been broken, but that, in the breaking of that law, essential right has been violated and wrong committed. It would be sufficient to authorize punishment that the law of the ruler is broken. Still it might appear that the will of the ruler might remit a punishment due to a mere violation of his will. But the law of God, it is claimed, is based upon the immutable distinctions between right and wrong and sin and holiness as they exist in the nature of God. Its violation, therefore, is sin. It is a destruction of the right. And the righteous and holy nature of God is such as to demand the punishment of the guilty. It is when justice is regarded in this aspect that it is called punitive or vindicatory justice.

This form of justice, however, is not admitted by all. There are some who say that God does not punish sin in any other respect than as a violation of his will. Still others claim that he does not even *punish* the violations of his will. Because of this positive or virtual denial of punitive justice, and because of the far-reaching evil that comes from erroneous views as to the punishment of sin, special attention will be given to this subject.

I. THREE QUESTIONS THAT ARISE. Three questions arise in this connection : (1) Does God really *punish* the violations of his law? (2) Does he punish them because they are mere violations, or because they are sin? (3) Is this done because of anything essential in his nature, or because it is expedient for governmental or other purposes?

2. THREE THEORIES GROWING OUT OF THESE QUESTIONS. Out of these questions three theories have grown : (1) The Universalists and some Socinians deny that God *punishes* even the violations of his law. They regard the precepts of morality and

duty set forth in his word as merely intended to guide us in this life. When this life is ended there may be no dealing with man for such violation. They are only for a temporary purpose, and having accomplished that purpose will have no further effect. God looks now only to the good of his creatures, and if the same method of dealing be extended beyond this life, it will be only for a time and only for the good of those who suffer. According to this, these are not punishments but chastisements, and God is moved by goodness and not by justice. (2) A second theory is that the laws given by God are merely exponents of his will ; that the ground upon which he commands is simply his sovereignty ; that, looking at the universe as a world to be created and to be occupied by his moral creatures, he selected such a system of laws as seemed to him best to secure the welfare of those creatures, and that these laws while seeking the happiness, not of the individuals, but of the mass, are such as are really best fitted to that end ; and that the justice of God is seen in so administering these laws by rewarding those who obey and punishing those who disobey, as to maintain his government and thus secure the welfare of the whole. God punishes sin, therefore, under this system, but he punishes it, not because of its heinous nature, but because it is best that men should not sin, and thus the best interest of all is secured by preventing by punishment the commission of sin. The end he has in view, therefore, is rather to furnish a spectacle which shall restrain sin than to perform an act demanded by the inherent nature of sin. It is his rectoral justice, therefore, rather than his vindictory justice, that is thus shown. This theory embraces four points: *a.* God punishes offenses or sins ; *b.* the object is only the better to secure the welfare of his moral creatures ; *c.* the laws of his government are based entirely upon his mere will ; *d.* consequently he punishes sin, not because of its inherent desert, but because the general happiness of his creatures and not his own holiness demands it. (3) The third theory is different in all respects, except the first of these points: *a.* it agrees that God punishes sin ; *b.* but it makes his object the maintenance of the right ; *c.* his laws and actions are based upon the immutable principles of right ; *d.* he punishes sin because from its nature it demands punishment from him.

3. THESE THEORIES CONSIDERED. It may be said in general as to these theories that the difficulty in attaining a correct conclusion is enhanced by the fact, that whatever might have been

the origin of these laws, the laws themselves would have been practically the same. Hence, no conclusion can be drawn from the nature of the laws themselves. It is manifest that God, in the establishment of the government of the world for any purpose, will not give to it laws contrary to his nature. It does not follow, however, because the same effect may be produced by either of these causes, that it is therefore unimportant to which of them it is assigned. There may be, and in the present case it is believed that there are, important reasons why only one cause should be assigned and that it should be ascertained to exist in the nature of God. Matters of great moment in connection with the atonement especially, but also with other parts of the plan of salvation, demand the true answer. But this fact is not to be allowed to warp our judgment or to lead us away from the truth. It is only mentioned to show the importance of the subject now under consideration.

(1) As to the first of these theories, it need only be said that the objections to it are partly involved in those to the second, and that those peculiar to it are too plain to need presentation here. They will more properly be considered in connection with the subject of future punishment.

(2) As to the second it may be objected: *a.* "That it makes happiness, and not holiness and virtue, the great end of God. The dictates of nature teach us all plainly that happiness does not occupy this place."¹ *b.* "It destroys the essential difference between right and wrong, which conscience teaches us."² *c.* It supposes that God might have made a world in which precisely opposite moral laws might have prevailed by his command; and that thus it would be his duty in this world to reward, in that world to punish, his creatures for the same action. *d.* It is opposed to the true relation of the will of God to his nature. It ascribes the laws of God to that will. It recognizes those laws as flowing from it alone. They are as God pleased. Now, it is not denied that they come from the free will of God and are such as please him. But they have a higher basis even than his will. That will is influenced by his nature and is its exponent. Now, whether that nature is itself the basis of good and right, or whether good and right considered as distinct from it in the nature of things simply accord perfectly with that nature, the result is the same; the will is influenced by the nature to estab-

¹ Dr. Charles Hodge, Manuscript Lecture.

² *Ibid.*

lish the moral laws for the government of his creatures according to the immutable principles of right and wrong. *e.* This theory is also opposed to the independence of God, who is thus forced to punish sin, not by any law of his own nature, which would still maintain that independence, but from a regard to the government of his creatures, which could not be otherwise maintained.¹ *f.* The instinctive sense of justice in man testifies to the ill-desert of sin. This is the universal testimony of conscience. But conscience speaks for God, and therefore testifies to the fact that, independently of the evil to society, the wrongdoer deserves punishment proportioned to his offense. *g.* Dr. A. A. Hodge, in his "Outlines," thus argues this from the love of holiness and hatred of sin in God: "If the reason for God's punishing was founded only in God's arbitrary will, then he could not be said to hate sin, but only to love his own will, or, if his reason for punishing sin rested upon governmental considerations only, then he could not be strictly said to hate sin, but only its consequences." But both conscience and Scripture teach that God does hate sin and love holiness.

(3) As to the third of these theories, it may be said that this is clearly the doctrine of the Scriptures.

a. General teaching. This is seen first in their general teaching concerning the nature of God and his dealings with his intelligent creatures. The Scriptures represent God as a just God; they do this in such a way as shows that his justice is not simply in his will, but is a part of his nature. They challenge denial of the position that the acts of God are in accordance with right and justice; and they show that these acts are what they are, not because of his sovereignty, but because of the absolute justice of his nature. They present God as actually claiming vindictory or avenging justice, speaking of his justice as hatred of sin and not as a desire to maintain government. Nay, they are constantly showing us instance after instance in which God has exercised that avenging justice, commencing with the ejection of Adam from Paradise and culminating in its highest and most signal example in the sacrificial work of Christ. It is remarkable that all of this can be established from the Scriptures in favor of vindictory justice, and not a passage can be given in proof that God is only active for the maintenance of his government or the mere happiness of his creatures. Indeed, in the Scriptures everywhere it

¹ Altered from Dr. A. A. Hodge's "Outlines."

is God's glory and dishonor, his holiness and sin, his love and his justice, that are placed in fearful contrast.

b. Special passages. This third theory may be still more clearly and emphatically shown to be the doctrine of the Scriptures by reference to certain special passages. Notice: (*a*) Passages in which God is spoken of as having a just character and in which this is held forth as an excellence in him. How can these be accounted for if justice and will are the same, or even if justice is no more than the administration of human affairs according to his plan? Deut. 32 : 4; Job 8 : 3; 34 : 10-12; 36 : 2, 3; Ps. 9 : 4; 11 : 7; 33 : 4, 5; 71 : 19; 89 : 14; 92 : 15; 97 : 2; 99 : 4; 119 : 137, 138; Zeph. 3 : 5; Rom. 2 : 2. (*b*) Passages in which God's claim to this character is vindicated by asserting his justice and his impartiality toward all men : Gen. 18 : 16-33; Deut. 10 : 17; Job 37 : 24; Eccl. 3 : 17; 12 : 14; Ezek. 18 : 29; Acts 10 : 34, 35; 17 : 31; Rom. 2 : 3-6, 11; 14 : 12; Gal. 2 : 6; Eph. 6 : 8; Col. 3 : 25; 1 Peter 1 : 17; Jude 15. (*c*) Passages in which God's justice is spoken of. It is never based upon his will nor his economy, but, *aa.* judgment is always based upon his righteousness : Ps. 9 : 8; 50 : 4, 6; 96 : 10, 13; 98 : 9; *bb.* his economy among the Jews is commended, not because of its setting forth his will, but because of its justice or righteousness : Deut. 4 : 8; Ps. 19 : 7-9; 119 : 138. (*d*) Passages in which God speaks of his justice as being a hatred of sin : Ps. 5 : 4, 5; Hab. 1 : 13. (*e*) Passages in which God is spoken of as a jealous God, exercising avenging justice : Exod. 20 : 5; Deut. 32 : 34, 35, 39, 41-43; Ps. 94 : 1, 2; Isa. 34 : 8; 66 : 6; Heb. 10 : 26-31. (*f*) Passages in which the dealings of God with his enemies are spoken of in connection with such words as anger, wrath, fury, etc. : Num. 12 : 9; Deut. 32 : 22; Judg. 10 : 7; 2 Sam. 22 : 8; Job 19 : 11; Ps. 2 : 5; 7 : 11; 21 : 9; 90 : 11; Isa. 28 : 21; 30 : 30; Jer. 30 : 24; Lam. 2 : 3; 3 : 43; Ezek. 5 : 13; 38 : 18; Hosea 12 : 14; Nahum 1 : 6. (*g*) Passages in which angels are spoken of as ministers of such vengeance. These are not introduced as proof of the justice of God, but simply as parts of transactions by which that justice is manifested : Num. 22 : 22-31; 2 Sam. 24 : 16; 1 Chron. 21 : 14-16, 27; Ps. 35 : 5, 6; Rev. 7 : 1-3; 9 : 15; 15 : 1; 16 : 17. (*h*) The instances given of the actual exercise of God's wrath are associated, not merely with the idea of producing effect in his moral government, nor with the exercise of his mere will, but with results produced by his emotions against sin, or, in other words, his avenging justice.

Some of these are: *aa.* the fallen angels; *bb.* our first parents; *cc.* Sodom and Gomorrah; *dd.* the flood; *ee.* the plagues of Egypt; *ff.* the punishments of the children of Israel in the wilderness; *gg.* the captivity of the Jews; *hh.* God's punishment of heathen nations because of their wicked instrumentality in the exercise of his wrath against the delinquent Israelites; and *ii.* the threatened eternal punishment of the wicked. (*i*) Passages which point out something in Christ's work as essential before God could pardon sin: Matt. 26 : 39; Rom. 3 : 26; 2 Cor. 5 : 21.

CHAPTER V. THE WILL OF GOD.

By the will of God is meant that power inherent in his nature, by which he purposes and chooses any end or object, or determines its existence.

I. PROOF THAT GOD HAS THIS POWER.

1. BELONGS TO PERSONALITY. A conscious personal being cannot be without will. Every proof that we have, therefore, that God has personal existence is evidence that he must have will.

2. BELONGS TO PERFECTION. Will is also the attribute of perfection, and must be found in the being of all perfection.

3. BELONGS TO INDEPENDENCE. The absolutely independent God, who is controlled by and dependent upon no person or thing, must have will, which determines his own acts.

4. BELONGS TO SUCH POWER AND WISDOM AND SOVEREIGNTY. The attribute of will cannot be separated from the possession of the power and wisdom seen in the creation of the universe, and in all God's outward acts, for without it the things which wisdom devises and power executes could neither be devised nor executed. It is also essential to the sovereignty by which he rules the universe, for will is the element in which sovereignty consists.

5. SCRIPTURES ASSERT IT. The Scriptures everywhere ascribe this attribute to God. John 1 : 13 : "Born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." Eph. 1 : 5 : "According to the good pleasure of his will." Rom. 8 : 27 : "Maketh intercession according to the will of God." Rom. 12 : 2 : "That good and acceptable and perfect will of God." 1 Cor. 1 : 1 : "Paul an apostle by the will of God," etc.

II. THE OBJECTS OF GOD'S WILL.

The objects of God's will are all beings that exist, and all events that take place.

1. HIS OWN EXISTENCE AND NATURE. God must will his own existence and nature. These are objects of supreme desire. The infinite excellence of that nature, which furnishes a completely worthy object of his complacent love, cannot be contemplated without a correspondingly infinite desire that it should exist and should be what it is. The will thus exercised, however, is not causal as it is toward all other objects. It does not give existence to God nor make his nature what it is, but on the contrary, it is because God exists and has such a nature that he must so will.

2. THE PERSONAL RELATIONS IN THE GODHEAD. The will of God is also exercised in establishing and maintaining the personal relations revealed to us as existing in the Godhead. It is by the will of the Father that he begets the Son, and by the will of the Father and the Son that the Spirit proceeds. The action of the will here is causal, although these relations are eternal, and are characteristic of the Godhead. They are the results of the divine activity, and as effects, must find their ultimate cause in the will which moves to action. The fact, that because this is divine will and action there can be no priority of time in the will to the act, does not forbid the causal relation which, because of the eternity of God, must make cause and effect in him co-eternal.¹

3. THE MUTUAL LOVE OF THE PERSONS. Another exhibition of will in the Divine Being is connected with the mutual love of the divine persons toward each other. This love proceeds from these persons as one form of eternal activity, and is willed by each to the full extent of its infinite exercise.

4. CREATION. The will of God is more plainly made known, however, to his creatures in his outward activity in creation. This was called into existence by the word of his power. He willed and it was done. But for that will it had not been. Viewed as a whole, or in its minutest part, the universe presents everywhere the impress of its Maker's will. To that will is due not only all material, but also all spiritual existence.

¹ The statement made in 1, that the will of God does not give him his existence, nor make his nature what it is, seems irreconcilable with this statement, that the will of God is causal in *establishing* the relations existing in the Godhead. And the first statement is no doubt the correct one. The will of God is an attribute of his eternal nature, and hence cannot have been causal in producing that nature. And these distinctions in the Godhead belong as truly to the essential nature of God as does his unity or his spirituality. It would be as proper, therefore, to hold that the will of God is causal in "establishing" his unity and his spirituality as to hold that it is causal in establishing his triunity.

5. **PROVIDENTIAL CARE.** The will of God is also manifested in his providential care and government of the universe. In creating it he has established laws, both mechanical and spiritual, by which it is regulated. Yet he has not withdrawn his own presence and power in its continued guidance and preservation, but is constantly developing through it and in it his eternal purpose.

6. **REDEMPTION.** In human affairs, however, the will of God is most distinctively exhibited in the work of redemption. Let this be admitted as a true work of God, and at once appear the proofs of a far-reaching end, accomplished by frequent acts of interposition and guidance, in which concentrates and culminates the entire scope of God's outward activity. The will of God is seen to be the propelling force of his devising wisdom and executing power in the accomplishment of one great purpose to which is indissolubly linked all his other acts and volitions.

III. GOD WILLS BOTH NECESSARILY AND FREELY.

A question arises as to this will of God, whether in its exercise he acts necessarily or freely.

It has been answered that his will is exercised both necessarily and freely, according to the object of that will.

1. **HE WILLS NECESSARILY.** God is said to will necessarily, himself, his holy nature and character, and the personal relations in the Godhead. This language may be admitted, if it be borne in mind that the necessity here declared is not one of fate, nor of outward compulsion. Whatever is meant by it must be fully consistent with God's free agency. It is a necessity that arises from his nature, because of which such must be the will of God, that he wills himself, his existence, and the relations of the persons of the Godhead. Such being the nature of the necessity, it would be better to express it in some way which would indicate its source and prevent misapprehension. The word "naturally" would suffice, were it not for its ambiguity in common use; consequently "essentially" is suggested as expressive of all the necessity, and at the same time of all the freedom, which must accompany an act of the will proceeding from the very essence or nature of God.

2. **HE WILLS FREELY.** As to all else than himself, God wills freely, whether his will has regard to their existence, or mode of existence, or their actions, or the events which influence or control them. He does his own will, not that of another. He chooses what and whom he will create, and the times, places, and

circumstances in which he will place those he creates. He marks out to all his intelligent creatures the paths of their lives. He uses them for his purposes. Though he gives to them also like freedom of the will, yet is their will subordinate to his, and, with their actions, is controlled by it. Yet is this so wisely done, and so truly in accordance with their own natures, as fully to preserve in them consciousness and conviction of the power of contrary choice, and of full responsibility for what they choose to do.

When it is said, however, that God wills freely, it is not meant that no influence is exerted upon his will. It is only intended to deny that his will is influenced from without. In all his outward acts, as well as in those within, he is governed by his own nature. That nature and that will must always be in unison. As he is infinitely wise, so must his will and action be directed toward wise ends in the use of wise means. His infinite justice forbids that he should will or do anything contrary to the strictest justice. The God of truth must also purpose in accordance with truth and faithfulness. His love too, which is so gracious a characteristic of God, forbids that he shall will otherwise than benevolently toward all, securing the happiness of the innocent, and desiring this even of the guilty, when it can be made consistent with his justice. The holiness of his nature makes it essential that, as all perfection, in perfect harmony, is involved in that holiness, so also must it be found in every purpose which he forms, as well as in every action by which his purposes are accomplished. When, therefore, God is said to will freely in all matters which are without, it is not meant to deny that he is governed by his nature in all respects in which that nature ought to affect his will.

Nor when it is said that God wills freely must this be understood to mean that he wills arbitrarily. He is not by any means indifferent as to reasons, or grounds, for his willing as he does. There are reasons perceived by him, which induce him to choose one end rather than another, and one set of means to that end in preference to others. There is in each case a prevailing motive, not necessarily dependent upon its own force or power, but upon the simple fact that, in the midst of the numerous ends and means known to him through his infinite knowledge, this motive makes this end and these means best pleasing to him. The very nature of choice in any being of intelligence and free agency makes this the method by which the will forms its decision. There is nothing in the nature of the omniscient and all-purposing God which forbids that this also should be the method of his volitions. Our conception of God in this respect cannot be incorrect, although, as in all instances in which we attempt to arrive at the perfections of God through those recognized as such in man, this conception may be very inadequate.

IV. POINTS OF SIMILARITY AND DISSIMILARITY BETWEEN THE WILL OF MAN AND THE WILL OF GOD.

The discussion of the preceding question shows how truly man, so far as his will is concerned, has been made in the image of God. It suggests the propriety, therefore, of setting forth

more particularly the points of similarity and dissimilarity between the will of man and that of God.

I. SOME POINTS OF SIMILARITY. (1) In man, will is the element in which sovereignty exists ; so also in God. (2) In man, will depends upon the understanding, that is, it is exercised, all other things being equal, in accordance with the dictates of the understanding ; so also in God. (3) In man, the will is essentially influenced by his nature ; so also in God. (4) In man, the will is controlled by the prevailing motive, which is made the strongest, because it is that most pleasing to him ; so also in God.

2. POINTS OF DISSIMILARITY : (1) God never wills what he cannot do ; man often does. (2) In God, the will is never influenced from without ; in man this is frequently done. By the outward control in man is not here meant that physical compulsion by which a man is said to act against his will ; but those legitimate outward influences from persons, circumstances, and events, which lead men freely to choose in accordance with the laws of the mind. (3) In God, the prevailing motive is not only the most pleasing, but presumably the best ; in man, it is only the most pleasing, not the most reasonable and right, nor the most conducive to happiness, but often the very contrary of these. (4) In God there is but one will, or purpose, which comprehends all his ends and means ; he does not will by successive acts, nor in successive moments, but simultaneously and eternally ; man wills successively, one volition follows another, and the volition of one man often succeeds the acts, as well as the volitions, of others. (5) The will of God is always accomplished ; that of man is often defeated. (6) God never changes his will, nor perceives any reason for such change ; man changes his frequently, from caprice, or because of new information, or because he sees the importance of a better life, or is carried off by passion to one that is worse.

V. VARIOUS DISTINCTIONS AS TO THE WILL OF GOD.

Various distinctions as to the will of God have been suggested, some of which are correct, or at least admissible, and others incorrect and objectionable.

The following list is given by Turretin, in the fifteenth and sixteenth questions of his third book. The statements made are in the main taken from his discussion.

I. CORRECT DISTINCTIONS. (1) The first distinction is be-

tween the decretive and preceptive will of God. By the decretive will is meant that will of God by which he purposes or decrees whatever shall come to pass, whether he wills to accomplish it himself effectively or causatively, or to permit it to occur through the unrestrained agency or will of his creatures. In either case, however, he has determined, purposed, or decreed, either to bring it to pass, or to cause or to permit it to be brought to pass. By the preceptive will is meant that which he has prescribed to be done by others. Such are the laws under which he places his creatures, or the duties which he enjoins upon them. It is the rule of duty. The decretive will must always be fulfilled; the preceptive may be disobeyed.

(2) Nearly corresponding to this first distinction is another into the will of *eudokia*, and that of *euarestia*. As the former was taken from two Latin words, so this is from two Greek words, and these Greek words are scriptural. The former division was made in connection with a purpose to do; this in connection with pleasure in doing, or desire to do or see done. But the two correspond in the fact that the will of *eudokia*, like that of decree, comprises what shall certainly be accomplished, and that of *euarestia*, like that of precept, embraces simply what it pleases God that his creatures shall do. It must not be supposed, however, that because of the meaning of *eudokia* (well pleasing), the decretive will expressed by this word is confined to those volitions of God in which the happiness and blessing of man are involved. It was with reference both to evil to some, and blessing to others, that Christ used it when he said: "Yea, Father, for so it was well pleasing in thy sight" (Matt. 11 : 26).

(3) A third distinction is between the will of the *beneplacitum* and that of the *signum*. By the *beneplacitum* is intended a will of God which is confined to himself, until he makes it known by some revelation, or by the event itself. Any will thus made known becomes the *signum*. Manifestly these may differ in several respects. If the will of the *beneplacitum* be confined, as it should be, to the decretive will of God, it will be both broader and narrower than that of the *signum*—broader, because at no time has the whole decretive will of God been revealed, and narrower, because the will of the *signum* must extend also to the preceptive will of God, which God prescribes as duty, and yet does not determine shall be performed. In some cases God even gives commands which are, for the time, a rule of duty, and therefore a part of his preceptive will, and thus also of this will

of *signum*, obedience to which he actually intends to prevent. Thus he ordered Abraham by the will of *signum* to sacrifice Isaac, which was thus made to his servant a rule of duty, yet by the will of *beneplacitum* he not only did not purpose the sacrifice, but intended to interpose to prevent it.

(4) A fourth distinction is between the secret and the revealed will of God. Turretin says : " The former of these is commonly referred to the will of decree, which for the most part is hidden in God ; the latter to the will of the precept, which is revealed and disclosed in the Law and the Gospel. The basis for this distinction is sought in Deut. 29 : 29 : ' The secret things belong unto the Lord our God : but the things that are revealed belong to us and to our children forever, that we may do all the words of this law.' The former is called a great deep and an unsearchable abyss (Ps. 36 : 6 ; Rom. 11 : 33, 34). The latter is accessible to all, nor is it far from us (Deut. 30 : 14 ; Rom. 10 : 8). The former has for its object all those things which God wills either to effect or permit, and which especially he wishes to do concerning each man, and which are therefore absolute and fixed without exception. The latter refers to those things which belong to our duty, and which are conditionally set forth. The former is always done, the latter is often violated."

2. INCORRECT DISTINCTIONS. (1) *Antecedent and consequent volitions*. By this is not meant one will or decree which precedes another in its logical order in the Divine mind, or in its execution by God, as that of the creation of man before that of his redemption ; nor one will of the precept, which consists in the prescribed duty, followed by another which sets forth the consequent rewards and punishments. Were this so, the distinction would be objectionable only because of its inaccuracy in transferring to God such methods of our action, or logical conception, as belong to that succession in our acts and will which cannot exist in God. It would be only the same kind of misstatement, of which orthodox theologians are guilty, when under the form of sublapsarianism, or supralapsarianism, they attempt to set forth the order of God's decrees. But in one form in which this distinction is incorrectly made, it is claimed that a consequent will in God arises after he sees the results of one which is antecedent ; in still another it is claimed that he forms a particular volition especially affecting an individual man following a general volition to seek the happiness of his creatures, or to prescribe a course by which that happiness may be secured.

To the distinction of antecedent and consequent volitions in these forms there are many objections: *a.* It admits succession in the decrees of God, and makes them many when they are but one; *b.* it makes them temporal when they are eternal; *c.* Turretinably argues that thus contrary wills would exist in God, who would thus be at one and the same time willing and not willing the same event; *d.* he also justly states that the antecedent will thus spoken of could be only a mere wishing (*velleitas*), and not a will (*voluntas*); *e.* he suggests that thus the independence of God would be taken away, since he must wait upon man to will and act before he could will.

(2) *Efficacious and inefficacious will.* This distinction would also be admissible if by the efficacious will were meant that of the decree, and by the inefficacious that of the precept. But as introduced, both terms are applied to the will of the decree. Turretin objects to this application because:

In the first place, "the Scripture testifies that the purpose of God is immutable, and his will cannot be resisted (Isa. 46 : 10 ; Rom. 9 : 19). But if it cannot be resisted, he will surely perfect that which he intends. Secondly, inefficacious will cannot be attributed to God, unless he is accused either of ignorance, because he knew not that the event would not occur, or of impotence, because he could not accomplish the result he purposed. And finally, the same reasons which prove that antecedent and consequent will are not allowable, are also proofs against efficacious and inefficacious."

(3) *Absolute and conditional will.* If by the conditional will were meant the conditions appended to the preceptive will of God, in the promises and threats given as inducements to duty, it would not be objected to. But the object of those who present it is to apply it to the decretive will, and to suppose that God in his purposes determines on certain conditions that he will do a certain act which he will not do if those conditions fail. Whether these conditions shall fail or not, is supposed to be unknown to God, or if known, yet at least so far undetermined, that he has formed no purpose whether or not to permit or to accomplish them. The purposes of God thus formed are not, therefore, absolute decrees, as are all those concerning what shall actually and absolutely take place, but are only conditional ones, based upon some antecedent condition which must first occur. This distinction is introduced chiefly to show how God can make an absolute decree about the salvation of mankind in general, and yet not about that of any one man in particular. Absolutely he decrees the salvation in general of all who believe.

But the salvation of each one is decreed only upon the condition that he believes. Whether that faith will be exercised by any one is not determined by God. Nor is it even known to God as involved in any purpose made by him. Such is the theory and purpose of this distinction. The objections presented against the other two of these incorrect distinctions are also justly made against it.

B. THE INCOMMUNICABLE ATTRIBUTES

The incommunicable attributes of God are his Simplicity of nature, his Infinity, and his Immutability. These will be considered in the order named.

CHAPTER VI. SIMPLICITY AND INFINITY.

I. SIMPLICITY.¹

I. MEANING OF EXPRESSION. In ascribing simplicity to God we mean that the nature of God, comprising his essence and his attributes, is simple, or uncompounded, pure spirit. We mean to declare that his nature is so purely or simply one as not to be compounded of separate substances, as matter and spirit, or even of the same substance in different forms, or of a substance with separable attributes; and we assert that even his attributes are one with his *essence*, and that he is not only *essentially* spiritual, but also essentially wise and good and holy and just and true and almighty and omnipotent. This means more than his unity, for that expresses only the fact that there is but one being, that is, God. Were God, however, both matter and spirit, or compounded in any other way, his unity would not be affected. Were there but one man in the world we should ascribe to him unity, and if there could be but one, we should ascribe *essential unity*. It means more than the spirituality of God, for that includes, as we have seen, only that he must be spiritual, and purely spiritual.

But there is nothing contradictory in the idea that created spirits might have a composite spiritual nature, mind, soul, and spirit, as three distinct essences, or that a purely spiritual nature should have a spiritual body as well as a spiritual soul.

But in God there can be no composition, and therefore his spiritual nature must be uncompounded. Even his attributes and his nature must be in such a manner one that his attributes

¹ It may be questioned whether simplicity is an incommunicable attribute.

essentially inhere in that nature and are not capable of separation from it, which really makes them one with that nature.

2. PROOF THAT THIS IS TRUE. (1) Composition (or a putting together) involves possibility of separation. But this would involve destructibility and changeableness, each of which is inconsistent with absolute perfection and necessary existence. (2) Composition involves a time of separate existence of the parts compounded. If so, then there was a time when God did not exist, because the parts of his nature had not been united, or when he existed imperfectly, not having yet received to his essential nature the additions subsequently made; all of which is inconsistent with absolute perfection and necessary existence. (3) If the parts have been compounded it has been done by some force from without, or has been a growth in his nature. They have not been added from without, because God is independent, and therefore cannot be affected from without. Besides, all outward form and all else than God had its origin in him, and he existed as God before it. They have not been a growth in him, for if so, he is not unchangeable. Any such addition to God or growth in him is also inconsistent with absolute perfection and necessary existence.

II. THE INFINITY OF GOD.

When we say that God is infinite we deny to him all limitation in his nature or essence. We are conscious of the finite nature of our soul as well as of our body; it has limitations as to place, time, and capabilities. In arriving at the idea of the perfect being by way of negation, we deny all such limitation in him, and therefore ascribe to him infinity as to time and space, as well as infinite perfection in his mode of existence, in his power, wisdom, goodness, justice, holiness, and truth.

(I) HIS ETERNITY.

God's infinity as to time is called his eternity. By this we mean that he has neither beginning nor end; and that with him there is no succession of moments.

It is difficult to attain any real conception of the mode of existence which is thus ascribed to him, it is so different from our own. Yet a brief consideration of what is involved in the nature of God must convince us that the idea which we express by these statements is just and true.

I. WITHOUT END. We can indeed have some comprehension of the idea that God's life can never end. We have this as a

definite idea of our own life. We believe that our lives shall continue forever. And we can of course believe this of God. This feature of God's eternity—his eternity *a parte post*, as it is called—does not present any special difficulty.

2. WITHOUT BEGINNING. It is, however, very difficult for us to conceive of a life which has had absolutely no beginning. We find ourselves going backward in our minds just as we are accustomed to go forward, that is by a succession of days, and we think inevitably of a first day. But whether we can conceive of life without beginning or not, we are bound to attribute this kind of existence to God. "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting thou art God" (Ps. 90 : 2). This is called God's eternity *a parte ante*.

3. WITHOUT SUCCESSION OF MOMENTS. This is to us still more difficult to conceive. It is indeed impossible to finite minds. And yet it seems that this must be a true idea. With God there cannot be succession of moments. For if God has succession of moments, then, (1) he must have had a beginning, which is opposed to his infinity. (2) He would not be unchangeable, for that would be true of him to-day which was not yesterday, and will not be to-morrow. (3) He would not be perfect, because something could be added to him from day to day. He would become older. He would have new experiences. Indeed, there would be either increase or diminution of his power, wisdom, etc. And, (4) this idea that God cannot have succession of moments accords with the statements of Scripture. God is always spoken of in the present. He calls himself I AM. His name, Jehovah, has been supposed mystically to express this. So too our Lord, when he would declare his equality with the Father, uses the present tense for each. "My Father worketh even until now, and I work" (John 5 : 17). So also in like manner he declared his divinity by saying, "Before Abraham was, I am" (John 8 : 58).

The schoolmen attempted to express the eternity of God by saying that it is "*punctum stans*," or "*nunc semper stans*."

This is the conception of eternity which we strive to attain. Our difficulty in doing so is that we can no more conceive of duration without succession than we can of an eternity *a parte ante*. But we see that in this conception we are not arriving at a thought in itself erroneous, as in the other case, but are simply recognizing the fact that God's mode of existence as to time is different from ours. Ours has succession of moments, increase in the length of the period, is not all of it possessed at the same time, has had beginning and might have an end, and has a past and future as well as present. God

has no succession, no increase of life, is possessed of the whole of his existence at once, and eternally possessed; he has had no beginning, can have no end, and lives in the present only, having no past or future.

A question arises, what then is the relation of time and eternity to each other?

Time is not a part of eternity, for if it were, eternity must have succession, viz. : *before time, during time, after time.*

They are in reality different modes of existence which are unlike each other, time being suited to the measurement of creation periods and creature life. True eternity belongs only to the life of God.

While time, however, is not a part of eternity, it co-exists with it.

Through the divine purpose all its events have been eternally present with God, and as well known and realized by him as though actually existent. And in the actual existence of time it has been present actually with God and with eternity, although not constituting a part of eternity.

The nature of these relations we cannot understand. Our ideas are vague, and the language in which we would convey them is incapable of expressing even what we perceive and know. But while this is true, we have no question as to the possibility of better knowledge in the future on this point. The difficulty is in reality no greater than in the connection between the immensity and omnipresence of God. Yet from the knowledge of the presence of our spirits as compared with that of our bodies, we comprehend the fact of the omnipresence of God with all created things, while the space in which they exist is no more a part of his immensity than is time a part of his eternity.¹

(II) HIS IMMENSITY, OR OMNIPRESENCE.

1. IMMENSITY. God's infinity in respect to space is called his immensity. Strictly speaking God is not confined to space any more than he is measured by time. For space must have its limitations. Its existence is commensurate only with the universe. Where there is no creation there is neither space nor time. And the universe we know is not infinite, but limited. Hence when we speak of God's immensity, we mean really more than his filling space, just as when we speak of his eternity, we mean more than his existence throughout all time. To express this idea of God's actual immensity, however, we have to indulge a fiction of infinite space, just as when we try to express his

¹ The most natural conception of time is that it is a measured section of eternity, that is, of eternal duration. This is really the only conception possible to the human mind. Turretin tries to minify time in relation to eternity by calling it "a point in the bosom of eternity." But the conception with him even in this is that time is a part of eternity, that is of everlasting duration. Until time began eternity was unmeasured duration. Somewhere upon this infinite duration there began a succession of events. The succession of events takes place on or in that stretch of duration, and it is called time. If it ceases, time ceases. But so much of eternity as has given place to this succession has been measured off. The rest is unmeasured *a parte ante*, and will be in the *a parte post*. All efforts to show eternity as something different from this must be unsatisfactory.

eternity, we are compelled to indulge in the fiction of infinite time.

2. OMNIPRESENCE. The proper term by which to express the relation of God to actual creation is the word *omnipresence*. By this we mean that he is present everywhere. He is present at one and the same time everywhere. His presence is not merely contact, but energy and power. It is not merely through his knowledge of it, or the exertion of his power upon it, that he is present in it; he fills it with his essence. He fills it, not as part to part, but the whole infinite deity is entirely, undividedly present, at each point of creation, in each moment of time.¹

The following valuable questions and answers are taken from the "Outlines of Theology," by Dr. A. A. Hodge, p. 141 of the new edition.

"What are the different modes of the divine presence?"

"God may be conceived of as present in any place, or with any creature, in several modes: first, as to his essence; second, as to his knowledge; third, as manifesting that presence to any intelligent creature; fourth, as exercising his power in or upon his creatures. As to essence and knowledge his presence is the same everywhere and always. As to his self-manifestation and the exercise of his power, his presence differs endlessly in different cases, in degree and mode. Thus God is present to the church as he is not to the world. Thus he is present in hell in the manifestation and execution of righteous wrath, while he is present in heaven in the manifestation and communication of gracious love and glory.

"How may it be proved that he is everywhere present as to his essence?"

"That God is everywhere present as to his essence is proven from *Scripture* (1 Kings 8 : 27; Ps. 139 : 7-10; Isa. 66 : 1; Acts 17 : 27, 28). And from *reason*. (1) It follows necessarily from his infinitude; (2) from the fact that his knowledge is his essence knowing, and his actions are his essence acting, yet his knowledge and his power reach to all things.

"State the different relations that bodies, created spirits, and God sustain to space."

"Turretin says: 'Bodies are conceived of as existing in space *circumscriptively*, because, occupying a certain portion of space, they are bounded by space upon every side. Created spirits do not occupy any portion of space, nor are they embraced by any; they are, however, in space *definitely* as here and not there. God on the other hand is in space *repletively*, because in a transcendent manner his essence fills all space. He is included in no space; he is excluded from none. Wholly present to each point, he comprehends all space at once.'"

¹ The distinction which the author makes between immensity and omnipresence can hardly be maintained. His claim that space is only commensurate with creation seems contrary to the intuitive conception of the mind. It is as impossible to believe in any limitation to space as it is to believe in the limitation of God. It is even more impossible to *conceive of* a limitation to space than to *conceive of* limitation to God. So also the author's effort to confine omnipresence to creation seems a forced use of the term omnipresence. Immensity and omnipresence are really only synonyms for the same idea.

CHAPTER VII. IMMUTABILITY.

By the immutability of God is meant that he is incapable of change, either in duration of life or in nature, character, will, or happiness. In none of these nor in any other respect is there any possibility of change.

This immutability is not, however, to be so understood as to deny in him some real ground for the Scripture statements of emotional feeling in the exercise of love, pity, long-suffering, and mercy, or of anger, wrath, and avenging justice. We could as well deny some real ground for the attributes of love, justice, and truth, which are at the basis of these emotions. We must never forget that we know but little, if anything, of the mode of operation of the divine mind. We are sure that we have to think and speak of it erroneously when our thoughts or words involve successive emotions in God, or such as have beginning or end. And yet the only way in which change in him in such emotional acts could occur would involve, according to our modes of thought, both beginning and end, and succession. We must remember, however, that whatever possibility of change in God appears is due only to our own imperfection of knowledge and incapacity to form true conceptions.

It is also true that the unchangeableness of God is not incompatible with such outward activity and relations as exist in connection with Creation, Providence, and Redemption.

I. PROOF OF GOD'S IMMUTABILITY.

1. IMPLIED IN HIS ABSOLUTE PERFECTION. Perfection permits neither increase as though he lacks, nor decrease as though he can lose. Change must be for the worse or for the better, but God cannot become worse or better.

2. INVOLVED IN HIS PURE SIMPLICITY. It arises in like manner from the pure simplicity of his nature. That which is not and cannot be compounded cannot be changed.¹

3. TAUGHT IN SCRIPTURES. It is expressly taught in the Scriptures in the following as well as in other particulars. A few passages out of many are referred to in support of each. (1) They declare him to be unchangeable in *duration and life*: Gen. 21 : 33; Deut. 32 : 39, 40; Ps. 9 : 7; 55 : 19; 90 : 2; 102 : 12; Hab. 1 : 12; Rom. 16 : 26; 1 Tim. 1 : 17; 6 : 16. (2) They

¹ For aught we know, the angels may be pure spirit, and yet they have changed, and may change.

affirm the unchangeableness of his *nature*: Ps. 104 : 31 ; Mal. 3 : 6 ; Rom. 1 : 23 ; James 1 : 17. (3) They also assert that his *will* is without change: Job 23 : 13 ; Ps. 33 : 11 ; Prov. 19 : 21. (4) His *character* is also said to be immutable, as for example, his *justice*: Gen. 18 : 25 ; Job 8 : 3 ; Rom. 2 : 2 ; his *mercy*: Exod. 34 : 7 ; Deut. 4 : 31 ; Ps. 107 : 1 ; Lam. 3 : 22, 23 ; Mal. 3 : 6 ; his *truth*: Num. 23 : 19 ; 1 Sam. 15 : 29 ; Micah 7 : 20 ; Rom. 3 : 3 ; 11 : 2, 29 ; 2 Tim. 2 : 13 ; Titus 1 : 2 ; his *holiness*: Job 34 : 10 ; Hab. 1 : 13 ; James 1 : 13 ; and his *knowledge*: Isa. 40 : 13, 14, 27, 28.

II. OBJECTIONS TO GOD'S IMMUTABILITY.

I. MUST HAVE CHANGED AT CREATION. It is objected that a change must have taken place in God in the creation of the universe. It is claimed that he must then have formed a new purpose, and must also have passed from a state of rest to one of activity.

(1) *The idea that God must have formed a new purpose.* *a.* This objection is based upon a forgetfulness of the fact that in him there is no succession, and no change of time from one moment to another. The creation of the universe is no less an outward act than is the time in which it has existence. It appears in time and with time. But with God there is no time and no relation of time exclusive of time itself. There was not before its creation. There will not be when there shall be no more time in creation. We may not be able to understand how this is, but we know that the fact must be so. It is on this account that the purpose of God to create was not a new one, formed at one time and not at another. On the contrary, that purpose, and indeed, his whole will, is eternal. Whatever may have given rise to that purpose, does not exclude this fact. *b.* There was nothing outside to influence him. He was moved entirely by his own will. Whether that will was altogether voluntary, or arose from some necessity in his nature, we need not now consider. If it was either the one or the other, in either event it was eternal, for if his nature be eternal, then any necessity of his nature is an eternal necessity, and any purpose he forms, whether of necessity, or voluntarily, must be eternal volition. So much for the objection, based upon a supposed new purpose.

(2) *The idea that he changed from a state of rest to one of activity.* This idea is equally without foundation. It supposes labor and toil in God. But the Scripture account of creation, as

well as the dictates of reason, forbids this. There was no laborious work of God. There never is; there never can be. His infinite power compasses his infinite will in the mere willing. Neither in the creation nor in the sustentation of the universe is there in God any of that busy, careful thought, and protracted, weary effort by which man maintains government or sustains the lives of those dependent on him. This view of creation accords with reason. It alone is worthy of an all-wise, all-powerful, independent, and self-existent God. It is the view also which is set forth in the Scriptures. Heb. 11 : 3 : "By faith we understand that the worlds have been framed by the word of God, so that what is seen hath not been made out of things which do appear." The whole account of the creation in Gen. 1 : 1—2 : 3, is full of this truth. In every case it is simply, "And God said," etc. So also in Ps. 33 : 9 : "For he spake, and it was done; he commanded and it stood fast." When it is said that he rested on the seventh day, no more is implied than that he ceased as to further creation; for the sustentation of the universe requires constantly the same exercise of power and will as its creation.

2. THE SCRIPTURES REPRESENT CHANGE. *It is again objected, that the Scriptures represent change in God, when they speak of him as "repenting" of the acts which he had done.* Gen. 6 : 6 : "And it repented the Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart." 1 Sam. 15 : 35 : "And the Lord repented that he had made Saul king over Israel." Ps. 106 : 45 : "And he remembered for them his covenant, and repented according to the multitudes of his mercies." Amos 7 : 3 : "The Lord repented concerning this : It shall not be, saith the Lord." Jonah 3 : 10 : "And God repented of the evil which he said he would do unto them." In reply to this objection, it may be stated these are merely anthropopathic expressions, intended simply to impress upon men his great anger at sin, and his warm approval of the repentance of those who had sinned against him. The change of conduct in men, not in God, had changed the relation between them and God. Sin had made them liable to his just displeasure. Repentance had brought them within the possibilities of his mercy. Had he not treated them differently, then there would have been change in him. His very unchangeableness makes it necessary that he shall treat differently those who are innocent and those who are guilty, those who harden themselves against him and those who turn toward him for mercy with repentant hearts. So far as the first of these pas-

sages is concerned, it is simply a protest against the great wickedness into which the race of man has fallen. The Scriptures show that God has had a purpose with reference to such sin, which from the beginning contemplated the fall of man and the different stages of wickedness by which in various ages that fall has been accompanied. These statements differ widely from those which declare love, pity, or anger, for there is no emotion in God correspondent with this outward declaration of repentance.

3. CHANGE WHEN PRAYER IS ANSWERED. Again, it has been objected that God must be changeable, or he could not answer prayer. It is said: "If his purposes stand forever, and if he changes not his will, then there is no place for prayer." To this it may be answered: (1) There can be no doubt whatever that God answers prayer. Prayers have been answered times without number, and the course of human events has been different many times from what it would have been if prayer had not been made and answered. (2) The difficulty is not one that affects God's immutability in the matter of answering prayer alone. It is a difficulty that is felt just as much in the matter of man's labor, or of any other act of his by which a new force is introduced into the universe. It proceeds from the fact that man, being a voluntary agent, may act according to choice at any moment of his life. That choice puts his acts outside of the mechanical forces of the universe. Over the mechanical forces it is admitted that God has absolute control, and that his purpose as to them undergoes no change. But it is thought that, if man can choose one thing or another, or can do, or not do, any special act as he pleases, then so much of the future being dependent upon and resultant from this act or volition, God must change his purpose to correspond with man's volition, if he answers the prayers of men. To this it may be replied: *a.* Even if we cannot explain the matter, we know that this view cannot be correct. For this would take away, or rather it would deny, the independence of God. It would make his volitions dependent upon those of man. Rather than believe this we would even deny that man is a free agent. *b.* But we do not have to deny the free agency of man. Neither do we, on account of this free agency of man, have to call in question God's immutability. The mistake is in supposing that God must be mutable in order to answer prayer. (3) This brings us to the question as to the real aspect in which we are to regard prayer. The answer to this question is that prayer is to be regarded simply as a secondary

cause. It has a place in God's providence like all other secondary causes. Like other secondary causes it is necessary to produce the desired result. God has simply given to prayer an efficient entrance into the workings of the universe. Its existence has been as fully known and purposed as any other secondary cause, and its presence can in no way take God by surprise, nor render necessary any new purpose or action on his part. So far then from changing his purpose when he answers prayer, God is in reality only carrying out that purpose.

It may indeed be difficult, and even impossible, for us to explain how any will or act of ours can be at the same time as fixed and certain with God as if it were a decree about some mechanical action of the universe, and at the same time perfectly voluntary with man, so that man can either will it or not will it, do it or not do it, as he may himself choose, yet we are perfectly sure that it must be so, both from our consciousness of ourselves and from our certainty of what is the nature of God.¹

4. CHANGE IN THE INCARNATION. It is further objected that there was change in God, in the act of the incarnation of the second person of the Trinity. This objection is based upon a misconception of the Scripture doctrine of the incarnation. (1) It was not the divine nature which became incarnate, but simply one of the persons subsisting in it. And so (2) no change took place in the divine nature. The human and divine natures of the Son of God were so related to his person and to each other, that while he was truly God and truly man, possessing every characteristic of each, the two natures remained entirely distinct, each with its own peculiarities and properties. The divine nature as

¹ In trying to theorize on the relation of prayer to God's immutability, we are in danger of doing violence to the Scriptures, and also to our practical faith.

1. It will not do so to fix the place of prayer in the eternal foreknowledge and purpose of God as practically to deny the free choice and free action of the human being who offers the prayer. Man is as truly a force in the universe now as is God. God has so made him. It is the marvel and mystery of creation that God could thus make him. But he has. Let us not then hold any theory of prayer that will make man a mere automaton.

2. Again, we should not allow any theory of God's *immutability* to shake for a moment our faith in the real efficacy of prayer as an influence upon God. James says: "The fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much in its working." Everywhere the Scriptures teach this same idea. A Christian had far better give up trying to conceive of God's immutability, and all effort to hold a theory as to how prayer works with God, than to give up his faith in the actual efficacy of prayer with God. We are not required to take special care of God's immutability. God will do this for himself. Neither are we required to have a correct theory as to the dynamics of prayer. But we are called upon to believe that prayer moves God. If we cannot believe this we cannot consistently believe any dogmatic statements of the Bible. Let us hold to this. God will doubtless take care of the consistencies of his own nature.

such was in no degree affected.¹ The Son of God was as truly divine after as before the incarnation. This will appear more clearly when we consider the incarnation.

5. CHANGE WHEN HE SUFFERED. It is alleged that God cannot be without change, since he suffered during the incarnation. The argument used is that the declarations about Christ's suffering are made not simply of the human nature, but of both natures combined, and that it was not merely man, but God also that suffered. This position is assumed by some who maintain that Christ had a complete human as well as divine nature, not a mere human body, but also a rational soul. This is necessarily also the position of those who claim that he had no human soul, but that his divine nature took the place of a rational soul.

The reply to this argument is that the Scripture statements do not teach that the divine nature suffered. This is nowhere said. They teach that the second person of the Trinity, who became man, suffered. But they plainly refer that suffering to his human nature only. They teach us that in the relations of his natures to his person he preserved unchanged the properties and qualities which belonged to them separately, and that this was especially true of the divine nature. There were, indeed, some communications from the divine nature to the human, but none from the human to the divine. But while thus distinct, they were united together in a single personality, and by such a union that whatever might be said to be true of, or to be done, or to be suffered by, either of the natures, might in like manner be affirmed of the person in whom they were united. It is because of this that Christ, the Son of God, is said to have suffered. He did this in his human, though not in his divine nature. The Scripture declarations that Christ suffered are no proof that God suffered, or that God can change in this respect.²

THE POSSIBILITY OF SUFFERING ON THE PART OF GOD.

There are those who do not receive the above statements as an exposition of the teachings of Scripture on this point. They claim, as necessary, an interpretation which asserts suffering of the divine nature.

¹ It is certainly true that the Son of God was as really divine after the incarnation as before. But it does not seem to follow from this that Christ's divine nature was not put under some sort of limitations by his incarnation. We shall see as to this later.

² It can hardly be maintained that the Scriptures "*plainly refer Christ's suffering to his human nature only.*" They seem plainly to refer his suffering to the *God-man*, Christ Jesus. They never divide between his human and divine natures, and refer one experience to one nature alone, and another experience to the other nature alone. They seem to refer all his experiences to the *God-man*.

In reply to these the unchangeableness of the divine nature is presented as conclusive against any such interpretation. Against their position are adduced also the numerous statements of Scripture asserting that God does not change, and that he is immutable in his nature and in his various perfections. There are also arguments from reason by which the same error may be refuted. So incontestable are these statements and reasonings that the objectors readily admit that there is no power or being who can change God contrary to his will, and that the idea of enforced suffering is revolting. The possibility of change and suffering in God they conceive, therefore, to result from his own will and his own voluntary choice.

This raises the question of the possibility of voluntary suffering on the part of God.

If this be possible it must arise in one of two ways : either the nature of God is essentially such as to admit suffering, or the will of God is capable of so changing his nature for a time as to enable it to suffer.

1. CAN THE WILL OF GOD THUS CHANGE HIS NATURE? The view that the will of God can change his nature is based upon an entirely erroneous conception of the relation of the will of God to his nature. That relation is not causal. The will does not create the nature, nor confer upon it its powers, nor exercise a controlling influence upon it. It is the nature that influences the will. It is because he is holy, just, and good that he wills holiness, justice, and goodness. And he wills these in himself because he alone is the infinitely holy, just, and good. His will, therefore, so far from being causative, is only approbative and complacent, and his essence can in no degree be affected by it. If this were not so the nature of God must be the effect of the will of God as a cause, and must be dependent upon that will. The foundation of all excellence, righteousness, and holiness would be, not what God is, but what he happens to will at any one time, and would make him differ again and again should he so will. And such will would be capricious ; for in making the will superior to the nature there is taken away all reason for choice in God to good or ill, and he is left, without motive, that is to accidental or capricious volition only. Moreover, if God is capable of this kind of change in any respect he is so in all others, for the power of the will to effect one modification in the divine nature necessarily involves the power to effect any or all other modifications.

The will, therefore, cannot change the essence of God, but is itself controlled by that essence ; it is not possible that it can confer a power to suffer which otherwise God would not have. If, therefore, this power of suffering is not inherent in the divine nature it can have no existence.

2. IS GOD'S NATURE ESSENTIALLY SUCH AS TO ADMIT OF SUFFERING? If this power is inherent in the divine nature it must be a quality necessarily and constantly belonging to the nature of God. And if so, its existence must be destructive of the blessedness so fully and eminently ascribed to God in the Scriptures ; or else it must exist there after the manner of those contingent conditions of our life, by reason of which we can pass from a state of happiness into one of suffering, and back to happiness again ; and the passage from one of these states to the other, on God's part, must be the result of the exercise of a divine volition.

But with God there can be no such contingent conditions. For :

(1) The very nature of his necessary existence forbids this.

(2) The language of Scripture, "I, the Lord, change not" (Mal. 3 : 6),

and "with whom can be no variation, neither shadow that is cast by turning" (James 1 : 17), is expressly contrary to such a supposition.

(3) The contrast drawn in the Bible between God and men in respect to change is distinctly based upon that contingency in man to which there is no similarity in God.

(4) The truth and faithfulness of God are magnified in the Scriptures by the fact of their exercise where man would thus change, but where God does not, because he is fixed and constant. The passage, "I change not," is presented in a context, where the will of God might be presumed to induce change, and the assertion that this is his nature is made to show why that will would not so affect him.

(5) In addition to all this, such contingent conditions or states are incompatible with the nature of God's eternity, which, as being without succession, excludes change, as well as with his simplicity which denies separation between his essence and his attributes, and, therefore, gives no room for change. Such contingent conditions or states are also absolutely excluded by the perfection of God, which cannot be always asserted of him if the states or conditions of his being can be changed, unless in all these states he could be equally perfect in all respects, which surely cannot be affirmed of the two states of happiness and suffering.¹

¹ CAN DEITY SUFFER?

We may assert positively that the divine nature cannot have any experience by suffering such as would imply imperfection. But, as Dr. H. B. Smith well says: "It is a bold thing to say that anything not contradictory nor sinful in its nature is impossible to God." And there seems, to say the least, as much logic on the side of God's being able to experience some kinds of suffering as against it. There is apparently more of Scripture and reason on the side of his ability to suffer.

1. To deny that the divine nature can in any wise suffer is equivalent to denying that he has any emotional nature. For where there is an emotional nature capable of experiences of happiness, such as complacency, joy, etc., there must be, as far as we can judge, a capacity for the opposite feelings of anger, dissatisfaction, etc. And these feelings are a species of suffering. Even a feeling of pity is an experience of suffering.

2. Again, the assumption that the capacity or ability to suffer necessarily involves imperfection does not seem to be borne out by the facts. Inability to suffer may be, in some cases, even a surer mark of imperfection than is ability to suffer. There is, for example, no surer mark of weakness, and even wickedness, than inability to sympathize and actually to suffer, when proper conditions for suffering arise. The power to suffer is often a mark of a fine and noble nature.

Dearly bought the hidden treasure
Finer feelings can bestow;
Chords that vibrate sweetest pleasure,
Thrill the notes of deepest woe.

3. The idea that the divine nature cannot suffer because it would be contrary to God's immutability seems to be a wrong conception of the meaning of the term immutability as applied to God. It confounds immutability with immobility. It would make God only a stolid and impassive being. "By God's immutability we mean simply that there is no change in his nature, attributes, or will" (Strong's "Theology," p. 124). We do not mean that God is always doing the same thing or having the same feelings. As Doctor Hodge well says: "It is a fearful sacrifice to the speciousness of logic that we should be compelled by it to give up our idea of a living, personal, sympathetic God."

4. To deny that the divine nature can suffer involves a denial that the divine

second person of the Trinity had any lot or part, or even sympathy with the sufferings of the God-man. It has been, no doubt, this unwillingness to believe that the divine nature can suffer which has led theologians to divide as they do the natures of the God-man, and attribute all his sufferings to his human nature. This, as we shall see when we take up the incarnation, is hardly sustained by the Scriptures.

5. The Bible does not show any concern about guarding the divine nature against intimations of a power to suffer. It ascribes to God, without hesitation, such experiences and feelings as, in our language, mean suffering, if they mean anything. There does not seem to be any sufficient reason for explaining all these away into mere "anthropomorphisms" or "anthropopathic" expressions. A more prudent and correct statement concerning the capacity or ability of the divine nature to suffer would seem to be as follows: (1) In so far as suffering would involve finite mutability or imperfection of any kind, God, of course, cannot suffer. (2) If the divine nature can suffer at all, it certainly cannot be on account of any compulsion from without. For, being all-powerful, God could remove, at will, all occasion for suffering—could indeed prevent any occasion to suffer from ever arising. (3) But if a capacity to suffer can be an element of perfection in a rational nature—and it appears that it can—then the divine nature can suffer whenever the divine being may see fit to allow himself to come under conditions that can give rise to suffering. This both God the Father and Christ the Son seem to have allowed in connection with the incarnation. (4) But what an experience of suffering in the divine nature can really mean, this is something unknown to us. We are hardly in a position to conjecture upon this point. The bloody drops of sweat in Gethsemane, and the agonizing cry on Calvary, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" show that it can be intense and awful beyond our power to imagine.

PART II

CONCERNING GOD'S ACTIVITIES

WHEN we took up the question as to "What we can know concerning God," we saw that the study of God might be divided into two parts, or divisions: first, "what may be known of God's essential nature," and secondly, "what may be known of God in his activities." The first of these divisions we have considered under the two general heads of God's mode of existence, and God's attributes. We now take up the second general division, and will try to learn what we can of the activities of the divine being. Activity in some form is essential to a personal, intelligent being. God must therefore be eternally active. This activity of God, as far as we can learn, is of three kinds.

First, there is an activity which is immanent and intrinsic. This is the activity of the persons of the Trinity in their peculiar relations to each other. Such activity is entirely within the divine nature, and has no special reference to things without. Such are the generation of the Son, and the spiration of the Spirit.

Secondly, there is an activity which is immanent and extrinsic. This form of activity remains within the nature of God, but has reference to things outside of the divine nature. It is what we designate as the decrees of God, or predestination.

Thirdly, there is an activity which is extrinsic and transitive. That is, it is an activity of God which does not remain forever within himself, but proceeds from him and terminates in and upon a creation. Such is God's activity in creation, providence, and redemption.¹

Of the first kind of divine activity we know comparatively little. The Son of God gives here and there a glimpse into the relationship between himself and the Father before his entrance upon the work of redemption. But there is scarcely enough revealed to justify an effort at a formal presentation of this kind of divine activity. Of the other two kinds, that manifested in the divine *decrees*, and that manifested in *creation* and *providence* and *redemption*, we know more, and we will now consider these in the order named.

¹ See Turretin's "Institutes," Bk. IV., Ques. I, Sec. 4.

BOOK I. GOD'S IMMANENT AND EXTRINSIC ACTIVITY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF DIVINE DECREES

THE doctrine of the decrees of God, or, as it is frequently called, predestination, is justly considered one of the most difficult of all the doctrines in which Christians believe. It involves some things hard to be understood, and the ignorant and unlearned have often wrested the doctrine to their own destruction. The difficulty of the doctrine and its dangers are, however, no good reason for refusing to study it. Least of all can any one afford, on this account, to refuse to accept it. The sole question with us is whether it is taught in the word of God. If so, it must be a part of our creed. For God would not have revealed it to us if he had not meant to have us receive it. In considering this doctrine, we will first try to state plainly *what the doctrine is*. We will then present the *Scripture proof* for the view taken. We will then examine *the objections*, or theories, that are urged against the doctrine, and we will conclude our consideration with some *practical suggestions* concerning the manner of holding and teaching the doctrine.

I. THE DOCTRINE STATED.

The decrees of God may be defined as that purpose or plan by which, eternally and within himself, God determines all things whatsoever that come to pass. Let us see now just what points are involved in this definition.

I. GOD'S PURPOSE OR PLAN. These decrees are defined to be God's *purpose* or *plan*. The term "decree" is liable to some misapprehension and objection, because it conveys the idea of an edict, or of some compulsory determination. "Purpose" has been suggested as a better word. "Plan" will sometimes be still more suitable. The mere use of these words will remove from many some of the difficulties or prejudices which make them unwilling to accept this doctrine. They perceive that in the creation, preservation, and government of the world, God must have had a plan, and that that plan must have been just, wise, and holy, tending both to his own glory and the happiness of his creatures. They recognize that a man who has no purpose or aim, espe-

cially in important matters, and who cannot, or does not, devise the means by which to carry out his purpose, is without wisdom and capacity, and unworthy of his nature. Consequently, they readily believe and admit that the more comprehensive, and, at the same time, the more definite is the plan of God, the more worthy is it of infinite wisdom. Indeed they are compelled to the conclusion that God cannot be what he is, without forming such a purpose, or plan.

2. FORMED ETERNALLY AND WITHIN HIMSELF. Any such plan or purpose of God must have been formed eternally and within himself. (1) It must have been eternally purposed. For God's only mode of existence, as has been heretofore proved, is eternal, and therefore his thoughts and purpose and plan must be eternal. The fact also that his knowledge is infinite, and cannot be increased, forbids the forming of plans in time, which, as they become known to him, would add to that knowledge. It is also to be remembered that the plan must precede its execution, but as time began with that execution, the plan could not have been formed in time, and must be eternal. (2) In like manner, also, was it formed within himself. He needed not to go without himself, either for the impulse which led to it, or the knowledge in which it was conceived. He had all knowledge, both of the actual and the possible, all wisdom as to the best end and means, all power to execute what he devised in the use, or without the use, of appropriate secondary means, and free will to select, of all possible plans and means, whatever he himself should please; and the impulse which moved him existed alone in that knowledge and will.

3. EMBRACED ALL THINGS THAT SHOULD COME TO PASS. It is as the result of this plan, or purpose, that things come to pass. According to this doctrine of decrees, God assumes a certain responsibility for the universe. This, as we shall see, is the most difficult feature in the doctrine. Nevertheless we cannot hold to any real doctrine of decrees and deny this feature. We should, however, make a distinction at this point. When we say that God determines whatever comes to pass, we should distinguish between an *efficacious* determination and a *permissive* determination. Some of the things which come to pass are the outcome of an efficacious decree on the part of God, that is, they come to pass because God determined not only that they *might come to pass*, but that he himself would bring them to pass. As to these things God, in decreeing them, took upon

himself the responsibility of their coming to pass. There are other events, however, which may be truly said to have been in the decrees of God, and yet God repudiates responsibility for their ever coming to pass. His decree concerning these is a *permissive* decree. These things were in his plan or purpose as truly as the others. But the purpose as to these was a purpose to permit and not to effect. God did not simply foreknow these events. He actually made a place for them in his plan. In a true sense he intended them to occur. But he did not intend *to bring them* about. Such, for example, is the entrance of sin; such also are all sinful acts that have ever occurred.

This distinction between efficacious and permissive decrees may not be altogether satisfactory. It may be difficult for us to see how God could plan to take sin in and not be himself responsible. But some such distinction we are bound to hold. For it is clear that God has not taken all events into his plan in just the same way and with the same sort of purpose or decree.

In one or the other of these ways, however, God has decreed all things whatsoever that come to pass—not *some things only*, but *all things*; not all things *in general*, but each thing *in particular*. It is useless, we repeat, to try to evade this conclusion if we hold to any real doctrine of a plan, or purpose, on God's part concerning the universe which he has created. For so interwoven are the events of the universe that a lack of purpose as to any *one event* would involve a lack of purpose as to a multitude of others also—indeed as to every other event in any wise connected with the one not purposed. Events do not happen without sufficient cause or causes. If, therefore, a particular event is purposed, then the antecedent event or events which caused that particular event must have been purposed also. And if any particular event was *not purposed*, then the antecedent event or events that caused this particular event were not purposed either.

To such an extent is the force of this realized that it is admitted by all that in the mechanical universe, and even in the control of the lower animals, everything that comes to pass is purposed, or decreed. But the free agency of man, and of other rational and moral agents, is supposed to prevent God's purposing, or willing, all things with reference to them. It is said that such purposing would take away that free agency and consequent responsibility.

The Scriptures, however, recognize the sovereignty of God and his control of man, and also the free agency and accounta-

bility of man. Consciousness also assures us of the latter. The nature of God, as has just been shown, proves the former. The Bible makes no attempt to reconcile the two. Paul even declines to discuss the subject, saying, "Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?" (Rom. 9 : 20.) The two facts are plainly revealed. They cannot be contradictory, they must be reconcilable. That we cannot point out the harmony between them is a proof only of our ignorance and limited capacity, and not that both are not true. It is certain, however, that whatever may be the influences which God exercises or permits to secure the fulfillment of his purposes, he always acts in accordance with the nature, and especially with the laws of mind that he has bestowed upon man. It is equally true that his action is in full accord with that justice and benevolence which are such essential attributes of God himself.

II. PROOF THAT THIS DOCTRINE IS TRUE.

[But for the fact that this doctrine seems to lead to certain consequences that are hard to explain or receive, it would very likely not have been called in question, or at least would not have been so violently opposed. The difficulties connected with it, however, and the opposition to it make it necessary to marshal with special clearness and force the proof in favor of it.

I. A REASONABLE DOCTRINE. This is, first of all, a reasonable doctrine in itself. If one can divest himself in his thought of the supposed hard conclusions that follow from the doctrine, he must see that it is reasonable. For if God is really the eternal, all-wise, omnipotent ruler of the universe, he assuredly has had a plan concerning his universe. If he is really omniscient he must have known everything that would come to pass. It is not possible that God could have been surprised by anything that has ever occurred. But if he foreknew that everything would come to pass, and did not in any wise interpose to prevent, then he must at least have purposed to *permit* those things to come to pass. And so there is absolutely no rational way by which anything can be thought of as not coming at least permissively under God's decrees.

This rational view is greatly strengthened when we remember that God is not simply a spectator of the universe, foreknowing what will happen, but its actual ruler, and that he upholds all things by his power, and that absolutely nothing can happen independently of him. If everything that exists draws its exist-

ence and its support from God, and is able to act only by reason of the fact that God upholds it in its acting, how can it be that anything has ever come to pass without some kind of purpose on God's part concerning it?

The difficulty, from a rational point of view, is not in accepting the doctrine that everything that ever comes to pass has been always in God's plan. The real difficulty is to see how anything, *even sin*, has come to pass without God's having been responsible for it. This difficulty will be solved if we ever understand fully the nature of God's rational creatures and the element of freedom and responsibility which God has lodged in them. But meantime there is no difficulty, from a rational point of view, in holding that the plan, or purpose, of God includes all things whatsoever that came to pass. This seems to be the only reasonable conclusion.]

2. SUSTAINED BY THE SCRIPTURES. This doctrine is not only a reasonable doctrine, it has also the clear support of the Scriptures. This scriptural authority for the doctrine will appear from the following statements and references, gathered with slight modifications from Hodge's "Outlines," pp. 205-213: (1) God's decrees are eternal: Acts 15 : 18; Eph. 1 : 4; 3 : 11; 1 Peter 1 : 20; 2 Thess. 2 : 13; 2 Tim. 1 : 9; 1 Cor. 2 : 7. (2) They are immutable: Ps. 33 : 11; Isa. 46 : 9. (3) They comprehend all events. *a.* The Scriptures assert this of the whole system in general embraced in the divine decrees: Dan. 4 : 34, 35; Acts 17 : 26; Eph. 1 : 11. *b.* They affirm the same of fortuitous events: Prov. 16 : 33; Matt. 10 : 29, 30. *c.* Also of the free actions of men: Eph. 2 : 10, 11; Phil. 2 : 3. *d.* Even the wicked actions of men: Acts 2 : 23; 4 : 27, 28; 13 : 29; 1 Peter 2 : 8; Jude 4; Rev. 17 : 17. As to the history of Joseph, comp. Gen. 37 : 28 with Gen. 45 : 7, 8 and Gen. 50 : 20. See also Ps. 17 : 13, 14; Isa. 10 : 5, 15. (4) The decrees of God are not conditional: Ps. 33 : 11; Prov. 19 : 21; Isa. 14 : 24, 27; 46 : 10; Rom. 9 : 11. (5) They are sovereign: Isa. 40 : 13, 14; Dan. 4 : 35; Matt. 11 : 25, 26; Rom. 9 : 11, 15-18; Eph. 1 : 5, 11. (6) They include the means: Eph. 1 : 4; 2 Thess. 2 : 13; 1 Peter 1 : 2. (7) They determine the free actions of men: Acts 4 : 27, 28; Eph. 2 : 10. (8) God himself works in his people that faith and obedience which are called the conditions of salvation: Eph. 2 : 8; Phil. 2 : 13; 2 Tim. 2 : 25. (9) The decree renders the event certain: Matt. 16 : 21; Luke 18 : 31-33; 24 : 46; Acts 2 : 23;

13 : 29 ; 1 Cor. 11 : 19. (10) While God has decreed the free acts of men, the actors have been none the less responsible : Gen. 50 : 20 ; Acts 2 : 23 ; 3 : 18 ; 4 : 27, 28.

III. OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE.

Owing to a belief that the purpose of God accomplishing his will in his rational creatures is inconsistent with their free agency, several classes of theologians have presented theories in opposition to the scriptural doctrine of decrees above set forth.

I. THEORY OF THE SOCINIANS. The most objectionable theory is that of the Socinians, who deny that God can know what a free agent will choose or do before he acts or wills. They maintain that the will is, at the moment of its choice, in such perfect equilibrium that there are no tendencies in any direction which prevent an absolute freedom of choice. No knowledge, therefore, of the will itself, nor of the circumstances which surround its action, will enable any one to say, before it is exercised, what will be its choice. Hence its act is entirely undetermined and indeterminable until the free agent wills. It cannot even be known beforehand by God himself.

The objections to this theory are obvious :

(1) It is based upon a wrong conception of the nature of free agency ; for it supposes each act of the will to be an arbitrary choice. But such arbitrary choice is not found even in God. As regards man, we know, from consciousness and experience, that his will is influenced by motives. Indeed, so truly is it governed by the nature of the man, and the attendant influences, that even we can predict his will and action in many cases, and only fail to do so perfectly in all because of our limited knowledge. The omniscient God cannot fail to know everything that affects the decision, and therefore what the decision will be.

(2) This theory is also opposed to the independence of God. It supposes him to have made beings of such a nature that his own actions and will must depend upon theirs, and that he must await their decision, wherever it will have any influential bearings on anything future, before he can know or purpose what he himself will do.

(3) As is also manifest from what has been said under the first objection, this theory is opposed to the omniscience of God. It expressly puts a limitation upon that omniscience by declaring that he is limited in his knowledge, at least so far as not to know beforehand the decision of the will of his creatures. But igno-

rance of this would also involve ignorance of all things in the future with which it may be connected. This would, in a world inhabited by free agents, constitute no small part of all that will occur.

(4) It is opposed to the many instances mentioned in Scripture of the prediction beforehand by God of even the bad actions of certain men. See as to Pharaoh, Exod. 7 : 3, 4 ; Hazael, 2 Kings 7 : 13 ; Judas, Matt. 26 : 21 ; Peter, Matt. 26 : 34, etc.

2. THEORY OF SOME ARMINIANS. Another theory has been advanced by some Arminians, who maintain that God does not know the free actions of men, not because he cannot know them, but because he chooses not to do so.

(1) The first objection to this theory is that, were it true, it would not give greater freedom to the will than does the orthodox statement.

Though this theory honors God more than the former, it is inferior to it with respect to the object for which it is introduced. If it could be true, as the first theory claims, that so indeterminate is the future will of a free agent that even God cannot know it, then that future will would certainly be entirely under the control of the free agent, and he would, to the utmost extreme, be free. His will would be in absolute equilibrium in the act of choosing. Neither would any motive exist to influence that choice. It would be thoroughly arbitrary, and so would not be a matter of God's decree at all.

But this second theory has not this advantage, for it does not suppose this condition of equilibrium. In claiming that God does not choose to know what he *might know* if he should so *choose*, it admits the certainty of the event. For the certainty of what will occur is as much fixed as it could be if *actually known* to God. For the supposition is that God *could know it if he chose* so to do. And it is clear that even God is not able to know an event as something that *will occur*, if it were not *certain* that it will actually occur.

We object to this theory then, first, on the ground that it has no advantage whatever over the orthodox theory. If it is said that the fact that God *could know* the event does not make God in any wise responsible for the event, it can be answered that, according to the orthodox theory of God's *permissive decrees*, God is fully as free from responsibility for the events which he only decrees to *permit* as he is, *according to this theory*, for the events which he is supposed to decree not to know. Moreover, this Ar-

minian theory makes just as really a place for God's decree and influence in the free acts of his creatures as does the theory which we have shown to be the Scripture doctrine. For this Arminian theory does not try to rule out a free exercise of influence on God's part to bring about any result that he desires or purposes. And so man, under the divine influence, is left not a whit more free, according to this theory, than he is under the theory which we have shown to be the doctrine of the Scriptures.

(2) A second and chief objection to this theory is that it is based upon a wrong conception of the relation of the will of God to his nature. That will does not confer the attributes of his nature, nor does it control them, but is itself influenced by them. God knows all things, not because he wills to know them, but because, from his nature, he has infinite knowledge—knowledge of all things possible, and knowledge of all things certain. If by his will he could refrain from knowing, he would change his nature. As well speak of a man not choosing to see with his eyes open the objects presented to his sight, as of God not choosing to know anything, whether that is only something which is possible or something which in any way has been made certain.

3. ORDINARY ARMINIAN THEORY. There is, besides the theories already referred to, the ordinary Arminian theory. This is that God knows all things that will come to pass, but does not decree all, but only some of them. The decisions of free agents are among those things which he is supposed not to decree. This theory aims to provide for the larger freedom of God's rational creatures. But—

(1) A manifest objection to the theory is that it does not accord with the statements of the Bible. This has already been made clear by the passages of Scripture which have been advanced in proof of the various points involved in the ordinary Calvinistic theory.

(2) A second objection will be found in the fact that this theory does not thus secure that freedom from certainty in the decisions of free agents, which is the great reason for the objections to the decrees of God concerning them. For if God knows that any event will occur, and can prevent it and does not, it is evident that he purposes that it shall exist, and makes it a part of his plan. The event is as absolutely certain to occur (if God actually knows it as an event that "*will come to pass*") as it could

possibly be under any purpose that God could have to bring it about. What God *knows* "*will come to pass*" is *certain* to come to pass. Otherwise he would know a thing as future which may not be future. His knowledge of it would be false. He would be himself deceived.

(3) A third objection to this theory is that it fails to accomplish another object for which it is introduced, namely, to secure such a relation of God to any free act of man as will take away all influence exerted upon that act by God's decree. We have seen that, so far as the *permissive* decree is concerned, the *knowledge of the event* does indeed render it certain that the event is going to happen. But it is only when the decree is *effective*, and *introduces means for its accomplishment*, that the free agency is affected. As to this case also, the Arminian theory is no whit better than that of the Calvinist.

The Arminian holds as firmly as does the Calvinist that God is sometimes directly active in his gracious influences upon men. Both hold that in all such gracious acts God is both merciful and just. Calvinists extend these gracious acts or influences no farther than do Arminians, for they deny as strenuously as others that God acts effectively to lead men to wicked decisions and deeds. So far as the nature of God's actions upon free agents is concerned, both parties agree. But the Arminian theory, in asserting foreknowledge without purpose, and in alleging that the foreknowledge is all that there is in God, is contrary to the relations of God's will to his knowledge, as well as to the statements of Scripture about the decrees of God; and while it leaves the event equally certain, supposes fully as much influence over the will of the creature and has equal difficulty in reconciling the free agency and consequent responsibility with the inevitable certainty of the event.

4. CHIEF OBJECTION. The chief objection to the doctrine of decrees arises from the existence of sin. According to that doctrine sin has not occurred accidentally, neither was it simply foreknown; it was a part of the plan and purpose of God that it should exist. But for this difficulty the doctrine would seem a most natural one. It is not likely that any one would object to a doctrine of decrees such as this if it applied only to heaven, or to a realm where there is absolutely no sin. But when it is said that the coming and the existence of sin were, in any sense, a part of the plan or purpose of God, then there is a disposition to shrink back and say it cannot be so.

The difficulty here is freely admitted. And in this respect the dispensation of God is surrounded with "clouds and darkness."

The following statements, however, may be made :

(1) That its being a part of the purpose or plan of God renders its presence no more difficult of explanation than that he should have foreknown its appearance, and not exerted his unquestioned power to prevent it. (2) That amid all the darkness we can yet see that God is so overruling sin as to cause it greatly to redound to his glory and the happiness of his creatures. (3) That even without any explanation of it, we can rest in our knowledge of the justice, wisdom, and goodness of God. (4) That we cannot see how its possible entrance into the world could have been prevented, consistently with the creation and putting upon probation of beings with moral natures, endowed with free will, and necessarily fallible because mere creatures.¹ And the right thus to put on probation, without such influence as would make his creatures certainly persevere in holiness, is one which none could justly deny to God. But that which God could possibly (under any contingency) permit, cannot, if it has actual existence, militate against his pure and holy character.

[In concluding this treatment of the doctrine of decrees some practical suggestions should be made as to the manner of holding and teaching the doctrine.

1. In so far as this doctrine is taught in God's word, it is not a doctrine for the unconverted. The Bible addresses itself to the unconverted in the fullest recognition of their personal responsibility. And its special message to them is that "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life." It says to all such : "Him that cometh unto me I will in no wise cast out," "whosoever will, let him come." It is far

¹ The idea that God could not have kept sin from entering the universe, and have done this "consistently with the putting upon probation of beings with moral natures, endowed with free will, and necessarily fallible," is an idea often advanced. It seems, however, hardly tenable. "With God all things are possible." And this thing could not have been difficult. If Satan could enter Eden and, by his wiles, persuade to sin, and do this entirely consistently with man's moral nature and free will, surely God, *if he had seen fit*, could have persuaded and strengthened man against sin; and could have done so entirely "consistently with man's moral nature and free will and the probation upon which man was put." As Dr. H. B. Smith has said : "Every explanation of sin must be false, if at the expense of God's sovereignty and omnipotence."

better for all unconverted persons to attend first to this side of the Bible teaching. God addresses himself to them in this way just as if the doctrine of decrees had never been given. God will take care of his decrees. We cannot. But our personal responsibility *must be attended to*, or it will soon be too late.

2. The doctrine of decrees, or predestination, as a rule, does not mean very much to *beginners* in Christian faith. As Dr. Shedd well says: "This doctrine belongs to the higher ranges of Christian truth." It is high—they cannot attain unto it. Let them not, however, deny that it is a truth. Let them follow on to know the Lord. But, meantime, until the doctrine comes to have some real signification to them, let them shrink from speaking or thinking too confidently concerning it.

3. It is pre-eminently a doctrine for maturer Christians. And *to these* it is not a doctrine for metaphysical hair-splitting, but a doctrine of practical Christian faith. Paul, the greatest and most confident proclaimer of the doctrine, nowhere undertakes to harmonize it with the doctrine of free agency and human responsibility. He left the "harmonizing" with God, knowing that, from God's point of view, the harmonizing would be easy. To the apostle, however, as a humble Christian man, the doctrine simply meant what he knew to be true, that *all things*, even "these little lives of ours, are interwoven with God's eternal purposes." The doctrine of decrees, or predestination, was to him like a great harbor to a storm-tossed mariner, a place where he might now and then anchor in peace, sheltered from every stormy wind, bathed in the sunshine of God's eternal love. In the midst of life's surging forces and uncertainties, it was a comfort to fall back on the thought that *God lives and reigns*, and is never taken by surprise or defeated in his eternal purposes, and that "*all things* work together for good to them that love God." He fell back on this doctrine at times as on the bosom of God, persuaded that "neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord."]

BOOK II. GOD'S EXTRINSIC AND TRANSITIVE ACTIVITY, OR GOD'S WORK IN CREATION AND PROVIDENCE¹

THE universe, with all that it is and all that it contains, is the result of the outward working of the triune God. It exists, not because of any necessity in God's nature to create it, but as the result purely of his will. It is the form in which the voluntary activity of God manifests itself outwardly. The special forms of this divine activity may be seen in creation and in God's providential management of this creation. In our consideration thus far of the divine activity we have had no occasion to make any allusion to the special offices of the different persons of the Trinity. The activity which has been considered has been an activity remaining entirely within the Godhead, and we know little of the part that each of these persons may have had in it. In the extrinsic and transitive activity of God, however, we shall find for the most part that each person of the Trinity—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—comes into manifestation and has a distinct office. Each of the persons performs such divine acts as show that he is God. Each demands and accepts equal honor from man. Each has his own special relation to every work, and in it all there is the same subordination of the persons that we have observed as revealed in the doctrine of the Trinity.

A. CREATION

CHAPTER I. CREATION OF THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE

It is natural that the origin of the universe should have been one of the most prominent subjects of inquiry among men. Various theories have been presented, not only by those who have been guided by reason only, but even by others to whom revelation has been known but not accepted as authoritative. All theories, however, may be generally reduced to four, namely:

¹ The author treats God's extrinsic and transitive activity under the heads, "Creation, Providence, and Redemption." The reviser has taken the liberty of trying to classify all the forms of this activity under the two heads, *Creation* and *Providence*.

First, that which asserts that matter is the one eternal, self-existent substance from which all else proceeds; secondly, that which regards it as an emanation from God; thirdly, that which maintains that matter is itself eternal, but has been acted upon by God, who has used its substance in the construction of all things, thus giving to them form and life; and fourthly, that which accords with the Scripture teaching, that the universe has been made absolutely out of nothing by the active exercise of the will and power of God.¹

I. THE THEORIES EXAMINED.

It is the duty of theology to examine each of these theories and to set forth the reasons for believing that matter is neither self-existent and independently eternal, nor an emanation from God, nor mere material used by him, but that it has been created out of nothing.

We will take the various theories up in the order named by the author.

(I.) MATTER, THE ONE ETERNAL SUBSTANCE FROM WHICH ALL ELSE PROCEEDS.

This theory, that matter is the one eternal substance from which all else proceeds, cannot be true for the following reasons:

I. WOULD MAKE MIND THE PRODUCT OF MATTER. If this theory be true then mind must be accounted for as a product of matter. The universe presents to us both mind and matter. Each of these must exist independently of the other, or the one must have been the production of the other. Which then has been the producing cause? Have the mental powers which are exhibited by man been the development of forces inherent in matter, which through various processes have finally attained to

¹ These four theories, given by the author, may be reduced really to three, as follows:

First, that *matter* is the one eternal substance from which all else has proceeded.

Secondly, that *God* is the one eternal being from whom all else proceeds, or comes, and

Thirdly, that *God and matter* are both eternal, and that by and from these two all else comes.

Under the first of these may be grouped the various materialistic theories of the universe. Under the second may be grouped the various theories that attribute all things directly to God. And under the third, all the theories that hold to the eternity of both God and matter. It may be added, however, that neither this grouping nor that of the author makes any place for the theories that hold to *two eternally antagonistic spiritual beings or principles*. This might appropriately constitute still a fourth class.

self-consciousness and thought and purpose, such as we find in man? or is there some infinite mind which has originated all things, both mind and matter?

The greater reasonableness of the supposition that mind has originated matter is ably set forth by Dr. Hovey, in his "Manual of Theology," pp. 28-39. He contends that it is more reasonable to suppose: (1) That there is one original and self-existent force or being, than more than one; (2) that matter is a product of mind, rather than mind of matter; (3) that the order of the universe is due to a supreme mind, rather than to forces co-operating together without purpose; (4) that the vegetable world is a product of mind organizing matter, rather than of matter organizing itself; (5) that the animal world is a product of mind, imparting a higher organizing principle to vegetable elements, rather than of vegetable forces acting alone; (6) that man, as a rational being, is a product of mind, giving a higher principle of life to animal being, rather than of mere vital forces acting without reason; (7) that man, as a moral being, is a product of the supreme mind, itself moral, rather than of vital forces that have no moral insight; (8) that man, as a religious being, is a product of the supreme mind, rather than of mere vital forces.

The above are simply condensed statements of the mere propositions laid down by Dr. Hovey. His full argument shows conclusively how utterly unreasonable is the idea that mind should have proceeded from matter, instead of having produced it. But if so, it is equally unreasonable that matter should be the one originating cause of the universe.

2. CONTRARY TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE LAWS WHICH CONTROL MATTER. The fact that matter cannot produce mind appears also from the existence of the laws which control matter. Matter has fixed limitations, within which alone it can act. Its movements, its changes of form, its developments, and, indeed, all things connected with it are governed by fixed, and, so far as we can see, unchangeable laws. Now these laws can be accounted for only in one of three ways. Either they belong to matter as a necessity of its nature, or matter has the power to give to itself laws, or these laws have been imposed upon it by a superior intelligence.

The first of these cannot be true, that is, that *these laws belong to matter as a necessity of its nature*. For then that necessity of nature would not only make these laws unchangeable (for whatever exists of necessity exists without possibility of change), but

would likewise make it impossible for men to conceive of any reasonable change in them in any respect. But the fact that there is such great diversity among the scientific theories which attempt to develop the laws controlling nature in many of its aspects, and that there seems no absurdity or natural impossibility that these laws should accord with any one of these theories, or be different from it, evinces that there is no absurdity or unreasonableness in supposing that the material universe might have been placed under very different laws from those which exist.

The second of these suppositions, *that matter has power to give laws to itself*, cannot be true either, because matter must then, in some aspect, have had intelligence to understand and establish law before the existence of mind in any form; for science teaches that created mind (which, upon the supposition, is the only kind of existent mind) comes forth in connection with the higher organisms of existence, and long after the apparent operation of the laws which regulate matter.

It is certain, therefore, that the third supposition is the true one, that is, that *the laws of matter have been imposed by a superior intelligence*, and consequently, that matter cannot be the eternal substance from which all else proceeds.

(II.) THEORY THAT MATTER IS AN EMANATION FROM GOD.

This theory cannot be true. For :

1. MATTER WOULD POSSESS THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. If matter proceeds from the nature of God it must possess the attributes of that nature and must exist in the same mode of existence with it. But matter has none of the attributes which belong to God. Nor is the mode of its existence like his. It has neither self-existence, nor eternity of existence, nor even infinity of space or time, since it is composed of finite parts, and exists in successive moments which are finite and measurable. It has no intelligence, nor purposing power, nor can it have wisdom or goodness; neither can it exercise justice nor experience love.

2. OPPOSED TO THE UNITY OF GOD. An emanation from the nature of God would be opposed to the doctrine of the unity of God. That which thus proceeds would be as truly God as that from which it comes forth. We should, therefore, have two Gods. Indeed, as matter itself is capable of indefinite division, there would be an indefinite number of Gods. The doctrine of the Trinity gives no support to such an emanation as matter would necessarily be. It does not teach an emanation from the

nature of God, for the divine nature remains one only, and is not divided among the three persons, but is the common substance in which they subsist. In order that matter should subsist in God in like manner, it must itself have a conscious personal existence and have all the attributes of God and have the same mode of existence.

(III.) GOD AND MATTER BOTH ETERNAL.

[This theory is, perhaps, of all the theories, the one most natural to the human mind. The impossibility of conceiving of a creation "out of nothing" causes the mind to postulate not only *God*, but the *raw material* on which God could work in bringing about the universe. This conviction is strengthened by the evident impossibility of annihilating any particle of matter. It is really questionable whether the theory of absolute creation would be easily believed except for the fact that it is revealed to us in the word of God.]

The only way satisfactorily to refute this theory of the eternity of both God and matter is to bring some proof that matter was not eternal. The effort is made by some theologians, and by some scientists, to prove from the laws of matter that matter cannot be eternal. A far more satisfactory proof, however, is the proof of the next theory.]

(IV.) GOD THE ONE ETERNAL BEING, THE ABSOLUTE CREATOR OF ALL THINGS.

I. THEORY STATED. This theory holds that God is the only eternally existing being, and that, without any pre-existing materials, he has created the universe. When it is said, however, that God made the universe without the use of pre-existing material, it must be borne in mind that the reference is to the original universe, and not to the universe as it developed after the original creation. [There can be no question that much of creation, as it exists to-day and has existed for ages, was brought into being by means of evolution, or development. In this secondary creation by development, or evolution, God used the material which he had originally created, and by means of this previously made material, and largely, if not altogether, by the laws which he gave to this material, and by his guiding providence, he has evolved a very different sort of universe from that which he originally created. But the essential point of the theory now under consideration is that originally there was no being or ex-

istence in the universe except God, and that God brought into being a universe without the use of pre-existing material. In other words, that the original universe came into being by the fiat of God as an absolute creation. This theory leaves the largest room for all *real* evolution. It simply stands against the *eternity* of matter, and for original creation as set forth in the Scriptures.]

2. THEORY PROVED. (1) *Reasonable*. It is no objection to this theory that it was first made known by revelation. Being thus revealed it appears to reason not only to be fully accordant with all the facts and phenomena of matter, but to be the only theory which can account for them. That this theory has been suggested by the language of God's word makes it no less reasonable than if suggested by some mere man. It is at once seen not to be an impossibility. It is not a creation out of nothing, in the sense that it has had no cause, or has been produced without the existence of forces adequate to the end. The cause and the forces are in God—in his will and wisdom and power and goodness. It cannot be said to come from nothing, for it comes from God. The mind readily rests in such a theory. It fully answers all the demands of the problem to be solved. It is accompanied with none of the difficulties which press against the theories based upon the eternity of matter. The manner in which God works is indeed unknown to us; but that he may so work is highly accordant with reason.

(2) *Plain teaching of Scripture*. The creation of the universe out of nothing is the plain teaching of Scripture. It is true that the phrase to "create from nothing" is not found, except in one of the apocryphal books of the Old Testament (2 Macc. 7 : 28). But the fact itself is taught expressly in Heb. 11 : 3 : "By faith we understand that the worlds have been framed by the word of God, so that what is seen hath not been made out of things which do appear." The account of the general creation in Genesis conveys the same idea, and a like impression is produced by the Scriptures generally. It has been argued from the verbs used to declare the creation, both in Genesis and elsewhere; but the argument is doubtful, as these words are also applied to acts of creation out of pre-existent matter.¹

(3) *Accords with the nature of God*. This idea of creation out of nothing accords with a correct idea of the power of God over

¹ One of the best reasons for so understanding this language is that those to whom the language was directly addressed always so understood it.

matter. If he did not create it, it exists independently of him. But, if it is his creation, then he has absolute control, not only over the forms into which he has shaped it and over the laws he has given it, but over matter itself in every respect, even over its longer existence for a moment of time. This alone is power worthy of a God.

III. OBJECTIONS TO THE SCRIPTURE ACCOUNT OF CREATION.

Several objections have been raised against the account of the creation given in the first chapters of Genesis.

1. AGAINST THE IDEA OF ITS INSPIRATION. It is claimed that the general account which concludes with the third verse of the second chapter cannot be an inspired writing, because it was evidently taken from some other source and incorporated in this book, and that so the account is without authority.

In reply it may be said : (1) That this has not been and cannot be established. (2) That if it were, it would not affect its inspiration. It is much more probable that the genealogies of Christ, given by Matthew and Luke, were from the records of the family of David. The inspiration of Matthew and Luke and Moses does not depend upon these having been made as direct revelations to them, but upon the fact that they were moved by the Holy Ghost to insert them in the books they were writing, such moving of the Spirit being, however, an evidence of the truthfulness of the records. If, therefore, it could be proved that the account of creation existed long before the days of Moses, this proof would in no respect militate against its inspiration and authority.

2. AGAINST THE ACCOUNT ITSELF. It is claimed that Genesis represents the Creation as occurring in six literal days of twenty-four hours each, and that geological science has proved that the world was created in periods of time much longer.

In reply to this it may be said that the account does not necessarily teach that this work was done in six such days.

(1) Because the word "day" is sometimes an indefinite term. It is applied to each of these periods in the first chapter, and also to all of them unitedly in Gen. 2 : 4. The Scriptures frequently use it very indefinitely, as the "day of trouble," "of wrath," "of temptation," "of vengeance," etc. It even embraces the whole period of a captivity, as "the day of Jerusalem" (Ps. 137 : 7), and "the day of Egypt" (Ezek. 30 : 9). These and many other applications show that frequently it means merely a period, and the length of the period must be ascertained otherwise.

(2) Because the Hebrew words translated "evening" and "morning," while almost always used for those portions of the day, do not necessarily indicate a day of twenty-four hours duration, but may denote only the changes which occur periodically in any cyclical period. The root ideas of these words are "the mingling" (evening) and "the bursting forth" (morning). They are thus beautifully descriptive of a time of intermingling of the elements, leading to a period of darkness, and that again by the bursting forth of the appearance of a new creation, the whole forming one cyclical period. The length of the period is not necessarily indicated by them. The use also of these words before the appearance of the sun and moon on the fourth day, very decidedly confirms the idea that the periods need not be those of an ordinary day.

(3) While it is admitted that the resting of God upon the seventh day, in connection with the language of the commandment respecting the observance of the Sabbath, favors the idea of days of twenty-four hours, even this does not make necessary such days. We know not exactly what is meant by God's resting on the seventh day. There is certainly something figurative, or anthropomorphic about it. The "rest" of this first chapter may represent the ceasing from creative work in this world, and the seventh day of rest which man is commanded to observe, may be commemorative and typical of the former; this being brief and inferior in comparison with that, as man is but an atom in the creation of the great God of this greater Sabbath.

From these facts it is manifest that we are not compelled to maintain that the creation was limited to six ordinary days. This is all that is necessary. If science can show the impossibility of such a six-day creation, we can reply that the Scriptures do not necessarily teach it. And the fact of this possibility of concurrence with possible scientific discoveries, heretofore so generally unlooked for, becomes strong evidence of the inspiration of this account of Creation.

3. AGAINST THE CHRONOLOGY. Again it is objected that, according to any Scripture chronology which we have, man has been on the earth only six or eight thousand years, and yet that fossil remains of men have been found who must have existed fifty thousand years ago, or more. But, (1) satisfactory proof of this has not yet been afforded. Scientific men themselves are not agreed about it. And (2) if true, the Scriptures are not necessarily wrong nor uninspired. The chronology of the dif-

ferent forms in which the Old Testament has come down to us is known to vary. This is attributable to mistakes in copying, which can more easily occur in the representations of numbers than of any other ideas. It may be that Adam was created more than eight thousand years ago, and that the original chronology of the Scriptures so taught. It may be that in connection with that greater antiquity, if all were known about it, would appear explanations of the great age to which many of the patriarchs are said to have arrived. Nor is it impossible that other races of men existed before Adam, either endowed as he was with both spiritual and animal life, or they with animal life only and he with the specially added endowment of a spiritual nature. While it is granted that such has not probably been the fact, yet it is not impossible that it may have been.

III. FACTS THAT SUPPORT THE SCRIPTURE ACCOUNT.

While these various objections thus seem not to render impossible the absolute verity of this Genesis account of creation, there are other facts which ought to be remembered which support the narrative.

1. USE OF THE LANGUAGE OF PHENOMENA. It is natural that the Scripture should use phenomenal language only as to scientific matters. We do this every time we speak of the sun rising and setting, and no one misunderstands or is deceived. This is the only method in which a book for all ages could refer to scientific matters. Had the Bible used language exactly suited to the science of to-day, embracing all its best established theories, in less than fifty years it would have to be admitted that it could not be from God, because of its lack of truth. Had it been written in the language of true science originally, age after age would have rejected it as false. It could only treat science phenomenally.

2. MARVELOUS AGREEMENT WITH LATEST RESULTS OF SCIENCE. But while the Scriptures are thus written in the language of phenomena, it is simply marvelous how they give underlying evidence that God, its author, knew truths of science that could not have been known to the science of that day. This is particularly shown in this account of creation. Light here appears before the sun and the moon. The order of the creation accords generally with that taught by geology from an examination of the stratifications of the rocks. Man is made after all other creations, and his body is made of the dust of the earth. Even the

universe was not made as it now appears, for, while the first verse of the first chapter states the creation of both heavens and earth, the second teaches that before the formative process began the earth was in a chaotic condition. The truth is, that so generally, and yet so accurately, are the statements made, that even if it could be proved that the universe is the production of original concurrent atoms, or of a universal fire mist, or the development of molecules, there is nothing in this Genesis account to commit it to the contrary. Even the creation of animal life, including that of man, is from the earth, which is directed to bring forth. The soul of man is the only living thing which is declared to have been a direct creation of God.

Thus we have, indeed, some difficulties in connection with the Scripture account of creation ; but we have also certain evidence which is strongly corroborative of this account. It may be said in conclusion that several theories have been presented for the full reconciliation of Genesis and geology. It is not necessary to state them here. It is enough that there are possible means of such reconciliation, and that any one or more of them may be true. The veracity of the Scriptures is otherwise abundantly proved. Here it is charged that they speak falsely. Were a man of well-known probity and honor thus assailed and facts, however strong or cumulative, presented against him, it would suffice to support his denial by showing that there are possible circumstances which may explain all seeming falsehood. So with the Scriptures. They are charged with error. It is enough to show one possible explanation. But in this case we can show several. This would suffice. But we are justified in challenging those who deny inspiration to account for the many coincidences with scientific teaching found in this narrative.

CHAPTER II. CREATION OF ANGELS.

In the last chapter reference was made only incidentally to the creation of intelligent, moral, and spiritual beings. There are several matters connected with such creations which deserve special consideration. The creation of angels will be first treated, because of their probable earlier existence and superior nature and position.

I. UTILITY OF THE INQUIRY.

Some have denied the utility of this inquiry, because men owe angels no duty of homage or worship, and because their usual

invisibility forbids that their presence for good or evil should be known. But it is surely important to know something of beings who have been so intimately associated with the past history of man, both for weal and woe.¹

II. BELIEF IN ANGELS A RATIONAL BELIEF.

It is said by some that reason decides against the existence of such beings, or, at least, against their appearance to man. But, on the contrary, nothing can be more rational than the belief that the God whose animal creatures in this world are of so many kinds and gradations should not stop with the first creation of moral and intellectual beings, but should extend upward his creative skill and power, throughout numerous classes of beings similar in nature to man. Nor is there anything unreasonable in the supposition that, while ordinarily these may be confined to the exercise of influences under the laws of mind and spirit, at times, at God's will, they should appear in bodily forms recognizable by the senses.²

III. THE SCRIPTURES TEACH THAT THERE ARE ANGELS.

Even superficial readers of the word of God must be convinced that it reveals the existence and presence with man of personal beings of another sphere, through whom God communicates to him, and aids and protects him, as well as of other angels whose influence is for evil, and is destructive of happiness.

There are some, however, who declare that all such teachings are purely figurative, and that the good angels of the word are "no more than the kindness and mercy of God, and the evil angels his afflictive, punishing, or chastising acts."

Such interpretations deserve the charge of "handling the word of God deceitfully." But even if these were admitted to be correct as to much or most of the language used, there are some instances of the appearance of angels which cannot thus be explained away. The interview between the angel and Hagar (Gen. 16 : 7-14) is one of these. That with the wife of Manoah is another (Judges 13 : 2-21). Signal instances also are those with Zacharias (Luke 1 : 5-20) and with Mary (Luke 1 : 26-38) and with Mary Magdalene and the other women (Matt. 28 : 1-7). Those statements are especially conclusive which are made in Mark 12 : 25 and Luke 20 : 36, in which it is declared as to the

¹ See article of Moses Stuart in "Bibliotheca Sacra," Vol. O, p. 88. ² *Ibid.*, pp. 90-93.

saints, "after the resurrection that they neither marry nor are given in marriage; . . . for they are equal unto the angels." There is also no meaning in Heb. 1 : 4 if there are no angels.¹

IV. NAMES GIVEN TO ANGELS.

Various names are given to angels. Some of these are descriptive of their nature, others of their offices.

1. CALLED ANGELS. This is their chief designation, and it is descriptive of their office. The word angel means a messenger. It is a word not confined to angels, nor to any other kind of messengers of God. (1) It is used of ordinary messengers among men : 1 Sam. 11 : 3; Job 1 : 14; Luke 9 : 52; (2) of prophets : Mal. 3 : 1; (3) of priests : Mal. 2 : 7; (4) of ministers of the gospel : Rev. 1 : 20; (5) of impersonal agents, as of pestilence : 2 Sam. 24 : 16, 17. Plagues likewise are denominated "angels of evil" : Ps. 78 : 49. Paul also calls his "thorn in the flesh" "an angel of Satan" : 2 Cor. 12 : 7. (6) It is also applied to the Second Person of the Trinity as "the angel of his presence" : Isa. 63 : 9; and "the messenger (angel) of the covenant" : Mal. 3 : 1. (7) The name, however, is generally applied to the angels of God as spiritual beings.²

2. CALLED SPIRITS. The name spirit is also given to them : Ps. 104 : 4; Mark 1 : 27; Heb. 1 : 7. This name is descriptive of their nature.

3. SONS OF GOD. They are sometimes called "Sons of God" : Job 1 : 6; 2 : 1; 38 : 7.

4. GODS. They are also called "gods." Comp. Ps. 97 : 7 with Heb. 1 : 6.

5. SERVANTS OF GOD, HOLY ONES, ETC. They are also called "Servants of God" : Job 4 : 18; Ps. 103 : 21; "Holy Ones" : Job 15 : 15; Dan. 4 : 13, 17; "Watchers" : Dan. 4 : 13, 17; "Thrones, Dominions, Principalities, Powers, and Might" : Eph. 1 : 21; Col. 1 : 16.

6. CHERUBIM, SERAPHIM, ETC. There are other names which are probably applied to them, as "Cherubim," "Seraphim," and "Hosts," as when God is called "Lord of Hosts."³

V. WHAT WE KNOW OF THEIR NATURE.

We know very little of the nature of angels. They are not described in the Scriptures. Yet some facts plainly appear.

¹ See "Kitto's Encyclopedia," article "Angels."

² *Ibid.*

³ Dr. J. Pye Smith, "First Lines," p. 328; "Kitto's Encyclopedia," art. "Angels."

1. SPIRITUAL BEINGS. They are spiritual beings. This is indicated by the only name derived from their nature. (*Cf.* No. 2, p. 148.)

Dr. J. Pye Smith attributes to them corporeal powers analogous to the substance of light, or of the electric fluid, and claims that thus light is cast upon such Scripture passages as speak of their relations to space and of their locomotion, as Luke 2 : 9 ; Matt. 28 : 2 ; Acts 1 : 10 ; 12 : 7.¹

Moses Stuart, on the contrary, maintains that "angels are incorruptible, immaterial, immortal, and, in their proper nature, impalpable to the senses."²

This seems to be the most correct and scriptural view, as it is also the one most generally held. All the difficulties it encounters may be explained by the fact that we have to speak of angels as we do of God in the language of man, which cannot always convey exact and adequate ideas of them.³

The declarations that "a spirit hath not flesh and bones" (Luke 24 : 39), that "God is a spirit" (John 4 : 24), that the children of the resurrection will "neither marry nor are given in marriage, for neither can they die any more, for they are equal unto the angels" (Luke 20 : 35, 36 ; Matt. 22 : 30), all indicate that the nature of angels is truly spiritual.⁴ The abode of the angels in heaven, and the offices they perform, confirm this idea. After all, however, it is unimportant to decide whether they are simply unembodied spirits, or have some sort of spiritual body, such as the Scriptures teach will belong to the saints after the resurrection. Either view maintains all that is essential to the spirituality of their nature.

2. INTELLIGENT BEINGS. They are intelligent beings. This seems to follow necessarily from their being spirits. But it is plainly taught in the Scriptures. (See Eph. 3 : 10 ; 1 Peter 1 : 12 ; 2 Peter 2 : 11.) These passages imply that they are superior to men in this respect.

3. MORAL BEINGS. They possess moral natures. They are not only made capable of knowing God's excellence and of worshiping him, but are also spoken of as being under moral obligation, so that they are rewarded for obedience and punished for disobedience. It may also be argued from the fact that their ministry in this life seems confined to moral and spiritual things (Heb. 1 : 14).

¹ "First Lines," p. 329.

² "Bibliotheca Sacra," Vol. O, p. 99.

³ Moses Stuart in "Bibliotheca Sacra," Vol. O, pp. 94-98.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

We may, in this connection, call attention to certain facts which result from the nature of angels :

1. As spiritual and intellectual beings they must possess freedom of will.
2. They are not subject to the restrictions and conditions of the world of sense. They do not occupy space unless they have some bodily form. Nevertheless they are not omnipresent, as is God, but they have location. Neither do they attain knowledge through the senses, nor are they affected by bodily appetites or desires.
3. As long as they retain their original innocent condition they must be happy. It is believed from the general tenor of Scripture that the angels that kept their first estate have been confirmed in their happiness. Such confirmation, however, results from the promises of God as a reward for their obedience, and is bestowed by him not as an act of justice, but in accordance with his veracity. No obedience can bring God under obligation to confirm.

4. They must also be possessed of great power.

Christ intimates that their power is greater than that of man (Matt. 26 : 53), and this fact is plainly taught in 2 Peter 2 : 11. (See also 2 Thess. 1 : 7 and Eph. 1 : 21.) This power is seen also in their performance of supernatural works, as perhaps in the rolling away of the stone at the sepulchre of Christ and in the opening of the prison door of Peter. It was most wonderfully exhibited in the strengthening of the Saviour in Gethsemane by the angel which appeared (Luke 22 : 43).

Dr. A. D. C. Twisten makes the following five valuable suggestions as to the exercise by angels of power over man :

(1) "Whatever may be the efficiency attributed to the angels, their relation to us can only be that of one finite to another finite cause, and is never to be imagined as similar to the relation which God, or Christ, or the Holy Ghost sustains to us.

(2) "The efficiency of the angels is, therefore, always to be represented in accordance with the laws of reciprocal action established between finite beings ; hence it never excludes our counter-action, or reaction, and can neither annul the power of nature nor the freedom of the will.

(3) "All action of angels upon the world of sense can take place only under the following conditions : that they enter into or become one of the series of causes there at work, and that they themselves act by means of these causes or in the same mode with them.

(4) "This entrance into the series of causes at work in the world of sense may be looked upon as an original, a primitive, perhaps also a transient influence ; but it can leave behind it effects which will propagate the primitive influence, and which may, therefore, be considered as parts of the angelic efficiency. Thus, for example, the temptation of the first man by Satan continues to operate in the law of sin and death which was thus introduced into the world.

(5) "The original entrance of angels into the world of sense seems not to depend upon their own good pleasure alone, but, if we may judge from its infrequency, to be limited to narrow bounds. In this respect, and in its very nature, it is analogous to miracles, and hence like these, appears to be specially attached to certain periods of divine revelation, or of the development of God's kingdom in this world.¹

¹ See the translation in the "Bibliotheca Sacra," Vol. I., pp. 774, 775.

VI. OFFICES DISCHARGED BY ANGELS.

Our final inquiry will be into the offices discharged by these beings.

1. CHIEF DUTY. Their chief duty is to attend upon God and perform his commands. This may be said, indeed, to include all that they do. They are God's messengers.

2. COME IN CONTACT WITH MEN. They are brought into contact with men by these commands. They are represented as present at the creation, at the giving of the law, at the birth of Christ, after the temptation in the wilderness, during the agony in Gethsemane, and at Christ's resurrection and ascension. They are deeply interested in the economy of redemption, and are constantly seeking to penetrate into its mysteries and know its depths. They feel a deep interest in man and become the medium of messages to him. They rejoice over his repentance, and are made the means of comfort, protection, and guidance. "Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to do service for the sake of them who shall inherit salvation" (Heb. 1 : 14). They are also made the messengers of God's vengeance to execute his wrath upon the sinful (2 Sam. 24 : 16, 17 ; 2 Kings 19 : 35 ; 1 Chron. 21 : 15, 16 ; 2 Chron. 32 : 21 ; Acts 12 : 23). This punitive office belongs to good as well as bad angels.

3. SUPPOSED GUARDIANSHIP. From the intimate connection thus existing between angels and men other offices have been assigned to them. Guided by rabbinical fables and led off by the peculiar views of Oriental philosophy, some have conceived that on each person in this life an angel attends to guard and protect him from evil.

This theory of a guardian angel has been held in various forms. Some have confined his presence to the good ; some have extended it also to the wicked ; some to the elect before or after conversion ; some to all men alike ; some have supposed two angels instead of one, the one good, the other bad. In like manner has the theory been held of guardian angels over nations ; some confining this also to good nations, others extending it to all. That such views existed among the Jews, and that they were also prevalent among the earlier Christians, may be admitted ; but the scriptural authority for them is wanting.

(1) *No real support in Scripture.* The passages supposed to favor them may be readily explained otherwise. This idea of guardian angels is earnestly advocated by Professor Stuart, in

Vol. O of the "Bibliotheca Sacra." He claims that they attend the good only.

The strongest points that he makes are based upon the attendance of angels upon the footsteps of Christ. That attendance is readily granted; but they were attendants, not guardians. This is seen from the fact that, although they strengthened him while here on earth as his agony seemed to require, that attendance is not confined to Christ in this life, but is spoken of as to be continued even after the time of his ascension. Besides this, that which is fatal to the theory is that it was not one special angel that was present, but several at one time, and probably different ones at different times. The sacred Scriptures never speak of any one of these as his angel, or as the angel, but only refer to an angel or to angels. This, however, is but the general sense in which God is said to send his angels, that they may be ministering spirits. This sending is not questioned, but is very different from the supposition of the appointment to each man of one angel, who, from the beginning to the end of life, is to be ever present to watch over his welfare.

The Scripture references by which Professor Stuart would prove this of individual men do not at all sustain him. They are Gen. 32 : 1, 2; 2 Kings 6 : 1-17; Ps. 34 : 7; Zech. 3 : 4-10; Matt. 18 : 10; Acts 12 : 7-15. There are, indeed, but two passages which at all make likely the idea of guardian angels to individuals. One of these is Acts 12 : 7-15, in which we are told that when Peter on his deliverance from prison knocked at the door of the house in which were the disciples, they were led to say, "It is his angel." Of this passage it may be said that it is doubtful whether reference was not made to the spirit of Peter; but even if not, the language is simply that of the disciples expressing a sentiment that commonly prevailed, and one for which inspiration is not at all responsible, except as correctly reporting the language used. The other passage is Matt. 18 : 10. This is well paraphrased by Knapp: "As we are careful not to offend the favorites of those who stand high in the favor of earthly kings, we should be still more careful not to offend the favorites of divine providence." "The humbly pious are those entrusted to the special care of those who stand high in the favor of God (who behold his face)." ¹

The Scriptures that seem to sustain the notion of guardian

¹ Knapp's "Theology," p. 212.

angels over nations are Dan. 10 : 13-21 ; 12 : 1. But here "Cambyzes and Alexander seem to be meant, and Michael is probably the Messiah."¹

(2) *Opposed by Scripture.* The following passages seem to be opposed to the idea of one angel to one man or nation : Gen. 28 : 12 ; 32 : 1, 2 ; 2 Kings 6 : 16, 17 ; Luke 16 : 22.

(3) *Further objections.* It is further to be objected : *a.* That this notion seems unworthy of the rank and office of such beings. But it is replied that God watches over us. This, however, is very different from the constant daily attendance upon us of one being of such superior intelligence. *b.* It is rendered needless by the watchful care of God. *c.* It has led, and naturally so, to the worship of angels. *d.* It is apt to derogate from the mediatorial glory of the Lord Jesus Christ.²

VII. THE NUMBER OF ANGELS.

The number of the angels is unknown, but that it is very great is shown by the following passages : Dan. 7 : 10 ; Matt. 26 : 53 ; Heb. 12 : 22.

VIII. THEIR DWELLING-PLACE.

As to their dwelling-place nothing definite can be said. They dwell with God. But is this in one place or in many ? We have no means of knowing.

CHAPTER III. CREATION OF MAN.

I. THE SCRIPTURE ACCOUNT.

The Scripture account of the creation of man is given in four places in Genesis. The first, in Gen. 1 : 26-28, is of both male and female. The second is of Adam only, in Gen. 2 : 7. The third is of the creation of the woman, whom Adam at that time called Isha (woman), because she was taken out of man (Ish) : Gen. 2 : 18-23 ; subsequently (3 : 20), he called her Eve, because she was "the mother of all living." The fourth is found in Gen. 5 : 1, 2, and states that God called them Adam. There are allusions to the statements thus made in two other places in this book, namely, 3 : 19, 23 and 9 : 6, 7. The other Scriptures, both of the Old and New Testaments, endorse the correctness of all the facts stated in Genesis by frequent allusions

¹ J. Pye Smith, "First Lines," p. 331.

² *Ibid.*

to one or another of them as undoubted truths. (See Ps. 100 : 3 ; 103 : 14 ; Eccl. 7 : 29 ; 12 : 7 ; Isa. 64 : 8 ; Mal. 2 : 10, 15 ; Matt. 19 : 4, 5 ; Mark 10 : 6, 7 ; Acts 17 : 25-29 ; Rom. 9 : 20 ; 1 Cor. 11 : 7-9 ; 15 : 45-47 ; Col. 3 : 10.)

The Scripture doctrine thus revealed is that man was created by God, being formed, as to his body, from earthy material, and as to his soul, by direct creation ; that he was made male and female, one Adam, in the image and likeness of God. The Adam thus made, the Scriptures also teach, was the progenitor of all the present race of men. Indeed they appear to allude to him as the embodiment of that race. Adam is not given as a proper name, as are Cain and Abel and Noah, but is used to express the creature God proposed to make (Gen. 1 : 26), as both male and female¹ (Gen. 5 : 2). "In all the other instances in the second and third chapters of Genesis, which are nineteen, it is put with the article, the man or the Adam. It is also to be observed that though it occurs very frequently in the Old Testament, and though there is no grammatical difficulty in the way of its being declined by the dual and plural terminations and the pronominal suffixes (as its derivative *dam*, blood, is), yet it never undergoes those changes ; it is used abundantly to denote man in the general and collective sense, *mankind*, *the human race*, but it is never found in the plural number. When the sacred writers design to express *men* distributively, they use either the compound term, sons of men (*benei adam*), or the plural of *enosh*, or *ish*."² The importance of this fact will hereafter be seen. It is confirmed by the title of "the second Adam" given to Christ.

II. THE UNITY OF THE RACE.

The expression above, "the present race of men," was not intended to intimate a belief that there have been more races of men than one. This, however, has been contended for. But, while the possibility of other races before Adam or contemporaneous with him may be admitted, the unity of the present race and its common descent from Adam must be maintained.

I. IDEA OF A PRE-ADAMITE RACE. The idea of a pre-adamite race "was first raised to notice by Isaac Peyrere, who, in 1655,

¹ Adam must have been just as much a "*proper name*" and *real person* as were Cain and Abel and Noah. If he was "the embodiment of the race," he was that as an *individual man*, the progenitor of all. In a sense, the race may be said to have been "in his loins," and so, he was the race.

² Kitto's "Cyclopedia," article "Adam," paragraph 3.

published his book styled 'Præadamitæ.' He pretended to find his Pre-adamites in Rom. 5 : 12-14. The heathen, according to him, are the Pre-adamites, being, as he supposed, created on the same day with the beasts and those whose creation is mentioned in the first chapter of Genesis. Adam, the father of the Jews, was not created until a century later, and is the one who is mentioned in the second chapter. Since the time of Peyrere, this hypothesis has been exhibited more connectedly, and has been asserted independently of the authority of Moses ; or, in other words, it has been asserted that the human race is older than Moses represents it." ¹

So far as this hypothesis is confined to the past existence of other races of men who had passed away when Adam was created, or who were at least destroyed before or at the flood, it may be admitted as a possibility. There is no direct statement of Scripture to the contrary. Any proof which would make it certain, or even probable, may be admitted. But while this is possible, it is not probable. Nothing in Scripture, not even with great violence, can be wrested to its support. The account of creation and the manner in which the Adam there created is spoken of is contrary to any idea that the creations in the first and second chapters of Genesis are of any but the one race. The scientific evidence as to the method of God's creations concurs with the biblical in furnishing no proof that God has ever created the same animals at different periods, or from any other than one original source of each species. While these facts, therefore, are not conclusive against the possibility of more than one creation of human beings, they render it highly improbable. But so far as this is intended to deny the unity of the present race, and to declare that any portion of it is not of Adamic origin, it is directly contrary to the word of God.

2. THE UNITY OF THE RACE PROVED. (1) *From the Scriptures :*
a. The Scriptures trace the race of men now existing back to Noah, and through him to Adam. *b.* They teach also that all others, except the eight saved in the ark, were destroyed by the flood. If any other races of men existed before that time, which is not probable, they must have then been destroyed with the others of the Adamic race. *c.* They not only speak of all mankind in general as though of this one race, but declare expressly that God "made of one every nation of men for to dwell on all

the face of the earth, having determined their appointed seasons, and the bounds of their habitations" (Acts 17 : 26). The King James version has "made of one blood." This is especially emphatic because spoken to the Athenians, who claimed a special, separate origin from others. *d.* The Scriptures account for the universal sinful condition of men by not only a representative, but by natural relationship to Adam. *e.* Salvation from sin is offered through Christ as the second Adam, whose fitness for his work was secured, not only by his representative relation, but also by his assumption of the same nature with man. Therefore his genealogy in Luke is traced back to Adam. It was also to "the whole creation" (Mark 16 : 15) that Christ commanded his gospel to be preached, and "of all the nations" (Matt. 28 : 19) that he ordered disciples to be made.

(2) *From science:* Science accords with revelation in teaching the unity of the race. It shows that among all men there are the same essential characteristics which make a man. This is denied by none. There is the same outward form and inward structure, and also like mental and moral characteristics. It is indeed true that wide variations exist in each of these respects, but they are all within the limits of a single species.

a. Comparative zoölogy. From the science of comparative zoölogy we learn the following facts: (*a*) Many species are capable of great variations. This is as true of man as of any other species, but the variations among men are no greater than among other species.¹ (*b*) Such variations may become permanent, or at least apparently so. (*c*) Under favorable circumstances, with the lapse of time, this permanence may become more and more fixed, and apparently incapable of return to the original type. (*d*) In these facts from zoölogy there is laid the strong probability, at least, that the different varieties of the human race may all be only *variations* of one original species. This probability is greatly strengthened by the following additional facts from zoölogy: (*e*) Variations that have become thus fixed, show a tendency to return to the original type, if brought under proper conditions for turning them thus backward. This is as true of types of men as of other animals. (*f*) It is a characteristic of animals that different species cannot unite to produce offspring; or if in any case they do produce offspring by such "crossing," that offspring is either altogether unfruitful, or, as Doctor Cabell

¹ Cabell's "Unity of Mankind," p. 34.

says, the fertility is partial and temporary, rarely, if ever, extending through more than two generations.¹ There is, however, no such natural bar to the production of offspring by the different races of men. They may intermarry and produce offspring that is itself continuously fruitful. This fact argues strongly that all races of men are of the same species. (*g*) While the Negro type of man, the most distinct and the one showing the greatest variety from the Caucasian or white race, may be traced far back in the monumental history of Egypt, there is no delineation of it in the earliest records for nearly fifteen hundred years. This is admitted by Nott and Gliddon in their "Types of Mankind," p. 256, though these writers speak of the Negro "as contemporary with the earliest Egyptians."

b. Comparative philology. The science of comparative philology also supports the doctrine of the unity of the human race. This science is as yet in its infancy, but has grown vigorously during the short period of its existence. Already the languages of men have been reduced by some to four, by others to three, and yet by others to two different forms, and the tendency is to connect all language with some one common source. Whether this can be done or not is uncertain. The position is at least conceded that variety in language does not militate against the unity of mankind.² It may be impossible to establish absolute unity of speech. The confusion at Babel renders this not improbable. But the investigations of this science show that the idea of several separate physical origins of the race receives no support from philology, because the grouping of men, as to physical race, does not correspond with the grouping rendered necessary by their different languages.

Prof. Whitney, who believes that the science of philology cannot now or ever decide either for or against this unity, says: "It does not seem practicable to lay down any system of physical races which shall agree with any possible scheme of linguistic races. Indo-European, Semitic, Scythian, and Caucasian tongues are spoken by men whom the naturalist would not separate from one another as of widely diverse stock; and on the other hand, Scythian dialects of close and indubitable relationship are in the mouths of people who differ as widely in form and feature as Hungarians and Lapps, while not less discordance of physical

¹ "Unity of Mankind," p. 77.

² The reviser heard the famous etymologist, Professor Curtius, bear the same testimony before his class in the university of Leipsic.

type is to be found among the speakers of various dialects belonging to more than one of the other great linguistic families."¹ The fact of this intermingling of dialects and races shows a common origin beyond the time of physical and linguistic changes. Thus do the two sciences, which were once so antagonistic to the doctrine of the unity of mankind, combine with each other to establish its truth.

III. THE NATURE OF MAN.

The nature of man is composite. It is usually considered as a union of body and soul.

I. BODY AND SOUL CONSIDERED SEPARATELY. (1) *The Body.*
a. Man's body is the highest form of material substance of which we have any knowledge. Matter as found in the simple forms of existence is called inorganic. In some of these inorganic states we find it in its lowest forms. In vegetable life we find it organized and existing in higher forms. It exists in still higher form in conscious, sentient being known as animal life. But the highest organism of matter is in man *as an animal*. He partakes with other animals of bodily form, appetites, desires, and passions. His bony structure is analogous to theirs, which approaches it closely, and yet with marked distinctions which manifest his still higher life with nobler capabilities. So also is it with his muscular covering or flesh, and his nervous system especially, culminating in a brain of superior size and weight and quality to that of any other animal. To this superiority of texture and organism in his material nature man owes no doubt much but not all of his supremacy over all other animals.
b. The bodily nature of man in its original condition was by nature pure. Sin does not exist in it essentially. There is nothing in matter that is corrupting, and nothing in the lower nature which of itself begets sin in an innocent soul. On the contrary, while temptation may present itself through the body, the actual sin is committed by the soul either separately or in union with the body.
c. The body in itself is a unit. Though composed of several members, it is affected through one sense only, namely, the sense of touch. Because of the various forms of experience this sense of touch is usually and conveniently divided into five so-called senses. Yet all of these are really only the one sense of *touch*. And every experience that is possible to the body refers itself to

¹ "Language and the Study of Language," p. 370:

the one center, or sensorium, which is the brain. And through this one great nervous center the entire body is controlled, all of which goes to show that the whole body is really only one organic unit. *d.* The powers of the body are practically unlimited within their respective spheres, the word unlimited being taken not in the sense of infinite, but in the greatly more restricted sense of *indefinite*. What man can accomplish physically, either as an individual over his own person or over others, or by combination with others over the world of matter, is so great that no one can ever say that the limit has been reached.

(2) *The soul.* *a.* In the soul of man his personality inheres. By personality we mean the self-conscious and self-determining part of man's being. There can be no question that this is associated with the soul which is the higher part of man's nature. The soul with its personality may be separated from the body and be still a personal living soul. It simply dwells in the body—is united with it—using it as a means of contact with the external world in which man, as a spiritual, personal being, is thus enabled to live and exercise the faculties of his higher nature. *b.* The soul is also by nature pure. The sinlessness of the soul in its primeval state has been universally admitted by all who receive the word of God. *c.* The soul as well as the body is a unit. Its powers, though many, are not separate and independent faculties. It is the *soul* that thinks, that feels, that purposes, that loves. For convenience these powers are divided in intellectual philosophy into the understanding, the will, the affections, and the conscience. But in the exercise of either of these powers it is only the *soul* so acting. *d.* It also has practically unlimited or indefinite powers. This may be asserted of the soul with its intellectual and moral nature, with its exercise of thought and reason, and its perception of moral truth even more emphatically than of the body. *e.* The soul of man, as a true spirit, possesses all the qualities which belong to spirit. It has consciousness, self-consciousness, self-determination, intellectual powers, free-agency, capacity of moral action; is subject to law, capable of voluntary sin, accountable to God for its action and for its spiritual condition of sin. It has natural God-given and God-ordained immortality just as other created spirits have.

2. BODY AND SOUL IN UNION. (1) *Both body and soul necessary to constitute man.* The union of both body and soul is necessary to constitute a real man. Of necessity, as we have seen, the self-conscious individuality or personality is inseparably connected

with the spiritual part of man's nature, that is, with his soul, for with him there is no animal life in the body separate from that of the spirit with which the body is united. Without the soul the body is but a form of clay. But the spirit without the body is only a spirit. It is not all there is of human nature. It is not a man. To make man the body is necessary, not necessarily the same body always, neither of the same size, nor with all its parts perfect, nor of the same ever-continuing materials, nor without change; but such a body as belongs to human nature and is fitted for the contact of the conscious personal spirit with the world of matter. If at any time, therefore, the spirit and the body shall be separated, the spirit will not be properly called a man until a subsequent reunion. Until then it would be spoken of as "the spirit of the man" or "the soul of the man." Accordingly the Scriptures speak thus of all men during the period intervening between death and the resurrection of the judgment day. (See Rev. 6 : 9 ; 20 : 4 ; Heb. 12 : 23.) It is thus also that the resurrection of the body and its reunion with the soul become necessary to carry out the purposes of God both as to the rewards and the punishments of the eternal future.

(2) *Nature of the contact a mystery.* We have no means of knowing the nature of this contact, or union, between the body and the soul and the action of one upon the other. It is a mystery which we know to be a fact both from observation and revelation. But as to the manner or nature of it, we have no revelation and no knowledge. All must be conjecture. Dr. J. Pye Smith gives, in his "First Lines," p. 342, three theories: *a.* That the mental volitions produce somehow material action in the brain; this cerebral and nervous action produces in turn muscular action in the body. *b.* That it is the result of "occasional cause." That is, that God, by his omnipotent and universal agency, produces, *on each occasion for action*, all the motions of the body to correspond with the volitions of the mind; and *c.* that God has effected a pre-established harmony between the mind and the body, by which it has been arranged that the action of each will take place at the same time and space, without any action whatever of the one upon the other. But they are all objectionable. The last makes the body and the soul entirely without connection with each other. The second makes God and not man operate the body, and that too without the soul's agency in any respect. The first is no explanation, for it accepts the physical connection, but does not state how it arises.

(3) *Possible experiences.* In consequence of possessing this two-fold nature man is enabled to have a very wide range of experiences. He is as truly animal as though he were not spirit, and as truly spiritual as though he were not animal. Each nature retains in this mysterious union its own attributes and properties absolutely. So that one is merely animal, and the other purely spiritual. And the man, as a unit with two-fold nature, is able to have all possible animal experiences, just as if he were only animal, and all possible soul experiences, just as if he were only spirit. He may also have the full range of blended experience that comes from the close and mysterious union of body and soul in one man.

(4) *The central link in the universe.* By reason of this strange union of body and soul man may be regarded as a kind of central link in the great universe of being. As we have learned heretofore, there are in the universe spiritual beings, which, if they have or can have, form and body at all, have only those of a spiritual nature. We know also that there are below man beings which have material being, but no spiritual nature. Man alone is possessed of both spirit and body. He is, therefore, as it were, the link which binds together the world of spirit and that of matter—the central link in the great chain of God's creation.

THE TRICHOTOMY-THEORY OF MAN'S NATURE.

Some have supposed that man has more than the two-fold elements of body and soul. "Pythagoras, and after him, Plato, and subsequently the mass of Greek and Roman philosophers, maintained that man consists of three constituent elements, the rational spirit (νοῦς or πνεῦμα, *mens*), the animal soul (ψυχή, *anima*), and the body (σῶμα, *corpus*). Hence this usage of words became stamped upon the Greek popular speech. And consequently the apostle uses all three when intending to express exhaustively in popular language the totality of man and his belongings. 'May your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire without blame' (1 Thess. 5 : 23 ; Heb. 4 : 12 ; 1 Cor. 15 : 44). Hence some theologians conclude that it is a doctrine given by divine inspiration that human nature is constituted of three distinct elements.

"The use made of these terms by the apostles proves nothing more than that they used words in their current popular sense to express divine ideas. The word πνεῦμα designates the one soul, emphasizing its quality as rational. The word ψυχή designates the same soul, emphasizing its quality as the vital and animating principle of the body. The two are used together to express popularly the entire man.

"That the πνεῦμα and ψυχή are distinct entities cannot be the doctrine of the New Testament, because they are habitually used interchangeably and often indifferently. Thus ψυχή, as well as πνεῦμα, is used to designate the soul as the seat of the higher intellectual faculties (Matt. 16 : 26 ; 1 Peter 1 : 22 ;

Matt. 10 : 28). Thus also *πνεῦμα*, as well as *ψυχή*, is used to designate the soul as the animating principle of the body (James 2 : 26). Deceased persons are indifferently called *ψυχάι* (Acts 2 : 27, 31 ; Rev. 6 : 9 ; 20 : 4), and *πνεύματα* (Luke 24 : 37, 39 ; Heb. 12 : 32)."¹

Other passages, not mentioned above, upon which light is supposed to be thrown by this distinction, are 1 Cor. 2 : 14, 15 ; James 3 : 15 ; and Jude 19.

Others, which show a promiscuous use of these words, and thus that the distinction is incorrect, are Matt. 27 : 50 ; Mark 15 : 37 ; Luke 23 : 46 ; John 19 : 30 ; Acts 7 : 59.

This apparent teaching of the New Testament is also that of the Old. The account of man's coming into a living condition is given in Gen. 2 : 7 : "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life ; and man became a living soul." The word *נֶפֶשׁ* here translated "living soul," means ordinarily mere animal life. It is the same word that occurs in Gen. 1 : 20, translated "creature that hath life;" in 1 : 24, "living creature"; in 1 : 30, "life"; in 2 : 19, "living creature"; in 9 : 12, 15, 16, "living creature." Gen. 2 : 7, therefore, teaches that man attained his animal life by the inbreathing of God. But Deut. 4 : 29 uses the same word for the rational spiritual part of man. So also does Deut. 30 : 10. See also Job 16 : 4 ; 1 Sam. 1 : 15. "Gesenius' Lexicon," Sec. 3, says : "To it are ascribed love : Isa. 42 : 1 ; Cant. 1 : 7 ; 3 : 1-4 ; Gen. 34 : 3 ; joy : Ps. 86 : 4 ; fear : Isa. 15 : 5 ; Ps. 6 : 4 ; piety toward God : Ps. 86 : 4 ; 104 : 1 ; 143 : 8 ; and confidence : Ps. 57 : 1. . . . The soul is said to weep : Ps. 119 : 28 ; to be poured out in tears : Job 30 : 16 ; to cry for vengeance : Job 24 : 12 ; and also to invoke blessings : Gen. 27 : 4, 25. More rarely, things are attributed to the soul, mind, *נֶפֶשׁ* which belong, (1) To the mode of feeling and acting, as pride : Prov. 28 : 25 ; patience and impatience : Job 6 : 11. (2) To the will or purpose : Gen. 23 : 8 ; 2 Kings 9 : 15 ; 1 Chron. 28 : 9. (3) To the understanding or faculty of thinking : Ps. 139 : 14 ; Prov. 19 : 2 ; 1 Sam. 20 : 4 ; Deut. 4 : 9 ; Lam. 3 : 20." Also, Sec. 5, he says : "With suffixes it is put very frequently for : I myself, thou thyself, etc." In Sec. 2, par. 3, he had already said as to the relation between this word and *רוּחַ*, that "they are sometimes opposed, so that *נֶפֶשׁ* is ascribed to brutes, and *רוּחַ* to men : Job 12 : 10 ; but *רוּחַ* is also ascribed to beasts in Eccl. 3 : 21." This word *רוּחַ* is that which is especially used of the spirit of God ; but it is also "spoken both of man and beasts : Eccl. 3 : 19, 21 ; 8 : 8 ; 12 : 7 ; Job 12 : 10." Once the human spirit is called the *רוּחַ* of God : Job 27 : 3 ; as being breathed into man from God, and again returning to God : Gen. 2 : 7 ; Eccl. 12 : 7 ; Ps. 104 : 29.²

It is manifest from these facts that the two words are both used in the Old Testament to express both animal life and the higher spiritual nature, and, therefore, that no radical distinction exists between them. The same word which expresses the animal life of beasts is applied to man as a rational and moral being, as well as to his animal life. And the same word which usually expresses the higher, spiritual nature, is also used even of brutes. It is also plain that the same act by which the spiritual nature was conferred upon man brought his animal life into being. In man, therefore, it would seem

¹ Hodge's "Outlines," pp. 299, 300. ² Gesenius' Lexicon, under *רוּחַ* Sec. 2.

that the spirit becomes the actual living, animating principle, and needs not to have superadded to it the mere animal life, but embraces this within the life which is that of the spirit. The doctrine of the Old Testament on this subject corresponds, therefore, with that of the New. The constituent parts of man are simply body and soul. When the animal life is the predominant idea, נֶפֶשׁ and ψυχή are most apt to be used, because the spiritual man is regarded especially in that aspect. When the idea of the higher nature is the main feature, רִיחַ and πνεῦμα are used, because reference to that peculiarity of it is most prominent. But the use of *all* the words for *either* aspect shows that it is, after all, the one principle in man simply differently contemplated.

IV. ORIGIN OF SOULS.

As the soul of man was a direct creation of God, the inquiry naturally arises, are the souls of all his descendants thus created, or whence come they? This question becomes a difficult one because of the immateriality and unity and simplicity of the soul on the one hand, and on the other because of the participation of the spirits of all men in sin.

I. PRE-EXISTENCE THEORY. To avoid these difficulties, some have believed in the pre-existence of the souls of men, which, either voluntarily or as the punishment of previous sin, enter the bodies of men. In this manner their existence in a sinful condition may be accounted for without propagation of souls on the one hand, or the creation of the souls of sinful men on the other.

(1) *Three forms.* This theory of pre-existence has been held in three forms. The first supposes that all the souls of men were created at the same time with that of Adam, each for his respective body, with which it either voluntarily or necessarily unites itself at some fixed period in its earliest existence. According to this form of the theory of pre-existence, the relations of souls to Adam are somewhat similar to those of the body. And these relations, involving as they do the whole man, soul and body, may cause a sinful condition under which each man, both as to soul and body, is born sinful. The second form maintains that these souls or spirits are unfallen angels which, of their own accord, assume this union with the body, that through it they may attain to the higher relationships to God and the state of greater glory which belong to his redeemed. The third affirms that they are angels who had fallen in another sphere, unto whom God affords this additional probation, or upon whom he has imposed this position as a punishment of their sins.

(2) *Answered.* a. The first of these forms. To be any explanation at all of the difficulties, it must recognize an actual exist-

ence of the souls of all men at the same time with that of Adam. To say that the mere idea of these beings was present with the divine mind—in the sense in which Plato and his followers believed the whole creation to exist in the divine mind as a model in accordance with which all things have been made, or in the sense in which all things were present with God in the purpose which, according to the Scriptures, he eternally formed of their future existence, through which he knows them, and they are eternally co-existent with him—is to suppose an actual creation afterward, and to leave unremoved every objection which may be pressed against the direct creation of each soul at the time of its entrance into the body, and to render useless any theory of pre-existence at all. But if these souls actually existed, they must at their creation have had conscious life with intelligence and moral character. The chief objections to the theory in this respect are: (*a*) That no man has ever had consciousness of a pre-existent state, or memory of things which occurred therein. This fact ought to be conclusive against this theory, for that consciousness in the soul is not affected by its union with or separation from the body, is plain from our consciousness in our present existence and from what the Scriptures teach of the condition of man between the hour of death and the resurrection. (*b*) The Scriptures give no hint of any creation or existence of the spirit of any man prior to its connection with the body. (*c*) No facts in human life or in the constitution of man support the theory, nor does reason in any way suggest or sustain it. It has originated entirely in an attempt to escape difficulties. (*d*) It undertakes no explanation of the condition or position of these spirits, regarded either as innocent or guilty, while awaiting the period of their union with the body. *b.* Against the second and third forms the same objection, lack of consciousness and memory exists. Against the second may be especially urged the impossibility for any purpose of a holy being voluntarily choosing a sinful condition, which the theory supposes permitted by God by granting to these spirits their sinful desire, for such choice would itself be sin. Against both the second and the third it may be said that the Scriptures nowhere ascribe the origin of sin in any of the human race to any other source than that of Adam, and that Heb. 2 : 16 expressly excludes angels from the benefits of Christ's redemption. The King James translation is, "For verily he took not on him the nature of angels, but he took on him the seed of Abraham." But the more cor-

rect translations of the Canterbury revisers and of their American committee are still stronger. The former is, "For verily not of angels doth he take hold, but he taketh hold of the seed of Abraham." The latter is, "For verily not to angels doth he give help, but he giveth help to the seed of Abraham."

2. **TRADUCIAN THEORY.** Another theory as to the origin of souls which has very extensively prevailed, is that the souls of men, as well as their bodies, are derived from their parents. According to this, it is man as the whole man that begets and is begotten; and as the body produces body, so, it is thought, soul produces soul. This theory is commonly known as Traducianism from the Latin *traduco*, to lead or bring over, as the layer of a vine, for the purpose of propagation. This theory is based upon several grounds.

(1) *Proof.* *a.* Its advocates claim that it is not wholly unsupported by the Scriptures. While Gen. 5 : 1 declares that God created man "in the likeness of God," in ver. 3, it is said that "Adam begot a son in his own likeness, after his image, and called him Seth." But this passage "only asserts that Seth was like his father. It sheds no light on the mysterious process of generation, and does not teach how the likeness of the child to the parent is secured by physical causes."¹ The fact that God breathed into Adam the breath of life but did not into Eve, is also adduced as proof of the derivation of her soul from his, as well as of her body. But this is an argument from ignorance. We know not how Eve was animated into life, but surely in her case there was no begetting of any kind, and therefore from it, even allowing that her soul came from Adam, no light could be thrown upon that of others subsequent to it. The language of Christ to Nicodemus (John 3 : 6), "that which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit," can have no application, because the spiritual birth or soul-begetting here spoken of is that of the new nature in man produced by the Holy Spirit of God. It would seem, therefore, that this theory has not any real support from any direct teaching of Scripture. *b.* But while this fact is admitted by many of its advocates, it is claimed that this theory accounts better than any other for the transmission of a sinful nature, and is thus especially supported by the Scripture doctrine of Original Sin. The Bible as well as experience teaches that men are born with a cor-

¹ Hodge, "Systematic Theology," Vol. II., p. 68.

rupt nature, and that the corruption is no less in the soul than in the body. This theory denies that God can directly create a sinful soul, and challenges a just explanation of the sinful state of man, even in infancy, unless it is due, as is the sinful body, to its connection with that of the parent. It is unquestionably difficult, though not impossible, to give such an explanation as shall be satisfactory, and hence this is a strong argument in favor of this theory.

But, on the other hand, it is improper and dangerous to say that the doctrine of original sin is not true, if there is no propagation of souls. That doctrine is plainly revealed, and is derived from unquestionable facts. Its correctness does not depend upon any theory which may be presented for its explanation. All that is justifiable is to show that this theory, if in no other respect objectionable, will account for it. But the universal sinfulness of man may have otherwise arisen, and whether or not we know the manner in which it has come to pass, we are not at liberty to say that its truth depends upon the correctness of any theory which Scripture has not distinctly connected with it. *c.* It is also argued in favor of Traducianism that the account of creation in Genesis represents God as resting after the creation of man, both male and female. It is said that this rest is evidently one from direct creation, because God is constantly creating mediately through the powers of reproduction conferred on plants and animals; that, therefore, if the souls of men are produced from the parent with the body, there is only in each case an instance of this mediate creation; but that, if directly created by God, there appears to be no sense in which he has ceased from creation, or can be said to have rested "from all his work which he had made." But nothing can be argued conclusively from these statements. We know not exactly what is meant by this Sabbath day rest of God. But that it was not a perpetual rest in all direct and immediate acts, as well as mediate, is seen in various well-known instances of God's direct action; as in the conception of Christ by the Holy Ghost; in the working of miracles; and in the work of the Holy Spirit in the regeneration of the souls of men. *d.* Traducianism receives strong support from the transmission of mental and moral characteristics from parent to child. These become equally fixed and permanent with those of the body. They may be traced throughout the various branches of any one race. They are found as national peculiarities which distinguish one people from another.

They appear in families, though not so plainly manifested because of the many intermarriages with other families, and of the tendency to reproduce the spiritual as well as the bodily traits of remote ancestors. They are often very strongly marked between parent and child, and the transmission is so plain that the general law has been laid down that generally, though not universally, the sons follow the mental and moral features of the mother, and the daughters those of the father. This argument would be very decisive could we entirely separate the spiritual man from the influence of the corporeal. "But," says Doctor Hodge, "this argument is not conclusive, because it is impossible for us to determine to what proximate cause these peculiarities are due. They may all be referred, for what we know, to something peculiar in the physical constitution. That the mind is greatly influenced by the body cannot be denied. And a body having the physical peculiarities belonging to any race, nation, or family, may determine within certain limits the character of the soul."¹

e. The advocates of this theory also urge that only thus can we account for such an incarnation of Christ as would make him truly of the race of man. His human soul must, like his human body, have proceeded from his mother. But the incarnation is a mystery as to the manner of which we cannot dogmatize, and from which especially we can draw no conclusions as to others of mankind. We know not even the connection with his mother of the human body of the Son whom she conceived. All that we know is that Jesus was truly her child, and that as such he was of our nature. How he became such is not fully revealed. But, if it be true of all others that their souls are direct creations of God and yet that they are of the human race, then the fact that the soul of Christ was not derived from his mother would make him no less a man than all others. The incarnation of Christ indeed the rather favors the theory of Creationism; for if his soul and his body were both derived from his mother, it is impossible to see how sin was not transmitted to him as it is to others. On the theory of Creationism we can understand how he could be born sinless, as a pure soul might then have been united with the body miraculously prepared for him, which body itself, because produced by direct divine agency, would also be pure and sinless.²

¹ "Systematic Theology," Vol. II., p. 70.

² The author answers well here a false claim made by the Traducianists, and then falls into what the reviser thinks is a mistake in his own claim for Creationism. It

(2) *Objection.* The chief, and almost the only objection to this theory of any weight, is that the idea of the propagation of souls involves their materiality. If this is true the theory must be rejected, even if we are left without any satisfactory explanation. That we cannot solve the problem otherwise, does not show that it has no solution.

Any explanation of the transmission of souls must recognize in the soul something different from the body, and something that has all the elements necessary to a true spirit. To suppose, therefore, that the spirit in man is only a higher form of the animal life, to which have been added intelligence and moral capabilities, is to suppose the soul to be incapable of any separate existence from that animal life, and therefore, to be dispelled into nonentity with the death of the body. This is so contrary to what the Scriptures teach of its separate and continued existence after death, as not to be admissible for a moment. It is because this has been believed to be necessarily true of it, if in any way material, and because propagation of souls has seemed to involve their materiality, that this theory has been so generally rejected.

But it may be questioned whether any such materialism is essential to a propagation of souls. It is claimed that extension belongs to matter alone, and that only through extension can there arise the capacity for increase in number. But this argues a knowledge of the nature of created spirits which we do not possess. The fact that the unity of nature and attributes in God as the Great Spirit, the Father of spirits, involves actual simplicity in him, does not prove that the same is necessarily true of the spirits he has created. It is not certain that they may not have some kind of spiritual bodies. Is it not more than possible that he who, though simply spirit, can create spirit like himself, but not of his own substance, may be able to confer upon such spirits such a power of multiplication, that what he does by

seems strange, after recognizing, as he does, that the incarnation of the Saviour was a mystery and a miracle, that he should say: "If his soul and his body were both derived from his mother, it is impossible to see how sin was not transmitted to him as to others." Surely if the mighty power of God can take a *vile sinner* and make him "meet to be partaker of the inheritance of the saints in light," that power was sufficient to bring forth from the womb of the virgin a body and a soul undefiled by sin. And again, Creationism has no whit advantage here over Traducianism. For Creationists hold that Christ got from his mother his *body*, which, with them, is *the vehicle for the transmission of sin*, and so it is just as difficult for them to see how sin was not transmitted, as it is for the Traducianist with his theory. No claim for either theory can be made from the incarnation. This is confessedly miraculous and abnormal.

direct agency in the first creation he also may do through them in the mediate creations of other spirits? It is not affirmed that this is true, but is it possible to affirm that it cannot be true?

Besides, we should be careful how we dogmatize as to what can and cannot be true of spirits, when we now know so much to be true which *a priori* we should have judged to be impossible. Thus we now know through the creation of man that spirit can be so associated with matter as to give it a fixed location in space; as to bring it into such contact with matter as to be able to act through it, and upon it; and, more than this, that it is so affected by the condition of the material organism with which it is connected, that the outward manifestation and exercise of its powers is weakened or strengthened through that organism and its moral faculties influenced toward sin or holiness. These, and many similar facts, we now know to be true, which, without experience and Scripture teaching, we should have denied to be possible because of the substantial differences of spirit and matter. Even in the Divine Spirit we are taught that forms of plurality exist, which, without the instructions of the word of God, we might have denied to be compatible with his spirituality and simplicity, yet which as now revealed are seen to be in no respect inconsistent with these necessary peculiarities of the One God.

These facts are not sufficient to enable us to maintain this theory of Traducianism as true, but only as possible; but they at least suffice to keep us from asserting that descent of one spirit from another can only come through some material substance in the soul, and from accepting, as the only possible solution, any other theory which may be accompanied with objections equally insuperable.¹

3. DIRECT-CREATION THEORY. The more prevalent theory as to the origin of souls is known as Creationism. It maintains that the soul of each man is directly created by God at the time of its union with its body.

(1) *Proof.* The arguments in its favor are thus presented by Dr. Hodge: *a.* "It is more consistent with the prevailing representations of the Scriptures. In the original account of the creation there is a marked distinction made between the body and the soul. The one is from the earth, the other from God. This

¹ The author has stated so strongly the argument for the Traducian theory, and answered so completely the only serious objection to it, that he makes it seem the theory easiest to hold. Indeed there is reason to believe that his own views underwent something of a change after writing this chapter.

distinction is kept up throughout the Bible. Body and soul are not only represented as different substances, but also as having different origins. The body shall return to dust, says the wise man, and the spirit to God who gave it. Here the origin of the soul is represented as different from, and higher than that of the body. The former is from God in a sense in which the latter is not. In like manner God is said to form 'the spirit of man within him' (Zech. 12 : 1); to give 'breath unto the people upon it,' and spirit to them that walk therein' (Isa. 42 : 5). This language nearly agrees with the account of the original creation, in which God is said to have breathed into man the breath of life to indicate that the soul is not earthy or material, but had its origin immediately from God. Hence he is called 'God of the spirits of all flesh' (Num. 16 : 22). It could not well be said that he is God of the bodies of all men. The relation in which the soul stands to God, as its God and Creator, is very different from that in which the body stands to him. And hence in Heb. 12 : 9, it is said : 'We have had fathers of our flesh which corrected us and we gave them reverence : shall we not much rather be in subjection unto the Father of spirits, and live?' The obvious antithesis here presented is between those who are fathers of our bodies and him who is the Father of our spirits. Our bodies are derived from our earthly parents—our souls are derived from God. This is in accordance with the familiar use of the word flesh, where it is contrasted, either expressly or by implication, with the soul. Paul speaks of those who had not 'seen his face in the flesh,' and of 'the life he now lived in the flesh.' He tells the Philippians that it was needful for them that he should remain 'in the flesh'; he speaks of his 'mortal flesh.' The psalmist says of the Messiah, 'my flesh shall rest in hope,' which the apostle explains to mean that his flesh should not see corruption. In all these, and in a multitude of similar passages, flesh means the body, and 'fathers of our flesh' means fathers of our bodies. So far, therefore, as the Scriptures reveal anything on the subject, the authority is against Traducianism and in favor of Creationism. *b.* The latter doctrine, also, is clearly most consistent with the nature of the soul. The soul is admitted among Christians to be immaterial and spiritual. It is indivisible. The Traducian doctrine denies this universally acknowledged truth. It asserts that the soul admits of 'separation or division of essence.' On the same ground that the church universally rejected the Gnostic doctrine of emanation as inconsistent with the nature of

God as a Spirit, it has, with nearly the same unanimity, rejected the doctrine that the soul admits a division of substance. This is so serious a difficulty that some of the advocates of the extraduce doctrine endeavor to avoid it by denying that their theory assumes any such separation or division of the substance of the soul. But this denial avails little. They maintain that the same numerical essence which constituted the soul of Adam constitutes our souls. If this is so, then either humanity is a general essence of which individual men are the modes of existence, or what was wholly in Adam is distributively, partitively, and by separation, in the multitudes of his descendants. Derivation of essence, therefore, does imply, and is generally admitted to imply, separation or division of essence. And this must be so if numerical identity of essence in all mankind is assumed to be secured by generation or propagation.¹ *c.* A third argument is derived from the scriptural doctrine as to the person of Christ. He was very man; he had a true human nature, a true body and a rational soul. He was born of a woman. He was, as to his flesh, the son of David. He was descended from the fathers. He was in all points made like as we are, yet without sin. This is admitted on both sides. But, as before remarked in reference to realism, this, on the theory of Traducianism, necessitates the conclusion that Christ's human nature was guilty and sinful. We are partakers of Adam's sin, both as to guilt and pollution, because the same numerical essence which sinned in him is communicated to us. Sin, it is said, is an accident, and supposes a substance in which it inheres, or to which it pertains. Community in sin supposes, therefore, community of essence. If we were not in Adam as to essence, we did not sin in him, and do not derive a corrupt nature from him. But if we were in him as to essence, then his sin was our sin, both as to guilt and pollution. This is the argument of Traducianists repeated in every form. But they insist that Christ was in Adam, as to the substance of his human nature, as truly as we were. They say that if his body and soul were not derived from the body and the soul of his virgin mother he was no true man, and cannot be the redeemer of men. What is true of other men must, consequently, be true of him. He must, therefore, be as much involved in the guilt and corruption of the apostasy as other men. It will not do to affirm and deny the same thing. It is a contradiction to say

¹ The author has completely answered this objection in his treatment of the Traducian theory.

that we are guilty of Adam's sin because we are partakers of his essence, and that Christ is not guilty of his sin nor involved in its pollution, although he is a partaker of his essence. If participation of essence involve community of guilt and depravity in the one case, it must also in the other.¹ As this seems a legitimate conclusion from the Traducian doctrine, and as the conclusion is anti-christian and false, the doctrine itself cannot be true."²

(2) *Objections.* There are two chief objections made to the theory of Creationism:

a. It is claimed that God is supposed, by a direct, originating act, to create a pure soul to inhabit a sinful body, and thus partake necessarily of its sin; or else that he must be supposed to create for that purpose a soul already sinful.

In answering this objection attention is called to the statement made in the first section and first paragraph of this chapter, that the Scriptures appear to allude to Adam as the embodiment of the race of man, and it was added: "The importance of this fact will hereafter be seen." It would seem from that statement that in some form there is a certain unity in human nature. Those who hold the theory of Traducianism believe that "the souls of children, as well as their bodies, exist in their parents in Adam, either as *real beings*, like the seeds in plants, and so have been propagated from Adam through successive generations, which is the opinion of Leibnitz in his "*Théodicée*," or they exist in their parents merely *potentially* and come from them by propagation or transference."³ Now, while the theory of propagation may be rejected, the fact of the unity of human nature still exists. The recognition of that existence will aid in solving many difficulties in theology, and among others, may afford a probable solution of a direct creation of God, which does not involve responsibility on his part for the guilt of a newly created soul. If it be true that human nature is one, and yet that men are many, it follows that a man is only "a manifestation of the general principle of humanity in connection with a given human body,"⁴ and that thus he becomes a conscious individual person of that humanity. This is analogous to, but yet quite different from, the three-fold personal relations in the Trinity of the Godhead. The latter is a

¹ This idea has been answered in a footnote under the Traducian theory. Dr. Hodge ignores entirely here the miraculousness of Christ's conception.

² "Systematic Theology," Vol. II., pp. 70-72. See the whole discussion, pp. 65-76, especially the concluding remarks, pp. 72-76.

³ Knapp's "Christian Theology," p. 201.

⁴ Hodge, Vol. II., p. 75.

three-fold, separate personal subsistence in one common, undivided, and indivisible divine nature or essence. The former embraces many separate individual personal manifestations of one human nature, his appropriate part of which is possessed by each person who thus becomes an embodiment in himself of the common humanity. If then it be accordant with God's general method of working, and with his purpose to produce this personal existence under proper conditions, new souls may be thus created whose connection with the common humanity may be as intimate as though they were originally contained in Adam for propagation, and who are therefore created sinful without any more relation of God to their creation than would have existed had they been propagated.¹

b. Again it is objected that direct creation is not in accordance with God's present relations to the world and his manner of acting in it. But that the common method of God, in the production of life of any kind, may be of this nature is ably set forth by Dr. Hodge in answer to the declaration of Delitzsch that the continued creation of souls is inconsistent with God's present relation to the world, and that he now produces only mediately, *i. e.* through the operation of second causes.

"This," says Dr. Hodge, "is a near approach to the mechanical theory of the universe, which supposes that God, having created the world and endowed his creatures with certain faculties and properties, leaves it to the operation of these second causes. A continued superintendence of Providence may be admitted, but the direct exercise of the divine efficiency is denied. What then becomes of the doctrine of regeneration? The new birth is not the effect of second causes. It is not a natural effect produced by the influence of the truth or the energy of the human will. It is due to the immediate exercise of the almighty power of God. God's relation to the world is not that of a machinist to a machine, nor such as limits him to operating only through second causes. He is immanent in the world. He sustains and guides all causes. He works constantly through them, with them, and without them. As in the operations of writing and speaking there is with us the union and combined action of mechanical, chemical, and vital forces, controlled by the presiding power of mind; and as the mind, while thus guiding the operations of the body, constantly exercises its creative energy of thought, so God,

¹ There hardly seems to be warrant in the Scriptures for any such "general principle of human nature."

as immanent in the world, constantly guides all the operation of second causes, and at the same time exercises uninterruptedly his creative energy. Life is not the product of physical causes. We know not that its origin is in any case due to any cause other than the immediate power of God. If life be the peculiar attribute of immaterial substance, it may be produced agreeably to a fixed plan by the creative energy of God whenever the conditions are present under which he has purposed it should begin to be. The organization of a seed, or of the embryo of an animal, so far as it consists of matter, may be due to the operation of material causes guided by the providential agency of God, while the vital principle itself is due to his creative power. There is nothing in this derogatory to the divine character. There is nothing in it contrary to the Scriptures. There is nothing in it out of analogy with the works and workings of God. It is far preferable to the theory which either entirely banishes God from the world, or restricts his operations to a *concursus* with second causes."

The consideration of this question may be terminated by adopting the language with which Dr. Hodge closes his discussion. "The object of this discussion is not to arrive at certainty as to what is not clearly revealed in Scripture, nor to explain what is, on all sides, admitted to be inscrutable, but to guard against the adoption of principles which are in opposition to plain and important doctrines of the word of God. If Traducianism teaches that the soul admits of abscission or division, or that the human race are constituted of numerically the same substance, or that the Son of God assumed into personal union with himself the same numerical substance which sinned and fell in Adam, then it is to be rejected as both false and dangerous. But if, without pretending to explain everything, it simply asserts that the human race is propagated in accordance with the general law which secures that life begets life; that the child derives its nature from its parents through the operation of physical laws, attended and controlled by the agency of God, whether directive or creative, as in all other cases of the propagation of living creatures, it may be regarded as an open question or a matter of indifference. Creationism does not necessarily suppose that there is any other exercise of the immediate power of God in the production of the human soul than such as takes place in the production of life in other cases. It only denies that the soul is capable of division, that all mankind are composed of numerically the same

essence, and that Christ assumed numerically the same essence that sinned in Adam.”¹

V. THE IMAGE AND LIKENESS OF GOD.

In the first account of creation God is represented as saying : “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness” (Gen. 1 : 26).

1. IMAGE AND LIKENESS SYNONYMOUS. A natural question has arisen whether there is any difference between the words “image” and “likeness.” It has been earnestly contended that there is some distinction to be made between them, and various conflicting opinions have been expressed as to what that distinction is ; but it is not probable that any was meant or can be established. None is apparent between the original Hebrew words ; and the scriptural use of them elsewhere seems to imply that none exists. In Gen. 1 : 27 the first of these is used alone, and is twice used. In Gen. 9 : 6 we have the first word alone, while in Gen. 5 : 1 the second alone appears, although in Gen 5 : 3 both are employed in stating the image and likeness of Adam in which Seth was begotten. The New Testament equally fails to make any distinction. In 1 Cor. 11 : 7 image (εἰκών) and glory (δόξα) are used ; in Col. 3 : 10 image (εἰκών) alone, and in James 3 : 9 likeness (ὁμοίωσις). The assumption, therefore, that there is any distinction between the words is entirely gratuitous. The two are merely synonymous, and are used in accordance with a common Hebrew mode of speech.

2. MEANING OF IMAGE AND LIKENESS. A more important question is as to what is meant by that image or likeness.

(1) There is certainly *no reference to the bodily form of man*. God, as pure spirit, has no body, in the likeness or image of which man could be created. The body of man, although in many respects superior to that of the brutes, is in a great measure like theirs. The analogy between man and animals generally is very striking, and especially that between him and those nearest to him in the stage of being. But there can be no analogy between him and God in this respect. In no way even could special honor be put on man in his physical nature, except as that nature gives evidence of the existence with it of those spiritual powers which elevate man above the brutes. It is as the dwelling-place of that spirit, and because of its intimate association with the life existent in that body, that any sacredness

¹ “Systematic Theology,” Vol. II., pp. 75, 76.

can be attached to the bodily form. It is this, therefore, that is doubtless meant by Gen. 9 : 6, where the shedding of the blood of man is made punishable on the ground that "in the image of God created he him (man)."

(2) That image and likeness *consist in the possession of a spiritual nature*. It is in this respect that man is like God, who is called "the God of the spirits of all flesh" (Num. 16 : 22 ; 27 : 16) ; and the Father of spirits (Heb. 12 : 9). The spirits of men are also spoken of as peculiarly the works of his hands (Eccl. 12 : 7 ; Isa. 57 : 16 ; Zech. 12 : 1), and it was to him that our dying Lord commended his spirit (Luke 23 : 46).

As thus spiritual, man has all the peculiarities of a true spirit :
a. He is a personal being with individual conscious existence and action. *b.* He has the intellectual powers by which he knows all things within the sphere of his being. *c.* He has that power of contrary choice which constitutes him a free agent, although controlled in that choice by the prevailing motive—by which is meant the motive which most pleases him, and which is, therefore, that to which his own nature gives prevalence. *d.* He has a moral nature, or a nature with reference to which we can say "ought" or "ought not." *e.* This moral nature as originally existent must have been (*a*) not only without taint of sin, and (*b*) without tendencies to sin, and (*c*) not merely in a condition of equipoise between sin and holiness as would make the soul indifferent to the one or the other, but (*d*) must have been entirely inclined toward the right, with a holy taste for the holiness of God, having capacity to discern its beauty, and inclination to love him as its possessor, accompanied by readiness to obey the law of God and perception of man's duty to serve him. That such was the original condition of man's moral nature is evident from Eph. 4 : 24 : "And put on the new man which after God hath been created in righteousness and holiness of truth." These elements, which belonged to the image of God in which man was created, have been lost. They are restored again in the renewing of man when created anew in Christ Jesus. That the whole image was not destroyed by the sin of Adam appears from the fact that man is spoken of as in that image subsequent to the fall and before the renewal. (See Gen. 9 : 6 ; James 3 : 9 ; 1 Cor. 11 : 7.) But that there was a loss, not merely of innocence, but of original righteousness, is evidently to be inferred from the above mentioned passage in Ephesians. *f.* Perpetuity of existence also belongs to the nature of created spirit, and is another

point of similarity between all spirits and God. This is commonly called immortality. But created spirits have not an immortal spiritual life. The soul may die. The death of the soul, however, is not the cessation of conscious personal existence. It is simply the destruction of its spiritual life by its contamination by sin and its separation from the favor of God. What the Scriptures teach of the death of the soul shows, therefore, that natural immortality should not be affirmed of man's spiritual nature. But perpetual existence has been given by God to the nature of created spirits. He might have made that nature otherwise. But he has chosen that it shall be ever existent. This perpetuity of existence is, however, merely in his purpose. He could have willed otherwise. No creation of God could have such a nature as of itself to be imperishable. It has been argued from the simplicity of the soul that it cannot be destroyed by God. But evidently he who created without compounding could also destroy without dividing. But he has chosen to give such a nature to spirit that to that nature belongs perpetuity of existence. It is, however, not self-existent, as is God, for it has not in itself the power of self-existence. Without God it could no longer be. It must be preserved, in the conferred nature, by that same power which created it. But God has given this nature to spirits, which he purposes ever to preserve, and through that gift and that preservation they have an endless existence.

(3) Some hold that man's *dominion over the lower orders* was a part of his image and likeness of God. When God purposed to make man, he also said: "And let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every living thing that creepeth upon the earth" (Gen. 1 : 26).

But evidently this was an office conferred upon the man made in God's image, and not a part of that image. The Scripture presents it as something that was to follow after the nature was conferred upon man: The resemblance between him and God in this respect is very striking. It becomes more so when we recognize the fulfillment of this purpose in its highest sense in the mediatorial dominion of the God-man. But this position is one of office and not of nature, and the image of God declared of man is manifestly an image of his nature.

VI. MAN PERFECT BUT NOT INFALLIBLE.

It was after the creation of man that God saw, as to every-

thing that he had made, that it was "very good," literally, "exceedingly good" (Gen. 1 : 31). On the previous days we are only told that he saw it was good, but at the last it was very good. There seems here a special emphasis, therefore, as to the perfection of man's entire nature. The points of that perfection have been exhibited in showing that man was made in the image of God. But that it did not include perpetual continuance in it we know from the fact that man fell from it in sinning against God. His nature, therefore, was fallible. In this respect he was not peculiar, for, as we have heretofore seen, there have been angels also who kept not their first estate. Indeed fallibility belongs to the nature of created spirits. It is involved in their possession of the power of contrary choice, that whenever good and evil are presented, the latter may be chosen, and thus the spiritual creature may fall. Any idea of a probation implies the presentation of such choice.

The perfection, therefore, of any created being does not consist in infallibility. The fact that man has fallen, argues nothing against his original perfection. For this, he needed only to have truly the nature which God gave him. God could not give him an infallible nature, though he could preserve him infallible in whatever nature he might choose to bestow. But he was under no obligation to do this: none to man; none to his own righteous nature. He had the right to test man at his will, and thus testing, to leave him to himself, without constraint to the contrary, to choose as he might see fit. This choice he made, but in the wrong direction, and man fell; but his fall was not due to the lack of any natural perfection.

The fall of a spiritual being may be prevented, either by not appointing to it a probation, or presenting the trial under such circumstances as will leave no temptation to choose the wrong, or by God's so influencing the mind as to counteract all the power of such temptation. But, that God has a right to test his creature is unquestionable, as well as that he is not bound to surround him with such circumstances, or so to counteract the power of all temptation, as to make sinning impossible. But, if he should thus protect or decline to test, the natural fallibility of the creature would still be a fact. He is under these circumstances not liable to fall simply because God protects him from that liability. He has not an infallible nature. The holy angels are often spoken of as confirmed in holiness; but this is not due to any change of nature, but must either be known from a knowledge of God's purpose and perhaps of his promise; even if in part, or altogether to be accomplished by what they have seen of the fearful evil of sin in the other angels, or in man. Without such promise, or declared purpose of God, there is no assurance that they may not yet fall.

B. PROVIDENCE

CHAPTER IV. THE GENERAL DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE

Intimately associated with the doctrine of creation is that of Providence, which is, however, a distinct method of divine activity. By acts of creation God brings into existence the things which he makes, and confers upon them their respective natures, qualities, properties, modes of existence, and laws of being, thought, and action. By acts of Providence he simply preserves these creations or permits or causes decay or change in them to such an extent and within such limits as he has purposed; and at the same time, in fulfillment of like purpose, he directs, controls, and guides them in accordance with the natures he has given them and the laws he has imposed upon them.

Providence is also closely allied with predestination or purpose; but the distinction between these two is also equally clear. The purpose of God is his predetermined plan as to what shall be done in his creation by himself or by others. It fixes the events which shall happen and the methods and agency by which they will take place. But providence is the actual doing or permitting of the things thus purposed and the securing of the ends thus designed. The purpose also is formed in eternity; the providential acts are performed in time.

But despite these very obvious distinctions, providence has been confounded both with purpose and creation, some holding that there is no other providence except what is involved in purpose, and others going to the other extreme and maintaining that providence is after all only a continual creation, and that there is no other connection between antecedent and consequent events than exists in the divine efficiency giving every moment renewed existence by acts of direct creative power. Each of these views is opposed to both reason and Scripture, which teach that there is a divine efficiency operating in this world differing in many respects essentially from that exercised in creation. This efficiency is displayed both in the preservation and government of the universe, and of the things which are contained within it.

I. PROOF OF PROVIDENTIAL EFFICIENCY NOW OPERATING.

I. THE ALMOST UNIVERSAL BELIEF. In presenting the proof that providential efficiency is now operating in the world, it is natural that attention should first be called to the almost univer-

sal belief in the providential action and care of God. This is based upon the same feeling of self-dependence in man to which reference has been made in the proofs of the existence of God. It is the witness to us which God gives, not only that he exists, but that he supports and sustains us in every moment of being.

2. THE WORLD ABOUT US. A second proof may be drawn from the world about us. Every argument it has afforded for the being of a God becomes equally conclusive of his providential care. The argument from causation, in tracing back all causes to some being who has the cause of his existence in himself, forces us to find in the present efficiency of such a being the final ground for all things that now occur. That from design leads us constantly to trace the purpose God has had in view in each event of life, and thus proclaims the presence and efficiency of him who is seen to be working out, even now, the purposes he has eternally formed. Moreover, the evidence that the world affords that it is not self-existent and independent proves the presence and efficient energy of one upon whom it depends for the properties, qualities, and life of its varied forms, and for their continued existence.

3. CREATION FROM NOTHING. The fact which we have learned of a creation out of nothing shows that the whole universe exists only through the will and power of God. Since it could only thus come into being, so it could only thus remain in being. Any contrary doctrine could only be held by those who deny a creation out of nothing. The history of philosophical opinions shows that this is true. The doctrine of providence has only been denied by those who have believed in the eternity of matter. It is possible to conceive, in the absence of other proofs to the contrary, that as man can construct machines and leave them to work through the laws of nature, so, if nature were self-existent and eternal, and if it possessed of itself all its attributes and qualities, the mere fact that God has given it form would not necessitate his continued presence; he would be acting then as man does, in subordination to and in the use of the properties and qualities of matter. But, however God may use these things in matter, he does not use them in personal subordination to their properties and qualities, but as himself their sovereign Lord. He has given these qualities. He could take them away. He could counteract them. He can destroy them. They exist only because he wills and causes. But such "will" and "cause" are only his providential operation by which he preserves them and

uses them as their Lord for his own purpose. His is the exercise of present divine efficiency in them and through them.

4. THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF GOD. The nature of God himself also furnishes indubitable testimony to his providential operations. This arises in opposite directions :

(1) *From the limitations of his nature.* As heretofore seen, there are some things which God cannot do. He cannot do impossibilities. He cannot confer his own incommunicable attributes upon another. This limitation arises from the fact that he is God, and beside him there can be none else. It is this limitation which makes it impossible to create a world which shall be self-existent and independent, and which, as being such, will not need his efficient action for its support and care. To do so would be to confer on it his own nature.

(2) *From the infinity of his nature.* On the other hand, the illimitable nature of God's attributes makes it impossible that he should not be efficiently present always with his creation. His omnipresence does not simply make him capable of being everywhere, but by virtue of it he absolutely is everywhere. He cannot be absent from his creation. He cannot withdraw himself even if he will. His knowledge of all events within his creation is also a necessity of his being. He cannot be ignorant of them if he would. The fact that he does not know of the existence of anything is of itself not only proof that it does not exist, but that it cannot exist. Because of his goodness also he must wish the happiness of his creatures and must make provision for that happiness. This arises not from any obligation to them, but from another necessity of his nature. He must be benevolently good. He must beneficently bestow wherever there are objects for such bestowal. The omnipresence, infinite knowledge, and goodness of the Almighty God, therefore, render necessary his providential care over his creation.

There can be but one thing that can hinder this benevolent care, and that is sin, which by demanding the punitive exercise of God's justice may change into punishment and misery that which otherwise would be happiness and joy. But this, so far from destroying providence, only introduces God as providentially acting in the form of government also, instead of preservation alone. He does not withdraw himself because of this sin. He is still present with the sinner. He continues to know his ways. He exercises providential care, and even sends blessings still upon him. He modifies his action only to correspond with the modified relation sin has introduced. Therefore, as the Ruler and Governor of the universe, he inflicts the punishment which sin has made necessary. Sin alone has brought into existence

this restraining and punishing rule and government. But for it, all would be merged into that fatherly care which seeks only to bless and protect and guide. The fact that there would be rewards does not prove any other kind of government; for the rewards of God are, after all, but gracious gifts, utterly undeserved, in no respect due except as sovereign bounties, and given under no other obligation than arises from his own truth which binds him to his purposes and leads him to fulfill his promises.

5. THE SCRIPTURES. The Scriptures abound in testimony to God's providential efficiency in the world. It is given in every imaginable form. General statements are made, as in Neh. 9:6, where the Lord is said to have made the heavens and their hosts, and the earth and seas and all that is therein, and to preserve them. Specific rule is declared over all the phenomena of nature, such as clouds, wind, rain, hail, snow, ice, cold, frost, thunder, lightning, storm, earthquakes, and all other natural events; many of these, formerly deemed accidental, are now seen to be governed by inexorable laws of God. The beasts of the field and the birds of the air are said to be carefully watched over by him. It is even he that clothes the flowers with their beauty by encircling them with his own shining garment of light. But men are his especial care. He provides the food for their bodies, and in a peculiar way watches and rules over their souls and lives. This he does with respect to the wicked as well as the good. His care extends to individuals, to families, to nations, and throughout the world. It appears not in great events only, but in those exceeding small, even to the numbering of the hairs of each one's head. So minute is the supervision asserted that some have even thought that the language of Scripture partakes of hyperbole. But the investigations of the microscope have shown that even to insects the most minute and invisible to the human eye has God given most beauteous forms and perfect outward coverings. His creative care has therefore descended to things most minute. Thus has the way been opened to the belief that the Scriptures even cannot tell us how minute is the providential care which God is now exercising over his whole creation.

II. PROVIDENCE NOT CONTINUOUS CREATION.

The evidences of continuous Divine action within the world have been so manifest that many have been led to the opposite extreme of deeming them actually creations renewed at every moment.

So far as the intention has been only to magnify the extent

and individual number of the providential acts of God, there is no especial harm in thus loosely talking of them as continuous creations. It might well be said that the power necessary to continue all things in existence is as great as that which would bring them each moment out of nothingness into existent life; and that the particularity with which each of these innumerable existences is looked after and cared for is as minute as if each were at the moment endowed with existence, nature, qualities, and powers. So long as we look at the mere glory to God's creative energy and power, there appears no other objection to the term continuous creation than its loose inaccuracy. But viewed in other aspects, this doctrine is seen to be not only inaccurate and false, but extremely dangerous.

1. DOES AWAY WITH CAUSE AND EFFECT. This idea of continuous creation does away with all the relation of cause and effect. No cause and its effect can have any relation to each other if both are separate creations of God. The former is not productive of the latter, nor is the latter the result of the former. The one is not a cause, nor is the other an effect. But if this is true, what confidence can we have in any of the phenomena of nature? I determine to accomplish some end. I put forth the energy I perceive necessary. The end is attained. I believe it to be due to my action and purpose. But according to this theory, the result is an act of God which occurs at the moment. It is not my action. It is not the result of my effort or power, but it is only something which God creates and which seems to have a connection with my purpose and effort, but has not. All reality is thus taken from life. If I find that I am mistaken here, I can have neither belief nor confidence in anything. If there is no real cause here, then I cannot feel sure that my mind does not deceive me when it urges me to seek a cause for all things, and not to rest, as to the universe, except in the belief of an uncaused First Cause. The tendency of such a theory is, therefore, to actual atheism. It seems to begin with a most credulous confidence in the Almighty, only to end in absolute disbelief of everything.

2. LEADS TO PANTHEISM. Such an idea leads necessarily to the acceptance of essential pantheism, if it does not drive to actual atheism. Every efficiency here is God himself acting. It is he that everywhere is alone the actor. The phenomena which accompany his action are only phantoms not realities. The acorn is not the fruit of the tree. It is his direct production. It is a

new creation of his hands. When it is planted, it is neither the acorn, nor the soil, nor the seasons, nor the air, nor anything else which causes a tree to come forth and grow. It is God, who at each moment makes a new creation different from what has preceded, though apparently its successor. God thus becomes the animating soul of the universe, and acts in it as the souls of men do in their bodies.

3. TAKES AWAY ALL RESPONSIBILITY. It absolutely takes away all responsibility for sinful acts, and all virtue in those that are holy. These are no longer the acts of the individual. He is deceived when he thinks that he wills them or does them. There are no actions but those of God. Besides, there is no one to be responsible. If the creation is a new one at each moment, the creature who did the act is gone. There is no one to be punished. The curious phenomenon of multiplied contradictions is therefore presented here. There is no action of a man, for it is God who has acted. There is no man who has acted, because the one before us is another creation; and while we have been speaking, he too has disappeared and another has taken his place. The deed has no character in its relation to man, for the man has not done it. God alone is responsible for it; for it is his act alone, into which has flowed neither the will, nor the power, nor the purpose, nor the activity of man, but only those of God.

4. IS MERE IDEALISM. Such a doctrine takes away all the evidences of an outward creation and introduces pure idealism. We believe in an outward creation because of the effects which, through the senses, it produces upon our minds. But if everything is a direct creation, these impressions on our minds are themselves direct creations made by God, and not by the outward world. They give no evidence, therefore, of the existence of anything except of God and of the individual who is conscious of receiving them. If they come from God alone there is no necessity for something outwardly corresponding to them. God and each individual, therefore, may be all that exists. Certainly they are all the existence of which any one can have any knowledge.

III. THE METHOD OF GOD'S PROVIDENCE.

It is impossible for us to comprehend, much less explain, the manner of God's providential action. We know no more of this than of the manner in which he created. Ignorance of the method of either action is, however, no reason for believing that

it does not exist. We who cannot tell how our own spirits act upon and through our own bodies may well accept the fact of the action of the universal Spirit as everywhere operating, though much of the mysterious and incomprehensible is therein involved. A few statements of facts which may be known may, however, be made upon this subject.

1. UNIVERSAL. This action is universal. It is not limited to certain kinds of creation, but, as we have seen, extends to everything and every event—the minutest as well as the greatest.

2. ACCORDS WITH THE NATURE OF GOD. The method of this action accords with the nature of God. The Judge of all the earth *must* do right. Whatever control God exercises must be in accordance with his infinitely holy and just nature.

3. ACCORDS WITH THE NATURE OF THAT WHICH IS GOVERNED. God's action in providence is not the same with all objects. It is always in keeping with the peculiar nature of that which is governed.

(1) *Over the material universe.* The action of providence here is purely mechanical, and it governs by the operation of physical law. The responsibility for all that comes to pass in this domain is entirely with God, since the control that he exercises is absolute.

(2) *Over plant and animal life.* In the management of the plant and animal life of the universe also God's providential control is absolute. In so far as the life of these things is connected with or composed of matter, the mechanical laws of matter are actively enforced by God. And if, as seems likely, there is in these lower orders anything which rises above matter and is independent of it, this also is under the direct and absolute control of God. For there is no reason to believe that the instincts and apparently voluntary powers of animals are any less under the direct and absolute control of God than is the material universe. The only difference in the government of these is, that providence controls these according to the laws of both their higher and lower natures, while he controls purely material things by the laws of matter only.

(3) *Over man.* When we come to consider the method of God's providential control of men we are confronted by a far more intricate problem. Besides possessing a material nature, which is governed to a great extent by the laws that govern matter, man is possessed of a soul and is a rational being. He is endowed with a certain freedom of will and an original capacity

for doing right and wrong. In the case of God's providential control of man, therefore, the problem as to *method* becomes a very difficult one, and our efforts to solve it must be more or less unsatisfactory. The fact that we could not solve it at all, however, would not disprove this providential control. The Bible is as explicit and clear as to this as it is concerning God's control of any other portion of his universe. "In God we live and move and have our being," as truly as does anything else. "The heart of man deviseth his way, but the Lord directeth his steps." The very hairs of the head are all numbered. The worst and most wicked act that any man ever performed—the slaying of Jesus Christ—is declared to have been according to "the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God." Concerning this difficult question, the method of God's providential control of man, the following may be said:

a. It is always in accordance with the nature of man. God does not govern man as he governs inanimate matter. He does not govern man as he governs the various lower orders of animals. God's action must fully accord with the free agency of man. Free agency belongs to the nature of an intelligent moral creature. He must have freedom of choice or he would not be responsible for his action. The very essence of responsibility consists in the power of contrary action, had one so pleased. God's providential action cannot, therefore, be such as to destroy man's freedom of will or the power of his contrary choice.

b. But this does not forbid the use of inducements to any specific action, nor the placing of man in circumstances which would influence or control his acts. Were these influences compulsory, so as to force to action against his will, the freedom of man would be destroyed, and with it responsibility. But wherever they are only persuasive, so as to lead him to delight in or to choose a specific course of action through his own good pleasure, liberty is preserved and man is accountable for his choice. The providential influences of God are of this nature only. Experience so teaches and the Scriptures so declare. Man is conscious at every moment that he could have chosen differently and acted differently, and that his act was the outcome of his own good pleasure. We could have no stronger proof that God has providentially acted in accordance only with our nature, except the word of God himself. This testimony is added, when he not only ascribes our sinful acts to our own will, but declares that he holds man responsible and will punish him for them.

c. It is a question also whether God may not, in his providential control of man, even originate action in him by producing some such change as is the result of the exercise of direct power. The man may be conscious of this fact and may feel assured that this change is not due to himself. In other ways also God may directly introduce controlling influences which forcibly originate new purposes in man, and so direct his will that it finds that which is pleasing to itself far different from the past. But this action of God is perhaps more in the nature of creative than of providential acts. The Scripture seems so to speak of them, and it may be doubted whether they belong to the realm of providence. Thus the words "creation" and "creature" are constantly applied to those who are vitally connected with Christ because of the new heart which God has given and of their renewal in the image of God. But whether these acts are to be regarded as creative only, or as providential also, it is evident that in them the restrictions arising from God's nature as to creative acts appear. The compulsion is toward holiness, not toward sin. The new heart is one fitted for God's service, and it loves him and desires to obey his statutes. He could not change a heart of holiness to one of sin without its own voluntary action, any more than he could create a sinful being. He cannot directly tempt to sin any more than he could make a man with original sin. His own righteous and holy nature is the guaranty of this and forbids that he should act otherwise. The connection of providence with sin will be considered under another head in this chapter.

IV. DISTINCTIONS IN PROVIDENCE.

There have been several distinctions made as to the providence of God :

I. GENERAL AND SPECIAL. The most common is that of General, Common or Universal Providence, and Special, Singular or Particular Providence. By general providence is meant the general care which God takes of the universe and all it contains, in preserving and upholding it under the general administration of the laws he has given it. By special providence is meant the minute care by which some events are supposed to take place immediately under his supervision or by his direct providential action.

It is unquestionably true that the acts of Providence extend to minute objects and specially marked events. But this is no

reason for making this distinction, which would seem to imply an indifferent, careless providence about all things else. The truth is that providence is of such a nature as to reach every natural event by the operation of general laws. It is a marked proof of the wisdom of God that he can so direct all the affairs of the universe as, without need of special action, to accomplish all the events he chooses. All providence, therefore, is general, because operated through general laws. It is also special, because every individual event comes to pass under God's own inspection, and through his own will and work.

"A general and a special providence," says Dr. A. A. Hodge, "cannot be two different modes of divine operation. The same providential administration is necessarily at the same time general and special, for the same reason, because it reaches without exception equally to every event and creature in the world. A general providence is special because it secures general results by the control of every event, great and small, leading to that result. A special providence is general because it specially controls all individual beings and actions in the universe. All events are so related together as a concatenated system of causes and effects and conditions, that a general providence that is not at the same time special is as inconceivable as a whole which has no parts, or as a chain which has no links" (" *Outlines of Theology*," p. 266).¹

2. ORDINARY AND EXTRAORDINARY. A second distinction is into ordinary and extraordinary providences. By the ordinary are meant those acts which, according to general law, commonly occur in every-day life and which are supposed to display no extraordinary action or purpose. By the extraordinary are meant any acts, such as miracles or prophecies, which are not naturally to be expected and are due to extraordinary Divine intervention.

3. MEDIATE AND IMMEDIATE. Another distinction is into mediate and immediate. This is similar to the last, except that this looks at providence from the agency of the divine act, whether done directly and without means, or mediately by means. The other views these acts according to their frequency and the impression thus produced by evident Divine interposition.

4. PHYSICAL AND SPIRITUAL. A fourth distinction is into physical or real, and spiritual or moral. The former regards providence as exercised about natural objects or things, the latter about persons, especially in their moral and spiritual relations.

¹ These general laws may be, and, no doubt, often are, *specially* manipulated, and, this *special* use of general laws may be properly called *special* providence.

V. DIFFICULTIES CONNECTED WITH THE DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE.

I. THE EXISTENCE OF SIN. The greatest of all the difficulties connected with the doctrine of providence is the existence of sin in the universe. If all things have always been under the control of God, and nothing has ever come to pass except in accordance with God's eternal purpose and his providential control, then how can we hold that God has had no responsibility for the existence of sin?

(1) *God's purpose to allow sin a mystery.* One question as to God's connection with sin no man can answer, namely, why he has allowed its existence at all. We can have no doubt that he could have prevented it. He can do anything not contrary to his own nature; and in that nature can be found no necessity for its existence. We can, however, see many ends which he has had in view in allowing it in his universe. But with all this, with our present knowledge of his will, we are compelled to confess that we cannot tell why he saw that it was better to admit than to exclude it.

(2) *No reason why he should not have allowed it.* On the other hand, however, no reason can be justly given why he should not have done so when he so purposed. There is nothing in its existence which makes him its author or shows any unholy action on his part in its introduction. Nor is there any evidence of any lack of power to prevent its origination, nor of any want of benevolent love to his creatures in permitting it.

(3) *What we know of God's relation to sin.* Of the actual origin of sin in the universe our information is very meagre. The Scriptures give us very little information beyond a few facts. But, even in these brief statements, we are taught explicitly that *sin is not due to any creative act of God*, and yet that it came into existence under his providential government. The Scriptures and our own experience are our sources of information upon the subject. From these we learn the following facts:

a. As to God's control in reference to sin: (a) That sin exists only in accordance with the purpose of God. Had he not seen fit to allow it, it could never have appeared in the universe. Its presence proceeds from no necessity of his nature, nor from any antagonistic power which he could not resist. (b) It cannot occur at any time nor in any form without his permission. While he does not actively originate it, he holds such absolute control over it that no single event in connection with it can take place without his

permission. (c) It cannot attain any end, however naturally operative toward it, which he has not designed shall be attained. (d) It cannot go any farther than the limits he has assigned. (e) Through it he works out his own righteous purposes, and not the sinful designs of those who are committing the sin which he thus overrules.

b. As to God's responsibility for it: (a) In any one act the ends of himself and of the sinner may greatly differ. (b) Likewise the same act may be sinful in the sinner, and not sinful in God. This is due to the difference of relations borne to persons and things by God and man. God has supreme control over life and property. Man has not. God may take away life or property by the hand of the assassin or the thief. He only does what it is his right to do. But it is sin in the man through whom he acts, because he has not the right to do either of these things. (c) The sinful actions of men may be sinful, either from the motives which prompt them, the ends in view, or the means by which they are accomplished. God may concur in such acts, from motives, with ends, and in the use of means which are altogether most holy. (d) The concurrence of God with the sinner is limited to the support of the natural faculties, in which support there is neither sin nor innocence; sin consisting not in their use, but in the intention with which they are used, and the object sought by that use. (e) The concurrence of God according to the regularity of general laws seems eminently desirable. If, whenever man acted virtuously, his powers of action were sustained, but not so when acting otherwise, there would really be no free agency in man, for he would not have the power of contrary choice and action. On the other hand, there would no longer be such regular action of the universe as seems necessary for the happiness and comfort of mankind. The action of nature would every day be suspended in thousands of instances, and confusion would everywhere exist.

2. THE UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF GOOD AND EVIL. Another objection to the doctrine of divine providence, which is apparently a very serious one, arises from the unequal distribution of good and evil in the world. Blessings are apparently not bestowed proportionately upon the good, and afflictions upon the wicked. It has been claimed that this is an evidence that God does not watch over and govern the world. Dr. J. Pye Smith ably answers this objection.¹ The following is an abstract of his argument:

¹ See his "First Lines," pp. 162-164.

(1) *We must take sin into the account.* "Any one who would reason fairly on this question cannot but, on the very threshold of this argument, attend to the sinful condition of the whole human race. The *sin of man*," a. "*Merits* the experience of penal evils, in all their variety." b. "This sin is the *cause* and *occasion*, sometimes directly, at other times more indirectly and remotely, of human sufferings." c. "Upon the broad scale of observation and history many examples of retribution can be observed."

(2) *The distribution of good and evil is by no means so unequal as appears to superficial observation.* a. "Even good men are the chief occasions of their own sufferings." b. "Their sufferings are made in the highest degree beneficial to them as a means of religious improvement" (Heb. 12 : 4-11). "They are oftentimes instruments of the greatest internal blessings. They are also means of benefit to others by their exhibition of the most edifying examples, and by the weight which instruction and admonition thus receive." c. "The piety, virtue, and good moral conduct of upright persons procure to them, in the ordinary course of affairs, a considerable measure of esteem, regard, kindness, and service from their fellow-men; and consequently a much higher degree of personal and social enjoyment than they would have if they were not religious characters." d. "The *objects* which men commonly regard as good in themselves and for their own sakes are in reality not so. They are good only as they are used; only when they are made the means of moral improvement." e. "We are very far from being competent judges of the state of the heart, and the degree of real holiness possessed by the *subjective individuals*; but we know enough to be assured that *the reality* in these important matters is far from being in accordance with the obvious and superficial *appearance*. It cannot be doubted that in many instances men acquire credit with the public for great religious excellence which is by no means justly imputed, as to either the degree or sincerity of it; and that deep and humble piety exists in some instances where extraordinary and unfavorable circumstances surround its possessors as with a dark cloud."

(3) *We must take the future state into the account.* "We cannot judge of this question with any approach to completeness without bringing into the account the *future state*. The present state is but the imperfect and preparatory condition of our existence, the period during which all must be done that is to fit us for eternity. All temporal things are as nothing compared with this great issue of all our labors and trials."

(A) THE FALL

CHAPTER V. FALL OF ANGELS

The first event that we notice in God's providential government of the universe is the fact that under this providential government the angels sinned, and that now they exist as fallen beings. Jude says of them (ver. 6), that they "kept not their first estate," but "left their own habitation," and are "reserved in everlasting chains under darkness unto the judgment of the great day." Peter says: "God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell, and delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment" (2 Peter 2 : 4).

Concerning this fall of angels and its consequences we are told comparatively little in the word of God. We know that somehow it found a place in the purpose and providence of God ; we know that the angels themselves are responsible for their own fall ; their punishment by God and the whole tone of Scripture are clear proof of this. We know that they still exist in this fallen, sinful state, and that they are beings of great power, and that their power has been often used to the injury of human beings. We know also that they are kept for a final judgment and eternal punishment. For we are told that God has not laid hold of them to save them (Heb. 2 : 16). And in Rev. 20 : 10 certain of them are declared to be "cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, . . . to be tormented day and night for ever."

The important relations which these angels bear to us and the great power over us which they exercise, justify a fuller consideration of them than our meagre knowledge of them would otherwise lead us to give.

I. THEIR ACTUAL EXISTENCE QUESTIONED.

On account of certain difficulties which seem to render the question perplexing as to the existence of fallen angels some have been disposed to deny their actual existence. Others have advanced the theory that Satan, either as created or uncreated, has always had a sinful nature and been filled with enmity toward God. Efforts have been made, even by Christian men, to explain away the plain language of Scripture, and especially that of the New Testament. It has been claimed that all that Christ and his apostles said upon this subject is to be accounted for upon the principle of accommodation. It is said that they knew

the prejudices of the Jews, and that, not wishing upon an unimportant matter to excite these prejudices, they accommodated the language of their teachings to Jewish ideas and used such words as seemed to imply belief in such beings.

In answer to all this it may be said :

1. THE BELIEF ALMOST UNIVERSAL. The belief in the existence of evil spirits has been almost universal in the world. The exceptions may indeed be said to be only the few who in more modern times have supposed this universal opinion to be simply the result of superstition.

2. HELD BY THE JEWS. The Jews undoubtedly held this belief. It is not disputed that it is taught in their later books, and that in the time of Christ the belief in such spirits was universal. But it has been denied that such views can be traced prior to the time of the Babylonish captivity. If by this is simply meant that prior to that time the Jews knew not of the fall of angels formerly pure, it is only equivalent to declaring that they knew not in what manner evil angels had come into existence. But if it is meant, as seems to be the case, that they did not know of the existence of evil angels, the position may be easily refuted from the Scriptures. That this is the opinion of these objectors is plain from the fact that they suppose the origin of these ideas to have been the Persian belief of the two principles of good and evil which they had met with in Chaldea. That faith taught indeed the origin of evil in this world, but not among the spiritual intelligences above. Besides, it attributed the existence of evil to a principle antagonistic to the great good, perhaps equally powerful yet constantly contending, perhaps finally to be vanquished.

The fact that the existence of these beings is taught at all, either in the Old or the New Testament, would be sufficient to make it an article of our faith. Yet, as this charge has been made, it is best to refer to it and to show from the Scripture proofs that it is untenable. The truth is that with the exception of Zech. 3 : 1, 2 (where the high priest Joshua is standing before the angel of the Lord and Satan standing at his right hand to resist him), there is no passage in all the post-Babylonish Scriptures by which the doctrine of evil angels could be proved, while there are many such passages in the earlier books.

In the book of Job, supposed by some to be the oldest, and sometimes even ascribed to Moses, Satan is represented as presenting himself among the sons of God before the Lord (Job 1 : 6).

This may be said to be a merely dramatic work, yet scarcely can it be denied that the conception of such beings must have existed prior to a dramatic use of them.

In 1 Chron. 21 : 1, however, Satan is said to have provoked David to number Israel. In Ps. 109 : 6 the psalmist says : "Set thou a wicked man over him and let an adversary (Satan) stand at his right hand." The use of the word "devil" also teaches the existence of evil spirits. In Ps. 106 : 37 the Israelites are said to have sacrificed their sons and daughters unto devils (demons).

Evil angels are also spoken of by the name of "evil spirits." In Judg. 9 : 23 God is said to have sent an evil spirit between Abimelech and the men of Shechem. In Sam. 16 : 14 the Spirit of the Lord is said to have departed from Saul and an evil spirit from the Lord to have troubled him ; in verse fifteen Saul's servants recognize this fact in addressing Saul, and, in verse sixteen, propose to send for a skillful player on the harp, through whom he should be made well ; and in verse twenty-three this device is spoken of as successful.

3. CLEARLY TAUGHT IN NEW TESTAMENT. When we turn now to the New Testament we find the proofs even more abundant. No one questions that this is the apparent language of this part of Scripture, whatever explanations are resorted to for escaping its plain meaning. The passages are not here presented because they will be quoted in connection with other points, and enough of them will then be given to prove this a New Testament doctrine. Including both the singular and plural forms, the word "*diabolos*" is found in the New Testament about forty times, demon sixty times, Satan twenty-three times, evil spirit eight times, dumb spirit three times, and spirit of divination once.

The commonly received doctrine as to the original state of evil angels is that they were once pure and holy, such as are now the angels of heaven, though not as they, confirmed in holiness. This is founded upon the supposition that it is impossible for God to create beings otherwise than free from sin. The only objection which can be made to this original innocence is suggested in such questions as these : how can a being perfectly holy be led to the commission of sin ? how would a being realizing the character and power of the Supreme Being ever be so unwise as to revolt against it ?

But these questions present only metaphysical difficulties which must vanish before actual facts. The existence of such beings is

plainly taught ; we are told in Scripture, as already seen, that they sinned, and all argument of this kind is merely an argument from our ignorance.

4. NOT "LANGUAGE OF ACCOMMODATION." The idea advanced by some, that what Christ and his apostles said upon this subject is to be accounted for upon the principle of accommodation,—that they knew the prejudices of the Jews and did not wish, upon an unimportant matter, to excite these prejudices and so accommodated the language of their teachings to Jewish ideas and used such words as seemed to imply belief in such beings,—such an idea cannot for a moment be held by any fair-minded reader of the word of God. For (1) it involves an unfair and a dangerous principle. If we may be allowed thus to strip Christ's language and the language of the Bible of its natural force, how can we know that anything at all is taught? (2) The object of Christ was not to accommodate himself to prejudices, but to remove them. What instance can be given of such conformity on his part? None can be justly claimed. On the contrary, he said that he came not to send peace, but a sword ; and to preach, not a gospel of accommodation, but one of contention and exclusiveness. He drove out with a whip of small cords those who defiled the temple. He persisted in healing upon the Sabbath day. He inveighed against the traditions of the elders. He attacked the hypocrisy of the scribes and Pharisees who were reputed most holy. Does any part of this conduct look like that of one who would have shrunk from declaring the non-existence of Satan? Was not the doctrine of the resurrection as against the Sadducees, and that of the salvation of publicans and sinners and the adoption of the Gentiles as against the Pharisees, even more unpalatable than would have been the denial of the existence of evil spirits? (3) The idea of mere accommodation to the Jews would not have involved the language upon this point used by Christ to his disciples in private. The time of the return of the seventy was peculiarly suitable to remove these prejudices from their minds. They came to Christ saying : " Lord, even the devils are subject unto us in thy name " (Luke 10 : 17). And Christ only teaches more plainly the existence of such beings, declaring that he beheld Satan, as lightning, fall from heaven, at the same time assuring them that even the power to cast out devils was no subject of joy in comparison with the fact that their names were written in heaven. (4) A still stronger objection may be drawn from the circumstances of the temptation. There the devil is

said to have tempted Christ. In cases of human temptation it may be said that it is the principle of evil in the heart that moves the man to do wrong, and that thus he is tempted. But what principle like this was there in Christ? Upon what ground can he be said to have been tempted except by the personal solicitation of an actually existing evil one?

II. CAUSE OF THE SIN OF ANGELS.

Another question of interest has been as to the cause of the sin of angels. Some, because of a misconception of the meaning of Gen. 6 : 2, have attributed it to lust. But this is not only contrary to the nature of angels, but also places the fall of man before that of the devil. Some have held that it consisted in the temptation of man. But he who tempted with evil intent and falsehood must himself have sinned beforehand. Besides, this tempter was one only, and the evil angels are many. Others think that it was envy of angels superior to themselves. This was the idea of the Jews, who, holding the theory of guardian angels over nations, supposed that some of them aspired to higher positions than were allotted to them. But the more common opinion is that it was a sin of pride. The apostle says of a bishop, that he must not be "a novice, lest being puffed up, he fall into the condemnation of the devil" (1 Tim. 3 : 6). From this it appears probable that pride was the sin of Satan, and that for this he was condemned.¹

III. THEIR RELATION TO EACH OTHER IN THE FALL.

The relation of the angels to each other in this sin and fall has been still further a subject of inquiry. In the fall of man we recognize both a natural and federal head. Through these we see that all have been made sinners. But did the angels have a federal head, or did they sin individually each one for himself? There is a difficulty in either hypothesis. On the one hand, how could a federal head, when he had sinned, infuse, by that sin, an unholy nature into those whom he represented; on the other hand, as we recognize the first beginnings of sin to be in the desire, how could so many simultaneously have revolted against God?

In favor of the federal theory, may be stated the fact of the

¹ See Kitto's "Cyclopedia," art. "Satan"; Dick's "Theology," Vol. I., p. 377; Knapp, p. 218.

headship of one over the others, and the nature of the sin, viz., pride, which may have arisen from the occupancy of a position of such power. Yet these do not necessarily imply it. Supreme position may have existed without federal relation.

In favor of the other theory may be adduced (1) the co-existence at that time of all those angels that sinned; this was not true of all mankind, and is a reason why they needed to act differently. (2) The immediate intercourse, because of their nature, which all others as well as their head may have had with God, to know his will and to perform it. In man this existed only in Eve, and may account for her personal sin before that of her representative. (3) The greater lack of excuse that would exist in a fall as the result of individual probation. (4) The fact that no provision of salvation has been made for them, either in the representative Saviour of man or in one for angels.

The main difficulty in the way of this theory may be removed by the natural supposition, that all the angels, or a portion of them to which all of these belonged, were put at one time upon probation, just as Adam was. In that probation some sinned, and some did not. The fall of all may, therefore, have been instantaneous. That one of them may have been the instantaneous instigator of this is not improbable. That he may have held rank over them before, is in accordance with what is taught of the rank of all angels. That he might in this act have attained this position is also not improbable.

IV. ACCESS TO THIS WORLD.

Satan is called "the god of this world" (2 Cor. 4 : 4). And that he has access to this world is evident from the history of the fall, from that of the temptation of Christ, from the warnings given to believers against him as their adversary, and from the declarations made as to the power he exercises to blind the minds of them that believe not.

As a finite being, Satan must be limited in his approaches to man. The doctrine of Satan is often objected to, upon the ground that thus we make out a being of almost equal power with God, and everywhere present. But this power of constant approach arises, not probably from personal contact, but from the multitude of inferior agents which he thus controls. By these he is everywhere operating; perhaps not operating always thus directly upon each one, but always keeping in progress the influences which he puts in operation among men.

V. EXTENT OF THEIR POWER.

What, then, we may inquire in the next place, is the extent of the power of evil spirits?

1. OVER MINDS. Undoubtedly they have great power over the minds of men. They may tempt, deceive, darken the minds of men, pervert the judgment of men, excite them to pride, anger, and other evil passions. It was Satan who instigated the Jews to put Christ to death. The old phraseology of the courts of justice in indictments for murder recognizes his power. It is not confined to the subjects of his kingdom; but over the people of God also, even after they have been rescued from their slavery to Satan, does he maintain and exercise the power to tempt, though not to destroy.

2. OVER BODIES. Satan also possesses power over the bodies of men. In Job 2 : 7, it is said that he "smote Job with sore boils from the sole of his foot unto his crown." In Luke 13 : 16, a woman is spoken of who had been bound by Satan for eighteen years by disease. In Acts 10 : 38, one of the works of Christ is said to have been the healing of all who were oppressed with the devil. In 1 Cor. 5 : 5, excommunication is spoken of as the delivering over of one to Satan for the destruction of the flesh. Satan is also said, in some sense, to have or to have had the power of death (Heb. 2 : 14).

It is here that naturally arises the question of demoniacal influence as proving, if true, the existence and number of such beings. Have Satan and his messengers the power thus to enter and afflict the minds and bodies of men?

The most serious objection to the idea of such possessions is that they have been confined to the age of Christ and the apostles. But (1) this is not certain. We even have declarations to the contrary. The Jews of the second century professed that there were such in their day. This was true also of the Christians of the third century. But the evidence of such possessions at these periods is not conclusive. It is not probable that any existed at that time. (2) Dr. Macknight, quoted by Dr. Dick,¹ says: "The possessions mentioned may have been diseases carried to an uncommon height by the presence and agency of demons." And, if this is allowed, there have possibly been such in all ages. (3) The difficulty mentioned must yield before the direct testimony of Scripture. A reason may be given for their

¹ "Theology," Vol. I., p. 403.

special prevalence in the time of Christ. The great struggle was about to take place between Christ and Satan, and uncommon freedom was doubtless granted to the devil and his assistants.

The following points show that the idea of demoniacal possessions is scriptural: *a.* The demons are expressly separated from the persons possessed. (See Luke 6 : 17, 18 ; Matt. 12 : 43-45 ; Mark 1 : 32, 34 ; 9 : 18.) *b.* The actions and language show the personality of some evil being or beings within the sufferer. They beseech Christ not to torment them before their time ; they answer his questions ; they come out of the possessed and enter into the swine ; they know Christ and call upon him as the Son of God. *c.* The writers mention facts connected with them, needless to be mentioned, which favor this. The number of demons cast out from Mary Magdalene is given. In Mark 9 : 29, Jesus says of a demon, "this kind can come out by nothing save by prayer." *d.* Jesus addresses the demons (Matt. 8 : 32). He orders the demons to come out, and permits them to go into the swine. In Mark 9 : 25, Christ rebukes the foul spirit. (See also Luke 4 : 35.) In Mark 1 : 25, Christ orders the demon to hold his peace and come out.

These are sufficient to prove the scripturalness of this doctrine, and to show that Christ did not speak and act concerning such demoniacal possessions merely from a spirit of accommodation.

3. OVER LAWS OF NATURE. They have no power to change the laws of nature. These are established by God, and are beyond the power of any of his creatures. He upholds and preserves with the same almighty power with which he created.

But, from Satan's superior wisdom, from his spiritual nature, and from his numerous emissaries, he has great power within the circle of those laws. It is thus that he performs the lying wonders by which, were it possible, he would deceive the very elect. It is thus that, in connection with his power over the mind, he has aided to establish false religions, to vitiate certain forms of the true religion, and to work as the great power of Antichrist in the world.

The connection held by him with the ancient heathen oracles is a subject worthy of study, and eminently suggestive of the extent of the power he exercises. These oracles failed precisely where Satan's knowledge failed—the want of power to predict the future. Answers that affected present knowledge were abundant. Ambiguous replies that could bear various interpretations were frequent. "Undoubtedly," says Dr. J. Pye Smith,

"fraud was practised. . . Still there appears satisfactory reason for believing that in some degree, and occasionally, there was a real diabolical influence."¹ The case of divination spoken of in Acts 16 : 16-18 seems conclusive upon this point : "A certain maid," says Luke, "having a spirit of divination met us, which brought her masters much gain by soothsaying. The same following after Paul and us cried out, saying, These men are servants of the Most High God, which proclaim unto you the way of salvation. And this she did for many days. But Paul, being sore troubled, turned and said to the spirit, I charge thee in the name of Jesus Christ to come out of her. And it came out that very hour."

Dr. J. Pye Smith presents in his "First Lines of Theology" some valuable points in reply to the objections that may be made to the doctrine of wicked spirits, and also on the practical uses of the doctrine.²

CHAPTER VI. THE FALL OF MAN.

The next event that we notice in God's providential government of the universe is the *fall of man*. This is no less mysterious and difficult to us than the fall of angels. The chapter on the creation of man presented man in all the sinless perfection with which God can create an intellectual and moral spiritual being. It was there shown that this consisted, as the Scriptures declare, not merely in an innocent sinlessness, which left him without taint or tendency to sin, but in original righteousness, which comprised a love of holiness and natural choice of good rather than of evil.

Some have maintained that there was originally in man a mere condition of equilibrium in which it was as easy to choose the wrong as the right. Nor can it be shown that, if this had been true, a trial upon probation, in which was given a choice of good and evil, with consequent reward and punishment, would have been unjust to man or derogatory to the character of God. But the plain teaching of Scripture is that man was not created in perfect equilibrium, but with a holy nature, the whole tendency of which was naturally toward the good and the holy. In thus fitting him for his trial God is seen, by special endowment, to have given him most graciously all the powers possible to fit

¹ "First Lines," p. 337.

² See pp. 337-340.

him for a wise choice in any instance in which he should be left to act according to his good pleasure. And yet, notwithstanding all the advantages which God gave to man in his creation and environment, man fell. The image of God in him, as we shall see, became blurred and defaced. He became a sinner, and henceforth God must treat with him as one no longer good. We now enter upon the study of this strange chapter in man's history—his fall from holiness and righteousness into sin and ruin.

I. HOW COULD MAN FALL?

In reply to the question how a being thus endowed could fall, the following suggestions may be made. While they may not be entirely satisfactory, they must be recognized as at least constituting a possible explanation of a subject so difficult.

1. HAD THE NATURE OF A CREATURE. The excellent nature thus bestowed was, after all, only that of a mere creature. The perfection, as such, could be only natural and bestowed, not essential and inalienable. Therefore, unless preserved by the purpose and acts of God, it might be lost.

2. POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE. This nature of man was that of a creature, the excellence of whose action consisted in always choosing the right and rejecting the wrong, but it had the power, should the inclination arise, of making and pursuing a contrary choice. No natural or compulsory necessity existed to prevent such choice. The right would only be chosen so long as the motive to do so should be the prevailing one. While, therefore, the nature was wholly inclined to the right, and would naturally and almost certainly act in that direction, yet if that nature could be so affected as to incline toward the wrong, there would be no hindrance to its sinful action.

3. GROSS VIOLATION NOT PROBABLE. Under such circumstances, against any gross violation of the law of God or sinful rebellion against him, the heart would so naturally revolt that the beginning of sin in this direction would be almost impossible; but if any desire should be awakened, in itself sinless when duly exercised, that desire might so increase as ultimately to acquire sufficient strength to overcome the right tendency of the nature, and to lead finally by undue exercise to wrong action for its gratification.

4. FOUNDATION FOR TEMPTATION. The foundation for such desire might be found in the wish to gratify the lower appetites, or to attain higher exercise of the intellectual faculties.

5. OCCASION FOR WRONG DESIRE. The cause of its springing up would naturally be the denial of some means by which it would appear that either or both of these wishes could be attained. This accords with the principle stated by the Apostle Paul, "I had not known coveting except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet" (Rom. 7 : 7).

6. ITS NATURAL COURSE. The natural result would be, not immediately to determine to do the wrong, but to question the justice or intention with which the act was forbidden. Then this doubt of God would so lead the nature toward sin that it would act in accordance with the desire that had arisen of gratifying either the sensual or the spiritual appetite.

II. HOW DID MAN FALL?

We have the account of the fall in Gen. 3 : 1-7. The statement is very brief yet complete. This is a proof of its inspiration. It agrees also with the best thought that men have been able to attain as to how such an event could take place.

1. THE MANNER, OR PROCESS. As to the manner, or process, of the fall, the narrative shows that the attack upon man had to be made in a most subtle manner : (1) We have the occasion, in God's forbidding man to eat of the fruit of a certain tree, called "the tree of the knowledge of good and evil" (Gen. 2 : 17). (2) We have that love of wisdom, natural and proper in an intelligent being, excited by the idea that through its increase would be given elevation in the scale of existence. (3) Led by this desire to think of its possible gratification, the very name of the tree whose fruit was forbidden seemed to confirm the language of the tempter. (4) The good thus attainable appeared to be one which God would so naturally wish to bestow that it created doubt whether God could really have meant to forbid its use, and particularly whether he would fulfill his threats, or had even intended them to be effective to prevent the proposed action. (5) Then followed the result, the statement of which shows the processes through which the mind of the woman had gone : "When the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and she gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat" (Gen. 3 : 6).

The Scriptures say but little of the difference between Adam and Eve in this transaction. The narrative of Genesis simply relates that the woman was the first tempted and the first to sin, and that through her the fruit was

given to the man. The only other allusion is that in which Paul states that "Adam was not beguiled, but the woman being beguiled hath fallen into transgression" (1 Tim. 2 : 14). This may mean only that the woman was tempted by Satan, while the man was not ; or that Eve believed the tempter and did not perceive the consequences of transgression, while Adam acted in full knowledge of them.

2. THE AGENT. As to the reality of an external agent in the temptation, there has been no little dispute. Some have held that there was no actor, but that the temptation was the result merely of the emotions and desires of the woman. But the Scriptures say distinctly that there was a serpent present, and active. Temptation through a serpent might have occurred in several ways.

(1) *Various theories concerning this agent.* *a.* A serpent might innocently and alone have been the occasion of the suggestion of the thoughts to Eve. *b.* Some evil being might have accompanied the innocent acts of the serpent to suggest to her mind the thoughts by which he would tempt her to sin. *c.* This evil spirit, in the form of a serpent, or taking possession of an actual serpent, might have used and uttered the language or suggested the thoughts attributed to him in the narrative. *d.* A fourth explanation has been suggested, and is somewhat advocated by Turner, in his "Commentary on Genesis," p. 187. This supposes that the devil was the only agent, and that all reference to the serpent is allegorical.

(2) *The doctrine taught in the Scriptures.* The Scriptures seem to accord more nearly with the third of these theories. There appears to be no valid objection to the acceptance of this, their most obvious import. *a.* It is surely not inconsistent with the power ascribed to Satan that he should thus enter the form of a creature already existent, or even assume the appearance of such a creature. "For even Satan fashioned himself into an angel of light" (2 Cor. 11 : 14). The temptation of Jesus shows that Satan can assume bodily form. Mere mental suggestion cannot account for all that then occurred. It is necessary to believe that he appeared in bodily form to our Lord and addressed him in words uttered with the voice. This is involved in the offer recorded in Luke 4 : 7 : "If thou therefore wilt worship before me, it shall all be thine."

The force of the objection from the curse against the serpent, as against an innocent animal, vanishes with the light thrown by modern science upon creation. This shows that the serpent has always had its present form. The

curse, therefore, so far as uttered against the animal is merely equivalent to an assertion of the continuance of what had always been, and only places before man a constant and dreaded memorial of the first sin. This is consistent with God's method of cursing and blessing as seen in the bow of Noah (Gen. 9 : 8-17), and Jacob's language as to Simeon and Levi (Gen. 49 : 5-7).

b. This third theory is favored also by the following facts:

(*a*) The title serpent and dragon is given elsewhere in Scripture to Satan. See Rev. 12 : 3, 4, 7, 9, 12-17; Rev. 13 : 2-4, especially Rev. 12 : 9, "the old serpent, he that is called the Devil and Satan." See also Matt. 3 : 7, where John calls the Pharisees "an offspring of vipers," and compare it with John 8 : 44, our Lord's language: "Ye are of your father the devil." (*b*) The narrative in Genesis demands more than mental suggestion through a mere animal. *aa.* A characteristic special subtlety is ascribed to the serpent. If the temptation of Eve arose from mere mental suggestion to her by the purposeless acts of a purely irrational animal, the mention of this subtlety is unaccountable. *bb.* The thoughts suggested could not have arisen in the mind of the woman alone, nor in that of the woman through any mere act of the serpent. These are (*aa*) That death would not ensue. (*bb*) That the knowledge of good and evil would elevate them to be gods (mighty ones). *c.* The subsequent references made in the Scriptures to this important transaction show that this was the beginning of the great struggle of Satan for the ruin of man, which was to end in his overthrow and complete destruction by the man Christ Jesus, the seed of the woman. *d.* "In the New Testament it is both directly asserted, and in various forms assumed that Satan seduced our first parents into sin. In Rev. 12 : 9, it is said, 'The great dragon was cast out, that old serpent, called the Devil, and Satan.' In 2 Cor. 11 : 3, Paul says, 'I fear lest . . . as the serpent beguiled Eve through his subtlety, so also your minds should be corrupted from the simplicity that is in Christ.' But that by the serpent he understood Satan is plain from ver. 14, where he speaks of Satan as the great deceiver; and what is said in Rom. 16 : 20, 'The God of peace shall bruise Satan under your feet,' is in obvious allusion to Gen. 3 : 15. In John 8 : 44, our Lord calls the devil a 'murderer from the beginning, and the father of lies, because through him sin and death were introduced into the world.'"¹

¹ Hodge, "Syst. Theol.," Vol. II., p. 128.

III. THIS A FALL UNDER THE COVENANT OF WORKS.

1. DEFINITION. A covenant is an agreement between two or more parties by which any one or more things are to be done under the sanction of rewards and penalties.

This is the ideal form of a covenant. Some parts of it may be wanting, and still it may be a covenant. Thus there may be penalties and no reward, or reward and no penalties. Also, the agreement may arise, not from mutual consultation, but from a command given and accepted. This may take place at the time it is given, and with the person to whom it is spoken, or the command may be given, or promise made to be accepted and acted upon by any who may at any time choose. Thus, between a government and its responsible subjects law becomes a covenant. Rewards also are promised, as for the killing of dangerous or destructive animals, or for the capture of criminals; or threats are uttered for violation of the rights of others, either as to life, liberty, or property.

2. COVENANTS OF WORKS AND OF GRACE. Theologians are accustomed to speak of two special covenants, the one of works, the other of grace. These do not embrace all the covenants between God and man, which indeed have been very numerous. The others most prominently mentioned in the Scriptures are that with Noah: Gen. 9: 11-17; with Abraham: Gen. 17: 2-14 (repeated to Isaac: Gen. 26: 2-5; and to Jacob: Gen. 28: 13-15); with Israel, in giving the law: Exod. 24: 7; Deut. 5: 2, 3; with Moses and Israel: Exod. 34: 27; with David: 2 Sam. 7: 12-16; with Solomon: 2 Chron. 7: 12-22; and that of Nehemiah and the Israelites with God: Neh. 9: 38 to 10: 39. The two covenants of works and grace are spoken of in Gal. 4: 22-31, and are called "the two covenants" in ver. 24. That of grace is the covenant of redemption made by God with his elect, or more properly with Christ, the second Adam, as their representative. That of works, is the covenant of the law entered into between God and all mankind through the first Adam, their natural head and appropriate and appointed representative.¹

3. ADAM UNDER A COVENANT OF WORKS. At the time that Adam fell he was under a covenant of works. In the understanding in Eden between God and the man all the elements of a covenant distinctly appear. (1) There are here the two parties

¹ Upon the Scripture use of the word "covenant" see Hodge's "Outlines of Theology," pp. 309 and 367-369.

to a covenant, God and man : the one prescribing what was to be done or left undone ; the other receiving the command to do or not to do it. If it be objected that God enjoined an act through his sovereign and supreme power and dominion to which man dared not object, the sufficient reply is that God was no more sovereign lord than man was willing subject. The holy constitution of his nature rendered his ready acceptance absolutely certain. (2) Here also we find the subject-matter of a covenant—the forbidding under penalty of the eating of a certain fruit. That which made this properly a part of the covenant, was that man knew that he was commanded not to eat ; that he recognized God's right to command and his duty to obey ; that he had a natural inclination toward obedience ; and that, accepting the command of God, he proceeded to submit himself to it. Both the knowledge and assent of man, however, may be absent from the general covenant of works, where it appears under the especial form of law or duty, whenever that absence is the result of man's sinfulness, and man still be held responsible. But in an innocent being this knowledge and assent are essential to responsibility. Yet that very innocence, because of the holiness of the creature's nature, secures such assent to God's law, when known, as completes the more formal covenant. (3) The third element of the covenant is the penalty, death, the meaning of which will be hereafter examined. The threat of God, "thou shalt surely die" (Gen. 2 : 17), was known not only to Adam, but to the woman also, as appears from her conversation with the serpent (Gen. 3 : 1-3). (4) The promises made or implied constitute a fourth element. It is questioned whether promises were added to the covenant. None appear in the narrative. None were necessary to make this a covenant. None are necessarily involved except such as are implied as attendant upon the result of obedience. It seems clear, however, that in this case there were promises both implied and expressed. These, therefore, may be first stated as being thus implied, and such considerations may be added as from our further information suggest that others were actually expressed.

a. Promises implied. (a) Continuance of God's favor, which having been bestowed on them as innocent creatures, would continue to be shown if they should not disobey his commands. (b) Continuance of their happy, holy condition, until by their own act they should forfeit it. (c) Continuance, therefore, unless in like manner forfeited, of the immortality natural to their souls ;

and as to their bodies, continuance of their then existent condition, or if any change should occur, a change into higher forms, bestowed for their greater happiness. (*d*) To this may be added that their children, so long as this state of innocence should continue, would be born with like innocent and holy natures.

That these results of obedience were implied may be inferred : *aa*. From the benevolent holiness and justice of God's nature. Even if never stated to Adam as promises, they would be naturally inferred by him from his knowledge of God. *bb*. From the very threat against disobedience. If, as we shall hereafter see, that threat involved not merely natural death, but also and chiefly that absence of God's favor and communion which is the death of the soul, then obedience to God's command must have involved the opposite of these. If death would follow disobedience, then life ought to follow obedience—life in all the opposites to death, and, therefore, life both of the body and the soul. It would seem, therefore, that there ought to be no question that these blessings were believed by Adam to have been made dependent upon his obedience to God's commands.

b. Promise expressed. But not only were these promises thus implied, it is a fact, also, that the promise of life was actually expressed. "This is clearly taught in various passages of Scripture : Lev. 18 : 5 ; Neh. 9 : 29 ; Matt. 19 : 16, 17 ; Gal. 3 : 12 ; Rom. 10 : 5." ¹

IV. QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE PROBATION WHICH LED TO THE FALL.

There are three further points of inquiry as to the probation upon which Adam was thus placed :

1. HOW LONG WAS THE PROBATION TO LAST IF MAN CONTINUED INNOCENT ? To this question no answer can be given. We have absolutely no means of knowing how long man was to be tried under this particular form of covenant. It is more than probable, however, that after a period which could not be very long, confirmation in spiritual life was to be attained, if man continued obedient.

2. WAS THERE TO BE ONLY THIS ONE TEST OF OBEDIENCE ? As to this it may be said that there is no evidence of any purpose on God's part of any other test. And it is altogether probable that this was the one test which was designed to settle the destiny of men. In favor of but one form of test the following may be said : (1) The fact that the simple purpose was to test man's

¹Hodge's "Outlines," p. 311

confidence in God and obedience to his will. So long as a sufficient one was presented, no multiplication of tests was necessary. (2) God knew whether his purpose was to allow men to fall or not, and knowing this, knew what test would be sufficient. He needed to try man, not to show to himself, but to others, what man would do. (3) In a case like that of Job, when his purpose is to exhibit his grace in his creature, he may allow many tests, one after another, but when that purpose is to permit the fall of his creature, it is not probable that he would allow his hopes of success to be raised, after successive trials, to result only in final and more embittered disappointment.

3. WAS CONFIRMATION IN HOLINESS AND HAPPINESS PROMISED IN ANY WAY AS A REWARD OF OBEDIENCE? Upon this question it may be remarked: (1) The fact that God selected this one thing to forbid, while he granted indulgence in all others, indicates that it was for a special test. That test would naturally be accompanied by a promise as well as by a threat. (2) A further evidence of such a promise, as well as of its nature, is to be found in the statements about the tree of life. Its suggestive name; its prominent position, "in the midst of the garden" (Gen. 2 : 9); its conspicuous character, such that it is one of the only two mentioned; its power of confirmation in life, which Gen. 3 : 22 shows to have been known to Adam—all of these indicate that the idea, not only of life, but of confirmation in life, had been conveyed to Adam. (3) The fall which resulted from the temptation shows that God's purpose in causing that tree to grow there was not to use it in the confirmation of Adam in holiness, for no such confirmation was to occur. We must find its use, therefore, in something prior to the fall. But in what, save to place constantly before Adam the promise of confirmed spiritual life, should the period of this probation be safely passed? (4) The necessity of his removal from the garden shows that some promise of confirmation in some existent condition thereafter unchangeable had been attached to this tree, to be fulfilled when man should be permitted to partake of it (Gen. 3 : 22).

V. SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE STORY OF THE FALL.

Three objections have been made to this transaction :

I. THAT IT MADE SO MUCH, EVEN ALL, TO DEPEND UPON A SINGLE ACT. But this arises (1) from the nature of sin; as guilt demanding punishment for any one transgression, even the least; and as corruption, rendering incapable of subsequent acts of

holiness ; and (2) from the nature of God's justice, which cannot pardon sin unatoned for. Any one sin must therefore necessarily terminate probation.

2. THAT THE TEST WAS IN SO UNIMPORTANT A MATTER, as the eating of a piece of fruit. But the more trifling the prohibition, the easier was the act of obedience, and the more flagrant that of disobedience.

3. THAT THE PRECEPT WAS A POSITIVE AND NOT A MORAL INJUNCTION. But this very fact made it a better test of obedience, (1) as testing the whole man ; not his love of holiness only, nor his reverence for God, nor the tendencies of his holy nature, nor those of his will only, but all ; (2) as making a well and sharply defined test of his confidence and obedience toward God ; and (3) as plainly manifesting to the guilty the sin they had committed and the condition into which they had brought themselves.

CHAPTER VII. EFFECTS OF THE FALL OF MAN.

The immediate effects of Adam's sin, as indicated in the narrative in Genesis, were first, shame, or fear of God's presence ; and secondly, a disposition on the part of both Adam and Eve to make excuse and to cast the blame upon another (Gen. 3 : 7-13).

The immediate curse uttered against the woman was (1) danger to her and her seed from the serpent and his seed ; (2) multiplied pain and sorrow in childbirth ; and (3) a condition of subservience to her husband (Gen. 3 : 15, 16).

That against the man was (1) that thorns and thistles should hinder the cultivation of the ground ; (2) that by hard labor in the sweat of his face should he eat his bread ; and (3) a positive declaration of the return of the man to the dust whence he had been taken (Gen. 3 : 17-19).

The evils thus threatened have not been confined to Adam and Eve, but have fallen also upon all their posterity. Whatever may be the connection between Adam and that posterity, it is generally admitted that the latter shares with him all these evils. And so in seeking the effects of Adam's fall, we shall find them in connection with the evil condition of his posterity, as well as of himself.

The curses uttered in the garden are not to be taken as exhaustive of the curse threatened. They are such only as were immediately suggested by the peculiar attendant circumstances of Adam's sin, and are to be regarded merely as examples of its

evil effects. Still even they have not been confined to Adam, but have come equally upon the race at large.

All the evil effects of Adam's sin are comprised under the one word "death." This was the threatened penalty. But what is meant by it?

I. NATURAL DEATH.

By natural death is meant the separation of the soul and body, and the consequent decay of the body. It cannot be reasonably questioned, we think, that this was a part of the death penalty visited upon man for his disobedience of the divine command.

I. OBJECTIONS. The following objections have been urged against the idea that natural death is a part of the penalty: (1) It has been said that this cannot be a result of Adam's sin, because the very nature of the body (*dust*) made it necessary that it should return to dust. To this it may be replied: *a.* It is not certain that there were in man's body before his sin any elements of decay which would naturally lead to separation from the soul and to corruption. *b.* Even if we admit that the body is naturally mortal and liable to corruption, it does not follow that had man not sinned he would have died. God might have continued forever to preserve his powers unimpaired, either by direct preservation or by some remedial means. Some think, not without reason, that this would have been done through the tree of life. *c.* The objection overlooks the fact that, from the nature of God's foreknowledge and purpose, things in themselves natural are made the punishments of others with which they are associated. In like manner also is it with his blessings. The whole narrative of the fall is full of examples of this principle. Of this kind is the serpent's curse, "upon thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life" (Gen. 3 : 14); of this kind also is the fact of the natural injuries which men and serpents would inflict on each other (Gen. 3 : 15); that of the rule of the husband over the wife (Gen. 3 : 17); and that of the thorns and thistles in the ground and the sweat and the labor for the means of life (Gen. 3 : 18, 19).

(2) A second objection against regarding natural death as part of the penalty is that the threatened penalty was a death which should occur on the very day the fruit should be eaten. To this it may be replied: *a.* This might be an objection if it were claimed that the penalty of natural death was the only penalty, or if it could be shown that the death thus threatened was so exclu-

sive as to forbid that natural death should be in any way associated with it. But no such claim is made. It is recognized that there was a death penalty which occurred on the very day that the fruit was eaten; and it is only claimed that natural death was associated with this penalty and grew out of it, whether immediately or more remotely. *b.* It may be said further, that it is not at all certain that the corrupt tendency to death and its beginnings may not be ascribed to the very hour of Adam's sin. If that sin removed all hope of God's counteracting the natural mortality, this would be so, whether it was to be counteracted, as Lange quotes Knobel as supposing,¹ "through the tree of life," or by some other means. It would also be true if, as Lange thinks, the threatened penalty, "death, here corresponding to the biblical conception of death, must be taken primarily to mean moral death, which goes out of the soul or heart, and, through the soul-life, gradually fastens itself upon the physical organism."² Under such circumstances the moral death would be the eventual cause of the physical death, and to the latter would be assigned the same time of beginning with the former. This might also be done, even if the gradual decay were a mere accompaniment of the moral death without being actually caused by it.

2. PROOF. In favor of the idea that natural death is included in the penalty we have:

(1) *The current meaning of the word death.* The word death is associated in the minds of those who use it far more with the idea of physical death than with any other idea. It is true, indeed, that it is also very commonly associated with the idea of spiritual death, but not nearly so naturally nor so commonly as with the idea of physical dissolution. And it is hardly to be supposed that this, the most prominent idea of the word, was not in any sense associated with it when the penalty of death was affixed to the violation of God's command.

(2) *The plain language of Scripture.* This probability, from the current use of the word death, is rendered certain by the language of Scripture used in the specific curse uttered in the garden after the transgression: "Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return" (Gen. 3 : 19). It is confirmed also by other passages of Scripture. Lange³ thinks that the teaching of the ninetyeth Psalm is undoubtedly that death belongs solely to the punishment of sin. But whether it is so taught in that psalm or not,

¹ "Commentary on Genesis," p. 239.

² *Ibid.*, p. 207.

³ "Genesis," p. 239.

it is unquestionably the teaching of Rom. 5 : 12-14 ; also of I Cor. 15 : 21, 22, 55, 56.¹

II. SPIRITUAL DEATH.

Spiritual death was also an effect of Adam's sin. Our inquiry into natural death as a penalty leads us to look for some other and higher evil as resulting from sin. It must be something which occurred at the very time of eating, which affected that part of man that was naturally immortal, and which was also connected with that part with which conscious personality is inseparably associated. It must therefore be the death of the soul.

The Scriptures present this in several aspects :

1. AS CONTRASTED WITH LIFE OF THE SOUL. It is contrasted with the life of the soul in many passages, such as Lev. 18 : 5 ; Deut. 8 : 3 ; 30 : 15-19 ; Ps. 119 : 17, 77, 116 ; Matt. 4 : 4 ; John 5 : 24.

2. AS ALIENATION FROM GOD. One distinct feature of this spiritual death, as presented in the Scriptures, is man's alienation from God and the consequent loss of God's favor and acceptance. The Scriptures speak of man in his fallen state as being "without God in the world" (Eph. 2 : 12) ; as "alienated from the life of God" (Eph. 4 : 18). They say that "all have sinned, and fall short of the glory of God" (Rom. 3 : 23). Also that "the wicked and him that loveth violence his soul hateth" (Ps. 11 : 5). "For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all unrighteousness and ungodliness of men" (Rom. 1 : 18). It is not only said that "he that believeth not hath been judged already," but that "the wrath of God abideth on him" (John 3 : 18, 36). "By nature the children of wrath" (Eph. 2 : 3). It is also evident from the work of Christ, which was to reconcile man to God and to propitiate his good will. Hence Christ speaks of himself as giving living water. We are said to live in Christ.

3. AS CORRUPTION OF NATURE. This spiritual death was not only the death of the soul, resulting in alienation from God, and consequent loss of favor and acceptance with him as referred to above, but it also consisted in a corruption of nature. The Scripture statements as to this corruption show :

(1) *The fact.* Before the flood it is said : "And God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually"

¹ See some valuable remarks on this point in "Edwards' Works," Vol. II., p. 373.

(Gen. 6 : 5). "Every one of them is gone back ; they are altogether become filthy" (Ps. 53 : 3) ; see also Eccl. 8 : 11 ; Matt. 15 : 19 ; Romans, first chapter at length, as to the heathen, in connection with Paul's question, Rom. 3 : 9. Similar descriptions appear in Isa. 59 : 3-14 ; in Gal. 5 : 19-21 ; Titus 3 : 3 ; 2 Peter 2 : 13-18.

(2) *Early appearance.* Its early appearance in man's life is another proof that corruption is the effect of Adam's sin. Certain passages of Scripture are supposed to refer to young children as though innocent of guilt. These are such as Matt. 19 : 13-15 ; Mark 10 : 13-16 ; and Luke 18 : 15-17 : "Of such is the kingdom of God." Also Matt. 18 : 3 : "Except ye turn and become as little children." Also 1 Cor. 14 : 20 : "Be not children in mind : howbeit in malice be ye babes, but in mind be men."¹ But these passages do not teach freedom from corruption. On the other hand, corruption in early infancy is plainly taught. "The wicked are estranged from the womb : they go astray as soon as they be born, speaking lies" (Ps. 58 : 3). "Behold I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me" (Ps. 51 : 5). "Foolishness (wickedness) is bound up in the heart of a child" (Prov. 22 : 15).

(3) *Universal extent.* It is found in every man. "There is no man that sinneth not" (1 Kings 8 : 46). "There is none that doeth good" (Ps. 14 : 1) ; and this is emphasized in ver. 3 by adding "no, not one." (See also Rom. 3 : 10 and the argument of the context. Also Ps. 53 : 1-3 ; 130 : 3 ; Prov. 20 : 9 ; Eccl. 7 : 20 ; Isa. 53 : 6 ; 64 : 6 ; Rom. 3 : 23 ; 5 : 12, 14 ; Gal. 3 : 22 ; 1 John 1 : 8-10 ; 5 : 19.) To the above passages might be added arguments for the universal existence of sin from declared necessity of regeneration in each man ; from the direction to preach the gospel to every creature ; and the assertion that there is no salvation for any man except in the name of Christ.

(4) *Complete possession of every soul.* This corruption extends to every affection of the heart and mind. Man is not only depraved, he is totally depraved ; that is, he is depraved in every part of his nature. Mr. Goodwin, in the "Lime Street Lectures," p. 128, says :

The soul is corrupted with all its faculties ; the mind with darkness and ignorance (Eph. 5 : 3) ; being subject to the sensitive part and strongly prejudiced against the things of God (1 Cor. 4 : 24) ; the conscience with stupidity and insensibleness (Titus 1 : 15) ; the will with stubbornness and rebel-

¹ See Gill's "Body of Divinity," Vol. I., p. 474.

lion (Rom. 8 : 7) ; the affections are become carnal and placed either upon unlawful objects or upon lawful in an unlawful manner or degree (Col. 3 : 2) ; the thoughts and imaginations are full of pride and vanity and disorder (Gen. 6 : 5). And as for the body, that is become a clog, instead of being serviceable to the soul, and all its members and senses instruments of unrighteousness to sin (Rom. 7 : 19). It is, I say, in general a universal depravation of every part in man since the fall ; and more particularly it consists in a privation of all good, in an enmity to God and the things of God, and in a propensity to all evil.¹

Better proof texts than those referred to in the above quotation are Eph. 4 : 18 and Rom. 1 : 21, instead of Eph. 5 : 3 ; and Rom. 6 : 12 ; 7 : 24 and 8 : 5-7 instead of 1 Cor. 4 : 24.

As to this entire or total depravity of man, the following points should be noted : *a.* It has not been equally developed in all. Nor is any one so wicked as it is possible for him to be. The doctrine of total depravity does not carry with it either of these ideas. It only teaches that there is depravity in every part of man's nature. The entire or total nature is affected by the depravity. This depravity, however, is a thing of degrees. It may be far greater in one person than in another ; and it may be much greater in the same person at different stages of his life. The wicked often wax worse and worse. The Scriptures fully recognize such degrees of wickedness, even in the hardening of the heart and the blinding of the minds of some.² *b.* It does not destroy freedom of the will. The condition of man is indeed such "that he cannot but sin," but this is due to his nature. When man sins, he does so of his own choice, freely, without compulsion. *c.* It does not destroy moral ability. Since the fall man has not only freedom of choice or power of self-determination, he is also able to perform moral acts, good as well as evil. He can be kind and just and fulfill his social duties in a manner to secure the approbation of his fellow-men. Not that the states of mind in which these acts are performed, or the motives by which they are determined, are such as to meet the approbation of an infinitely holy God, but simply that these acts, as to the matter of them, are prescribed by moral law. *d.* It does not destroy accountability or responsibility. For : (*a*) The Scriptures universally recognize man's liability to punishment for all the thoughts of his mind and the desires of his heart, or the

¹ See also Hodge, Vol. II., p. 255, and Gill's "Divinity," Vol. I., p. 474.

² A glass of water with one drop of poison in it is totally poisoned, that is, every part of it is poisoned. But it may become far worse than it is by an increase of the poison.

emotions of his physical nature, as well as for his acts. These are characterized by more or less of heinousness, according to their nature and the circumstances under which they are committed. The more intense the corruption, the more guilty is the man regarded. (b) The conscience of mankind approves these teachings of Scripture. We do not excuse men because of any state of moral corruption. The evidence of this is seen in the immediate difference which is made whenever physical compulsion or physical disease (insanity) leads to an act which otherwise would be regarded as sinful and blameworthy. (c) It does destroy "ability" for spiritual things. This is the only actual inability that is produced by the corruption of human nature. Man's nature has become such that, in his present sinful state, he loves sin and hates holiness. He prefers self to God. "Because the carnal mind is enmity against God: for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. So then they that are in the flesh cannot please God" (Rom. 8 : 7, 8).

Theologians, as we have seen, designate the class of acts as to which fallen man retains his ability, as *justitia civilis*, "things external." And the class as to which his inability is asserted is designated as "the things of God," "the things of the Spirit," "things connected with salvation." The difference between these two classes of acts, although it may not be easy to state it in words, is universally recognized. There is an obvious difference between morality and religion, and between those religious affections of reverence and gratitude which all men more or less experience, and true piety. The difference lies in the state of mind, the motives, and the apprehension of the objects of these affections. It is the difference between holiness and mere natural feeling. What the Bible and all the confessions of the churches of the Reformation assert is that man, since the fall, cannot change his own heart; he cannot regenerate his soul; he cannot repent with godly sorrow, or exercise that faith which is unto salvation. He cannot, in short, put forth any holy exercise or perform any act in such a way as to merit the approbation of God. Sin cleaves to all that he does, and from this dominion of sin he cannot free himself.¹

III. ETERNAL DEATH.

Eternal death is also the consequence of Adam's sin.

I. SO FROM THE NATURE OF THE CASE. Without any actual sentence to eternal death it would follow from the nature of the case that the present alienated and corrupted condition of mankind would be forever. This appears from the following considerations: (1) Condemnation can only be removed by proof of innocence; by legal justification; or by voluntary pardon. But the

¹ Hodge's "Systematic Theology," Vol. II., pp. 263, 264.

justice of God forbids him to pardon sin without atonement. By the deeds of the law can no man be justified; and above all, innocence can never be proved. Hence the Scriptures represent all men, not pardoned and justified through Christ, as condemned to everlasting death. (2) Corruption can only be removed by a cleansing of human nature sufficient to root out all taint of sin and to restore a holy disposition and habits. But the Scriptures show that man's condition is such that he cannot cleanse himself. Even if man had the will to cleanse himself, there is no power in him to bring about the result. Upon this point Dr. Dagg says: "The Scripture representations of men's inability are exceedingly strong. They are said to be without strength, captives in bondage, asleep, dead, etc. The act by which they are delivered from their natural state is called regeneration, quickening, or giving life, renewing, resurrection, translation, creation; and it is directly ascribed to the power of God, the power that called light out of darkness, and raised up Christ from the dead."¹

The following scriptures also distinctly assert this corruption and inability: "Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard his spots? then may ye also do good that are accustomed to do evil" (Jer. 13:23. So also John 1:13; 3:3; Rom. 5:6; 7:5, 21; 8:3; 9:16; and Eph. 2:1, 5). Such being the condition of man, it is seen to be impossible for him to be delivered by his own acts, even if he had the will to perform them. But for God's action there would be no deliverance, even if man had the will to deliver himself. But the case is still worse. Men have not the will to be released. This is evidenced by the statements of Scripture about their love of sin, and the delight that they take therein as specially leading to the rejection of the gospel (John 3:19-21). If, therefore, the doctrine of eternal death were no more than the natural continuance of the alienation and corruption of men, we see that in the absence of the means to remove these they must continue forever.

2. PLAIN TEACHING OF THE SCRIPTURES. We are not left, however, to inference on this point. The Scriptures are plain. They teach the confirmation of men beyond future escape in this condition of sin and misery and its aggravation, or at least a further development of it, which is restrained in this life and only slightly and in a few instances indicated. This is taught by showing: (1) That the day of judgment has been postponed, and

¹ "Manual of Theology," p. 171.

that men during the present life are in an intermediate state of probation. (2) That at the appointed time the wicked shall be judged and their final doom assigned to them. (3) That that doom shall be as eternal as the bliss of the righteous. The strongest words of the Greek language are used to express the eternity of that condition. These show that beyond that period there shall be no change of state or opportunity of redemption. (4) That the condition of punishment into which they will enter is that of the devil and his angels, which is an entirely depraved and corrupted state of bitter enmity to God and to holy beings and things; a state without restraints, in which the soul is wholly given up to sin. The first chapter of Romans teaches us what the removal of such restraints will produce. (5) Some intimation of what that state will be is given in the devil-blinded, self-hardened condition attained even in this life by the worst of men, who, in their willful, blasphemous, and high-handed opposition to God and holiness, show that they are spiritually possessed by the devil.

CHAPTER VIII. ADAM'S RELATION TO THE FALL, OR THE HEADSHIP OF ADAM.

The relation of Adam to the fall of man was such as seems to justify a separate chapter upon this subject, or rather upon the subject of his relation to the race, which made it possible for him to play such a part in bringing about the fall and the consequent ruin of every human being. The Scriptures teach clearly that this fall and this ruin of the race are due to Adam. His fall involved that of his posterity also. In the covenant under which he sinned, he acted not merely as an individual man, or as the sole one of his kind, or as one isolated from all others of his kind, but, as the head of the race, for his posterity as well as for himself. The condition of mankind also shows that all have participated with him in the evils which resulted.

In order that a proper comparison may be made between the innocent, and afterward the sinful, condition of Adam and that which is universally found in his descendants, it will be well to recall the facts as to Adam in these respects, and those also which are seen to be true of mankind in general. The consideration of these will prepare the way for that of the relation between the parties to which the present condition of man is due.

I. THE FACTS AS TO ADAM.

These may be briefly stated since they have already been set forth, and the present statement is only an epitome of that already given.

1. **CREATED PERFECT.** Adam was created perfect, because of which perfection he was not only without sin, but had a strong and controlling though not invincible inclination to holiness and obedience to God. Such must be the nature of every being who is innocent and uncorrupted.

2. **CAPABLE OF SINNING.** This nature did not make him incapable of committing sin, but only made it very improbable that he would choose to do so. Such improbability naturally belongs to a nature whose whole inclinations are toward that which is good. But improbability is far from being impossibility. The possibility of sinning necessarily inheres in every creature endowed with a moral nature and permitted freedom of choice between good and evil. This is no more than saying that a creature is fallible because he is not God, who alone is through his own nature infallible.

3. **HE FELL WILLINGLY.** Adam, in the trial to which he was subjected, did fall, not accidentally nor ignorantly, but deliberately, knowingly, and of his own free will.

4. **HIS NATURE BECAME CORRUPT.** Prior to this fall there were exhibited in him the nature and condition which belong to an innocent and holy man, and which must be found in any of mankind who have not been affected by his sin. Subsequent to it he possessed the nature and condition of a corrupt and guilty man, which likewise must appear in all of those who have been affected by that sin.

5. **UNABLE TO RECOVER.** The result of that sin was inability to continue in the state in which he was originally created, or to return to it.

6. **INABILITY NATURAL AND PENAL.** This inability was not merely natural, but also penal. Punishment was inevitable where it existed. It was due to the corruption of his nature through the defiling taint of sin, which was a part of that threatened death, which, not confined to, nor chiefly consisting in, the death of the body, included this corruption and consequent inability of the whole man, together with the loss of the complacent love of God, and of communion or fellowship with him.

II. FACTS AS TO ADAM'S DESCENDANTS.

The facts as to the descendants of Adam show that they have universally partaken of his corrupted nature, and that, not even in their earliest years, have any had the innocent nature, with its strong proclivities to holiness, which constituted his original condition.

1. BORN CORRUPT. They are born with the corrupted nature which he acquired, together with all the other evils set forth as the penalties of his sin. This was true even of his first children, Cain and Abel, as it has been also equally true of all others even to the present time.

2. UNABLE TO RECOVER. No one of these descendants has been able to recover the nature possessed by Adam before the fall. In each of them the same inability has existed which fell upon him.

3. UNABLE TO ESCAPE THE DEATH PENALTY. No one has been able to escape the complete fulfillment of the penalty of death, in all its meanings, except through the work of Christ. Even the infant children of Adam are born under all the penalties which befell their ancestor in the day of his sin. Actual transgression subsequently adds new guilt to guilt already existing, but does not substitute a state of guilt for one of innocence.

4. THIS DESERVED. Not the judgment of God only, but that of man also, regards a sinful nature as deserving punishment equally with a sinful act. The law of man is necessarily confined to the punishment of the acts, because these alone give such testimony to the condition of the heart as man can correctly apprehend; but the character of any act is regarded as alleviated, or aggravated, by the character of the actor; and men are shunned or courted as they are deemed to be good or bad, without any other reference to their acts than as they testify to character. (1) *Testimony of conscience.* The conscience of mankind has universally taught that this condition of their natures is sinful, and is as fully worthy of punishment as the personal transgressions which proceed from it. (2) *Testimony of Scripture.* The Scriptures plainly assume and declare that God righteously punishes all men, not only for what they do, but for what they are. Men are indeed represented as more guilty and sinful than they know themselves to be, because, through the restraints with which God surrounds them, their natures have not been fully developed into all the sin toward which they tend. This is the

argument of the first part of the Epistle to the Romans, the turning point of which is Rom. 2 : 1. It is also illustrated in the case of Hazael (2 Kings 8 : 12, 13). It follows, then, that a corrupt nature makes a condition as truly sinful and guilty and liable to punishment as actual transgressions.

From the above points it will be seen that men, as descendants of Adam, are invariably born, not with his original, but with his fallen nature ; and more than this, that they not only receive that corrupted nature which was a part of the penalty of his sin, but with it, all the other penalties inflicted because of that sin. It is also plain, that a condition of sinfulness is regarded as worthy of punishment, not only by the Scriptures and by personal conviction of conscience, but also by the universal sense of mankind ; and consequently that men may be punished for the corrupt nature thus inherited, although they may not have been personally guilty of a single transgression. And for this universal condition no other reason has been assigned than the one sin by which Adam fell, and it has, consequently, been generally recognized as, in some way, the result of that one transgression. This naturally leads us to inquire into the nature of the connection between Adam and his posterity through which such sad and serious results have occurred.

III. CONNECTION BETWEEN ADAM AND HIS POSTERITY.

While Adam's sin was the first sin, and while that was not committed according to the original tendencies of his nature, yet, as we have seen, all his posterity have been born with the corrupt nature which thence ensued, with all its tendencies and its actual development in due time into personal transgressions. This cannot be accidental, nor without some controlling cause. It is evident also that it has not resulted from the mere imitation of an example ; it is a deep-rooted evil inherent in the nature. It is found there before any example can be perceived, much less imitated. Manifestly this universal sinfulness of mankind is due to some kind of connection with Adam. We have now to try to find such a connection of the race with Adam as will account for the universal involvement of his posterity in this sinful condition.

I. THE NATURAL HEAD OF THE RACE. Such is the natural relation borne by all men to Adam, as their common father, that nothing but his death before the birth of posterity, or some such miraculous influence as goes against nature, or at least acts

apart from it, and is believed to have existed in the birth of Jesus, could have prevented all the evils which befell Adam from coming in like manner upon his posterity. By natural generation they *must* be born with sinful natures such as his, and must, therefore, be corrupt and guilty, eternally destitute of God's complacent love and liable to natural death.

2. ALSO FEDERAL HEAD OF THE RACE. But while the above would follow from mere natural law, the Scriptures teach us that Adam was not merely the natural, but also the federal head of the race. They show that the mass of mankind proceeding from Adam by natural generation sinned in him, not consciously, but representatively, and therefore are justly treated as though they had consciously sinned, because they are responsible for the act of their representative. The natural headship would, indeed, have sufficed to account for all the effects of Adam's sin. But the federal relationship becomes necessary in connection with salvation through Christ.¹ It is on this account that it is more prominently set forth in the New Testament as the common relationship of both the first and second Adam. The establishment of it as to the first Adam is to be regarded as a special act of the grace of God, conferring the privileges of success where the evils of failure would not be increased, and preparing the way for future grace in the representation in Christ. The principle, however, upon which it is based is a general one of nature, and one constantly recognized in the Scriptures. In proof that Adam was also the federal head of the race the following considerations are offered :

(1) *It is natural and common for men to deal with each other on this principle of representation.* Blessings are bestowed and injuries inflicted in accordance with it. Men become heirs to the noble or base characters of their ancestors as really as to their property. The friendship and affection entertained for a father, and no less the dislike and aversion, are renewed as to the son. A similarity is presumed to exist between them, which is deemed a proper basis for such action, until the conduct of the child shows a difference of nature, and, by destroying this presumption, causes him to be differently treated. Nor is this confined to those who are connected, like father and son, in direct succession. The taint of a committed crime soils and stains a

¹ This conviction that Adam must necessarily be a federal head of the race because Christ was federal head, leads the author into a very elaborate argument upon this subject. We shall see how satisfactory the argument will be.

whole family, even in its collateral branches. A remote relationship with the guilty one is deemed a disgrace, and the one thus connected realizes himself to be shunned, even if pitied, by those free from such misfortune. On the other hand, the most distant connection with one distinguished for wisdom or virtue, for great deeds or for high position, is thought to be a matter of congratulation, not alone for any supposed substantial benefits that may accrue, but for the simple connection itself.

The same principle extends itself throughout all the circumstances and ramifications of the life of each man. Each takes pride or shame in the place of his birth, in his early or late companions, in the community or State or country in which he lives, in its progress or backwardness, in its good or bad character, in its power or weakness, in its knowledge or ignorance—in short, in any qualities of excellence or of inferiority which are attached to anything to which he belongs. Every man is in some measure represented, though not of his own choice, perhaps by bare accident, perhaps even against his own will, in all the circumstances and persons which surround him.

This principle only gains strength when connected with a duly appointed representative. The president or the king appoints an ambassador to a foreign court, and each citizen, though he had no hand in the appointment, is affected by the action of this, his representative. A representative to Congress is elected, against whom one has voted, and of the whole discharge of whose duties one disapproves, and yet such a one is bound by these very acts of the one whom he wished not as his representative.

(2) *The representative relation thus seen in mankind in general is recognized in the same forms in the Scriptures.* *a.* Recognized as existing in man's life with God: (*a*) It is distinctly declared in the aspect of love and hate toward the children of those who love and hate him, in Exod. 20 : 5, and is even more prominently brought to view in Exod. 34 : 7. (See also Deut. 4 : 40 ; 7 : 7–9 ; Lev. 20 : 5 ; 26 : 39 ; Num. 14 : 18, 33 ; Job 21 : 19 ; Ps. 89 : 29, 36 ; 109 : 12–16 ; Isa. 14 : 19–22 ; 65 : 6, 7 ; Jer. 32 : 18 ; Rom. 11 : 28.) (*b*) In the fact that different conduct on the part of the children shall counteract the blessing or curse which comes because of the parent, see Lev. 26 : 40–42 ; Neh. 9 : 2, 3 ; Ezek. 18 : 10–23 ; Dan. 9 : 4–27 ; 2 Cor. 3 : 16. (*c*) That all of a nation suffer and are punished for the sins of their rulers and representatives is taught throughout the whole history of God's dealings with Israel. A signal instance of this was

the punishment of all Israel because of the sins of Eli and his sons. (*Cf.* 1 Sam. 3 : 11-14 with 1 Sam. 4 : 10-22.) Another was in the pestilence sent because David numbered the people (2 Sam. 24 : 2-17). The punishment of all who had killed the prophets is announced by Christ as concentrated on that one generation (Matt. 23 : 34-39). The death of Christ, which had been brought about by the rulers of the Jews, is charged upon the people themselves (Acts 2 : 23 ; 3 : 13-15). It is also charged elsewhere upon the rulers (Acts 5 : 30). (*d*) On the other hand, how often was the anger of God turned away or modified by the intercessory prayers of Moses, and for the sake of Moses ; as in the battle with the Amalekites (Exod. 17 : 9-12) ; and when the golden calf had been made (Exod. 32 : 9-14) ; and in his covenant with Moses after the renewal of the tables of the law (Exod. 34 : 9-28) ; also after the report of the spies (Num. 14 : 15-21) ; and numerous other instances. The case of Elijah and the woman of Zarephath is another illustration. Favor is shown to her because of the prophet's sojourn with her. (1 Kings 17 : 20-22.) It was because of the grace that Noah found with God that he and his family were saved in the ark (Gen. 7 : 1). Abraham's prayer secured from God the promise to save Sodom, if it contained ten righteous ones (Gen. 18 : 32). God promised to save Jerusalem, if one just man could be found (Jer. 5 : 1). These are but a few of the instances which show this to be a prevalent principle in the divine government.

b. Shown in the sacrifices. The doctrine of representation was especially set forth in a religious aspect under the Old Testament economy in the sacrifices which were offered. (*a*) In the earliest sacrifices. The sacrifices under the ceremonial law were anticipated under some more general law of sacrifice which was given to mankind in general. This was exemplified from the earliest times. This is supposed by some to have been the source of the coats of skins with which the Lord God clothed Adam and his wife immediately after the fall (Gen. 3 : 21). It is more plainly seen in the superiority of the sacrifice offered by Abel over that of Cain (Gen. 4 : 1-8). Noah also offered burnt offerings (Gen. 8 : 20, 21). Abraham also built altars to the Lord, calling upon his name (Gen. 12 : 7, 8 ; 13 : 3, 4, 18 ; 21 : 33). The idea of the burnt offering was familiar to Isaac, as appears from his question to his father, and the ram was actually there offered as a burnt offering in the place of Isaac (Gen. 22 : 7-13). Isaac also built an altar at Beer-sheba and called upon the

Lord (Gen. 26 : 23-25). Jacob did the same at Shechem (Gen. 33 : 18-20), and at El-bethel (Gen. 35 : 7), and at Beer-sheba (Gen. 46 : 1). Moses also offered sacrifices before the ceremonial law was given (Exod. 17 : 15, 16). We are told that this was even done by Jethro (Exod. 18 : 12). In Exod. 20 : 24-26 God prescribes to Moses that an altar to him must be of earth, or of unhewn stone, and without steps for its ascent. It is almost certain that these more ancient sacrifices taught at least partially the same truths as those of the ceremonial law. (b) In the ceremonial sacrifices. The sacrifices attached to the ceremonial law explicitly set forth the fact of representation, including the ideas of substitution and imputation as well as of sacrifice. These are the constituent elements of any doctrine of representation which releases from sin. They are fully exhibited in the representation of men in Christ. In that in Adam the sacrifice does not appear, because his was a representation which involved guilt and not atonement. While these sacrifices, therefore, illustrate all that is involved in the representation in Adam, they are properly types of that in Christ, by which guilt was removed and atonement made to God for sin. *aa.* In them we have the sinner and the victim substituted for that sinner. The offered animal becomes his representative. What is due to the man is inflicted upon that substitute. The act of the latter thus becomes that of the former, and, upon the supposition that the victim is authorized and adequate, there is a full discharge of further penalty or obligation. *bb.* There is not only a substitution of one for another, but an actual transfer to this one from that other of his sins, trespasses, uncleanness, or whatever else unfits him for acceptance with God. After this transfer the man is treated as though he had never been thus defiled, and the victim is dealt with as though alone the offender. This transfer is what is commonly known as imputation. By it the sin of Adam is transferred to us, or in other words so reckoned to us or put to our account that we are treated as though it were ours. In like manner the sin of man was transferred to Christ, who bore it, though he knew no sin personally, and he was made sin (or a sin offering) for man, and was treated as though he were a sinner. On the same principle the righteousness of Christ is also imputed to man, who though personally sinful, is treated as though he were righteous. *cc.* The third element is the sacrifice, by which satisfaction is rendered to the broken law and God can be just and yet justify the ungodly. This was shown by the death of the

victim whose life was thus given through its blood in behalf of those whom it represented, as was that of Christ upon the cross.

The whole attainment of salvation through Christ was thus symbolized through these Mosaic sacrifices. The antitype, as well as the type, depends upon the principle of representation. This forms the connecting link. The Mosaic sacrifices were not offered in general, but for specified persons. It was not sin in the abstract that was confessed, but the sins of special individuals. The fact of representation has thus been distinctly involved in the whole religious life set forth in the Scriptures. It was only through the act of a duly appointed representative that guilt could be removed and salvation obtained.

c. It is specifically taught in the New Testament. The New Testament not only recognizes the doctrine of representation or federal headship, it teaches specifically that this was the method by which guilt was incurred through Adam. (a) Rom. 5 : 12-21 : The chief passage in which this is taught is the well-known passage in the fifth chapter of Romans. The apostle is here arguing for the possibility of justification through the act of Christ. He does this by drawing a parallel between Christ and Adam, and the effects of Adam's sin and Christ's meritorious work. This parallel could be drawn only on the ground of federal representation. Only thus could it be in connection with Christ as it had been in connection with Adam. Christ could in no sense be a natural head of man. He could only be a constituted or appointed representative head. He is thus everywhere set forth. So the parallel made between him and Adam shows that the headship of the latter was representative and not natural only. The same truth is also taught in 1 Cor. 15 : 45-49, not only in the names given of the first and second Adam, but by the contrast between their natures and the effects produced by each. In these two chapters from Romans and Corinthians we find ascribed to men, because of the connection with Adam and as punishment of his sin, almost all the penalties which were inflicted upon Adam in the threatened penalty of death. There is the all-comprising word "death," declared to have come by sin, and that the sin of one man (Rom. 5 : 12), and this death came upon all, even those who had not sinned like Adam. In what respect "not sinned after the likeness of Adam's transgression" (ver. 14) if reference be not made to the fact that there was no personal sin, as there is none in infants? This seems clearly suggested by the interjected expression "who is a figure of him that was to

come" (ver. 14), for Adam was only a figure of Christ by virtue of this representative headship. "Judgment unto condemnation," another penalty of Adam's sin, is also declared to have come through one (ver. 16, 18). The death of the soul, as the opposite of its spiritual life, is also asserted to have resulted from one man's offense (ver. 17). The controlling power of this sin, which causes the inability to return to God and serve him, is shown by the declaration that "sin reigned in death" (ver. 21), which is a result of the one man's disobedience mentioned in ver. 19. (*b*) 1 Cor. 15 : 22: If natural death is not included in the word death in this chapter of Romans, and the denial that it is so included is hardly possible, it is yet certainly connected with representation in Adam in 1 Cor. 15 : 22. These two chapters, therefore, show this representative relation of Adam, and that because of it all men have sinned in him and are justly treated as sinners.¹

¹ THE FEDERAL HEADSHIP OF ADAM.

The reviser has always felt constrained to differ with the author as to the supposed federal headship of Adam for the following reasons:

1. It is admitted at the outset that the theory of "natural headship" alone "would have sufficed to account for all the effects of Adam's sin" (*cf.* p. 221).

2. The claim that because "Christ was federal head, therefore Adam must have been federal head also," will hardly stand testing. Christ and Adam were alike in some things and in some relations, but very different in others. Adam could do his work as natural head; Christ could not do his work in that way. There is apparently no more reason for saying that Adam must have been *federal* head because Christ was *federal* head, than for saying Christ must have been *natural* head because Adam was *natural* head.

3. Some of the author's claims as to "the principle of *representation* among men" may well be questioned. But if everything that is claimed on this point be granted, it still would not prove that in this particular case the relation in which Adam acted for the race was that of representative, or federal head.

4. It is strange, if this doctrine is true, that only two passages in all the word of God can be cited as giving any sort of proof of it (Rom. 5 : 12-21; 1 Cor. 15 : 22, 45-49). The Scriptures abound in statements as to the federal headship of *Christ*, they say absolutely nothing as to a federal headship of *Adam*, unless it may be inferred from these two passages.

5. These passages do not seem at all to justify such an inference. (1) In the fifteenth chapter of First Corinthians the apostle is discussing the resurrection of the body from the grave. It seems to be a straining of language to interpret these verses as setting forth any teaching concerning federal headship. (2) The passage in the fifth chapter of Romans only narrates the fact that "by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all sinned"; and the further fact that, over against this ruin that came by Adam, Christ wrought a glorious work of redemption. There is not a word in the whole passage as to the method by which Adam did his work, nor a word as to the method by which Christ did his. We know from other passages of Scripture that Christ did his work as federal head. We have no such teaching concerning Adam. None such is claimed. Every allusion to Adam in connection with the fall the rather favors the idea that he did his work of ruin as the natural head of the race. This has

The discussion of this representative relation of Adam has rendered necessary a reference to that of Christ. It will be appropriate, therefore, to present in a tabular form the parallel between the consequences of these relations as a further proof of the representative character of each of these persons :

THOSE REPRESENTED IN ADAM.	THOSE REPRESENTED IN CHRIST.
<p>Sin is imputed. Treated as though sinners. Not thus personally sinners. Not regarded as actually guilty of Adam's sin.</p>	<p>Righteousness is imputed. Treated as though righteous. Not thus personally righteous. Not regarded as actually meritoriously possessed of Christ's righteousness.</p>
<p>But only sinners representatively. Though not personally sinners in Adam, yet born sinful, and naturally becoming actual sinners.</p>	<p>But only righteous representatively. Though not personally holy in Christ, yet born again unto holiness, and graciously becoming more and more holy until finally sanctified.</p>
<p>Condemned to all the penalties of death because of Adam's sin.</p>	<p>Released from penalty, and attaining to spiritual life and immortality, because of Christ's active and passive obedience.</p>
<p>Voluntarily accepting the relation to Adam, and persevering in the life of sin inaugurated by him.</p>	<p>Voluntarily, though by God's help and grace, accepting the relation to Christ, and persevering in the holy life into which he has brought them.</p>

(B) SOTERIOLOGY, OR GOD'S WORK IN SAVING MAN

AA. CHRIST THE SAVIOUR, OR CHRISTOLOGY

CHAPTER IX. CHRIST IN THE OLD TESTAMENT.

The history of the Jewish nation is peculiarly marked by its expectation of a Messiah. Christians believe that this was fulfilled in the birth of Jesus, the son of Mary. The object of this

mystery enough connected with it, without bringing in the fiction of a federal relationship in sinning. Dr. J. A. Broadus says concerning this passage in Romans : "This passage teaches that in some way all sinned in Adam. But as to how they sinned in Adam, whether representatively or otherwise, the passage does not say, and I do not believe that any one knows. The idea that the sinning was done representatively, or by representation merely, is only a theory of the theologians which cannot be substantiated by Scripture." The reviser once said to Dr. Broadus that he could not see that the passage even teaches necessarily that "all sinned in Adam." It simply says that "all sinned." It does not say where, when, or how they sinned. It does, however, very clearly trace all sin back to Adam. "By one man sin entered the world." But it is an *inference only* that this sinning was done in Adam. We need to distinguish sharply between the *certain teaching* of the Scriptures and the *inferences* of both the *theologians* and the *exegetes*.

chapter is to show what testimony the Old Testament gave of the coming of such a personage, and what were its predictions about the nature of his person and work. This is preliminary to the more full information to be gathered from the Christian Scriptures. It is well to see that the true doctrine as to the Saviour of man is not that of the New Testament only, but of the whole Bible. The unity of divine revelation will thus appear. The testimony of prophecy will be added to that of the miracles which attended the life of Jesus and the ministry of his followers. The authority of the later revelation will be seen to rest, not upon these miracles alone, but also upon the concurrence of its teachings with the inspired truth already accepted by the Jews. Our Lord himself and his apostles were constantly accustomed to appeal to these then existent Scriptures as testifying of him: Matt. 1:22, 23; 2:23; Mark 1:2; Luke 1:70; 4:21; 24:27, 44; John 1:45; 5:39, 46; Acts 2:25-31; 3:13, 22, 24; 7:52; 8:30-35; 10:43; 13:32-37, 47; 15:15-17; 24:14; 26:6, 22, 23; Rom. 1:2; 2 Tim. 3:15, 16; 2 Peter 1:19-21. We may therefore profitably consider some of the more important predictions of the Messiah which appear in the Old Testament.

I. THE PROMISED SEED.

The human character of the Messiah was foretold in the prediction that he should be of human seed. This was presented in three special forms: First, in the seed of the woman; second, in that of the patriarchs; and third, in that of the family of David.

I. SEED OF THE WOMAN. The earliest prediction of the coming Messiah took place in Eden. It is sometimes called the prot-evangelium, or first gospel. Yet it should not be forgotten that, whatever glad tidings it conveyed to man, it was uttered in the form of a curse upon the serpent. "And the Lord God said unto the serpent, Because thou hast done this, cursed art thou above all cattle, and above every beast of the field; upon thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life; and I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed: it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel" (Gen. 3:14, 15). The whole tenor of subsequent Scripture, especially that of the New Testament, shows that this is not to be regarded as merely declarative of hostility between mankind and the serpent tribe, but more par-

ticularly of the future strife between Christ and Satan, and of the final triumph of the former over the latter. (See especially John 8 : 44 ; 2 Cor. 11 : 3 ; Heb. 2 : 14 ; 1 John 3 : 8 ; and Rev. 12 : 9.) To what extent our first parents comprehended the full blessedness of this promise cannot be ascertained. Much of the knowledge of the antediluvians, especially as to the gracious purposes of God in redemption, has been left unrecorded. But we have glimpses of their faith and knowledge which furnish reasons for believing that they were not left by God without sufficient information to lead them to expect a deliverer from their sinful and spiritually lost condition. The faith of Abel, by which he "offered unto God a more excellent sacrifice than Cain" (Heb. 11 : 4) and the "coats of skins" which "the Lord God made for Adam and for his wife" (Gen. 3 : 21), are strongly suggestive of bloody sacrifices, typical of Christ, commanded by God in the very beginning. The prophecy of the second coming of Christ which Jude (ver. 14, 15) tells us was made by "Enoch, the seventh from Adam," betokens a degree of knowledge to the very end of the world which, but for that record, would never have been imagined. We are therefore not to be hindered by any presumption that our first parents did not know what God was promising, from carefully scrutinizing the record left us, nor from giving to it all the fullness of meaning its literal interpretation may convey. Now that record taken in its strictest grammatical interpretation teaches not only that the promised seed had become a ground of hope to the woman, but that she had learned to associate with him who was to be the antagonist of the serpent the name of Jehovah himself.

The King James version of the Scriptures translates her language upon the birth of Cain (Gen. 4 : 1) : "I have gotten a man from the Lord." The Canterbury revision reads : "I have gotten a man with the help of the Lord." The literal rendering is : "I have gotten a man, the Jehovah himself." The Hebrew particle translated in the former of these versions "from" and in the latter "with the help of" is equivalent to the Greek "*αὐτός*" and the Latin "*ipse*." Dr. J. Pye Smith says :

The primary, proper, and usual force of the particle *אֵת* (*eth*) placed here before Jehovah is to designate an object in the most demonstrative and emphatical manner. In this use it occurs immediately before and after this clause, and forty times in the first four chapters of these primeval records, not including the instance before us. It is also prefixed to every proper name in the governed case throughout the fifth chapter. This prodigious

number of instances, all occurring in the same connection, in the same strain of topic and discourse, in the same most venerable documents (supposing them to have been pre-existing fragments before the age of Moses), is surely sufficient to determine a grammatical question. It is true that, in subsequent periods of the language, this particle came to be used as a preposition to denote *with*, or *by the instrumentality of*; but this was only a secondary idiom, and many of its supposed instances, on a close consideration, fall into the ordinary construction. There seems, therefore, no option to an interpreter who is resolved to follow faithfully the fair and strict grammatical signification of the words before him but to translate the passage as given above¹ (I have obtained a man Jehovah).

It is true that Eve was mistaken in supposing that the son thus born to her was the Messiah. The language of inspiration only asserts that she said this, without admitting that she was correct. Indeed, the record shows she was not. It is not here quoted, therefore, as proof of the divine character of the Redeemer, but only of the fact that she had believed the promise of God, was looking forward to its fulfillment, and had learned in some way to associate the name of Jehovah with the expected seed of the woman. It is also evident that not only did she believe that Jehovah was to be the Messiah, but that she expected his appearance in human form.

2. PATRIARCHAL SEED. A more definite and undoubted promise of the Messiah as "a seed" was made to Abraham and Isaac and Jacob. The apostle to the Galatians distinctly declares that "the Scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the Gentiles by faith, preached the gospel beforehand unto Abraham, saying, In thee shall all the nations be blessed" (Gal. 3 : 8). He also says emphatically (Gal. 3 : 16) that this seed "is Christ." The predictions of this kind to Abraham are recorded in Gen. 12 : 3 ; 18 : 18 ; 22 : 17, 18. Each of these three passages refers in so many words to "the Seed," in connection with the spiritual blessing of the nations. Others, as indeed do the first two of these, contain also promises of the bestowal of the land of Canaan upon the natural descendants of Abraham. (See Gen. 12 : 7 ; 13 : 14-17 ; 15 : 5-18 ; 17 : 8 ; 24 : 7.) By this promise as to the nations, the prediction in Eden, which had heretofore been general of the race, confined the birth of the Messiah to a descendant of Abraham. Both promises, that of the earthly Canaan and that of the spiritual seed, were repeated to Isaac (Gen. 26 : 2-5 ; see also ver. 24) ; while to Jacob was given that of the earthly Canaan in the blessing by Isaac (Gen. 28 : 3, 4),

¹ "Scripture Testimony to the Messiah," Book II., Chap. 4, Sec. 1.

and by God (Gen. 35 : 10-12) at Bethel, where the promise of both blessings had been previously made to him (Gen. 28 : 14).

These predictions constitute properly the patriarchal promise of "the Seed," which is more commonly spoken of as the promise to Abraham, because of his greater prominence, as well as because first announced to him. To what extent it was understood by them is also beyond our knowledge. But the language of Christ (John 8 : 56), "Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day, and he saw it and was glad," shows a more full comprehension of the blessings promised than the recorded statements in Genesis would suggest. Perhaps to Abraham, "the father of all them that believe," was revealed somewhat clear ideas of the future person and work of his blessed Seed. It has been supposed, not without justification, that this occurred in connection with the commanded sacrifice of Isaac, related in the twenty-second chapter of Genesis. Certainly that occasion furnishes, if not a type, yet a very apt illustration of the offering up by the Divine Father of his only-begotten Son (*cf.* Heb. 11 : 17), whom he did not withhold from "the father of us all" (Rom. 4 : 16), nor from them which, being "of faith are blessed with the faithful Abraham" (Gal. 3 : 7). It is not, indeed, improbable that Abraham had before this been taught, or was so on this occasion, that by the sacrifice of "the seed," the blessing was to come which had been promised through him to mankind. Was not his reply to Isaac singularly prophetic when he said : "God will himself provide a lamb for the burnt-offering?" (Gen. 22 : 8.) Especially may this be imagined when we find him calling the place of sacrifice "Jehovah-Jireh" ; so that it became a saying at least to the days of the record : "In the mount of the Lord it shall be provided" (Gen. 22 : 14).

3. SEED OF THE FAMILY OF DAVID. This title is used in full recognition of the truth that Christ is almost constantly called the Seed or Son of David. It is intended only to recall the fact that Christ was also foretold as "a shoot out of the stock of Jesse, and a branch out of his roots" (Isa. 11 : 1), and that he is called "the Lion that is of the tribe of Judah, the root of David" (Rev. 5 : 5). Indeed, the prophecy, "until Shiloh come" (Gen. 49 : 10), which was made of Judah in the blessing of his sons by Jacob, has been largely regarded by Jewish as well as by Christian writers as a prophecy of Christ. This opinion is strengthened by the declaration that "Judah prevailed above his brethren, and of him came the prince" (1 Chron. 5 : 2).

The promise of the Seed of David was, like that to the patriarchs, of a two-fold nature: first, of the continuance of the kingly rule in Solomon, and, secondly, of the reign of Christ as the truly everlasting King.

The beginnings of both promises appear in the vision of Nathan, the prophet, which he made known to David when the latter was forbidden to build a house for God, and in the exultant and grateful prayer of David which followed (2 Sam. 7 : 4-29). David naturally regarded this as a promise of the continuance of his house "for a great while to come" (ver. 19). The words "for ever," as applied to any earthly kingdom, could only be thus relative. But this double prophecy included, as subsequently developed, another of a King truly everlasting, of whose kingdom there shall be no end, and with whom are really associated the "sure mercies of David."

This prophecy was uttered in the early part of the reign of David, and the understanding of it to which he attained may be traced through such of his psalms as are of a Messianic nature. These, therefore, become exegetical of the original statements. The true key to the interpretation of these psalms is to be found in David's comprehension of the theocratic nature of the government of Israel. The earthly was known to be only the viceroy of the Heavenly King. The glory of the royal office was to be exercised perpetually and everlastingly by Jehovah himself, and only temporarily by the one who from time to time might sit in God's place on the throne. Thus, in the conceptions and language of David, the two were mingled perpetually, and his thoughts and utterances passed instantaneously from the earthly monarch to the true King of kings. Hence much of his language became prophetic, and led Israel onward to the idea of the Messiah as King of Israel. The following may be taken as some of the proofs of these facts and of the consequent characteristics of Messiah pointed out by him:

(1) That Jehovah was *theocratic King* is distinctly asserted: Ps. 22 : 28; 24 : 1-10; 93 : 1. (2) *Yet also human*. For he is a sufferer for others, whose prayers for deliverance show the intensity of his agony and despair: Ps. 22 : 1-22. The sufferings are the essential means by which those who fear the Lord will be called on to praise and glorify and fear God, and by which the meek shall eat and be satisfied, and hearts shall live forever and all the nations shall remember and turn to God and worship him. (3) *An exalted King*: Ps. 2 : 6; 110 : 2, 5, 6.

(4) *A universal monarch*: Ps. 2 : 10-12; 22 : 27; 110 : 5, 6. (5) *His kingdom everlasting*: Ps. 145 : 13. (6) *The king himself to be glorious*, reigning in truth, meekness, and righteousness, and the sceptre of equity to be the sceptre of his kingdom: Ps. 45 : 4, 6. (7) *To escape the corruption of the grave*. Speaking in the person of the king, David said, "My flesh also shall dwell in safety, for thou wilt not leave my soul to Sheol; neither wilt thou suffer thy holy one to see corruption": Ps. 16 : 9, 10. (Cf. Acts 2 : 25-27; 13 : 35, 36.) (8) *Begotten Son of Jehovah*: Ps. 2 : 7. (9) *David calls him his Lord*: Ps. 16 : 2; 110 : 1. (Cf. Matt. 22 : 41-46; Mark 12 : 35-37; Luke 20 : 41-44; Acts 2 : 34-36.) (10) *Also addressed as God*: Ps. 45 : 6, 7. (11) *To be a priest forever after the order of Melchizedek*: Ps. 110 : 4. (Cf. 1 Sam. 2 : 34, 35, as a possible germ prophecy of this priesthood; but especially Hebrews, chap. 4-10.)

These references will suffice to show that David expected not only the perpetuity of the merely earthly kingdom, with its succession of monarchs of his family, but that he also looked in the same line of descent for a true appearance of Jehovah, whose reign in this human person would thus be universal, whose flesh would never see corruption, of whose kingdom there would be no end, whose power would be terrible and his wisdom and righteousness superhuman, to whom, as his Lord, David would himself be subservient, who is already the begotten Son of God and can justly be called God, whose government would be especially spiritual, who, with the kingly would combine a priestly office of peculiar character and origin, and yet whose sufferings would be intense, and these sufferings the foundation of the blessings of his people and of their devotion to God. Are not these the characteristics of the Christian idea of the Messiah as set forth in the New Testament? In whom, except in Jesus Christ, have these expectations been fulfilled? In what respect has he not met them fully?

II. CHRIST IN THE PROPHETICAL BOOKS.

The Messiah, thus promised as the seed in the three forms we have considered, was the subject of frequent prophecy unto the days of Malachi. The predictions as to his birth became more distinct. The belief which separated him from all other kings of the nation and made him an especial object of hope and desire constantly increased. The association and identification of him with Jehovah appeared more clear. The application to him of

the divine names and attributes was made with less reserve. The nature and object of his sufferings and their saving efficacy were more plainly revealed, and the participation of the Gentiles in the blessings of his reign was more distinctly set forth.

1. HIS BIRTH. Isaiah foretold the coming forth of "a shoot from the stock of Jesse and a branch out of his roots" (11 : 1), and of the birth from a virgin of a child who should be called Immanuel (7 : 14); and Jeremiah, the raising up unto David of a righteous Branch in whose days "Judah shall be saved and Israel dwell in peace," and whose name shall be "The Lord is our righteousness" (Jer. 23 : 6). Gabriel announced that the Messiah would come and be cut off within seventy weeks from the time of the going forth of the commandment to restore and build Jerusalem (Dan. 9 : 24-27). Micah predicted the coming forth from Bethlehem Ephratah of the ruler of Israel "whose goings forth are from of old, from everlasting" (Micah 5 : 2). Haggai declared that "the desirable things of all nations shall come" and fill the house then building with greater glory than that of Solomon. The scholars who prepared the Revised version, while so translating the word which, in the King James' version, is "desire," state in the margin that the Hebrew is "desire," which should suffice to retain the older translation regarded by many as a prophecy of Christ's appearance in that temple, especially when the extraordinary manifestations are considered as accompanying, viz, the shaking of "the heavens and the earth and the sea and the dry land" (Haggai 2 : 6, 7). Finally, Malachi tells of a messenger who shall go before and prepare the way for the Lord, the angel of the covenant who will suddenly come to his temple.

2. A SPECIAL KING. The following passages will fully set this forth : Isa. 32 : 1 ; 33 : 17 ; 57 : 9 ; Jer. 8 : 19 ; 23 : 5 ; Ezek. 37 : 2 ; Dan. 2 : 44 ; Hosea 3 : 5 ; Micah 4 : 8, 9 ; and Zech. 9 : 9.

3. THE HOPE OF ISRAEL AND JUDAH WAS ASSOCIATED WITH JEHOVAH AS KING : Isa. 6 : 5 ; 12 : 2, 6 ; 33 : 22 ; 43 : 3, 10, 11, 14, 15 ; 44 : 6, 23 ; 45 : 15, 21, 22, 25 ; 60 : 2, 9, 14, 16, 19, 20 ; Jer. 10 : 6-10 ; 23 : 5 ; 46 : 18 ; 48 : 15 ; 49 : 38 ; 51 : 57 ; Zech. 14 : 9, 16.

4. DIVINE NAMES AND ATTRIBUTES ASCRIBED WITH LESS RESERVE. He is called "Immanuel" (Isa. 7 : 14). His name was also to be "Wonderful, Counsellor, Mighty God, Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace" (Isa. 9 : 8). Mention is made of one for whom the way in the wilderness should be prepared and a

highway made straight after the manner of kings journeying in ancient days. This one is called Jehovah, God; in him shall the glory of Jehovah be revealed, and he that tells good tidings to Zion is directed, "Lift up thy voice with strength, lift it up, be not afraid; say unto the cities of Judah, Behold, your God! Behold, the Lord God will come as a mighty one, and his arm shall rule for him" (Isa. 40 : 3, 5, 9, 10). The Branch of David foretold by Jeremiah was to be called "The Lord is our righteousness" (Jer. 23 : 6). The ruler of Israel to come forth from Bethlehem Ephratah was one "whose goings forth are from of old, from everlasting" (Micah 5 : 2).

5. NATURE AND OBJECT OF HIS SUFFERINGS MORE PLAINLY REVEALED. These are set forth with such marked distinctness in the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah that from it may be gathered all the main ideas which enter into the atoning work of Christ. We have there the substitution of a victim, himself innocent, in the place of the guilty; upon whom their sins are laid; who is wounded for their transgressions; with whose stripes they are healed; whose soul is made an offering for sin, and whose travail is rewarded with a satisfactory seed. The imputation of sin, and its punishment and the reward are all from God. The lamblike patience of the sufferer is no less descriptive of Jesus than are the sinlessness of his character and the two-fold aspect of God exercising avenging justice and unceasing love. He is still God's righteous servant whose work is worthy of great reward.

The angel Gabriel also said to Daniel: "After three-score and two weeks shall Messiah be cut off, but not for himself" (Dan. 9 : 26). We have also that remarkable language of Zechariah applicable to Christ and to none other: "Awake, O sword, against my shepherd, and against the man that is my fellow, saith the Lord of hosts" (Zech. 13 : 7).

6. PARTICIPATION OF THE GENTILES IN THE BLESSINGS MORE DISTINCTLY ENUNCIATED. The earlier prophecies to David had been simply of conquered foes. In like manner also some of those in later days spoke of triumphing Israel, or merely indicated the increase of the government without reference to special blessings. But the following refer to the Gentiles as blessed with the Jews, and even sometimes without them: Isa. 11 : 10; 42 : 1-17; 49 : 6-13; 62 : 2; Jer. 16 : 19-21; Hosea 2 : 23; Mal. 1 : 11.

Thus does it appear that the prophecies give still more complete development of the promises made in the seed of the woman

and of the patriarchs and of the family of David, by which he who was the hope of Israel is made known also as the Saviour of mankind.

The discussions above will suffice to show how abundantly the Old Testament taught of the Messiah in the aspects referred to. But the doctrine of Christ in the Old Testament will not be completely shown without considering that manifestation in which he revealed himself as

III. THE ANGEL OF THE COVENANT.

I. CHRIST THE ANGEL OF THE COVENANT. There were other manifestations of God to the senses of man. Such was that of the voice heard in Eden (Gen. 3 : 8), and by Moses from the burning bush (Exod. 3 : 2-5), and by the children of Israel out of the fire in Hebron, when they heard the voice of words and saw no form (Deut. 4 : 12), and by Moses at Sinai (Exod. 19 : 19), and by Samuel (1 Sam. 3 : 1-14), and by Elijah (1 Kings 19 : 9-20). But we have no reason to confine such a manifestation to the Son of God, especially as a like voice from the Father is recorded in the New Testament at the baptism of Christ (Matt. 3 : 17), at the Transfiguration (Matt. 17 : 5), and in answer to the prayer of Christ (John 12 : 28). By such a voice, or by dreams, or by other sensible means, must God also have forbidden the eating of the tree of knowledge, and commanded Noah to build the Ark, and communicated with Balaam (Num. 22 and 23), and with many of his true prophets to whom the "word of the Lord" came. But except in the interview with Balaam, when "the angel of the Lord" met him (Num. 22 : 22-35), no reason presents itself why these communications should be ascribed to the second person of the Trinity alone. Whatever opinion one may have upon this point cannot be supported by any direct or positive language of Scripture.

But this is not true of the appearances of the *angel of the covenant*. The prophecy of Malachi should leave this question without doubt. "Behold," says Jehovah to Israel through that prophet, "I send my messenger, and he shall prepare the way before me: and the Lord, whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to his temple; and the messenger (angel) of the covenant, whom ye delight in, behold, he cometh, saith the Lord of hosts" (Mal. 3 : 1). "Behold, I will send you Elijah the prophet before the great and terrible day of the Lord shall come" (Mal. 4 : 5). We have here: (1) A distinct promise of the sending of the angel of

the covenant, in whom Israel delights. (2) After the manner of Hebrew parallelisms he is identified with the Lord who shall come to his temple. (3) At first a mere messenger is announced as his forerunner, but afterward it is declared that this shall be Elijah the prophet. (4) The office of the messenger or prophet is to prepare the way for the angel of the covenant. Here is an undoubted reference to the coming Messiah. It could not otherwise be understood, even without the application made of it in the New Testament to Christ and his forerunner, John the Baptist (Matt. 11 : 10).

2. HIS DIVINITY TAUGHT. Having therefore identified the Messiah with the angel of the covenant,¹ it only remains to show that this was a divine angel, having the names, attributes, and authority of God and receiving the worship peculiar to him alone.

(1) *Divine names are given to him and claimed by him.* *a.* That of Jehovah. By the inspired writers: Gen. 16 : 13 ; 18 : 1, 17, 20, 26, 33 ; Exod. 3 : 4, 7 (*cf.* ver. 2) ; 13 : 21 (*cf.* with Exod. 14 : 19) ; Josh. 5 : 13 (*cf.* with 6 : 2). *b.* That of God. By Hagar: Gen. 16 : 13 ; by Jacob: Gen. 32 : 30 ; 48 : 15, 16 ; by the writer: Exod. 3 : 4, 6 ; by God himself: Gen. 31 : 13 (*cf.* ver. 11 ; also chap. 28 : 13-22 and 32 : 9) ; Exod. 3 : 6 (*cf.* ver. 2).

(2) *The angel of the Lord is also identified with Jehovah and with God.* *a.* With Jehovah. A signal instance of this is to be found in the events recorded in the thirty-third to the fortieth chapters of Exodus. Because of the great sin of Israel in making and worshiping the golden calf, recorded in the thirty-second chapter, God was very angry with the people. He threatened them, "I will not go up in the midst of thee" (Exod. 33 : 3). This filled Moses and the people with alarm, although God had promised to send an angel before them. Moses therefore went to the tent of meeting, and the pillar of cloud descended and stood at the door of the tent, and "The Lord spake with Moses" (Exod. 33 : 8, 9). The reassuring promise was then given by Jehovah: "My presence shall go with thee, and I will give thee rest" (Exod. 33 : 10). This was followed by the hewing of the "two tables of stone like unto the first" (Exod. 34 : 2), and by the making of the tabernacle (chap. 35 to 40), upon the finishing of which "the cloud covered the tent of meeting, and the glory of the Lord filled the tabernacle. And when the cloud was taken

¹ It seems somewhat questionable whether we can hold that the expression "angel of the covenant" always refers to Christ, because it so refers in this chapter of Malachi. In some other passages the reference to Christ does not seem at all certain.

up from over the tabernacle, the children of Israel went onward through all their journeys; but if the cloud were not taken up, then they journeyed not till the day that it was taken up. For the cloud of the Lord was upon the tabernacle by day, and there was fire therein by night, in the sight of all the house of Israel, throughout all their journeys" (Exod. 40 : 33-38). A comparison of the threat of Exod. 33 : 3 and of this record with the language of Ps. 99 : 7, "He spake unto them in the cloudy pillar," and Isa. 63 : 9, "And the angel of his presence saved them," shows that the cloud was the visible manifestation of Jehovah to Israel, and that the angel of his presence embodied the glory of Jehovah. Its presence with Israel was the presence of Jehovah himself. This identification of Jehovah with the angel is also exhibited with equal clearness by a comparison of Exod. 13 : 21 and 14 : 19. In the former it is said that "The Lord went before them by day in a pillar of cloud to lead them the way"; in the latter we read of "the angel of God which went before the camp of Israel." *b.* With God. This identification of himself with God is made by the angel that appeared to Abraham by saying, "Now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, from me" (Gen. 22 : 12. See also ver. 15, 16).

(3) *Divine attributes and authority are ascribed to him.* *a.* Creative power. He promised Hagar, "I will greatly multiply thy seed, that it shall not be numbered for multitude" (Gen. 16 : 10). And in like manner said to Abraham, "I will certainly return unto thee when the season cometh round; and, lo, Sarah thy wife shall have a son" (Gen. 18 : 10). *b.* Sovereignty. The power of absolute right over the cities of the plains is asserted in the foretold destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah and his answers to the successive prayers of Abraham that upon certain conditions he would spare those cities (Gen. 18 : 18-33). *c.* The Judge of all the earth is the efficacious title given by Abraham as he pleads with the Man before him, whom he recognizes as Jehovah, not "to slay the righteous with the wicked" (Gen. 18 : 25). Two of the three men who appeared to Abraham are called angels (Gen. 19 : 1), and this third is manifestly "the angel of the Lord." *d.* Divine worship is paid to and received by him. This worship was demanded of Moses at the bush in which the angel of the Lord appeared (Exod. 3 : 2) when "God," by which name as well as that of Jehovah the angel is called, commanded him: "Draw not nigh hither: put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place

whereon thou standest is holy ground" (Exod. 3 : 5). A like command was given to Joshua (Josh. 5 : 15) by the man that appeared to him and claimed to be "the captain of the Lord's host," before whom "Joshua fell on his face to the earth and did worship" (ver. 14).

Thus does it appear that we have in the record abundant testimony to the identity of the Jehovah God with this angel of the covenant whom Malachi predicted as the coming hope of Israel. His appearance was not delayed until the time of his permanent incarnation. The seed of the woman appeared in human form, and as angelic messenger, and as glowing fire and cloud, long before that "fulness of the time came" in which "God sent forth his Son, born of a woman" (Gal. 4 : 4), when the Word, which "was with God," and "was God" "in the beginning," "became flesh and dwelt among us" (John 1 : 1, 2, 14). What relation these earlier manifestations had to the subsequent birth in the flesh or to the human nature then assumed is beyond our knowledge. Nor is it wise, by conjectures induced by curiosity, to prosecute inquiries which can accomplish no good and may be fraught only with evil. Speculation about the unknowable too often results in skepticism as to what is actually known, especially when such knowledge has come through revelation from God. It is sufficient to know that God added this outward "sign" to confirm faith in the promises he had given, and by it taught the future interposition of his own Son in human flesh for the deliverance of his true people, the spiritual Israel, from a severer bondage than that of Egypt, and the guidance of them by the Covenant Redeemer into the unspeakable blessings and glory of the Heavenly Canaan.

Thus did the Old Testament testify of Jesus the Christ, the Saviour of men. As the seed of the woman, he will utterly destroy the power of the serpent, the great enemy of man. In him the day has come which Abraham foresaw and was glad. In him the Lion of Judah, the seed of David, appears as the King of kings, the Lord of lords, whose reign is universal, not only over those living on earth at any one time, but over all the living and the dead of this world, and indeed of the whole universe. His untold sufferings have secured the happiness of his people and their devotion to God. His kingdom is an everlasting kingdom. His priesthood has neither beginning nor end. He is the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world. He ever liveth to make intercession for us. He hath made us kings and priests

unto God. At his name every knee shall bow and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord to the glory of God the Father. His flesh is indeed the tabernacle which is filled with the glory of Jehovah, in whom the ancient prophecy to Israel is fulfilled: "Behold your God!"

In the testimony thus given in the Old Testament as to Christ we perceive a portion of the evidence it also affords to that doctrine of the Trinity which was developed more clearly in the New Testament. Here is seen one not only identified with God and Jehovah, but also distinguished from him. Here also are other glimmerings of a tri-personality in God presented to a people unto whom God was especially revealed in his unity, and which had almost unconquerable tendencies to polytheism. What was thus revealed was understood very obscurely, if at all, in Old Testament days. For what purpose was it given except that in the later time might be apparent the unity of the doctrines of both Testaments, and the evidence of the inspiration of each in their testimony in common to this and to other doctrines which were divinely foreshadowed in the former, but have been distinctly declared in the latter revelation?

CHAPTER X. THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

We saw in the last chapter that God promised in the Old Testament a redeemer. In the garden in which the fall occurred this promise was made. It grows brighter and brighter on the pages of the Old Testament, until at last it becomes so clear and unmistakable in the prophecy of Isaiah that rationalists are driven to insist that the language could not have been penned when the book is said to have been written. At length the fullness of time came and God sent forth his son, born of a woman, the promised Redeemer.

Before we take up the actual work of redemption accomplished by Christ we will pause to consider the marvelous Person himself. He had a great work to perform. It required a person altogether peculiar to do this work. Among all the characters that have appeared on this earth there has never been another who, in his own unique personality, could approach in interest him whom we call Jesus Christ. Let us reverently, and yet with earnest inquiry and enthusiasm, draw near to consider the Person of Christ. *Behold the man*—JESUS CHRIST THE SON OF GOD!

I. DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY AT THE FOUNDATION.

The doctrine of the Trinity lies at the foundation of that of Christ's Person. That doctrine is that three persons subsist in

one divine nature. It was one of these persons, and not the divine nature itself, that became incarnate. It was not the Godhead, but one of the persons of the Godhead. That is, it was not the Father and the Son and the Spirit, but the Son alone.

It was not, therefore, that which was common to the three persons that assumed our nature. It was that which, in the economy of the Trinity, is distinguished from the others. It was not the divine nature or essence, but a person who subsists in that divine nature equally with the others, yet who is distinguished, in his relation to that divine nature, from the other persons of the Trinity.

The doctrine of the Trinity, that is, of personal distinctions in the Godhead, is, therefore, essentially involved in the doctrine of the person of Christ. Personal distinctions in the Trinity are not necessary, indeed, to the incarnation of God, but they are to that of a divine person. They are also necessary to the work which Christ performed. Were God only one person he could not manifest rule, and yet empty himself of it; could not send, and yet be sent; could not be lawgiver, and also voluntary subject; could not make atonement, and yet receive it; could not pour out wrath, and yet endure it. But the Scriptures persistently teach, not that "God came," but that God "gave his only-begotten Son," "sent his Son not to condemn the world," "sent forth his Son made of a woman," "sent his only-begotten Son into the world," and that "the Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world." Indeed, the first chapter of John, which sets forth the doctrines of the Incarnation and Trinity, plainly declares that "No man hath seen God at any time; the only-begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him" (John 1:18).

II. PRESERVED IN THE INCARNATION HIS ESSENTIAL RELATIONS TO THE DIVINE NATURE, OR ESSENCE.

This Person, in his incarnation, preserved unaltered his essential relations to the divine nature or essence.

I. ONE SCRIPTURE PASSAGE ONLY SEEMS OPPOSED. The only Scripture passage which seems to oppose this idea is Phil. 2:5-8. But a proper consideration of this passage shows that it does not. The subordination, thus voluntarily assumed by the Son, was manifestly official, and that of one divine person to another. It could not have been a subordination of one divine nature to another, for there is but the one divine nature. It is,

therefore, a subordination of one person to another, the Son to the Father. Neither, in that subordination, was there any separation of Christ from his divine nature. Such separation was not necessary to his incarnation. It was only necessary that he should appear to men as man, and not as God. His divinity was, therefore, concealed in his human form. But he, being God equally with the Father and the Spirit, possessed of right rule and authority over all creatures and worlds. This he continued to possess essentially as God; but as the Son, he yielded its exercise exclusively into the hands of the Father; so that during the period of his earthly residence he consented to be as one that was sent, and thus as the servant of the Father, doing his will and obedient to his authority.

The context shows this to be the only meaning. The object in introducing this statement is to induce the Philippians, in a like spirit of self-submission, to esteem others better than themselves (a case, therefore, of subordination among equals). And after this statement about Christ, Paul enforces this obligation by showing how the Father had so rewarded this act of the Son, that the rightful dominion and power, which belong essentially to God, and to Christ therefore only in his divine nature, had been conferred upon him in his human nature, so that "every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord to the glory of God the Father" (Phil. 2 : 11).

It was this official position of rule and dominion which constituted the glory which he had with the Father, and which he prayed the Father to bestow upon him again. Such prayer was not necessary to secure it for himself as God, for in his divine nature he had continued to possess although not to exercise it. But it was necessary, since this was also to be conferred upon him as man, and in this respect it could only be conferred as a reward or gift, and by the consent of all the persons of the Trinity. (*Cf.* Ps. 2, especially ver. 6-8, but the whole psalm also.)

The Scriptures go no further than this idea of official subordination. They say nothing of Christ leaving his divinity behind him, as though it had been cast off like a garment. They do not say that for his dwelling on earth his divinity had to cease, or to be absorbed in that of the Father and the Spirit; nor that it had an indefinite existence in a transition state, awaiting a reunion after the work of the incarnation was complete.

It is well to remember that they not only do not, but could not thus teach, for some men imagine this, and so overlook what may be next shown, namely:

2. OTHER PASSAGES OF SCRIPTURE ABUNDANTLY PROVE THIS.

So fully is it taught that Christ was truly God while he was incarnate, that we have no evidence at all of his divinity which is not presented with equal force of him while on earth. All the attributes of divinity are ascribed to him, eternity of existence, self-existence, omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, presence in heaven and on earth, the contemplation of and unity with the Father, and co-working with him. These are declared of him and manifested by him while he stood in the form of man in the midst of his disciples and the multitude.

It was while in the same form that he performed acts which none other than God can of himself do, declaring that these acts were done by his own power. He turned water into wine, not by the ordinary and slow process of nature, but instantly and without a word. He created bread and fish in the hands of his disciples. He controlled the winds and the waves. He forgave sin. He gave life to the dead. He made known events in distant places. He searched the hearts and revealed the secret thoughts of men. He laid down his own life and took it up again.¹

The constant workings of his divine power and energy, by which he is essentially, as God, always working with the Father, were indeed concealed; but thus, at times, before the people at large, and more frequently before his disciples, the divinity shone through the veil which ordinarily concealed it, and testified that he was as truly God as he was also man. See the statements of Christ as to his co-working with the Father in John 5 : 17-31.²

¹ The question may be asked, whether he did these things by the power of his innate divinity, or by the Holy Spirit, who was given him without measure. See note following.

² The miracles were, indeed, a proof that Christ was all that he claimed to be. But there is ground for believing that they were the *Father's testimony* to the Son rather than the acts of Christ's own inherent divinity. Christ intimates quite clearly that he cast out devils by the *Spirit of God*, and it is at least questionable whether he did not, while on the earth, do all his mighty works by the Spirit that was given him without measure.

There is a feeling with some that it may in some way affect belief in Christ's real divinity to hold that he wrought his miracles by the power of the Holy Spirit, rather than by his own inherent divinity. This, however, is a mistake. In either case the miracles prove his divinity. If wrought by his own divine might they would show the *actual exercise* of his own divine powers. If wrought by the power of the Holy Spirit they would be the *signs of the Father's approval* of his clearly asserted claim that he was divine. The simple question is, what does the Bible teach on the subject? The teaching of the New Testament is certainly very striking concerning the dependence of Jesus on the Holy Spirit during his earthly life. It is clearer still, however, concerning his actual divinity. And one had far better be mistaken as to the power by which Jesus wrought his miracles, than concerning the *fact of Christ's divinity*. Belief in Christ's divinity is *fundamental*; belief as to the *special kind of power* by which Christ did his mighty works is not.

3. HE ALLOWED HIMSELF TO BE TREATED AS GOD. How could he be called God during his days in the flesh, or receive worship as such? How could it be the will of the Father that men should honor the Son even as they honor the Father? How could Elisabeth call Mary the mother of my Lord? or the angels announce to the shepherds that Christ the Lord was born? or Peter declare to the Jews that they had crucified the Lord of glory? or Paul describe the people of God to the Ephesian elders as the church of God (or, according to another reading, "the Lord") which he had bought with his own blood? How can men be warned lest they crucify the Son of God afresh and tread him under foot? How could Thomas cry out to him, "My Lord and my God"? and how Peter confess, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God"? It was because, though a servant, he was still the Lord, having the relations to his divine nature unimpaired, and entitled to the names and honors of the Godhead, as he was also able to perform the acts and display the attributes of God.

Such is the proof that Jesus, during his incarnation, preserved unaltered his essential relations to the divine nature, or essence. Before leaving this point it ought to be remarked that the importance of this fact of the Scripture teaching cannot be overestimated. In its appropriate relations to the other truths taught it becomes the foundation of every hope. It is not a mere speculation. It enters into the very life of the Christian, enabling him to say: "I know him whom I have believed, and I am persuaded that he is able to guard that which I have committed unto him against that day" (2 Tim. 1 : 12). It is not sufficient for us to know that the person who died for us was divine before he came into the world. The Scriptures assure us, and we need to comfort ourselves with the assurance, that he was equally divine when a babe in Bethlehem, when suffering upon the cross, when ascending from Olivet, and even now, while in human nature, he rules as mediatorial King, or makes intercession with the Father as our great High Priest. We must even go beyond the idea of *some kind of divinity* merely, and recognize him as the unchangeable God, who was, and is, and ever shall be, the Almighty, the well-beloved Son of the Father, whom that Father always hears, and to whom all things have been entrusted, in order that the consummation of his glorious kingdom may be fully attained. The incarnation has been, indeed, of only one person of the Godhead, but of a person truly and essentially divine, whose relations

to the divine nature have remained unaltered during his incarnation on earth and in heaven.

III. CHRIST BECAME INCARNATE IN SUCH A SENSE THAT HE BECAME MAN.

The Scriptures tell us that "he was made flesh and dwelt among us"; that he was "made like unto his brethren"; that he was the "son of man"; that he was "man." The apostle says (Rom. 5 : 15), "one man, Christ Jesus."

I. EXPLANATION.

(1) By this is not meant that this Divine person co-existed with a human person, so as to be, after all, two distinct existences or persons, the one receiving grace and favor from the other. In this sense God may be said to co-exist with all men, especially with the righteous. (2) Nor is the idea only of such indwelling that the glory of God is manifested as so especially present that the human person was the temple of the divine. In this sense God dwells even in material substances, as in the tabernacle and temple of God. In this sense the Holy Ghost dwells in the bodies of believers in a still more perfect union. And such indwelling will attain its highest form when God shall dwell in the temple to be composed of his redeemed saints. (3) It means that there is such a union of the divine and human as makes Christ actually and truly a man. While the relation to the divine nature remains unchanged, and Christ is still truly God, the relation to the human nature is so assumed that Christ also becomes truly man. He is born of a woman. He comes in the flesh. He assumes a human nature which becomes as truly and really, though not as eternally and essentially, his as his divine nature.

The Scriptures are clear upon this point. They reveal to us a proper humanity, consisting of a real body and a rational soul. Christ is represented as combining in his humanity all that is in ours, except that he, being without sin, exhibited that perfection of humanity which has appeared in no other of the race except in Adam before his fall.

2. PROOF.

(1) *He had a human body.* a. The Docetic heresy. In the early days heretical views existed as to the reality of the human body of Christ. Matter was deemed inherently evil, and it was supposed that Christ could have had no material body. His body was supposed, therefore, to have been merely a phantom,

an appearance of a man. Probably to such a heresy the Apostle John refers (1 John 4 : 3 ; 2 John 7). Those who in early times held this opinion were known as the Docetæ. *b.* Contrary to Scripture. The Scripture statements as to this fact of Christ's having had a real body are too plain to be called in question. Christ is spoken of as conceived in his mother's womb, as born, as drawing nourishment from her breast, as receiving circumcision, as growing in stature, as hungering, thirsting, wearied, as eating, drinking, sleeping. We are told of his bodily pain, of his bloody sweat, of his sinking under exhaustion, of his pierced body, of his bones that were not broken, of the wounds made in his hands by the nailing to the cross. The parts of his body are mentioned—his hands, his feet, his side, his head, his brow, his cheek, and his breast on which the beloved disciple leaned. Everywhere the Scriptures persistently labor to make it appear that Christ's body was real and to induce the multitude and his disciples to believe it to be such. Three special passages may be mentioned which alone are sufficient to settle this point beyond all dispute. They are: (*a*) Heb. 2 : 14 : "Since, then, the children are sharers in flesh and blood, he also himself in like manner partook of the same." While this refers, indeed, to human nature in general, it cannot be taken of that to the exclusion of the very characteristics by which that human nature is described. (*b*) Matt. 14 : 22-33 : In ver. 26 they are said to cry out, "It is an apparition," and in ver. 27 Christ replies, "It is I," meaning distinctly to deny that it was only an "apparition" that they saw. (*c*) Luke 24 : 13-49 : This is the account of that interview in which those who had walked with him to Emmaus report his presence with them to the eleven disciples. The language of ver. 36-39 is : "And as they spake these things he himself stood in the midst of them, and saith unto them, Peace be unto you. But they were terrified and affrighted, and supposed that they beheld a spirit. And he said unto them, Why are ye troubled? and wherefore do reasonings arise in your heart? See my hands and my feet, that it is I myself; handle me, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye behold me having." He then showed his hands and feet, and still further called for meat, and ate "a piece of a broiled fish." This action of Christ either meant nothing or meant that he had, even then, a real body, with all its functions in due exercise. The fact, therefore, that Christ in his incarnation possessed a real human body, subject to all the sinless in-

firmities of our bodies, is put beyond all question. This is so evident from the Scriptures that the Docetic heresy had little power and soon disappeared.

(2) *He had a human soul.* *a.* The Apollinarian heresy. Upon this point of Christ's human soul also a heresy very soon sprang up. It was thought by some that if Christ had a human soul in addition to his divine intelligence, he must have had a double personality, and not have been one person only. And hence, Apollinaris and his followers became the advocates of a theory that Christ had no human soul, but that his divine nature took its place. This theory was rejected with almost singular unanimity; but it has been revived from time to time, gaining now and then a brief and limited acceptance, only to be forgotten again when the true doctrine has been set forth. *b.* Contrary to Scripture. Against this Apollinarian heresy, and the assertion that there is no proof that Christ had a human soul, the following considerations are urged: (*a*) The objection is one that is based simply upon the ignorance of man as to what is possible with God. Apollinaris and his followers profess not to be able to see how the divine person, the Son of God, could take upon himself a human soul without becoming two persons. This is a very weak and irrational argument. Such a principle in religion would prevent the acceptance of some of the most patent truths in religion and in common life. For example, who can see how the doctrine of the Trinity is true? Who can see how body and soul unite in one personality? (*b*) The Apollinarian heresy presents greater difficulties than that which it tried to remove: It presents Christ as acting in many ways as if he had a human soul, and as making the impression all the time that he had a human soul, when in reality, as they say, he was an entirely different sort of being. And again, it involves the denial that Christ was a real man. For if Christ had not a human soul, how can he be said to have been a real man? The body alone cannot constitute one a man. And yet again, if Christ had not a human soul then he was not qualified for his work of redemption. "It behooved him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might become a merciful and faithful high priest." Why should he need a body for this work any more than a soul? It was not the bodies of men alone that needed to be saved. Thus the Apollinarian theory, instead of relieving us of difficulty, involves us in greater. We need not, however, settle the case by argument alone. (*c*) The Scriptures establish the fact that Christ had a human soul:

aa. Negative testimony. Of the theory of the substitution of the divine nature for the human soul not one hint is given throughout the entire Scripture. Not a syllable is there which teaches anything more than that a divine person became incarnate. Nothing is said of the absence of a human soul ; nothing of the incarnation being in only a partial human nature ; nothing to show that the divine nature had anything to do with the work, except that the divine nature was possessed by him who became incarnate, but possessed by him, not separately from, but unitedly with, the other persons of the Godhead. The Scriptures teach, not that the divine nature (God) became incarnate, but that he who as well as the Father and the Spirit is God, became man.

bb. Positive proof. (*aa*) Notice first the experiences already mentioned in connection with the body ; showing that it was not simply a temple in which Deity dwelt, but that Christ experienced in his body all those sinless passions and desires which arise from association of the body with a human soul, such as weariness, fatigue, thirst, etc. Does the body experience these when separated from the soul ? And did the body then affect the divine nature of Christ as it does a human soul ? Is the divine nature capable of such affection from a mere material organization, a mere shell of a man ? It may be said that the affections referred to are those of the body only, and that even among men they are not associated with the soul, and that the life indicated in them is only the physical life possessed by all animals, and that such life is not inconsistent with the absence of a rational soul. The position assumed is not correct ; but if granted, it gives no advantage to the theory we oppose. Is it not still the fact that the body exercises more or less influence on the mind, as well as the mind over the body ? Bodily disease enfeebles the mind. The mind, by its will, sustains, and by its mental trials, depresses the body. When, therefore, we see such results in Christ, we must attribute them to the same causes as among men. What then gave occasion and power to the tempter in the wilderness except the bodily desire arising from the previous forty days' fast ? To what was due Christ's inability to carry his cross to crucifixion if not to the failure of his bodily powers, resulting from the mental agony endured in the garden and the judgment hall ? In his temptation too, what was tempted by his bodily hunger ? Was it God ? Was it the divine nature that had taken the place of a human soul ? The Apostle James declares (1 : 13, 14) : "God cannot be tempted with evil." In the face of a declaration so positive and so un-

qualified—written too after the temptation of Christ, and with a full knowledge of all its facts—we must believe that the intellectual and spiritual nature of Christ then tempted was not divine, and therefore must be human.

(*bb*) But the Scriptures not only show Christ liable to these mutual influences of body and mind, and to the resultant temptation by Satan, they teach us that he also received the gracious influences of the Holy Ghost. That the body was thus affected is undoubted, for the body was conceived by the Holy Ghost. But the influence of the Spirit over the soul is also taught. At the baptism of Jesus we are told that “the Holy Ghost descended in a bodily form, as a dove, upon him” (Luke 3 : 22). After the baptism “Jesus, full of the Holy Spirit, returned from the Jordan, and was led by the Spirit in the wilderness” (Luke 4 : 1). After the temptation, “Jesus returned in the power of the Spirit into Galilee” (Luke 4 : 14). At Nazareth, in his first recorded public discourse, “he found the place where it was written, the Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he anointed me to preach good tidings to the poor” (Luke 4 : 17, 18). “And he began to say unto them, To-day hath this Scripture been fulfilled in your ears” (Luke 4 : 21). These were certainly influences upon his soul. How could they have been exerted, and why so exerted, if that soul was the divine nature? What need could divinity have for consecration, for grace? What need to be led, or, as Mark (1 : 12) expresses it, to be driven into the wilderness? How could a divine being lack in that which was essentially divine? That the wants of the body might be supplied is not strange. The body is human, but if he had no human soul, what was it that the Holy Ghost influenced?

(*cc*) The Scriptures, however, do not represent Christ as receiving aid from a divine person only. At the close of the temptation angels came and ministered to him. It may be said that this was only to the body; but it is doubtful if it were of the body only, for much of his temptation was mental. But certainly it was the agony of the spirit of Christ, and not of the body, which the angel in Gethsemane was sent to relieve.

(*dd*) We have also such action of Christ as is not consistent with the idea that he had no human soul. We find instances of such intellectual and spiritual restraint, limit, and subjection as cannot be true of God. The declaration that Christ marveled at the unbelief of certain persons is perfectly intelligible, when spoken of a human soul, but not, when ascribed to the

mind of Deity. So also Luke's statement that "Jesus advanced in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and men" (Luke 2 : 52). Also that other assertion of Christ, so plainly and distinctly made, of his ignorance of the time of the final judgment (Matt. 24 : 36), can be comprehended as possible only of his human soul, to which had not been imparted the knowledge which he must have possessed as God. What shall be said also of his subjection to his parents after the dispute with the doctors in the temple? Was it only bodily subjection? What does exclusively bodily subjection mean? Is it not the mind and the heart that yield obedience, and submit to authority? What then was it that was thus subject? Was it his divine nature? Was it God himself? Can God be thus subjected to a creature? Yet if Christ had no human soul there were then at Nazareth two human beings, to whom the infinite and omnipotent God, the Ruler of the universe, was subject in his real divine nature, giving them reverence and obedience and recognizing in the man official superiority and submitting to their will.

(ee) How account for Christ's prayers, if he had no human soul? Were they only prostrations of his body by the indwelling divine nature, or were they utterances of a soul oppressed with heavy burdens, delighting in converse with God, and knowing that there is a place for prayer, and seeking and rejoicing in the privilege of offering it? Is that soul God? or is it the man Christ Jesus, lifting up the voice of supplication to his divine Father? These prayers too are for himself; not for others only; most frequently for himself. See a signal instance in Gethsemane. He proposes to withdraw for prayer with three of his disciples, telling them that his soul is exceeding sorrowful unto death. Mark (14 : 33) tells us that this was because "he began to be greatly amazed and sore troubled." "He went forward a little and fell on the ground, and prayed that if it were possible the hour might pass away from him" (ver. 35). He returned "and again he went away, and prayed, saying the same words" (ver. 39). He did this three times. Is this not human action? What is there here befitting or possible to a merely divine intelligence or spirit? If his were a human soul, how otherwise would he have acted? But if divine, what reality could there be in these emotions, what need could he have? What comfort, what strength could he gain in such an act? Upon the supposition of a human soul the presence of that strengthening angel is accounted for, but how explain the

strength which any creature, however exalted, can give to the Almighty Creator?

(*ff*) The very language of Scripture as to the condition of his soul in that hour of trial is conclusive. To the expression just quoted may be added his prayer, that "if it were possible, the hour might pass away from him" (Mark 14 : 35); also his petition, "remove this cup from me" (Mark 14 : 36). "Now is my soul troubled," he exclaims, "and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour, but, for this cause, came I unto this hour. Father, glorify thy name" (John 12 : 27). "O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass away from me" (Matt. 26 : 39). What have we here but trouble and anguish and doubt and fear and trust and desire of release, and yet full resignation? Are these characteristics of a divine mind? or do we not see here the complete humanity of Christ revealed for our comfort and assurance? For what other purpose the record of these facts? Can God be honored by showing his divine nature thus racked and agonized in the performance of that great work which it is claimed must be done by God alone? Surely it is the humanity of the Saviour that is thus revealed, even before the final agony and triumph. The proof that this same person is God is not lacking. It is indeed the Son of God who thus, in human soul and body, is doing the work. But it is his human soul, not his divine nature, that thus pleads and shrinks and fears, and which still willingly submits, resolves to press on, is strengthened by God's messenger, and again confident in God goes forward with sublime self-devotion to the cross. The distance between this and God is infinite; this soul, the creature, the finite, the fearful, the mutable, the suffering, the trusting, the dying; and him the Creator, the Infinite, the support of those who trust, the Immutable, who cannot suffer, who cannot die. The acts due to the divine nature are marked and characteristic, and so also are those of the human nature. While we look at the former, we must say, this is God; none other than he can perform such acts, can possess such attributes, can be called such names. Equally, while we look at the latter, we must say, this is man. None but man can thus suffer, can thus be limited, can thus pray. The very nature of God forbids that he should change, that he should be limited,¹ that he

¹ Is it not going too far to say that "the very nature of God forbids that he should be limited, that he should be dependent, that he should be affected by anything outside of himself, that he should be ignorant of any future event"? It seems clear that the divine nature of Christ did impose self-limitations of some kind upon itself

should be dependent, that he should be affected by anything outside of himself, that he should be ignorant of any future event.

Christ therefore had a human soul as well as a human body. To deny this, and to assert that the divine nature became his soul, we must deny the unity of God, which establishes the undivided nature of his essence, and also the perfection of God, which makes him unchangeable and omniscient and independent and impassible; and we must assert when Scripture presents him amid intellectual and spiritual experiences which are foreign to God, but are of the nature of the human soul, that those were not the experiences of a human soul, but of divinity itself. If we thus deny that the names, attributes, acts, and experiences, natural to a human soul, are proof of complete humanity, we need not be surprised that others deny that he was God, however abundantly the Scriptures ascribe to him divine names, attributes, and acts.

IV. BUT ONE PERSON IN THE TWO NATURES.

We have not here a God and a man: but we have one who is God, and who is also man; and who being thus one person, unites in himself through these two natures the many exactly opposite characteristics needed for his work. Despite the contradictory character of his natures, the personality is but one. There was not one personality for the divine nature and another personality for the human nature, any more than there is one personality for a man's soul and another personality for his body. The whole nature made up the one person, Jesus Christ. And the personality of this divine human being was henceforth neither simply a divine personality nor a mere human personality, but a God-man personality.

I. THE PERSONALITY INHERES ESSENTIALLY IN THE DIVINE NATURE. The personality of Christ is necessarily, essentially, inseparably, and eternally united with that part of his nature which is divine. He was a person before his incarnation, having all the elements of essential personality. He can never be any less than a person as regards his divine nature. For, if so, that would prove that he was really not divine.

during the incarnation. Jesus says of himself: "Of that day and hour knoweth no man. . . Neither the Son, but the Father." We cannot say that this statement is not concerning the *divine* Son or the *divinity of the Son*. The statement is concerning the *God-man*, Jesus Christ. It was the *God-man* who did not know, not simply the *humanity* of the God-man. So also it was, we think, the *God-man* that suffered, not simply the *humanity* of the God-man.

2. CONNECTED VOLUNTARILY AND NOT ESSENTIALLY WITH CHRIST'S HUMAN NATURE. With Christ's human nature the personality was associated voluntarily and separably, though *permanently*; the human nature having been created for that purpose, and assumed by the divine *person* of his own will, in the fullness of time.

3. PERTAINS TO BOTH NATURES. While, however, the personality belongs essentially to Christ's divine nature, and is associated only voluntarily and separably with his human nature, yet when so united it pertains as truly to the human nature as to the divine. It indicates and records the human side as truly as it does the divine side. Our Lord invariably uses the word "I," whether as expressing his human or divine nature, or both; whether speaking of himself as Son of God, or as Son of Man, or as the Messiah; and whether referring to his human actions and emotions or to his divine works as Mediator.

It is in this intimate union that we are to find the full explanation of the many seeming contradictions involved in what is taught us of the person and work of Christ. So intimate is the union of the one person with two such distinct natures, that we cannot always separate what Christ says of himself as God, from what is said of himself as man. This, however, may puzzle us in interpreting the word of God, but not in harmonizing its statements. But without this doctrine the word of God cannot be made to agree with itself. When, however, we remember that though truly divine he is human, and that because of the one person all that he does in either nature may be as fully said to be done by him as though he had no other, we see the Scripture statements fall beautifully and regularly into their respective ranks, and in that two-fold unity each receives its full force. It is thus that he who is said to fill the universe was contained in the womb of Mary; that he whose are the cattle upon a thousand hills felt the pangs of famishing hunger; that he who made the world had not where to lay his head; that he who had given the fig tree its fruit, and knew what it was bearing, came to it, if haply he might find anything thereon; that he to whom, as God, are known all things from the foundation of the world yet offered up fervent prayers, with agony and strong supplication, not for others only, but chiefly for himself, and also declared that he knew not the judgment day; that he who, as God, had given salvation to men before his incarnation, because of the certainty of the work he would accomplish, yet, as man, approached with shrinking and

perhaps with fear of failure his work, praying the Father that the cup might pass from him. And, hanging upon the cross, how amazing the mystery of contradiction! As God, he enjoys supreme felicity in the unchanged blessedness of his divine nature; as man, he is in vital agony both of body and soul. As God, the eternal outflowings of the mutual love of the Father, and of the Spirit, and of himself, the Eternal Son, continue to bestow unabated mutual bliss. As man, he is the victim of the Father's wrath, which because of the sin upon him culminates in that Father's withdrawal amid the agonizing cry of the Son, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" With a loud cry the mortal man dies; but the eternal life of God remains unchanged.

V. SUMMARY.

The full statements of the Scriptures on this subject may be summed up as follows:

1. God is one in nature, essence, and being; therefore, there is but one God—one divine nature.

2. God is three in person—Father, Son, and Spirit. Hence, in the one undivided divine nature subsist three persons.

3. One of these persons (the Son), and one only (not the Father and Spirit also), became man. It was not the three persons that became man; therefore, not the divine nature which is common to the three, but one person only. God, therefore, was manifested in the flesh, not because the Godhead or the divine nature became flesh, but because the Son or the Word, who is God because he subsists in the divine nature, became flesh.

4. In becoming man he still remained God, because he still continued to subsist in the divine nature.

5. In becoming man he became as truly man as he is truly God, because he assumed a true human nature in both its forms—body and soul—and subsisted in it as really as he did in the divine nature.

6. As it was the same person who became man as well as God, there were not two persons,—one divine and one human,—but one, at the same time divine and human.

7. This one person, therefore, had by virtue of his divine nature, all divine experience; and by virtue of his human nature, all human experience; thinking, willing, and purposing as God, and exercising all the divine attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence, etc., and thinking, willing, and purposing

as man, with limited powers and limited knowledge, subject to temptation, suffering, doubts, and fears.

8. This one person was therefore able to suffer and bear the penalty of man's transgression, because being of man's nature he could become man's representative and could also endure such suffering as could be inflicted upon man; yet, being God, he could give a value to such suffering which would make it an equivalent, not to one man's penalty, but to that of the whole race.

9. All the difficulties in the way of believing these things to be true and possible are removed by the analogy which is seen in the union in man of two natures in one person. This shows in a most remarkable way an almost exact likeness in each man to that constitution and nature of the God-man which the Scriptures reveal in the doctrine of the person of Christ.

QUERY: CAN CHRIST BE CONSIDERED AS REALLY A MAN?

We have seen that Christ in becoming man assumed no additional personality to that which he had before the incarnation; but personality is certainly essential in order that one be really a man. The question then arises, Did Christ really become a man? Was he really made in all points like unto his brethren? To this it may be answered:

1. If the Scriptures represent this as all that was done, and yet teach that Christ became a man, that teaching is sufficient; we need no further testimony. God knows what is essential to the constitution of man. And the Scriptures do unquestionably so represent him. He is declared to have been made in all points like unto his brethren. (See Heb. 2 : 17.)

2. It is said that to be completely a man Christ must also be a human person. Granted; but is his person not a human person so far as respects humanity alone, just as it is a divine person so far as respects divinity alone? Does individuality acquire character separated from the nature to which it belongs? Would Christ be any longer divine if separated from his divine nature? If he were to cease from his incarnation, would he be any longer a man? What is personality but individual self-conscious existence and will power? And what gives it character, as human, angelic, or divine, except the nature in which it inheres? A person is simply an individual intellectual and spiritual existence in some nature. A divine person is one who is this in divine nature. An angel is one who is this in angelic nature. A man is such in human nature. Christ, therefore, was and is a man because of his individual intellectual and spiritual existence in human nature, and is God because of his individual intellectual and spiritual existence in divine nature. He is the God-man because as one being he is a person in both natures, having individual intellectual and spiritual existence in a human nature and also in the divine nature. He is, therefore, properly a human person and a divine person, but not two persons, for it is the subsistence of the one person in both of these natures that makes him one being only. He is as properly a human person, therefore, as he would be if not divine, just as he is as properly a divine person as he would be if not a man.

3. Within the same race too, what constitutes personality? Is it the continued retention unchanged of the same identical portion of the common nature, the same body and soul? Science teaches constant change in the body, leaving not a particle now of what existed years ago. While the soul cannot thus be measured, experience teaches us that great changes occur even there; in its capacities, emotions, habits, tendencies, and in numerous other respects. Yet, amid all, the personality remains unchanged. Newton was the same person in maturity as when a babe.

4. Even the moral nature undergoes change without the change of personality, as shown in the difference in Adam before and after the fall, and in Paul at Stephen's martyrdom and when he exclaimed in contemplation of martyrdom, "I am already being offered" (2 Tim. 4 : 6).

5. Nor is it destroyed by actual separation from a part of the nature which belongs to it. The thief in paradise was the same person to whom Christ spoke peace, though he had left his body hanging on the cross. The saints with Christ are the same persons who once dwelt on earth in bodies now mouldered into dust.

6. It is recognized as existing unimpaired even in a state of utterly unconscious connection, as in a senseless condition produced by outward pressure on the skull, or by the use of chloroform and other anæsthetics, if this be not also the condition of healthful slumber. If these are facts, why may not a person who possesses one nature assume another also, and yet be as truly a person in that nature as any others who possess it?

7. But some one may object that the difficulty arises, in the case of Christ, from the union in the one person of two natures essentially different, in one of which Christ had before existed and with which he is essentially united, while the other is only assumed in time, and that too, voluntarily. But this finds sufficient analogy in the two-fold nature united in ordinary human persons. Personality here exists inseparably from the soul, separably from the body. This is evident when at death the personality is with the soul in the presence of God, not at all with the body in the corruption of the grave. It is true that we cannot speak of these two elements of our nature as separated from each other as widely as humanity and divinity; yet how vast is the distance between matter and spirit! so vast, indeed, as to be only surpassed by that between the finite and the infinite. It is also true that we cannot speak of such essential union between the human soul and its personality as we can between Christ and his divine nature. Yet we have reason to believe the union so complete that from the beginning of the soul's existence throughout all eternity there shall be no separation. Upon no grounds, then, can it be asserted that the absence of a separate personality for Christ's human nature made Jesus, in any respect, not like unto his brethren. Scripture affirms, and reason supports the idea, that the same person, existing and operating, we know not how, but according to the nature of God, was truly God; and also existing in human nature and operating as we do through its conscious relations to the real body and human soul, of which that nature was composed, was truly man. In each nature he knew of his relation to the other; as God, knowing that he was man, and as man, knowing that he was God. Yet the divine nature did not partake of that human knowledge and experience which he had of affliction, suffering, and temptation, any more than the human nature experienced the conscious relation of Christ to the Father in the divine nature, or possessed the attributes of om-

niscience or omnipresence.¹ No limitations or changes which he experienced in his human nature could deprive him of complete divinity; nor could any influence nor any value arising from the essential union of his person with his divine nature take away from the absolute and real humanity assumed by Christ and consciously realized by him when he became man. However united, he was capable of separate experience, action, thought, and knowledge, and indeed of separate conscious existence in the two natures. Thus is it at least with us.² We have separate experience of the sufferings and joys of our souls and our bodies, and this fact removes any difficulty in believing that it was so with Christ as to his divine and human natures when we find the Bible thus teaching.

CHAPTER XI. OFFICES OF CHRIST.

Three offices are ascribed by the Scriptures to Christ—those of Prophet, Priest, and King.³

I. CHRIST AS PROPHET.

I. PROPHET, IN THE SENSE OF TEACHER. The word prophet is to be taken here in its wider sense of inspired teacher. It is frequently confined, in common language, to one who foretells future events. But it literally means one who speaks for his God

¹ Here the author is moved by his deep conviction that "divinity cannot suffer," to deny to Christ's divine nature any sort of participation in the experiences that came to him through the channel of his human nature. The Scriptures, however, cannot be said to make such a separation between Christ's "human experiences" and his "divine experiences." They attribute all his experiences to the *one personality—the God-man*. It must be true, indeed, that Christ had experiences that were made possible only by reason of his having human nature—experiences that could reach his divine nature only through the human nature. But he was only *one person*, and it must have been the *one person*, the *God-man*, who was conscious of any experience that he had.

² Do we really have "separate experience of the sufferings and joys of our souls and bodies"? We have experiences that are possible by reason of having *souls*, and experiences that are possible by reason of having *bodies*. But any experience that we have is surely an experience of the one person. When the body is affected the mind is affected, and *vice versa*. It is the composite being, *man*, that has the experience, not the *body* of the man only, nor the *soul* of the man only.

³ It seems strange that practically all theologians should have held on to the idea that the Scriptures ascribe only three offices to Christ. He was, indeed, prophet, priest, and king. But he was more. The most conspicuous of his offices on earth was to fill the place of "the lamb of God," to bear the sin of the world. This office is usually treated as a feature of his office as priest. But surely no one ever thought of considering the office of victim in the old sacrifices as a feature in the functions of the priest. Christ's office as victim is an office as distinct from his priestly work as is the priestly work from the prophetic work. Another office which he filled was that of being himself a manifestation of God to men—not by prophetic utterance simply, but in his own person. He came also as the power of heaven to draw all men unto himself. Each of these offices—all of Christ's offices—should be magnified in our teaching and preaching. There seems to be room in theology for a better classification of the offices of Christ.

and denotes a divine teacher merely. Thus Moses is spoken of as a prophet, and Christ was foretold as a prophet who should be like unto Moses. It is in connection with this that the term Logos, or Word, applied to Christ in the first chapter of John is appropriate. With the office of teacher Christ united, as was common with the prophets, the prediction of future events and the working of miracles. But the office of teacher was his special work as prophet. This work is discharged in the following ways:

2. HOW DISCHARGED. (1) In the personal revelations which he made, before the days of his incarnation, to our first parents, to the patriarchs and to others of their day, to Moses and the people of God in the wilderness, and to various others, as to Manoah, the children in the furnace, etc. These were made in appearances of human form, in the burning bush, in the pillar of cloud and fire, in the Shechinah, etc., etc. (2) In the inspired revelations which he made through holy men of old, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. The Old Testament Scriptures are composed of a portion of these. (3) While on earth in his incarnation: *a*. Personally, as (*a*) he set forth by his own acts the divine attributes, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, eternity of existence, etc., and (*b*) as he exhibited God's love for man, his hatred of sin, and his love of holiness and righteousness in the work of man's salvation. *b*. By his instructions, as he taught (*a*) in words to his disciples and others what he exhibited in his person as to the matters above stated, and (*b*) the truths relative to the kingdom he was to establish, its nature, its subjects, the relations they should bear to each other, to him and the Father, and their future destiny and glory, as well as the condition and fate of those who should reject him. (4) By the instructions he gave through his apostles and other inspired men after his ascension. (5) By the revelation of himself in the lives and character of his true disciples in all ages. (6) By the instructions given through his preached word in all ages. (7) By the revelations of glory he shall make to the church of first-born ones in the world to come. (8) By the revelation which through these he shall make of the glory of God to the universe of created intelligences.

II. CHRIST AS PRIEST.

The office of "priest" is one of divine appointment. That of Christ corresponds to that of the high priest under the Mosaic

economy, and is foreshadowed by it. The Epistle to the Hebrews sets this forth very plainly and explicitly. The priesthood of Christ, however, varies from that of the high priest in several particulars. Christ's priesthood is perpetual, is in one person, without predecessor or successor, making one offering, once for all; an offering actually, not symbolically, effective, deriving value not from appointment alone, but from its nature also. In this case also the victim is the same person as the high priest. Consequently, Christ's office as priest is to be contemplated in the two-fold aspect of priest and victim.¹

I. CHRIST AS PRIEST. (1) *As priest he offers up the sacrifice*, laying it upon the altar of oblation, and through it appeasing the wrath of God, making reconciliation between God and man, and securing in its proper presentation the removal of guilt and punishment from man. This work he performed on earth. (2) *As priest he also intercedes with God for pardon or justification or other blessings for all for whom he died, in all the respects in which he can make his death available for each.* This office he performed on earth and continues in heaven. It did not cease with his life on earth, but he is represented as continuing as an ever-living High Priest to make intercession for us (Heb. 7 : 23-25); sitting down at the right hand of God (Acts 2 : 33-36; Heb. 8 : 1; 9 : 12-24). (See the law as to the Jewish high priest entering in once every year in Heb. 9 : 27; also the law laid down in Exod. 30 : 10; Lev. 16 : 2, 11, 12, 15, 34; see also Heb. 7 : 27; 10 : 10. 1 Peter 3 : 18 confines it to their sufferings and does not include the offering.) It is not for the purpose of offering the sacrifice that he is there (Heb. 9 : 24, 25); but to make intercession for those for whom the sacrifice has already been offered (Heb. 10 : 11, 12, 14-18). As to this intercession, it should be remarked: *a.* It is an intercession *made for his people* (Luke 22 : 32; John 14 : 16; 17 : 9, 15, 20, 24; Eph. 2 : 18; Heb. 4 : 14-16). The passages in Isa. 53 : 12 and Luke 23 : 34 have been adduced as indicating intercession which avails in some respect for all men. But such benefits are not the result of intercessory prayer, nor of Christ's atoning work conferring general benefits; they come from the necessary co-exist-

¹ Should we not rather dwell upon his office as priest and try to understand that, and then dwell upon his office as victim and try to understand that? The author comes nearer to treating the subject in this way than most theologians. He gives a separate chapter to the atonement, in which he lays admirable stress upon Christ's office as victim.

ence of the persons thus benefited with those to whom the resulting benefits of the atoning work belong.¹ *b.* We are not to suppose that he engaged in actual spoken prayer before God. Nor are we to understand by this a mere influence of his sacrifice continued without further activity on his part, but some real activity corresponding fully to the essence of prayer and petition, to which is due all the blessings to which his people attain.

2. CHRIST AS VICTIM. (1) *His qualifications.* *a.* Sinlessness. For this position he needed to be pure, holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners, and one in whom there was no sin. He must be a spotless Lamb. *b.* Humanity. He must needs be human, in order that he might be of common nature with those for whom he died, and that he might be capable of suffering, and of such suffering as man may endure. *c.* Divinity. He must also be divine, in order that his successful prosecution might be assured, and that his offering might have merit sufficient to ransom those for whom he died. *d.* Federal relationship. He must be the federal head of the race, in order that he might be a proper substitute for sinners, not only securing righteousness by obedience, but bearing and removing their guilt by making satisfaction for it. (2) *The offering.* Thus qualified he was offered up as a victim; his body to the suffering which culminated in his death on the cross; and his soul to the anguish due to the realized presence of imputed sin, to the wrath endured from God, and to the separation from God's favor while bearing that wrath.

III. CHRIST AS KING.

Christ announced to his disciples just before his ascension, "All authority hath been given unto me in heaven and on earth" (Matt. 28 : 18). Peter at Pentecost declared "that God hath made him both Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom ye crucified" (Acts 2 : 36).

Constant references had been previously made to his kingdom. It was not simply spoken of as the kingdom of God, and kingdom of heaven, but as closely connected with Christ (Luke 22 : 29, 30 ; 23 : 42 : John 18 : 37).

I. MEDIATORIAL KING. Christ, as the God-man, is Mediatorial King. As Son of God he had the right of rule over the uni-

¹ The author's view is colored here, no doubt, by his strong convictions as to a "limited atonement." He does not recognize what many of us believe to be a fact, namely, that Christ was in some sense also purposely a propitiation for the sins of the whole world.

verse. Of this he emptied himself and became man, that he might become Mediator and do the work of salvation. Having become man he died on the cross. On this account he has been exalted, so "that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, . . . and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father" (Phil. 2 : 6-11. *Cf.* Acts 2 : 22-36, especially ver. 36). "God hath made him both Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom ye crucified." (Also 1 Cor. 15 : 24-26.) This mediatorial reign is not confined to human subjects, but extends also to angelic. The angels of heaven are his attendants and messengers.

2. SPIRITUAL KING. Christ reigns over his spiritual kingdom, securing the final result of the establishment of that kingdom in the persons of all his people when he shall "present the church to himself, a glorious church" (Eph. 5 : 27).

3. KING OVER VISIBLE CHURCHES. He reigns over his visible churches on earth through the laws he has given, through the Spirit by which he dwells in them, and by his providences, overruling, controlling, and accomplishing all his purposes.

4. KING OVER CREATION. He rules over this world as King of kings and Lord of lords, causing all things to work together for his ends. He rules over the universe. He even rules over Satan and his evil angels. Their exercise of power for evil is permitted only for a time. Even during that time it is controlled by Christ, so that it is limited by his will, and is therefore truly subjected to him.

CHAPTER XII. ATONEMENT OF CHRIST, OR CHRIST AS VICTIM.

SECTION I. NATURE OF THE ATONEMENT.

We saw in the last chapter that one of the offices of Christ is that of priest. As priest he offers up the sacrifice, laying it upon the altar. We saw also that the sacrifice which he thus offered was himself. By this offering of himself he made at-one-ment, or reconciliation between God and the sinner. The question forces itself upon all thinking minds as to this work of reconciliation: How was reconciliation effected by what Jesus did? Upon this question various views have been held. These different views are generally referred to as the various theories of the atonement. Some have held that the atonement was only what the etymology of the word implies, an at-one-ment,

and that Christ acted only as a mediator, or reconciler. These deny that there was any need for expiation. They say, "All that man needed was a reconciler." Others hold that "without the shedding of blood there could be no remission of sins"; and that Christ had first to make expiation for sin before he could become a reconciler between God and man. They claim that the idea of at-one-ment in the sense of reconciliation does not by any means express the work that Christ had to do. They hold that the at-one-ment, or reconciliation, could not take place until Christ as priest made *expiation* for sin. He must make *atonement* before he could make at-one-ment. However much these various theories may differ from each other, they may all be grouped under these two general divisions, namely, the *expiatory* and the *non-expiatory* idea of reconciliation. The theories may all be classified according to the *scarlet*, or blood line. They are as follows :

I. NON-EXPIATORY THEORIES.

(1) SOCINIAN THEORY.

I. THEORY STATED. The Socinian theory is the lowest of all the so-called theories of atonement. It is really not a theory of actual atonement. It is merely a theory of at-one-ment. It proceeds on the principle that God is pure benevolence, that vindictive justice is incompatible with his character, and that upon mere repentance, God can and will forgive the sinner. The work of Christ, therefore, is regarded as one in which he simply reveals or makes known pardon to man. Nothing that he has done secures it, because he had nothing to do to this end. It was already prepared in the benevolence of God's nature, and is simply now made known.¹

The advocates of this theory explain away all that the Scriptures say on the subject of Christ's death for us by maintaining that his life and death were mere examples to us of the manner in which we should live and submit to God. In their view, therefore, Christ is merely a great teacher and a bright example. Some of these have even gone so far as to speak of the sacrifices of the ancient dispensation as things suitable only to a barbarous age, and so far from regarding them as types of Christ's sacrificial work, have looked on them as permitted only for the weakness of the people, whom God ordered to offer them.²

¹ Symington on the "Atonement," pp. 2, 3.

² Nehemiah Adams, "Evenings with the Doctrines," p. 197.

2. OBJECTIONS. (1) It ill accords with the Scripture description of the nature of sin. (2) It is inconsistent with other attributes of God than mercy. (3) It is at variance with the letter and spirit of divine revelation. (4) It is irreconcilable with the exalted nature of the mediatorial reward conferred on Christ.¹

(II) MIDDLE THEORY

A second theory of the Atonement is that which has commonly been called the Middle theory. By this is not meant that there are only these two and one orthodox theory, but simply that this stands between the theory of the Socinians and those theories held by persons who, however differing from each other, are regarded as evangelical.

I. THEORY STATED. "This theory maintains that in consequence of what Christ did a certain power to pardon sin was conferred upon him."² It supposes that "God may pardon sin without punishment or satisfaction. But that a difference should be made between innocent persons who have never sinned and those thus pardoned; that the latter may not boastingly suppose themselves on an equality with the former." This difference made by this arrangement is that "instead of a full pardon, sinners shall be pardoned on repentance, for the sake of something Christ was to do, because of which he is entitled to intercede for them."

2. OBJECTIONS. (1) "This scheme is only apparently superior to the former in claiming that this is done because of what Christ has done." (2) "It gives a defective view of the divine character." (3) "It does not explain the Scripture language as to Christ's work." (4) "It fails to account for the peculiarity and severity of his sufferings."³

(III) MORAL INFLUENCE THEORY.

A third so-called theory of the atonement is that of Moral Influence. Its most noted advocates in this day have been Horace Bushnell and McLeod Campbell. It is difficult to say whether it, or the one last mentioned, approaches more nearly to that of the Socinians or is more remote from evangelical ideas.

I. THEORY STATED. Like the so-called Middle theory, it deems repentance alone to be essential for a sinner's acceptance with God. It maintains that there has never been any obstacle in the nature of God to the granting of full pardon upon mere repentance for sin. The necessity for Christ's life of suffering and

¹ Symington, p. 3.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 4.

death of agony is to be found only in the need of motives arising from the love thus exhibited to man to induce him to repent. It is for the sinner's sake that Christ has lived such a life of misery and woe as is incident to man. So far as this theory has been held by Socinians they have recognized the work of Christ simply as that of the exalted man, Christ Jesus. But as presented by Bushnell and Campbell, God in Christ has thus identified himself with man in his misery and sin. Campbell goes so far as to represent Christ as so fully thus made one with man as to have been the representative penitent and confessor of sin. It is the great love thus shown which exerts the strong moral influence which causes man to repent and to be reconciled unto God.

2. OBJECTIONS. All the objections to the Middle theory may with equal force be urged against this. To these may be added: (1) That while that theory recognizes the power to forgive sin to have been bestowed upon Christ as the result of something he has done, this confines the effect of his work to the production of penitence in the sinner through the influence which the love he has thus displayed exerts in taking away the indifference and enmity of the human heart. (2) That while this theory recognizes the great truth that the love of Christ exhibited in his sufferings and death has a strong influence in leading men to reconciliation with God, it diminishes the extent to which this love has been manifested, by denying that element in those sufferings which arose from their relation to the penalty endured for sin in the satisfaction of the justice of God. (3) That, as indeed is true of all schemes which depend entirely upon subjective influences in the sinner, it fails to present any method of salvation available for those who have had no knowledge of these sufferings. Thus are cut off from all the blessings of salvation, not only all infants and idiots, but also the many saints of God who died before the birth of Jesus.

(IV) SO-CALLED ETHICAL THEORY.

A fourth theory of the atonement is what is called the Ethical theory, suggested by the Andover divines.¹ It agrees substan-

¹ President A. H. Strong presents and advocates a very different theory from this, which he also designates as the "Ethical Theory." In both cases the designation seems unfortunate. Its meaning is uncertain, and in neither case is it at all characteristic of the theory. The theory mentioned above is far better known as the "New Theology" theory. It is as the author says, only another form of the "Moral Influence" theory.

tially with the theory just considered, but because of the somewhat recent prominence of the "New Theology," of which Andover may be regarded as the most prominent exponent, it deserves special consideration in the form set forth by that school. It has been most distinctly presented in a series of articles on "Progressive Orthodoxy," published editorially in the fourth volume (1885) of the "Andover Review." The third of this series is on the atonement.

I. THEORY STATED. The specific points of this theory are: (1) That Christ is universal mediator, and as such must appear for the relief of any portion of the universe which needs his help. His incarnation would probably have occurred if there had been no sin; the existence of sin changes the conditions of that incarnation, but not the power and reality of Christ. (2) The effect of Christ's work has been to change the relations of God to man which secures a change in the relation of man to God. This is the reconciliation effected. In the work of atonement there is no imputation or transfer of the sin of man to Christ nor of Christ's righteousness to man. (3) There is a sense in which Christ may be called man's substitute, or rather man's representative. He was so related to man, and so in sympathy with man, that he suffered and repented for him. He felt keenly his sin, and grieved and suffered for it. And this suffering and grief which Christ endured may be thought of as an offering by humanity to God of something which was of eminent value. And when Christ suffered thus it was, in a sense, the race suffering. The race may be thought of as approaching God and signifying its penitence by pointing to Christ, and by giving expression in him to repentance which no words could utter. This so-called substitutionary suffering and penitence is not, however, available apart from the power of man to repent, and the attainment in the individual of repentance. It avails only because man, although a sinner, is still under appropriate influences, capable of repenting, and the suffering of Christ for man and his sympathy with him are able to awaken man to a real repentance which is revolutionary and thorough. (4) The ground on which the sufferings and death of Christ can be substituted in this way for the punishment of man is not because the guilt of man was borne by him and was atoned for in the way maintained by the older Calvinistic divines, but because: *a.* By them, as truly and fully as by such punishment, was expressed both the abhorrence of God for sin, and the righteousness of the law. *b.* Because in this way is re-

vealed the love of God, who so seeks the sinner as to manifest that even his wrath is but his love which cannot allow the sinner to be blessed in his sin. *c.* Because in this way is an end put to separation from God, which is the first and greatest punishment of sin; and in view of Christ's death it would be puerile to exact literal punishment of those who are thereby made sorry for sin and brought in penitence to God. *d.* Because by his knowledge of them man is brought to repentance. (5) Justice to God's own love requires that this revelation of himself be made known to every sinner. (6) The application of the gospel is made by the Holy Spirit who regenerates no one except through that one's personal knowledge and experience of it.

2. OBJECTIONS. Various objections may be made to the theory thus presented, which are common to it and the theory of Moral Influence. The following, however, are some of those which are suggested by its distinctive features :

(1) Against the idea of universal mediation by Christ : *a.* Its plausibility arises from an indefinite and mixed idea of mediation. A mediator is not an agent by whom an act is done by one person for another. Neither is the mediator a medium of communication by which one person conveys information to another. Yet the writer from whom the foregoing outlines have been prepared so claims when he says : "Therefore he mediates or reveals God to any part of his universe."¹ A mediator is one who intervenes between two persons to bring them into agreement or accord with each other. It is in this sense only that it is applicable to the position occupied by Christ between God and sinful man. *b.* Christ is not even a universal medium. (*a*) He is not so in creation, as is claimed by those who hold this theory. For creation is not his work alone, but is the work of God, in which each of the persons of the trinity co-operated.² (*b*) He is not a universal medium in revealing the nature and glory of God to the whole universe, for the Scriptures nowhere teach that he has thus revealed God, except in connection with the work of incarnation and redemption. *c.* Neither is any foundation given in Scripture or reason for the belief that any intermediary is necessary between God and his innocent creatures. The Scriptures in general represent God's pure and holy angels as in his presence, as receiving communications from him, and as messengers sent forth by him to minister to the heirs of salvation. The only interme-

¹ "Andover Review," Vol. IV., p. 57.

² See on p. 125.

diary between God and an innocent being which the Scriptures mention was between God and Christ himself, when, after his temptation "angels came and ministered unto him" (Matt. 4 : 11), and when after his prayer in Gethsemane for the removal of the cup, "there appeared unto him an angel from heaven, strengthening him" (Luke 22 : 43). *d.* But all foundation for a theory of universal mediation is destroyed by the fact that no such mediation has occurred in connection with sinful beings other than man. Especially has it not been true that, "if at any point his world is sick, weary, guilty, hopeless, there Christ is touched and hurt, and there he appears to restore and comfort." It seems, therefore, that so far as the idea of universal mediatorship by Christ is essential to it, this theory cannot be accepted. Yet the writer referred to puts it forth as the true starting-point of the inquiry for "a doctrinal statement which shall be comprehensive, satisfactory, and at the same time free from ethical objections and inconsistencies."¹

(2) This theory cannot be an adequate expression of the Scripture teachings about Christ's sufferings and death, because it sets forth nothing in them because of which God can justly pardon and accept the sinner. The sinner is recognized as deserving punishment. But that punishment is not borne by Christ. All that Christ does, according to this theory, is to suffer, but the sufferings and death are not recognized as punishment endured in the place of the sinner. It is affirmed that this is so, but no reason is given for such necessity. Christ in his union with the race is said to be the great confessor and penitent. But why also the great sufferer and martyr? Why could he not have appeared among men without suffering at their hands, or being put to death by them? Is it not plain that no explanation of his sufferings and death can be given which does not recognize these as inflicted by God, and however wickedly by man, only by man as the instrument of the suffering, the cause of which is the sin which he bore for man and the ultimate source of which is God, not in his mere providential action, but as the avenger of sin and of the violations of his righteous law.

(3) Neither can this theory find anything in its explanation of the sufferings and death of Christ which enables him to make such a revelation of God as could not have been made without them. What revelation of any attribute of God is expressed in

¹ "Andover Review," Vol. IV., p. 56.

the sufferings of Christ, according to this theory, which cannot be uttered in words and taught without those attendant sufferings and death?

(4) The plan of salvation is represented in Scripture as one of grace without the works of law; but this theory makes it one partly by Christ's work and partly by that of the sinner.

(5) The act of the sinner by which his justification is attained is stated in Scripture to be faith. But this theory makes repentance the sole requisite in the sinner. This theory would make necessary such a revision of the word of God as would substitute repentance for faith in hundreds of places. It is a singular fact that in an article on this subject of about five hundred and fifty lines of a broad octavo page the word "faith" occurs but once, and that in this sentence: "He who is not moved to penitence and faith by Christ is under a greater condemnation."¹ How different from the doctrinal expositions of the work of Christ contained in the word of God.

(6) Another objection to this theory is its teaching about regeneration. If this never occurs, "except through the knowledge, motive, and power of the gospel," in what way can infants be saved? And how have the saints of old attained salvation? Yet, evidently, such must be the meaning of this theory.

(7) Still another objectionable feature appears in the necessity asserted for the preaching of the gospel to each individual man before justice pronounces its final word. *a.* This idea is based upon a strained interpretation of Mark 13 : 10: "The gospel must first be preached unto all the nations." *b.* It is inconsistent with the statements as to the difference of knowledge possessed by men before the judgment day and the different action toward them by the Judge on that account. *c.* The idea is baseless that God is under any obligation to man or to himself to secure this universal announcement. It is utterly without any warrant in Scripture.

(V) GOVERNMENTAL THEORY.

A fifth theory is commonly called the Governmental theory of the atonement. This is another of the non-expiatory theories. It may also be considered as really another sort of Moral Influence theory.

I. THEORY STATED. Those who hold this theory maintain that God cannot consistently forgive sin upon mere repentance and

¹ "Andover Review," Vol. IV., p. 65.

faith. Sin, they say, must be punished. But the necessity for its punishment does not arise from the nature of God and his abhorrence of sin. There is no principle in him which requires all sin to be punished for itself alone. It must be punished only because of the necessity which exists for maintaining God's moral government in the universe. "They therefore regard the sufferings of Christ as intended to make a moral impression upon the universe by this display of God's determination to punish sin, and thus make the forgiveness of sin consistent with the good government of the universe."¹

2. OBJECTIONS. Against this theory are the following objections: (1) The nature which it ascribes to sin. It does not regard it essential that all sin should be punished; therefore, sin does not in itself intrinsically deserve punishment. (2) It places the punishment of sin on a wrong basis, namely, the good of the universe as involved in the moral government of God, and not because it deserves punishment as sin. (3) God is here beheld, not as a righteous judge taking vengeance on the violators of his law, nor as a rightful king punishing those who have rejected his authority, but simply as a benevolent being entirely regardless of his own nature, or of the difference between right and wrong, punishing some men for the good of others. (4) According to this theory the necessity for punishing sin rests, not in its own nature, but because there are other created beings in the universe than those who have sinned. Had God created one man, or one angel only, and had that angel sinned, there could have been no reason, either in the broken law or in the dishonor to God, for his punishment, unless other beings were also to be created. (5) This theory claims no support from Scripture; but is presented simply as a philosophical explanation to avoid the difficulties supposed to exist in the ordinarily received doctrine of the necessity of punishment by God. (6) It is opposed by Scripture in every particular involved in it: the nature of sin; the desert of punishment; the vengeance of God against the violator of his law; the fact that God acts of his own will and does not draw the reasons of his action from without; the teaching of Scripture about the priestly office of Christ; the work he has done; the position he bore to us as being made sin for us; the ground of our redemption; the causes of condemnation, and a hundred other particulars, which show that the Scriptures are not

¹ Hodge's "Outlines," p. 301, first ed.

merely not silent on this subject, but that the contrary doctrine lies at the very basis of all its instructions.

II. EXPIATORY THEORIES.

(1) ARMINIAN THEORY.

A sixth theory is that of the Arminians. As now presented this theory is held more extensively by the Methodists than by any other class in our country.

1. THEORY STATED. It is held that Christ died, and that for sin. But he did this only in the sense that makes it consistent for God to offer salvation to men on the ground of evangelical obedience, and not of perfect legal obedience. This theory teaches a general atonement without any application of it on the part of God. Connected with the doctrine of sufficient grace to each man, it supposes that the individual does or does not exercise faith and obedience, and thus secures eternal life or loses it.¹

2. OBJECTIONS. The objections to this theory are: (1) "It gives an indefinite conception of what Christ did. Either it involves no satisfaction to divine justice and to the law, or it implies universal satisfaction. In the first case it dishonors God, in the second it forces us to hold the doctrine of universal salvation." What is meant by the expression, "he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness," if God is not justly under obligations for what Christ did to give salvation to all for whom he died? (2) If it is said that the object was simply to make salvation possible for all, the reply is, that this is not what the Scriptures represent. They speak positively

¹ Cunningham, in his "Historical Theology," Vol. II., pp. 301-323, gives a much fuller statement of the "Arminian View of the Atonement." The chief points as he presents them are as follows:

1. They believe in universal or unlimited atonement—that is, that Christ died and offered up an expiatory sacrifice for the sins of all men, without distinction or exception as to individuals.

2. The penalty which Christ bore was, however, not a full equivalent for men's sins. It was only a substitute for the penalty due to man, which substituted penalty God graciously allowed.

3. The appointment and acceptance of Christ's satisfaction involved a relaxation or virtual abrogation of the divine law.

4. God is now enabled, consistently with his justice and veracity, to enter into a new covenant with men, in which more favorable terms are proposed to them than before, pardon and reconciliation being granted now upon condition of faith and repentance, which conditions all are able to fulfill.

5. There is no election on God's part of individuals in the atonement, neither are repentance and faith any part of the purchase of Christ. It is all left now to the individual.

of salvation as procured, not the means of salvation; and of certain salvation, not possible salvation.¹ "The effects of Christ's death are spoken of in Scripture as reconciliation and justification (Rom. 5 : 10; Eph. 2 : 16); remission of sins (Eph. 1 : 7); peace (Eph. 2 : 14); deliverance from wrath (1 Thess. 1 : 10); from death (Heb. 2 : 14); from the curse of the law (Gal. 3 : 13); from sin (1 Peter 1 : 18)." ² We are spoken of as justified when ungodly. (3) This view of the atonement is utterly incompatible with the Scripture doctrines of innate corruption, regeneration, election, justification, adoption, and sanctification. Every proof of the true doctrine on these points is an argument against it. (4) This theory makes it possible that Christ should have died in vain. (5) This theory makes salvation partly of God and partly of man, in the most objectionable form. It represents God as permitting Christ to die that the demands of the law may be lowered.

(II) LUTHERAN THEORY.

1. THEORY STATED. A seventh theory is the Lutheran, which teaches that Christ's death was intended to make such a satisfaction to the justice of God that he could offer salvation to all that believe in him.

2. OBJECTION. The objection to this theory is that by rejecting the doctrine of election it omits a part of the truth. The statement is not opposed, as far as it goes, to the views usually held by the orthodox. Salvation, according to this theory, is offered to all, and offered because satisfaction for sin has been made to the justice of God. But for whom is this salvation? They say, as we do, for those that shall believe. And hence the question between us is, Who will believe, and how will this faith be effected? The doctrine of election teaches that they shall believe whom God hath chosen, for whom he sent Christ, for whom Christ died, and shall believe as the result of the gracious influences of the Spirit purchased by Christ's work.

(III) SO-CALLED ANDREW FULLER THEORY.

The most distinguished advocate of this theory is Andrew Fuller, a man of the clearest perceptions and of remarkable power of precise statement. His views on the subject appear

¹ Do not the Scriptures speak both of "means of salvation" and of "possible salvation"?

² Hodge's "Outlines," p. 314, first ed.

in the "Conversation on Particular Redemption," Andrew Fuller's "Works," Vol. II., pp. 692-698. He has here sought to establish a theory not substantially different from that of the older Calvinists, but after all one which is better merely at first sight.

I. THEORY STATED. (1) According to this theory the work of atonement was not wrought out by Christ for the elect as such, nor for the church, either as foreseen or designed to be composed of those to be saved; but for sinners as sinners. The work of atonement had nothing to do with the persons to whom it was to be applied, considered as an atonement, but only had respect to men as guilty sinners in God's sight. The work to be accomplished was precisely what would have been had there been no election, no church to be established, no work of grace to be wrought on the heart, but each person left to act in its reception or rejection as he should choose. But (2) there was a limitation, according to election, put upon the application of this atonement. And by reason of this purpose of God not to apply this work of Christ in all cases with the same divine power and influences, all persons are not affected alike by it. But so far as the actual work of atonement itself is concerned it was for all men alike. It was an expiation offered for the sin of the world. It was such a satisfaction of divine justice as made it possible for God to offer salvation to all men. And as stated above, the actual expiation was made as much for one as for another. The following extracts from Andrew Fuller's discussion will show his position. The disputants are Peter and James; the latter presents the views of Fuller. Peter gives the theory as he understands it thus:

"The particularity of the atonement consists in the sovereign pleasure of God with regard to its application."

James replies: "I should rather say the particularity of redemption consists in the sovereign pleasure of God with regard to the application of the atonement, that is, with regard to the persons to whom it shall be applied."

Again says James: "You say the position in question places the particularity of redemption in its application. Whence, if you will recollect yourself, you will find that it places it in the sovereign pleasure of God with regard to its application."

Again Peter: "But have you ever made use of the term application so as not to include the divine intention?"

James: "I am not aware of having done so."

Again: He sums up by saying that his "object in the distinction has been merely to distinguish what the death of Christ is sufficient for, from what it was the design of the Father and Son to effect through it."

Again: "I do not consider particular redemption as being so much a doctrine of itself as a branch of the great doctrine of election."

"Atonement and redemption are both effects of Christ's death, but in such order as that one is the consequence of the other."

Again: In the previous conversation on substitution he says, p. 690: "Concerning the death of Christ, if I speak of it irrespective of the purpose of the Father and the Son, as to the objects who should be saved by it, referring merely to what it is in itself sufficient for, and declared in the gospel to be adapted to, I should think I answered the question in the scriptural way by saying it was for sinners as sinners. But if I have respect to the purpose of the Father in giving his Son to die and to the design of Christ in laying down his life, I should answer, it was for the elect only."

An analysis of this theory will show the following points:

(1) *It agrees with the ordinary Calvinistic theory in that it, a.* Regards satisfaction for sin as necessary; *b.* recognizes that this has been made by Christ; *c.* claims that the value of Christ's death is sufficient for the world; *d.* declares that its benefits accrue to some only; *e.* maintains that this limitation is because of God's purpose, and not because of action on the part of man.

(2) *It differs from the ordinary Calvinistic theory in that it* makes redemption and atonement two different works, instead of the same work viewed in two different aspects. *The older doctrine* regards the atonement as a reconciliation of sinners to God, but of sinners who are thus redeemed from the condition of bondage and misery in which they had been. Atonement, therefore, *is* reconciliation, redemption *is* deliverance; but of *the same persons by the same work, and at the same time*, each being involved in the same decree. *The new theory makes atonement* an act of reconciliation by Christ's death, not of the persons redeemed alone, but of the whole world, and this, as the result of a general decree to send Christ to reconcile the world to God. *Redemption* comes under the decree of *election*, which has nothing to do with reconciliation; and by it only certain persons have the benefit of the reconciliation thus effected, not because of their own acceptance or faith, but because God gives to them all the advantages of the work of atonement and withholds them from all others.

2. OBJECTIONS. (1) This theory represents the whole world as actually reconciled to God by Christ's death. If so, on what ground is this reconciliation destroyed? It really involves the doctrine of universal salvation.

(2) If this is not the view, then when the Scriptures speak of our reconciliation to God nothing more is meant than that a mere mode of reconciliation has been arranged, a medium of acceptance with God has been provided. But if there is merely a medium

of acceptance provided, how can men be spoken of as actually reconciled to God? In what proper sense can Christ be said to have borne our sins, and to have been wounded for our transgressions, if his act was merely the arrangement of a medium for salvation? Christ, to make atonement, must have been substituted in our place, borne our sins, had imputed to him our trespasses, and the chastisement of our peace must have been upon him. But, if so, a true atonement must have been made. It could not have been the mere arrangement of a medium of salvation. It must have been salvation itself. And, if for all, all must be saved.¹

(3) This theory is inconsistent with one of the facts admitted by its advocates: that the death of Christ was a penal sacrifice. Penalty and guilt have no respect to sin in the abstract, but only to it as associated with sinners. If the work of atonement simply wrought out a medium of access, then it was a mere general exhibition of God's hatred of sin, having no respect to particular persons. On the governmental theory that such an arrangement was necessary simply to display before the universe the evil of sin, this idea of atonement might be allowed. But on the theory of satisfaction to justice the atonement must be made by a penal sacrifice.

(4) This theory, like all others of a general atonement, lies under the difficulty that it extends reconciliation, or a medium of reconciliation, to persons who by death have been confirmed in destruction, or it shuts off from its benefits all who have died before Christ. The theory of limited atonement recognizes all who are included in it as saved by virtue of it. The virtue

¹ On the last page of this chapter the author makes what seems to the reviser a far more satisfactory statement. There he recognizes that Christ in *some sense* "did actually die for the salvation of all"; and that the atonement may be "contemplated as securing *the means* of reconciliation"; and that "*actual atonement for the elect is not inconsistent with the securing of a method of atonement for all.*" Why may we not hold that for the elect he died as the *actual personal substitute*, while for the non-elect he secured the means, or *opened up a way, for possible reconciliation*? If it be asked, How could Christ's death avail except by actual substitution for the individual? the answer is that it is fully as easy to explain this as it is to explain the idea of substitution for the individual. The whole thing is God's plan, and in many respects it is incomprehensible to us. The simple question is, what do the Scriptures teach? And it may be confidently claimed that they teach that Christ died for *all men*, as certainly as that they teach that he died especially for the elect. Even in the Old Testament sacrifices we find that sacrifices were offered at times for the whole congregation, as truly as at other times for single individuals. Andrew Fuller, we think, has done good service in emphasizing this general feature of the atonement, which high Calvinists, up to this time, had failed to do in their earnest insistence upon the limitations according to election.

secured, therefore, is applied to all to whom it belongs. The fact that the Lamb was slain before the foundation of the world, or in other words, the certainty of Christ's death, makes salvation beforehand possible, and permits God to bestow it. The death of Christ only fulfills what has thus been relied on. But in the case of a general atonement made for the whole race, we have Christ dying, not simply for those who will not be saved, but for those who are already damned.¹

(5) This theory is incompatible with those expressions of Scripture which speak of Christ's death as though it were confined to the elect.² *a.* John 10 : 11, 15, 26-28 : "I am the good shepherd: the good shepherd layeth down his life for the sheep, . . . and I lay down my life for the sheep. . . But ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep. My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me: and I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, and no one shall snatch them out of my hand." (*a*) The sheep here are those to whom he will give eternal life; (*b*) they are those for whom he lays down his life; (*c*) they are not all, because he tells those who were rejecting him that they were not his sheep; (*d*) the whole language used implies that the salvation of the sheep alone is the object for which his life is laid down. *b.* John 17 : 9, 19 : "I pray not for the world, but for those which thou hast given me. . . For their sakes I sanctify myself, that they themselves also may be sanctified in truth." *c.* Rom. 5 : 8, 9 : "But God commendeth his own love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Much more then, being now justified by his blood, shall we be saved from the wrath of God through him." Here those for whom Christ died are plainly declared to be thus justified by his blood, and the certainty of salvation from wrath is maintained. See also the passage in Rom. 8, where the apostle uses the language of exultation. In ver. 32 : "He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not also with him, freely give us all things?" (*a*) For us all: here is the true extent of the atonement. The all are those who are truly saved. (*b*) Those for whom he has thus been delivered feel assured that he will

¹ It is proper to say that these objections are not felt at all by those who have sympathy with the theory of a general atonement.

² It would be better to say, "which speak of Christ's death as though it were meant *especially* for the elect." The Scriptures can hardly be said to represent the death of Christ as "*confined to the elect.*"

give also all grace, so that their salvation is secure. But this is true only of the elect; therefore, for them alone and not for others was Christ "not spared." Ver. 34: "Who is he that shall condemn? It is Christ Jesus that died." This is the sufficient answer as the apostle teaches; but according to the theory of Fuller it is the application of Christ's death, and not the death itself, that removes condemnation. Eph. 5: 25: "Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also loved the church, and gave himself up for it." Titus 2: 14: "Who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a people for his own possession, zealous of good works." It is for the "us" who compose this people, that Christ has given "himself." 1 Peter 1: 20: The very manifestation of Christ in the world is said to have taken place for those "who through him are believers in God."¹

3. SUPPOSED ADVANTAGES. It was thought by Andrew Fuller that this theory had some decided advantages over the Calvinistic theory.

(1) It is claimed that it is more in accordance with certain expressions in the Scriptures which seem to teach a general atonement. It is said that the Scriptures use language which clearly teaches a general atonement even while they speak of a specific object in the death of Christ. It is claimed, therefore, that both a general atonement and a particular application are taught, but not, as Calvinists insist, a limited atonement. But it appears on examination that the act there spoken of cannot be limited to the meaning here given, and that either these passages teach universal salvation, or they have a meaning, as used by Christ and his apostles, which does not involve the idea of such equal universality as includes in the same respect, in every way, every one of the posterity of Adam.

(2) Again, it is said that this theory makes the specific offer of the gospel to all appear more sincere than the former. Both of these arguments in favor of the supposed superiority of this theory over the old Calvinistic theory will be considered in connection with our consideration of the next theory, which will be shown to be the true Scripture doctrine. It may be simply added

¹ The real objection to the Andrew Fuller theory is that it does not seem to do justice to the passages that show a *special work for the elect* in the death of Christ. The objection to the ordinary Calvinistic theory, as already intimated, is that it does not seem to do justice to the passages that represent Christ as dying for *all men*. The truth seems to be in a combination of the two theories.

here that this theory has only *apparently* any advantage over the usual older Calvinistic theory. It, as well as the older theory, has to recognize: *a.* That salvation is confined to the elect. *b.* That salvation is given as the result of God's action. *c.* That the death of Christ has no greater value under this than under the older theory. *d.* That the limitation is in the purpose of God. *e.* It will be found also that God can, under the older theory, make the gospel offer with equal sincerity. For each theory holds: (*a*) That a sufficient basis of salvation exists, if God had chosen to extend it. (*b*) That God knows that only those chosen by him will accept. (*c*) That this acceptance is due to special grace. And (*d*) that it was God's purpose to withhold this special grace from some; a purpose formed in eternity and recognized as existing when the sacrifice was offered, and when the offer of salvation was made.

(IV) CALVINISTIC THEORY.

This is the theory of Calvin and the churches which he established. It is the theory of the regular Baptists of the past. No other prevailed among those who have held distinctively Calvinistic Baptist sentiments until the days of Andrew Fuller. He, because of his remarkable ability, contributed greatly to the acceptance of the modification which we have just been considering. Our plan in presenting this older Calvinistic theory will be to state clearly its points. We will then show that it is the scriptural doctrine of the atonement in each of its particulars. After this proof, inquiry will be made into its extent, whether it is general or particular. In that place will naturally come up the questions as to the true explanation of the passages which have been thought to teach a general atonement.

I. THEORY STATED. The Calvinistic theory of the atonement is, that in the sufferings and death of Christ, he incurred the penalty of the sins of those whose substitute he was, so that he made a real satisfaction to the justice of God for the law which they had broken. On this account God now pardons all their sins, and being fully reconciled to them, his electing love flows out freely toward them. The doctrine as thus taught involves the following points: First, that the sufferings and death of Christ were a real atonement; secondly, that in making it Christ became the substitute of those whom he came to save; thirdly, that as such he bore the penalty of their transgressions; fourthly, that in so doing he made ample satisfaction to the demands of the law and

to the justice of God. And, fifthly, that thus an actual reconciliation has been made between them and God.¹

2. THEORY EXAMINED. Each of the points mentioned above will need explanation and amplification, as well as proof, that its precise meaning may be clearly ascertained. We will take them up separately :

(1) *The first point to be proved is that the death of Christ was a real atonement.* By this is meant that the death of Christ was not merely a moral example, as say the Socinians ; that it was not a mere exhibition of God's determination to maintain his government for the benefit of his creatures, according to the Governmental hypothesis ; that it was not merely a manifestation of God's abhorrence of sin by which man could be led to penitence, as held by the New Theology ; that it was not merely an arrangement set forth in the universe as the means of lowering the demands of the law, as say the Arminians ; but that it was *a sacrifice for sin*, the great antitype of the Mosaic sacrifices, by which guilt and condemnation is taken away from those for whom he made it, and by which they are made at-one with God. The proof that this was the nature of Christ's act, is :

a. That this is the generally received notion of sacrifice in all nations.

b. That the earliest record of sacrifice, in the history of Cain and Abel, points to the idea that God had appointed a mode of expiation for guilt. The sacrifice of Abel was in one sense no

¹ Those who believe in a general atonement of any kind will object to this theory as thus stated, because it seems to ignore those passages of Scripture which teach certain universal bearings of the atonement. The author says, indeed, that such passages will be noticed in considering the "Extent of the Atonement." But the question arises, "Why should not these passages be given their full weight in a *statement of the doctrine?*" It is felt that the constant tendency with strong Calvinists is to lay the emphasis too much on the *limitations*. The Scriptures lay emphasis not only on the *limitations according to election*, but also on the provisions *for the whole world*. The reviser sympathizes with the idea that the atonement is both *special and general*. The passage, "the Saviour of all men, specially of them that believe," expresses the idea whether we may use it as a proof text or not. Feeling this, he has at several points in this chapter taken apparent issue with the author. The only point of real issue, however, is as to the emphasis that should be given to the passages which seem to teach a general atonement. The author recognizes these passages. He makes, on the last page of this chapter, a summing up of the doctrine which is practically unobjectionable to one who believes in a general atonement. The reviser only feels that these facts as to the universal bearings of the atonement ought to be given their full weight alongside of the passages which show that the atonement was limited. He can but wish that a sixth point had been added to the five mentioned above, namely, that "*a way was opened whereby all might be saved.*" The statements made by the author on the last page of the chapter seem to make ample room for such a sixth point.

better than that of Cain. Each was a gift; but that of Abel was a sacrifice of blood, in testimony of acknowledged guilt; that of Cain merely a thank offering. The Lord had respect to the offering of Abel, and when Cain was angry the Lord remonstrated with him, and said: "If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou doest not well, sin coucheth at the door" (Gen. 4 : 7). This account establishes the fact that the idea of sacrifice, which thus has prevailed among all men, originated in early instruction by God, beginning from the time of our first parents.

c. When we come, however, to look at the sacrifices of the Mosaic economy, we find still the same idea taught, and even more fully, since the type was now confined to the nation through which the antitype was to appear. That economy shows that the blood of animals was constantly offered to God; that this was done by his command as making reconciliation and atonement; that in these offerings was always involved the idea of sin committed by the people, or the individual, or the priests, or a ceremonial defilement of the nature of sin, which made essential the cleansing of the altar itself, or the persons officiating; that, in the act of sacrifice, the hand of the individual, or of the elders, or of the priests, was laid upon the head of the animal for the confession of sin upon it, that it might be made a proper sacrifice; that the animal was then slain or sent away; and that, as the result of all these arrangements, the forgiveness of sin followed.

This latter idea may appear too strongly put, but it is owing to our overlooking the fact that the sins thus atoned for were not all the sins of the Israelites, but only the sins which took place in their civil relations as individuals, or as a nation, to God. The forgiveness of them involved, therefore, only the temporal blessings thus associated. As they were typical of Christ and of a heavenly Canaan, so those who looked through the type to the antitype received full pardon for all sins, because of the offering that God was one day to make, and in which they trusted. In either case, however, there was actual remission of sins. For the national or individual sins, for which God had appointed this method of pardon, there was actual remission because of the sacrifice, and, in those who looked forward to Christ, and for whom, therefore, his sacrifice was made, there was also actual remission of the sins thus laid upon him.

Another caution is also suggested here. We speak of the sacrifices of old as the means God appointed for the pardon of sin. And in like manner we speak of God's method of salvation being by the death of Christ. But in either case we do not mean by the expression that the means of salvation alone was in the sacrifice, but salvation itself. The law of sacrifice was the

method of God for the remission of sin, but the sacrifice itself secured the actual remission : so, the death of Christ may be contemplated as God's method of saving sinners so long as we are speaking of it as the arrangement or scheme devised by God to accomplish a certain work ; but, as itself a sacrifice, the death of Christ secured salvation, and not the mere means of salvation.

d. Such now being the usage of the word "sacrifice" among all men, and especially in the Jewish nation, did we find merely the word sacrifice used in reference to Christ, we should be justified in believing that there was made by him a real sacrifice or atonement. If the New Testament or the other Scriptures said nothing of the nature of his work or its effects, we should be fully warranted in saying that because it was a sacrifice it secured an actual remission of sins by the shedding of his blood. Were we confined to this argument, therefore, we might simply show that the New Testament does speak of him as the Lamb of God, as our Passover, and as having died for us, and thence we might argue that he has made a real atonement for us. But we may go much further and show that it actually teaches this fact.

e. It is clearly taught that by Christ's sacrificial death an offering was made for sin which actually secured the pardon of the sinner. (*a*) In the Old Testament : The prophets of old spake of it in this wise. Thus in Isa. 53 : 6, 10, 11 : "All we like sheep have gone astray, . . and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all. . . Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him ; he hath put him to grief : when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, . . He shall see of the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied : by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many : and he shall bear their iniquities." The points here are : *aa.* Our sins are laid on him. *bb.* He is afflicted. *cc.* He is made an offering for sin. *dd.* Thus he justifies many (not all—and why these ?) because "he shall bear their iniquities." (*b*) In the New Testament : The New Testament teaching corresponds with that of the Old. John 1 : 29 : The announcement of the Messiah by John shows that the sacrifice of Christ was the prominent work of his life. "Behold the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world." The same announcement was made again the next day. Matt. 20 : 28 : "The Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many." Matt. 26 : 28 : "This is my blood of the covenant which is shed for many unto remission of sins." Acts 20 : 28 :

"The church of God which he purchased with his own blood." Rom. 5 : 10 : "We were reconciled to God through the death of his Son." Eph. 5 : 2 : "Christ . . . gave himself up for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God for an odor of a sweet smell." Col. 1 : 14, 19-22 : "In whom we have our redemption, the forgiveness of sins. . . For it was the good pleasure of the Father that in him should all the fulness dwell ; and through him to reconcile all things unto himself, having made peace through the blood of his cross ; through him, I say, whether things upon the earth or things in the heavens. And you being in time past alienated and enemies in your mind in your evil works, yet now hath he reconciled in the body of his flesh through death, to present you holy and without blemish and unreprouable before him." This passage includes all the points under the head we are now discussing. We have here a sacrifice by Christ in his death ; through his blood peace is effected, and forgiveness of sins ; not the means, but the things themselves ; actual forgiveness, actual peace. The whole Epistle to the Hebrews is proof upon this point. 1 Peter 1 : 18-20 : "Knowing that ye were redeemed, not, etc., but with precious blood, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot, even the blood of Christ." 1 John 2 : 2 : "He is the propitiation for our sin ; and not for ours only, but also for the whole world." 1 John 4 : 10 : "God sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins." The passages adduced will suffice to show that Christ's work was a real sacrifice ; that by his blood he procured pardon, peace, redemption, and remission of sins for those whom he represented. How many or how few these are does not here affect the question. The work here done was a sacrifice and was completely accomplished. The proof to be given of the other points will add materially to the evidence of the nature of the work of Christ in this respect.

(2) *In order to make this atonement Christ became the substitute of those whom he came to save.* Here, also, we may refer to the position in this respect occupied by the offering under the Mosaic laws, as well as to the general notion of sacrifice. The language of Job 1 : 1-5 indicates that he recognized the fact that substitutes might be offered, and would be accepted in the place of those who were guilty of offenses to God. And this may be taken as evidence of the usually received opinion before the segregation of Israel, as well as that among the Gentiles subsequent to that event. But the declarations of God as to the Levitical sacrifices and the method of their observance exhibit this more

clearly. In the first chapter of Leviticus God gives to Moses directions as to the offering of sacrifices by the people; among other things he says (ver. 4) of the individual making the offering: "He shall lay his hand upon the head of the burnt offering; and it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him." The account of the scapegoat in Lev. 16 : 20-22 furnishes another instance of substitution, which, as another use will be made of it, is not referred to here at length. It is, however, a signal example of such a substitution as put an animal in the place of Israel, and made him as their substitute to bear their iniquities.

These declarations of the substitution of the victim are numerous in Exodus and Leviticus, and are referred to in all the Mosaic books. They, therefore, made familiar to the Jewish people the notion of substitution, and impressed upon them the need of a victim for the making of atonement who should actually stand in the place of those who were to be atoned for. The language of the Scriptures as to Christ, therefore, could not have been otherwise understood. As used by the prophets, by John the Baptist, and by the inspired writers of the New Testament, it must have been intended to make this impression, which must inevitably have been produced. To such an extent is this so, that the prophetic language of Isaiah relative to Christ's sufferings was felt to be so completely fulfilled in them, that almost all the language in the New Testament which speaks of his atonement is tinged by the expressions there used. Let us look at the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah then as indicative of the teachings of the sacrifices and of the work foretold to be accomplished. The whole chapter speaks of substitution and inflicted penalty. The following passages refer to substitution. Ver. 4, 5: "Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows: yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted. But he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed." Ver. 6: "The Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all." Ver. 11: "By his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many: and he shall bear their iniquities." Ver. 12: "He bare the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors." The following passages show that the New Testament recognized the fulfillment of these prophecies, and that in Christ was found the antitype of the sacrifices of old in this respect. Matt. 20 : 28: "The Son of man came . . . to give his life a ransom for many." John 11 : 47-52 gives an account of a coun-

cil among the Jews, in which a certain remark was made by Caiaphas, which the evangelist claims as a prophecy and applies to Jesus. See ver. 49-52 : "But a certain one of them, Caiaphas, being high priest that year, said unto them, Ye know nothing at all, nor do ye take account that it is expedient for you that one man should die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not. Now this he said not of himself : but being high priest that year he prophesied that Jesus should die for the nation ; and not for the nation only, but that he might also gather into one the children of God that were scattered abroad." 2 Cor. 5 : 21 : "Him who knew no sin he made to be sin on our own behalf." Gal. 3 : 13 : "Having become a curse for us." Eph. 5 : 2 : "Christ also loved you, and gave himself up for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God, for an odor of a sweet smell." 1 Thess. 5 : 9, 10 : "For God appointed us not unto wrath, but unto the obtaining of salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ, who died for us, that, whether we wake or sleep, we should live together with him." 1 Tim. 2 : 5, 6 : "For there is one God, one mediator also between God and men, himself man, Jesus Christ, who gave himself a ransom for all ; the testimony to be borne in its own times."

There are several questions which arise in consequence of this substitution on the part of Christ. One as to the qualifications essential to it which he possessed. Another as to the manner in which substitution can be effected. Another as to the justice with which an innocent person can be put in the place of a guilty one. And yet another, whether Christ, being thus substituted, became personally a sinner. These questions belong the rather, however, to a discussion of imputation and are only relevant here because that doctrine is implied in this doctrine of atonement. The only exception is the first. The second and third have already been discussed in treating of the representative relation of Adam and the principle of substitution involved in it and in the law of sacrifices. As to the fourth point, it may be said that Christ is not represented in Scripture as made personally a sinner by substitution ; neither were the sacrifices of old regarded as personally obnoxious to God ; but they were so officially ; that is, in their positions as substitutes ; and Christ became so, being made a curse for us. But this official substitution did not make him a sinner, but only caused him to be treated as such. The first question may be answered thus : *a.* That the possession of a human nature such as ours is represented in Scripture as essential to his position as substitute. *b.* The possession of a divine nature, in consequence of which he was a divine person, was also requisite to give an infinite value to his work. *c.* It seems also essential that he should not have been two persons, a divine person and a human person ; else could not the value of the acts performed in his human nature have been greater than those of any other innocent man. It was, therefore, not the human nature of Christ that was substituted for us, but Christ himself ; yet it was not Christ in his divine

nature that suffered, but value was given to the suffering from its being the suffering of one who also essentially possessed the divine nature. The doctrine of the Trinity lies, therefore, at the basis of that of the atonement, and hence the denial of the latter by all those who reject the former. *d.* A holy nature ; a lamb without spot or blemish. *e.* As consequent upon the possession of such a union of natures in himself, Christ could make a voluntary offering of himself, by which merit could be procured and penalty endured for others. *f.* That he should be designated by the Father to this position, that he might be the legal representative of his people and their covenant head.

(3) *In so offering himself, Christ actually bore the penalty of the transgressions of those for whom he was substituted.* *a.* This point is involved in the two that have preceded it, and consequently may be argued from the evidence afforded by them. These points mutually confirm each other. Thus, in bearing the penalty, he appears to have been substituted for us and to have been made a sacrifice. In being made a sacrifice he has been substituted and has borne the penalty. We may, therefore, present all the proofs that Christ was a sacrifice, and was the substitute for our sins, as so much in favor of the fact that he bore the penalty of transgression. *b.* But we may otherwise learn from the Scriptures themselves that this penalty was actually borne by Christ. It is taught : (*a.*) In those passages in which Christ is represented as having borne our iniquities. The meaning of this clause is definitely fixed by the Scripture usage. In the following passages this phrase is applied to Christ. Isa. 53 : 6 : "The Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all." Isa. 53 : 11 : "By his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many : and he shall bear their iniquities." Isa. 53 : 12 : "He was numbered with the transgressors ; yet he bare the sin of many." 1 Peter 2 : 24 : "Who his own self bare our sins in his body upon the tree."

The following passages show that the phrase "to bear iniquity" means to bear the penalty of iniquity. Lev. 5 : 1 : "And if any one sin in that he heareth the voice of adjuration, he being a witness, whether he hath seen or known, if he do not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity." Lev. 5 : 17 : "And if any one sin and do any of the things which the Lord hath commanded not to be done ; though he know it not, yet is he guilty and shall bear his iniquity." Lev. 7 : 18 : "If any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings be eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed unto him that offereth it : it shall be an abomination, and the soul that eateth of it shall bear his iniquity." Lev. 19 : 8 : "But every one that eateth it shall bear his iniquity, because he hath profaned the holy thing of the Lord : and that soul shall be cut off from his

people." Lev. 24 : 15 : "And thou shalt speak unto the children of Israel, saying, Whosoever curseth his God shall bear his sin." Num. 14 : 34 : "After the number of the days in which ye spied out the land, even forty days for every day a year, shall ye bear your iniquities, even forty years, and ye shall know my alienation." Ezek. 18 : 20 : "The soul that sinneth, it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son." Ezek. 44 : 10, 12 : "But the Levites that went far from me, when Israel went astray, which went astray from me after their idols ; they shall bear their iniquity." "Because they ministered unto them before their idols, and became a stumbling-block of iniquity unto the house of Israel ; therefore have I lifted up mine hand against them, saith the Lord God, and they shall bear their iniquity." ¹

(b) Another class of passages shows that Christ bore the penalty of sin by representing him *as suffering because of it, and as bearing the penalty attached to it*. Such passages used as to an innocent person show that he bore the penalty for others, but in most it is distinctly declared that it was for his people.

aa. That class of passages which represents Christ as *suffering because of our sin*, or that his sufferings were connected with our sins. The passage in Isa. 53 : 4, 5, is a signal example. "Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows : yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted. But he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities : the chastisement of our peace was upon him ; and with his stripes we are healed." In accordance with this vision of the prophet we have the accounts given in the New Testament. Rom. 4 : 25 : "Who was delivered up for our trespasses." Heb. 13 : 12 : "Wherefore Jesus also, that he might sanctify the people through his own blood, suffered without the gate." 1 Peter 2 : 24 : "Who his own self bare our sins in his body upon the tree." 1 Peter 3 : 18 : "Because Christ also suffered for sins once, the righteous for the unrighteous, that he might bring us to God." More passages might be given were it not that the Scriptures more frequently state the nature of this connection, and they will be quoted in the succeeding class under this head.

bb. The second class of passages which treats of the connection of Christ's sufferings with our sins in that which represents those sufferings as *the penalty of our sins*, or which declares that *Christ bore that penalty*. The penalty due for our transgressions was death, the full meaning of which is only foreshadowed to us by the death of the body. Added to this is the separation from

¹ See Magee on "The Atonement," Vol. I., pp. 200-220, for an able and learned discussion of the meaning of the phrase "bear iniquity."

God by reason of the moral death which ensued from sin and the condition of condemnation for sin. The former must be eternal, unless restoration to God is effected. The latter involves eternal death in its mere execution.

The death of Christ included the penalty in all its fullness. In it he offered up his body and was laid in the grave. In it the separation from God took place by which he was led to feel himself forsaken. "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" was his cry of agony. That his death was not eternal, as would ours have been, arose from the fact that in the execution of the sentence of condemnation, God found in him not such a victim as mere man would have been, unable to atone, or render full satisfaction; but one whose glorious nature gave infinite value to suffering, and who could feel most keenly, yet could bear without destruction the wrath of God. The Scriptures are clear in representing just such a penalty as having been endured by Christ, accompanied by just such agonies. No one can read the accounts given by the evangelists without being impressed by the fact that they ascribe just such a character to his sufferings on Calvary.

But, independently of such general statements, we have a distinct class of passages in which Christ's suffering is represented as the penalty of our transgressions. Such are, Isa. 53 : 5 : "The chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed." The latter part of this verse is quoted in 1 Peter 2 : 24. Isa. 53 : 8 : "For the transgression of my people was he stricken." Ver. 9 declares his perfect innocence and then ver. 10 says : "Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him; he hath put him to grief : when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed," etc. 1 Cor. 15 : 3 : "For I delivered unto you first of all that which also I received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures." 2 Cor. 5 : 14, 15 : "For the love of Christ constraineth us; because we thus judge, that one died for all, therefore all died; and he died for all," etc. 2 Cor. 5 : 21 : "Him who knew no sin he made to be sin on our behalf." Gal. 3 : 13 : "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us." Col. 1 : 21, 22 : "And you, being in time past alienated . . . yet now hath he reconciled in the body of his flesh through death." Heb. 9 : 26 : "But now once, at the end of the ages, hath he been manifested to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself."

(4) *In so doing, he made ample satisfaction to the demands of the law and to the justice of God.* We have thus seen, first, that

the sufferings and death of Christ were a real atonement; secondly, that in making it Christ became the substitute of those whom he came to save; thirdly, that as such he bore the penalty of their transgressions. From these the fourth point follows.

a. The very fact that he was the substitute of the sinner, and that he bore his penalty, shows that the satisfaction he made was ample; Christ could have made none that was not. Anything he could do must be acceptable to God; for God delighteth in him. Any act of his must be of infinite value to accomplish any end for which he designed it. Any penalty borne by him must have found a victim fully sufficient to fulfill every demand. The very fact that he has been substituted and has borne the penalty, shows that he has made ample satisfaction.

b. But this is also seen in the fact that the declaration is made that thus the demands of the law are fulfilled and not lowered. The language of Christ on this point is explicit. Matt. 5 : 17 : "Think not that I came to destroy the law or the prophets: I came not to destroy, but to fulfil." Rom. 7 : 1-6: The apostle argues that we are no longer bound to the law, but bound to Christ; that our obligations have been annulled, and that henceforth "we have been discharged from the law, having died to that wherein we were holden; so that we serve in newness of the spirit, and not in oldness of the letter." This whole argument implies and is based upon the idea that the law has been fulfilled for us by Christ, who has thus delivered us from the bondage of obligation, that we might serve with the spirit of love. Freedom from the law on our part, accompanied by the declaration that Christ came not to lower it, but to fulfill it, shows that in the atonement for us he has made ample satisfaction for all our sins and failures, as well as secured for us complete righteousness by his perfect obedience. We may here add also the prophecy of Isa. 42 : 21 : "It pleased the Lord, for his righteousness' sake, to magnify the law, and make it honourable," and the fact that Christ is called "The Lord is our righteousness," in Jer. 23 : 6, and also that the Apostle Paul in Phil. 3 : 7-11, renounces his own righteousness of the law that he might have that "which is through faith in Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith." This fact implies a conviction of the ample extent of the righteousness which is by Christ.

c. That an ample satisfaction is made to justice is seen also in the fact that mercy and justice are said to be reconciled in Christ. These are represented as antagonistic; mercy pleading for the

sinner, and justice demanding his punishment ; truth requiring the fulfillment of the threatened penalty, which is consistent with peace, only by the death of Christ. Ps. 85 : 10 : "Mercy and truth are met together ; righteousness and peace have kissed each other." The same fact seems to be declared in the song of the angels, on the plain of Bethlehem, Luke 2 : 14 : "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace among men in whom he is well pleased."

d. This is also seen in the approval which God gave to the work of Christ. Had that work not been satisfactory, we should not have expected the actual declarations of approval of it. That approval is evidenced : (*a*) By Christ's testimony to it. He tells us that he came to do the will of his Father ; that his Father sent him not to condemn the world ; but gave him, that whosoever believeth might not perish but have everlasting life. (*b*) In the manifested expressions of approbation by God in the miracles by which Christ attested his mission, as well as by the witness of John. (*c*) In God's own words of approval at his baptism, at the transfiguration on the mount, and at other times. (*d*) In the angelic messengers sent to strengthen him in his work, and to minister to him after the temptation in the wilderness, and in the garden. (*e*) That most signal evidence afforded in the resurrection of Jesus from the dead, which, as is constantly declared, was a seal of approval. (*f*) The ample character of this satisfaction is further seen in the declarations by the sacred writers of the certainty of the salvation that is based upon it. Every offer of salvation made is a passage in proof of this point. The words of the commission, "He that believeth, and is baptized, shall be saved" (Mark 16 : 16), and the offer of the apostle, "Believe on the Lord Jesus, and thou shalt be saved, thou and thy house" (Acts 16 : 31), are positive affirmations. (*g*) We find further proof in the seventh place in such passages as show that so ample has been the work of Christ that even a sinner is warranted to approach and claim salvation in Christ's name, and that God gives it as due to the merits and work of Christ. Heb. 4 : 16 : "Let us therefore draw near with boldness unto the throne of grace, that we may receive mercy, and may find grace to help us in time of need." Heb. 10 : 19, 22 : "Having therefore, brethren, boldness to enter into the holy place by the blood of Jesus, . . let us draw near with a true heart in fulness of faith." Eph. 3 : 12 : "In whom we have boldness and access, in confidence, through our faith in him." 1 John 1 : 9 : "If we confess

our sins, he is faithful and righteous to forgive us our sins, and cleanse us from all unrighteousness." (*h*) The ample satisfaction of the atonement made is also seen in the fact that it is declared perfect for its end in the language of the apostle in Heb. 9 : 25–28, where he argues the incompleteness of the Mosaic sacrifices, because they had to be offered more than once, and the perfection of Christ's, because "now once at the end of the ages, hath he been manifested to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself." And again in 10 : 10 : "We have been sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all." 1 John 1 : 7 : "The blood of Jesus his Son cleanseth us from all sin."

A question arises in view of this ample satisfaction, in what way may it be regarded as gratuitous when it is thus a full recompense for all. This is well answered in Hodge's "Outlines of Theology," p. 308, first ed. The answer includes five points : *aa*. Christ did not die to make the Father love the Elect, but was given to die because of that love. John 3 : 16 : "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him might not perish, but have eternal life." 1 John 4 : 9, 10 : "Herein was the love of God manifested in us, that God hath sent his only begotten Son into the world, that we might live through him. Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins." *bb*. Christ made full satisfaction to divine justice in order to render the exercise of love consistent with justice. Rom. 3 : 26 : "For the showing, I say, of his righteousness at this present season : that he might himself be just, and the justifier of him that hath faith in Jesus." Ps. 85 : 10 : "Mercy and truth are met together ; righteousness and peace have kissed each other." The greater the obstacle and the more costly the price demanded of love by justice, the greater the love and the more free. On this ground God commendeth his love. Rom. 5 : 8 : "But God commendeth his own love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." *cc*. God the Father and God the Son are one God, identical in nature, moved by the same love, and exacting the same satisfaction. *dd*. Penal satisfaction differs from pecuniary. If a Sovereign appoints or accepts a substitute, it is all of grace. *ee*. To Christ as Mediator, the purchased salvation of his people belongs of right from the terms of the eternal covenant, but to us that salvation is given, in all its elements, stages, and instrumentalities, only as a free and sovereign favor. The gift is gratuitous if the beneficiary has no shadow of claim to it and if no conditions are exacted of him. The less worthy the beneficiary is, and the more difficult the conditions which justice exacts of the giver, the more eminently gratuitous the gift is.

(5) *The fifth point to be shown is, that by this work an actual reconciliation has been effected.* *a*. The points already proved show this. If an atonement has been made by one who was actually substituted in the place of the guilty, who, as so substituted, paid the penalty and rendered full satisfaction to the law,

so that the law has no longer any claims, then there has been undoubtedly an actual reconciliation. Peace has been made by the cross between God and man.¹ *b.* The plain declarations of Scripture are that God has been reconciled to us by Christ. Rom. 5 : 10 : "For, if while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, shall we be saved by his life." Similar declarations are found in 2 Cor. 5 : 19 ; Eph. 2 : 13, 16, 17 ; Col. 1 : 20-22. They are not given at length, because they will have to be presented immediately for another purpose.² It may be said that reconciliation is admitted, but that this means only a method of reconciliation. *c.* Therefore it must be shown that actual reconciliation has been made, from what the Scriptures say of the purpose had in view in reconciliation, which was actually to save, not to make salvation possible.³ Luke 19 : 10 : "For the Son of man came to seek and to save that which was lost." 2 Cor. 5 : 21 : "Him who knew no sin he made to be sin on our behalf ; that we might become the righteousness of God in him." Gal. 1 : 4 : "Who gave himself for our sins, that he might deliver us out of this present evil world, according to the will of our God and Father." Gal. 4 : 4, 5 : "God sent forth his Son, born of a woman, born under the law, that he might redeem them which were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons." 1 Tim. 1 : 15 : "Faithful is the saying, and worthy of all acceptance, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners ; of whom I am the chief." The purpose of God is thus seen, not to make salvation possible, but actually to save, to redeem, to make righteous, etc. Still it may be said that this purpose might be effected by a method of reconciliation. *d.* But the Scriptures, in speaking of what is actually effected by Christ's work for those who are reconciled by it, show that the reconciliation was actually made in that work itself. The time at which it was done, and what was done at that time, show this. Rom. 5 : 10 : "For if

¹ While it is true that *Christ has made complete expiation* for sin, and hence *complete provision* for "actual reconciliation," yet it can hardly be said that "actual reconciliation *has been effected*" and "peace *has been made* by the cross between God and man," until the sinner accepts Christ by personal faith. "The carnal mind is enmity against God," and the wicked are exhorted to "kiss the Son lest he be angry," and they "perish from the way when his wrath is kindled but a little." God is constantly represented as *unreconciled* with the wicked.

² These passages are all addressed to Christians. Of course in their cases the "reconciliation *has been effected*."

³ A purpose "actually to save" can hardly be said to make the salvation already actual. It only assures it. The same is true of a purpose to reconcile.

while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, shall we be saved by his life." The time was, "while we were enemies," at the time of Christ's death. The application of salvation follows this reconciliation. Gal. 3 : 13 : "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us." Eph. 1 : 7 : "In whom we have our redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses according to the riches of his grace." Eph. 2 : 14-16 : "For he is our peace, who made both one, and brake down the middle wall of partition, having abolished in his flesh the enmity, even the law of commandments contained in ordinances ; that he might create in himself of the twain one new man, so making peace ; and might reconcile them both in one body unto God through the cross, having slain the enmity thereby." Col. 1 : 20 : "And through him to reconcile all things unto himself, having made peace through the blood of his cross. 1 Thess. 1 : 10 : "Even Jesus, which delivereth us from the wrath to come." 1 Peter 1 : 18, 19 : "Knowing that ye were redeemed, not with corruptible things . . . but with precious blood, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot." All these passages¹ speak of these effects as actually accomplished by Christ in his death upon the cross. *e.* The connection between the gift of the Spirit and the work of Christ shows that there has been actual reconciliation. The promise of the Spirit to us is made, and that Spirit is given, as a reward of Christ's death. That death is declared to have this gift as one of the purposes to be effected by it. Acts 2 : 33 : "Being therefore by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, he hath poured forth this, which ye see and hear." This shows that the gift of the Spirit is the result of Christ's exaltation, which was also taught by Christ when he said that, unless he went away, the Spirit could not come. Gal. 3 : 13, 14 : "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, . . . that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith." Titus 3 : 5, 6 : "He saved us, through the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost, which he poured out upon us richly through Jesus Christ our Saviour."

¹ Practically *all* of these passages seem to refer only to actual Christians—those who have accepted Christ. The Scriptures hardly teach that there has been actual reconciliation between God and any unbeliever. They seem to the reviser to teach very plainly the contrary (*cf.* Eph. 2 : 11-12). The author would, no doubt, have explained his position consistently with this idea if his attention had been called to the point. (*Cf.* p. 297.) See Hodge's "Outlines," p. 314, first ed.

These passages show that (a) The gift of the Spirit was purchased by Christ's death. (b) That that gift secures actual salvation. (c) That it must be given to all for whom he has died. (d) That in that death actual reconciliation is consequently secured.¹

SECTION II. EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT.

The discussion of the nature of the sacrificial work of Christ has in great part prepared the way for that of the EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT. But while the previous inquiry has necessarily included some statements as to the limitation which the Scriptures put upon this work, and presented some facts which establish such limitation, a special treatment of this branch of the subject is nevertheless necessary.

Here also we have several theories :

I. FIRST THEORY.

1. THEORY STATED. The Universalists, connecting the nature which the Scriptures assign to the atonement with some expressions which seem to assert its universal extent, hold the notion of such a universal atonement as actually secures the salvation of all men.

2. OBJECTIONS. The objections to this view are : (1) Salvation is confined in the Scriptures to those that believe, and all men are not believers. (2) The gospel is spoken of as the only means of salvation, and the gospel is not even preached to all. (3) Express threats are uttered in the word of God against those who die in their sins. (4) At least one sin is expressly mentioned that shall not be pardoned. (5) The arrangement of God's plan of salvation is such as shows that the people of God are saved from their sins, not in them ; consequently the unholy are not saved. (6) The descriptions of the judgment day deny universal salvation. (7) The Scripture doctrine of the hell prepared for the punishment of the wicked shows it to be untrue. These and many other facts show that the atonement is limited in some way. The question arises, in what way?

II. SECOND THEORY.

1. THEORY STATED. A second theory makes the atonement itself general, but limits its benefits to those who exercise faith.

¹Secured as a thing to be *certainly effected*, but hardly as something *already effected*. Compare first few lines of Chapter XIII., p. 297.

It is claimed that thus only can be interpreted the passages which speak of a work for the world, consistently with any limitation; that thus only can God justly offer salvation to all; and that this theory fully meets all the conditions on which salvation is offered.

2. OBJECTIONS. It cannot be denied that salvation is offered and will be given on the condition of faith and repentance; nor that there are general expressions which assert that Christ's work of atonement has efficacy beyond the limits of the elect; but these facts must be so explained as to harmonize with the nature of the atonement and its relation to those for whom it was especially made.¹ The following objections, therefore, may be made to this theory: (1) Any atonement, general in any sense as not to be limited in God's purpose, is inconsistent with what we have seen to be the nature of the atonement. (2) It does not accord with justice that any should suffer for whom a substitute has actually borne the penalty and made full satisfaction. (3) It makes salvation the result in part of faith; but faith is the result of reconciliation, not its cause; it is the gift of God. (4) It is inconsistent with the many passages which teach the doctrine of an election of man to salvation, not because of foreseen faith. (5) It is inconsistent with those passages which point out the connection of the purpose of God with the salvation of those who are saved.

III. THIRD THEORY.

1. THEORY STATED. A third theory is that this limitation is one of purpose; that God designed only the actual salvation of some; and that, whatever provision has been made for others, he made this positive arrangement by which the salvation of certain ones is secured.

2. THEORY PROVED. (1) *Positive proof.* In favor of this theory it may be said: *a.* That this is in accordance with the doctrine of election. *b.* That it explains how it is that such a

¹ The reviser thinks that there does not seem to be any more reason for holding that the facts as to a *general atonement* must be "so explained as to harmonize with the nature of the atonement, and its relations to those for whom it was specially made," than for holding that the *special atonement passages* should "be so explained" as to harmonize with the facts of a *general atonement*. Would it not be better just to give the Scriptures that teach *general atonement* an equal chance with those that teach *special atonement*, and try to hold both as mutually consistent? Indeed, we may leave the features of limitation to God, since that is his part, and he will surely take care of that whether we do or not. But it may be a matter of serious consequence if we fail to emphasize the idea that Christ died for *all men*.

salvation as the Scriptures represent to have been wrought out by Christ is attained by some, and by some only. *c.* It alone agrees with the language of limitation used in some Scriptures as to Christ's death; either in those passages in which it is specially appropriated to Christians, or those in which he is spoken of as a ransom "for many." This class of passages is numerous.

(2) *Objections answered.* The objections to this theory are: First, that the offer of salvation is made to all men. Secondly, that the Scriptures speak of Christ's death as for the world, and in such a way as to contrast the world at large with those who believe. An explanation of these passages must therefore be given which, while it retains the full force intended in Scripture of these general expressions, and maintains the sincerity of God's offer of the gospel to all, shows at the same time its harmony with the doctrine of a definite purpose of God. *a.* It was with the intention of doing this that Andrew Fuller suggested his theory of the atonement. But, as has been shown, that theory accomplishes the desired end only by ascribing such a nature to the atonement as makes it only a method of reconciliation for the people of God, and not actual reconciliation. *b.* A far better explanation is given by Dr. A. A. Hodge in the following:

"Question 17. State first negatively, and then positively, the true doctrine as to the design of the Father and the Son in providing satisfaction.

"I. NEGATIVELY. 1. There is no debate among Christians as to the *sufficiency* of that satisfaction to accomplish the salvation of all men, however vast the number. This is absolutely limitless. 2. Nor as to its *applicability* to the case of any and every possible human sinner who will ever exist. The relations of all to the demands of the law are identical. What would save one would save another. 3. Nor to the *bona fide* character of the offer which God has made to 'whosoever will' in the gospel. It is applicable to every one, it will infallibly be applied to every believer. 4. Nor as to its *actual application*. Arminians agree with Calvinists that of adults only those who believe are saved, while Calvinists agree with Arminians that all dying in infancy are redeemed and saved. 5. Nor is there any debate as to the universal reference of *some* of the benefits purchased by Christ. Calvinists believe that the entire dispensation of forbearance under which the human family rests since the fall, including for the unjust as well as the just temporal mercies and means of grace, is part of the purchase of Christ's blood. They admit

also that Christ did in such a sense die for all men, that he thereby removed all legal obstacles from the salvation of any and every man, and that his satisfaction may be applied to one man as well as to another, '*if God so wills it.*'

"II. POSITIVELY. The question is what was the design of the Father and Son in the vicarious death of Christ. Did they purpose to make the salvation of the elect certain, or merely to make the salvation of all men possible? Did his satisfaction have reference indifferently as much to one man as to another? Did the satisfaction purchase and secure its own application, and all the means thereof, to all for whom it was specifically rendered? Has the impetration and the application of this atonement the same range of objects? Was it, in the order of the divine purpose, a means to accomplish the purpose of election, or is the election of individuals a means to carry into effect the satisfaction of Christ otherwise inoperative?

"Our 'Confession' (The Westminster) answers :

"Chap. VIII., Sec. 5. 'The Lord Jesus, by his perfect obedience and sacrifice of himself, . . purchased not only reconciliation, but an everlasting inheritance in the kingdom of heaven for all those whom the Father hath given unto him.' Chap. III., Sec. 6. 'As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath he, by the eternal and most free purpose of his will, fore-ordained all the means thereunto. Wherefore they that are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed in Christ. . . Neither are any other redeemed by Christ . . . but the elect only.

"Chap. VIII., Sec. 8. 'To ALL those for whom Christ hath purchased redemption, he doth certainly and effectually apply and communicate the same.'—'Articles of Synod of Dort,' Chap. II., Sec. 1, 2, 8.

"The design of Christ in dying was to effect what he actually does effect in the result. 1. *Incidentally* to remove the legal impediments out of the way of all men, and render the salvation of every hearer of the gospel objectively possible, so that each one has a right to appropriate it at will ; to impetrate temporal blessings for all, and the means of grace for all to whom they are providentially supplied. But, 2, *Specifically* his design was to impetrate the actual salvation of his own people, in all the means, conditions, and stages of it, and render it infallibly certain. This last, from the nature of the case, must have been his real motive. After the manner of the Augustinian Schoolmen, Calvin, on 1 John 2 : 2, says, 'Christ died sufficiently for all, but efficiently only for the elect.'"¹

¹ "Outlines of Theology," pp. 416, 417 of the second edition.

c. Another statement upon this subject may prove more satisfactory, although it embraces no more than is actually implied in the above extract from Dr. Hodge. It has only the advantage of recognizing more explicitly the relation of the atoning work of Christ both to the world and to the elect; a relation clearly indicated to be such that he can be called, in some general sense, the Saviour of all men, though he bears this relation more especially to those who believe (1 Tim. 4 : 10). The statement suggested is, that while for the elect he made an actual atonement, by which they were actually reconciled to God, and, because of which, are made the subjects of the special divine grace by which they become believers in Christ and are justified through him; Christ, at the same time and in the same work, wrought out a means of reconciliation for all men, which removed every legal obstacle to their salvation, upon their acceptance of the same conditions upon which the salvation is given to the elect.¹ According to this statement: (a) Christ did actually die for the salvation of all, so that he might be called the Saviour of all; because his work is abundantly sufficient to secure the salvation of all who will put their faith in him. (b) Christ died, however, in an especial sense for the elect; because he procured for them not a possible, but an actual salvation. (c) The death of Christ opens the way for a sincere offer of salvation by God to all who will accept the conditions he has laid down. (d) That same death, however, secures salvation to the elect, because by it Christ also obtained for them those gracious influences by which they will be led to comply with those conditions. (e) The work of Christ, contemplated as securing the means of reconciliation, is a full equivalent to all that the advocates of a general atonement claim; for they do not suppose that more than this was done for mankind in general, while Calvinists readily recognize that this much has been done for all. (f) But, while the making of an actual atonement for the elect is not inconsistent with the securing of a method of atonement for all, the assertion that such was the special work done for the elect complies with the nature of

¹ This is an entirely satisfactory statement of the atoning work of Christ. And the author here says that Christ "*wrought out a means of reconciliation for all men, which removed every legal obstacle to their salvation.*" His treatment of the doctrine would no doubt have awakened less antagonism if this fact could have been given the same prominence and emphasis that are given to the limitations of election. It was the failure of strict Calvinists to do this that caused Andrew Fuller to put forth his theory. Unfortunately, Andrew Fuller fails properly to recognize the truth of Calvinism, that *there is a special sense in which Christ died for the elect.*

the atonement as heretofore seen, and shows how Christ could be especially their Saviour and also the Saviour of all.

BB. THE HOLY SPIRIT THE COMFORTER, OR PNEUMATOLOGY

CHAPTER XIII. THE GOSPEL INVITATION, OR OUTWARD CALLING.

THE atoning work of Christ was not sufficient for the salvation of man. That work was only Godward, and only removed all the obstacles in the way of God's pardon of the sinner. But the sinner is also at enmity with God, and must be brought to accept salvation, and must learn to love and serve God. It is the special work of the Holy Spirit to bring this about. The first step here is to make known to man the gospel, which contains the glad tidings of this salvation, under such influences as ought to lead to its acceptance.

I. OUTWARD CALL COMMANDED.

The gospel is commanded to be proclaimed to every creature, inasmuch as there is in the work of Christ a means of redemption for every one. This is the external call of the gospel. The command to give this call, or invitation, is clear from the following passages :

1. SUCH AS SHOW THAT THE OUTWARD PRIVILEGES OF GOD'S WORD ARE NO LONGER TO BE CONFINED TO ISRAEL, but are to be extended to the Gentiles also. This had been foretold in prophecy : Gen. 18 : 18 ; 26 : 4 ; Ps. 2 : 8 ; Isa. 42 : 1-4 ; 49 : 6, 7, 8 ; 55 : 5 ; 60 : 3 ; 65 : 1-12 ; Jer. 16 : 19 ; Mal. 1 : 11.

It is also taught in the New Testament in various ways : Matt. 8 : 11-13 ; 12 : 18-21 ; 21 : 33-41 ; 22 : 1 ; 28 : 19 ; Mark 12 : 1-9 ; Luke 4 : 20-27 ; 14 : 16-24 ; 20 : 9-16 ; John 3 : 16 ; 4 : 20, 21, 39.

2. SUCH AS SHOW THAT THE GENTILES WERE NOT FIRST TO BECOME JEWS IN ORDER TO BE MADE PARTAKERS OF THE GOSPEL. Acts 10 : Peter sent to Cornelius ; Acts 11 : 1-18 : Peter's report of that visit ; Acts 11 : 19-30 : the gospel sent to Phœnicia, Cyprus, and Antioch ; Acts 13 : the labors of Paul and his companions ; Acts 15 : the conference at Jerusalem ; Rom. 1 : 13-16, and the whole of the Epistle and of Paul's other Epistles to the churches generally, especially Galatians.

The above two classes of passages serve to show how the universal preaching of the gospel was impressed upon the early Christians, and, consequently, that they would be led to give full meaning to other unlimited expressions.

3. SUCH AS DIRECTED THE GOSPEL TO BE PREACHED TO ALL. Mark 16 : 15 ; Acts 2 : 21 ; Rom. 10 : 13.

4. SUCH AS SHOW THE FREENESS WITH WHICH SALVATION WAS OFFERED TO ALL AS INDIVIDUALS. Acts 2 : 39 ; 11 : 14 ; 16 : 31 ; 2 Cor. 5 : 19-21 ; 1 Tim. 1 : 15 ; Titus 2 : 11 ; Rev. 22 : 17.

5. SUCH AS SHOW THAT THE RESTRICTIONS WHICH SEPARATED THE JEWS AND THE GENTILES BEING REMOVED, THE UNIVERSAL OFFERS OF SALVATION MADE PREVIOUSLY TO THE JEWS, MAY NOW BE APPLIED TO ALL MEN IN GENERAL. Isa. 1 : 18 ; 55 : 1-7 ; Ezek. 18 : 21, 32 ; 33 : 11.

6. THE LANGUAGE OF CHRIST TO THOSE TO WHOM HE SPAKE. Matt. 11 : 28 ; John 7 : 37.

The above classes of passages show that this call of the gospel is made indiscriminately to all men. No difference of nation or class or condition ; no question as to election or non-election ; nor any as to the purpose to make it effectual, enters into this call. It is made to every one. Nothing is known to those who are to proclaim the gospel which can make its offer to one any more sincere than to another. Whatever differences men may make from personal feeling or national sympathy or local attachment, are not only not commanded by it, but are often inconsistent with it.

II. THIS CALL UNSUCCESSFUL.

This outward call, or offer, of the gospel, however, meets of itself with no success.

1. TESTIMONY OF MINISTERS. The testimony of all who have preached it has been that, without special influence of grace from God, the preaching has been in vain. The prayers made to God constantly for such aid furnish universal evidence of such convictions.

2. TESTIMONY OF CONVERTS. The same testimony is as universally given by those who have received the gospel. Each one ascribes his salvation to the special influences of God.

3. TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. This also is the teaching of the Scriptures which declare this fact. Eph. 2 : 8 is only a specimen of the universal teaching, which will appear more fully elsewhere.

III. WHY UNSUCCESSFUL.

I. NOT DUE TO DEFICIENCY IN THE GOSPEL. This failure of the outward call to bring men to Christ very clearly is not due to any deficiency in the gospel. For: (1) None can doubt the fullness of the scheme of redemption contained. (2) None can question the facts as to personal sin and need of Christ which are made known. (3) None can deny the freeness with which it is offered. (4) No one can deny that he is one of those to whom it is offered. (5) All persons admit that God will give it to any one who will forsake sin and strive to live a new life, trusting him for help. (6) Every one is convinced that he can turn away from all acts of sin and live the contrary life of holiness and obedience, if he will. (7) It is universally acknowledged that God is worthy to be believed in every statement he makes. It is because of the above and kindred facts that our Lord says, John 12 : 48: "The word that I spake, the same shall judge him in the last day."

2. DUE TO SINFUL NATURE. The Scriptures teach us why this word is rejected. It is not from want of evidence, nor from intellectual doubt, but always because of something sinful, either in the heart or will.

Some of the reasons which the Scriptures thus give are presented in "Hill's Bible Readings," p. 99, as follows: (1) Pride, which may be national: Matt. 3 : 9; John 8 : 33; Acts 13 : 45; 17 : 5; 22 : 21, 22; intellectual: Matt. 11 : 25; John 9 : 39-41; Rom. 1 : 21, 22; 1 Cor. 1 : 19-21; or social: John 7 : 48. (2) Self-righteousness: Mark 2 : 16; Luke 7 : 39; 18 : 10-14; Rom. 10 : 3. (3) Love of praise: John 5 : 44; 12 : 43. (4) Love of the world: 2 Tim. 4 : 10; James 4 : 4; 1 John 2 : 15. (5) Love of money: Mark 10 : 17-24; Luke 16 : 13, 14; 1 Tim. 6 : 9, 10. (6) Cares of the world: Matt. 13 : 7-22; Luke 10 : 40. (7) Fear of man: John 7 : 13; 9 : 22; 12 : 42. (8) Worldly self-interest: Mark 5 : 16, 17; John 11 : 48. (9) Unwillingness to separate from impenitent friends: Luke 9 : 59-62. (10) Unwillingness to believe what they cannot understand: John 3 : 9; 6 : 52-60; Acts 17 : 32; 1 Cor. 2 : 14. (11) Unwillingness to have their sins exposed: John 3 : 19, 20. (12) Unwillingness to submit to God's authority: Luke 19 : 14; 20 : 9-18. (13) Prejudice against the messenger: Matt. 12 : 24; 13 : 57; John 1 : 46; 6 : 42; 7 : 52; 9 : 29. (14) Spiritual blindness: Matt. 13 : 15; 1 Cor. 2 : 14. (15) Unfaithfulness to the light which they had: John 12 : 36. (16) Waiting for a convenient season: Acts 24 : 25. (17) Frivo-

lous excuses: Luke 14 : 18. (18) Lack of deep convictions: Matt. 13 : 5 ; 22 : 5. (19) Lack of earnestness: Luke 13 : 24. (20) Neglect of the Bible: Luke 24 : 25 ; John 5 : 39 ; 7 : 27 ; Acts 17 : 11, 12. (21) Neglect of religious meetings: John 20 : 24. (22) Blindness to special opportunities: Luke 19 : 44. (23) Desire for special signs: Matt. 12 : 38, 39 ; 16 : 1-4 ; John 6 : 30 ; 1 Cor. 1 : 22. (24) Regard for human traditions: Matt. 15 : 9 ; Mark 2 : 23-28. (25) Insincerity: Matt. 15 : 7, 8 ; 21 : 25-31 ; Acts 24 : 26. (26) A controversial spirit: Matt. 22 : 15-40. (27) A murmuring spirit: Matt. 25 : 24. (28) Having no desire for God: John 5 : 42 ; Rom. 1 : 28. (29) Hatred of God and of Christ: John 15 : 22-25. (30) Hatred of the truth: Acts 7 : 51-54 ; 2 Thess. 2 : 10-12 ; 2 Tim. 4 : 3. (31) The power of the devil: Matt. 13 : 4-19 ; John 8 : 44 ; 2 Cor. 4 : 3, 4.

IV. GOD'S SINCERITY IN THE OFFER.

1. QUESTIONED. Because of this certainty that the mere outward call, or invitation, will not be successful, a question has arisen with some as to God's sincerity in making this outward call to those who do not accept. It is said that the fact that it is made by him, knowing that men will not accept it without his efficient grace, and yet not purposing to give that grace, argues insincerity in the offer.

2. ANSWERED. To this the following replies may be made: (1) If it be true that he does make the outward call and does not give to all, but to some only, the efficient grace, the very character of God is an assurance of his sincerity. The real question here then is an inquiry into these two facts. If they are taught in the Scriptures, it is impious and blasphemous to doubt God's sincerity. (2) This inquiry would never have arisen had God only made the general offer and left all men to perish in its rejection. But if so, his additional grace to some does not in any respect argue his insincerity in the partial grace thus shown to others. (3) The very nature of the gospel offer, as before stated, shows God's sincerity. It is one which has all the inducements for its acceptance which one can imagine, and that acceptance depends simply upon the willingness of each man to take it. (4) Lest any should doubt the sincerity of God, he assures us of that fact in his word. Paul describes him (1 Tim. 2 : 4) as one "who willeth that all men should be saved." God himself says (Ezek. 33 : 10, 11) : "And thou, son of man, say unto the house of Israel ; Thus ye speak, saying, Our transgressions and our sins are

upon us, and we pine away in them ; how then should we live ? Say unto them, As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked ; but that the wicked turn from his way and live ; turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways ; for why will ye die, O house of Israel ? ”

The attempt has been made by Lutheran theologians, and adopted by some others, to harmonize the sincerity of God's external call with the salvation of some only, by supposing that God gives equally to all his Spirit, which makes salvation effectual in some, but that those who reject the gospel resist the Spirit given to them, and thus refuse, while the others yield to it and thus are saved. They say, therefore, that it is thus true that all have the Spirit equally, and yet that the salvation of the saved may be said to be by the grace of God.

The natural objection to this explanation is that not only is the salvation of men ascribed to grace, but to grace alone, to the exclusion of all merit and work. (See Rom. 3 : 27-4 : 25 ; 9 : 11 ; Gal. 2 : 16.) But if some do not resist and others do, however much of grace there is, there is certainly some merit in those not resisting by which they can boast over others who resisted. Notice especially Rom. 4 : 16 : “ For this cause it is of faith, that it may be according to grace ; to the end that the promise may be sure to all the seed.”

Another objection is that the salvation to the saved is, as we shall see, distinctly based in the word of God on the election of some : “ Even as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blemish before him in love : having foreordained us unto adoption as sons through Jesus Christ unto himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace, which he freely bestowed on us in the Beloved ” (Eph. 1 : 4, 5, 6).

V. RESPONSIBILITY FOR REJECTION.

[A further question arises which ought to be settled at this point. It is as to man's responsibility in thus rejecting this offer of salvation. Nearly all, if not all, objections to the doctrines of grace are consciously or unconsciously based upon the idea that somehow man is not responsible for not receiving the offered salvation. It is said that his nature is such that he cannot accept the gospel. He is said to be dead spiritually, and hence powerless to do anything, even to accept. There is too, a very specious line of reasoning by which this apology for man is urged. But such reasoning, besides being contrary to every man's own consciousness, is contrary to the word of God, and it will not stand in the judgment. The Scriptures recognize, at the least, enough of free will and of power in man to make him responsible for his rejection of the offered salvation. He is treated by the Saviour as having such freedom as makes him responsible—a

freedom which is declared even to prevail often against the yearning heart and earnest efforts and influences of God. In Matt. 23 : 37 Christ says : "How often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens . . . and ye would not." *Ye would not*, YE WOULD NOT. In Acts 7 : 51 Stephen says : "Ye do always resist the Holy Ghost." The Scriptures are more full of such passages than they are of those which set forth man's helplessness. Moreover, they are plain and emphatic in their censure of men for their rejection of God's offers, while all efforts to excuse men for rejecting these offers have nothing for support except the speciousness of human logic. Then let "God be true and every man a liar." Any inability on man's part, any "*cannot*" of human nature, as Dr. Shedd well says, is at bottom only a guilty "*will not*." The true state of the case is as follows : All men are ruined by sin ; all are responsible in this ruin ; God has provided for all a way of escape ; he offers to all the way or plan thus provided. Up to this point there is no partiality manifested. No difference whatever appears in the fullness and freeness of the offer. And the offer, we know, is sincere, because God makes it. No speciousness of logic, no mental difficulties should make us question the plain teaching of the Scriptures upon these points. But the nature of man is such that where there is only this outward offer he is, without exception, sure to reject it ; and he is guilty in God's sight for the rejection. Did God stop at this point, therefore, Christ would have died in vain *so far as actually saving men is concerned*. None would accept. The whole world would remain in sin, without God and without hope, guilty and under condemnation. And as has been said, "If every one were so left no one would think of blaming God." But will God leave man thus ? Or will he do yet more ? And if he does yet more, will he be henceforth impartial ? or will he do for some more than for others ? This brings us to consider the doctrine of election and non-election as bearing upon the Holy Spirit's work with souls.]

CHAPTER XIV. ELECTION AND NON-ELECTION.

SECTION I. ELECTION.

The words Elect, Election, Foreordination, Chosen, Foreknow, and Foreknowledge, occur so frequently in Scripture that it is

allowed by all that the Scriptures teach a doctrine of election of some kind. The chief controversy is as to what that doctrine is. Several theories have been presented as descriptive of the instructions of the Scriptures.

I. LOCKE'S THEORY.

1. THEORY STATED. First, there is the theory set forth by the celebrated John Locke in his "Commentary and Paraphrase of the Epistles of Paul." It has been called the theory of Nationalism. According to this, election consists "in the choice of certain whole nations into the pale of the visible church catholic, which choice, however, relates purely to their privileged condition in this world, extending not to their collective eternal state in another world." Locke held that the cause of this election is, "That same absolute good pleasure of God, which through the exercise of his sovereign power, led him to choose the posterity of Jacob, rather than that of Esau, that upon earth they should become his peculiar people and be made the depositaries and preservers of the true religion."¹

2. OBJECTIONS. The objections to this theory are evident, and may be briefly stated: (1) The election spoken of in the New Testament is an election of persons within a nation, and not of the nation itself. A distinction is made between the Jewish nation and the remnant of them according to the election of grace (Rom. 11 : 5). It is also said in ver. 7 : "That which Israel seeketh for that he obtained not; but the election obtained it, and the rest were hardened."

Mr. Locke attempts to remove this difficulty by supposing that the Israel here spoken of is the whole nation before the loss of the ten tribes, and that the remnant is all of the rest that remained Jews at the time Paul wrote. But that the present nation was the Israel referred to, Paul himself shows by applying to it, in Rom. 10 : 21, the title of Israel. "But as to Israel, he saith, All the day long did I spread out my hands unto a disobedient and gainsaying people." The Israel to whom Isaiah, who is here referred to, went, was Judah; his prophecies were but seldom made to the ten tribes.

(2) A distinction is also clearly made by the Scriptures between persons in the same nation, the elect being separated from others, as in Matt. 24 : 22-24, where fearful calamities are foretold, and it is said that prophets shall arise, etc., and that if it were possible they shall deceive the very elect. The parallel

¹ "Faber's Primitive Election," p. 22.

passage is in Mark 13 : 20–22. (3) Against this theory may also be quoted such passages as show that the called and the elect are not identical, as Matt. 22 : 14 : “Many are called, but few chosen.”

II. FABER'S THEORY.

A modification of this theory has been made, or rather another one has been suggested so similar that the idea has evidently been caught from that of Locke. It is given by George Stanley Faber in his work on “The Primitive Doctrine of Election.” It may be called the theory of Church Election, or of External Church Privileges.

1. THEORY STATED. Mr. Faber states this theory as follows : “The idea is that of an election of individuals into the pale of the visible church, with God's moral purpose that through faith and holiness they should attain everlasting life ; but yet with a moral possibility of their abusing their privileges even to their own final destruction.”

2. SUPPOSED PROOF. The following arguments are offered in favor of this theory : (1) It is said that we never find one particular set of Christians addressed as being especially elect to the exclusion of all other Christians, who, together with the unconverted world at large, are thence exhibited as reprobates. But we constantly find that all the members of the local church addressed are collectively saluted as being in God's purpose and design elected through holiness to glory.” (2) In favor of this view it is asserted also that the apostle teaches us in Rom. 9 : 6–26, that the terms election and elect are used in the same sense in which they are used in the Old Testament ; and clearly in the Old Testament, election was into the pale of a visible church or theocracy. (3) Again it is said that the addresses to the churches contained in the letters of the apostles indicate the election of whole churches, and that consequently election must be merely to external church privileges. Dr. Faber does not cite the passages at length, because he thinks that any attentive reader, by attending to them, will readily perceive their palpably universalizing tendency. But he adduces as proof the beginnings of Romans, First Corinthians, Ephesians, Colossians, First and Second Thessalonians, and First Peter. (4) Yet again, three passages are adduced in which a whole church as such is styled elect, and it is argued thence that this is the scriptural meaning of election. These passages are 1 Peter 5 : 13 : “She that is in

Babylon elect together with you saluteth you." 2 John 1: "The elder unto the elect lady and her children," and ver. 13: "The children of thine elect sister salute thee." (5) A fifth argument is adduced from the parable of the laborers in the vineyard (Matt. 20: 1-16), and the marriage of the king's son (Matt. 22: 2-14). "These," says Faber, "contain the passages where the term elect or chosen first occurs, and in these parables the chosen, or the elect, are all those who so far obey the call of the gospel as to enter the pale of the visible Christian church." And in order to show that they are not secure there from destruction, the case of the man without the wedding garment is mentioned.

3. ARGUMENTS REFUTED. The foregoing arguments in favor of the Faber theory of election may all be answered as follows: (1) To his first argument, that "*we never find one particular set of Christians addressed as being specially elect to the exclusion of all other Christians,*" it may be replied, that this argument proceeds upon the erroneous supposition that there were persons called Christians in apostolic times who did not actually profess to be converted persons, and therefore were not properly to be regarded as such. Every argument in favor of a converted church-membership is an argument against this supposition, and therefore against this theory. All Christians were regarded as elect; and while the apostles knew that in all probability some were among them who ought not to be there, yet they did not undertake to pronounce infallibly upon the spiritual condition of those to whom they wrote. They simply addressed all Christians as if they were what they claimed to be—real children of God, holy, elect.

(2) As to his argument from an apparently *similar use in the Old and New Testaments* of the terms *election* and *elect*, it may be replied: *a.* If this is true, it favors the theory of Nationalism rather than this theory of "church election," or election to external church privileges. *b.* The apostle, however, himself distinguishes between the extent of the election which had *before existed* and that which *was now manifested*. "They are not all Israel who are of Israel." "Neither because they are Abraham's seed are they all children" (Rom. 9: 7); thus indicating that the limitation had been formerly made according to the national extent, but that now a segregation is made from this. The two elections, therefore, differ in extent. *c.* Besides, there is clearly taught, even in the Old Testament, an election of individuals—

an election, so to speak, within an election. The whole nation was elected to national privileges; but it was said: "In Isaac shall thy seed be called" (Rom. 9 : 7). The fact of an election to external privileges is then in no sense against an election of individuals to certain special privileges. This was true under the Old Testament. And hence, if it is admitted that the terms are used similarly in the New Testament, this would not in the least be opposed to an election of individuals to salvation.

(3) To the claim that "*the addresses to the churches, contained in the letters of the apostles, indicate the election of whole churches,*" and that, therefore, "*the election must be merely to external church privileges,*" it may be replied: *a.* Of all the Scriptures referred to, singular to say, none speaks of election in the addresses to the churches except Ephesians, the two Thessalonians, and First Peter. But the others all speak of the saints and of a calling to sanctification. The truth is that, as they professed to be God's children, the apostle, in the judgment of charity, speaks of them as such, and this is shown by the language of all the salutations as well as of the Epistles at large. *b.* The language in Ephesians is used as inclusive, not only of those to whom he wrote, but of himself also. It evidently is intended to refer to him and them as having like hopes and being partakers of like promises. That at least it is not intended to refer to the mere privilege of church membership is evident from the fact that the apostle speaks of these persons as "sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise" (1 : 13). They are spoken of also as having been "quickened" (2 : 1), as having been "dead through your trespasses and sins" (2 : 1), and as having been the "children of wrath even as the rest" (2 : 3). Such language scarcely comports with an address to those whom the apostle had not reason to believe to be converted persons. *c.* The Epistles to the Thessalonians, to which Faber also refers, are even more distinctly against him, for here we have not simply to infer what were the feelings which led to the expressions used by the apostle; but he himself tells us of the fact that he knew their election, and assigns the reasons of his belief. These are not because they enjoyed the outward privileges of the church, but because of their work of faith and labors of love and patience of hope, and because the gospel came not to them in word only, but also in power and in the Holy Ghost and in much assurance. *d.* As to the First Epistle of Peter it may be said, (*a*) That the elect spoken of are "sojourners of the dispersion in Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia,

Asia, and Bithynia." This at least creates the presumption that they had no special opportunities of church privileges. But this is doubtful. (*b*) They are, however, spoken of in chap. i, ver. 3, 4, 5, as begotten . . . "unto a living hope, . . unto an inheritance . . . reserved in heaven for you, who, by the power of God, are guarded through faith unto salvation." Again, they are spoken of (ver. 7, 8) as loving Christ, as believing in him and rejoicing with joy unspeakable.

(4) To the fourth point, in which three passages are adduced where *a whole church, as such, is styled "elect,"* and the claim made that therefore this is the scriptural meaning of "*election*," we answer: *a*. Of these passages it may be said that the application of any of them to a church is doubtful. This is evident, from any English version, of all except the first, and the literal rendering of that is, "The, from or in Babylon, that is elected with you, saluteth you." It would be bad to form a theory upon such doubtful passages. *b*. Admitting these, however, to have the meaning asserted, and that an elect church would be spoken of as such only with reference to the privileges thus conferred upon its members; it does not follow that this is the only sense which election can have. It must be shown not only that there is such an election, but that nothing else is spoken of under that name before this theory can be established as the only election taught. The truth is that the general nature of the terms elect, choose, etc., makes it practicable to have several kinds of election, and the nature of the election has to be decided by those declarations of its character and purpose which accompany it. *c*. Under any view of election, save that of Nationalism, it would be perfectly appropriate to apply the word elect to the body as such which is supposed to be composed only of elect members. Thus we often speak of Congress or of a State Legislature as the assembled wisdom of the State or country, because such is hypothetically its character; it being supposed to be composed of men who represent by their wisdom that of their constituents. So the church may be spoken of as elect, because being composed of those supposed from the best sources of knowledge to be the elect of God.

(5) To the fifth argument for Faber's theory, *that from the parable of the laborers in the vineyard, and the marriage of the King's son, we reply: a*. The first of these parables is merely instructive as to the fact of God's sovereignty, and as to his bestowment of blessings on whom he will. The phrase is added,

"many be called but few chosen," which is the key to the parable, and yet in nowise bears upon the subject under discussion, save to show that there are two classes, the called and the elect, and that the first comprises many, the latter few; facts which oppose the theory of the author, who claims that the elect are not the few that are saved, but are the same as the many who are called to the external privileges of God's truth. *b.* The second parable is even more distinctly against him. In it there are three classes: the first, those who are called, and pay no attention to the invitation to the feast; the second, those who enter to partake of it, who may be regarded as the ones gathered here on earth into earthly churches; the third, the class marked by the separation from among them of the one who had not on a wedding garment, which represents the self-deceived in Christ's earthly churches. Immediately after the order for his destruction is given by the king, it is added, "For many are called, but few chosen." Does not the word chosen here evidently point out those who are the saved, as distinguished from those who are outwardly privileged, either as the outwardly called who refuse, or the called who enter the church and enjoy its privileges? If so, the author's view of election is false.

These are the only arguments, that can properly be so called, that are advanced in favor of this theory, and the above statements fully show that the Scriptures nowhere teach the doctrine of election as thus set forth. The theory has been examined more at length than its own merits deserve, partly because it is not so generally known, but more especially because it has the sanction of a man of known ability and scholarship, though of admitted fanciful and unsound judgment.

III. THEORY OF ARMINIANS.

Finding now that election is in no respect merely one to external privileges, we pass to the third theory which has been suggested; that of perseverance in foreseen faith, set forth by Arminians of all classes. In connection with this idea of election is also taught a universal atonement, offered upon condition of faith to all persons, to each of whom is given sufficient grace to accept or reject it. Upon this acceptance or rejection, salvation depends.

I. THEORY STATED. This theory of election asserts that: (1) The salvation of individuals is the result of their own choice and perseverance. (2) The election made by God is simply an election

of a class, that is, of all persons who would believe. (3) So far as the election of individuals took place in eternity, it was only as God foresaw what would be the result of the election of a class. (4) That it is an election made upon condition that they would accept the offer of the gospel.

[In order the better to test the correctness of this theory it should be noted : First, that this theory recognizes no election on God's part of any individuals to salvation. It simply holds that God elected to give salvation to all that class who would believe. That is to say, between the different classes of people, believers and non-believers, he elected to save *believers*. Secondly, this theory does not even recognize the election by God of individuals for the bestowment of special sufficient and constraining grace and opportunities such as will certainly lead to belief. All are treated just alike ; all are given sufficient grace to believe, and it is left entirely with the individual whether he will believe or not. Thirdly, this theory makes the real ground of election only the faith which God foresees will be exercised. It does not place election at all in the sovereign will of God. Fourthly, it leaves altogether uncertain and contingent the number to be saved, except as God can figure this out in his foreknowledge. The number saved is in no sense a matter of God's sovereign will.]

2. OBJECTIONS. As this theory is just the opposite in every respect of the Calvinistic theory of personal, unconditional, and eternal election, it is better to put the two in direct contrast, and to proceed to the proof that the Scriptures teach the latter, and not the former.

IV. THEORY OF CALVINISTS.

1. THEORY STATED. The theory of Calvinists as to election is that *God* (not man) *of his own purpose* (in accordance with his will, and not from any obligation to man, nor because of any will of man), *has from eternity* (the period of God's action, not in time in which man acts), *determined to save* (not has actually saved, but simply determined so to do, and to save not merely to confer gospel or church privileges upon) *a definite number of mankind* (not the whole race, nor indefinitely merely some of them, nor indefinitely a certain proportionate part ; but a definite number), *as individuals* (not the whole or a part of the race, nor of a nation, nor of a church, nor of a class, as of believers or the pious ; but

individuals), *not for or because of any merit or work of theirs, nor of any value to him of them* (not for their good works, or their holiness, or excellence, or their faith, or their spiritual sanctification, although the choice is to a salvation attained through faith and sanctification; nor for their value to him, though their salvation tends greatly to the manifested glory of his grace); *but of his own good pleasure* (simply because he was pleased so to choose).

An analysis of the foregoing statement will show that this theory holds as to election, that: (1) It is an act of God, and not in any sense the result of the choice of the elect. (2) It has been with God an eternal purpose. (3) It is an election to salvation, and not to outward privileges. (4) This election, or choice, is one of individuals and not of classes. (5) It was made without respect to the action or merits of the persons elected. (6) It was made simply according to God's own good pleasure.

2. PROOF. Whether we should believe this doctrine or not depends entirely upon whether it is taught in the Scriptures. We have no other possible way of knowing anything upon the subject. We must therefore look to the Scriptures alone for the truth.

Before proceeding, however, with the direct proof that the doctrine of election, as stated above, is taught in the Scriptures, it should be remarked that the words election and elect are used in the word of God in various senses. They sometimes signify a choice to office, whether made by man or God. Compare: Luke 16 : 13 (Christ's choice of the twelve apostles), Acts 1 : 21-26 (the selection of an apostle in the place of Judas), Acts 9 : 15 (Saul as a chosen vessel), 1 Peter 2 : 6-8 (Christ spoken of as the corner-stone, elect, precious, etc.). They sometimes signify the choice of Israel to their peculiar national privilege of being the chosen, or separated, people of God: "The God of this people Israel chose our fathers" (Acts 13 : 17). Again they are used of a choice of salvation made by an individual: "Mary hath chosen the good part which shall not be taken from her" (Luke 10 : 42).¹

But in a large majority of cases these words have reference to the *choice of salvation* either in the purpose of God or the act of choice by God.

We will now take up the proof that the words are used in this

¹ Many will disagree with the author's exegesis of this passage. Other passages however, use the word in this sense of a "choice of salvation."

last sense. Our aim will be to sustain, point by point, the doctrine of election as stated above.

(1) *Election an act of God, and not in any sense the result of the choice of the elect.* The inquiry here is not an inquiry into the reason for the election, but simply as to the agent. The simple question now is, Does God choose the elect? We are not concerned at this point whether it is of his own purpose, or because he foresees that they will believe, or for any other reason. The sole question now is, Is the election an act of God? The fact on this point would appear more clearly if we were to exchange the common word choice or chosen with the equivalent word elect. The following passages are sufficient, though the examples are far more numerous. John 13 : 18 : "I know whom I have chosen." John 15 : 16 : "Ye did not choose me, but I chose you" (not to their offices as apostles, but) "that ye should go and bear fruit." Rom. 8 : 33 : "Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's chosen ones?" Rom. 9 : 15 : "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy." Eph. 1 : 4 : "Even as he chose us in him." Eph. 1 : 11 : "Having been foreordained according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his will." 2 Thess. 2 : 13 : "God chose you from the beginning unto salvation."

(2) *Election an eternal purpose, or choice, on God's part.* Another important fact to be shown is the eternity of election in opposition to the idea that it was in time. The proof on this point is two-fold. There are passages which show that the election took place before existence in this world or before the world began, and there are those which actually declare that it was eternal. Between the two classes of passages there is really, however, very little difference, as from the nature of the case, what took place before time must have been in eternity, and besides, the object of proof of an eternal election is simply to show that it was not dependent on human action, but simply on the will of God alone.

a. Those which show that the election took place before man's existence, or before the world began. Jer. 1 : 5 : "Before I formed thee in the belly, I knew thee, and before thou camest forth out of the womb, I sanctified thee." Matt. 25 : 34 : "Then shall the King say unto them on his right hand, Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world." Eph. 1 : 4 : "Even as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world." 2 Thess. 2 : 13 : "But

we are bound to give thanks to God alway for you, brethren, beloved of the Lord, for that God chose you from the beginning unto salvation in sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth." Compare also the language used as to the names written in the Lamb's book of life. Rev. 13 : 8 : "And all that dwell on the earth shall worship him [that is, the beast], every one whose name hath not been written in the book of life of the Lamb that hath been slain from the foundation of the world." Rev. 17 : 8 : "And they that dwell on the earth shall wonder, they whose name hath not been written in the book of life from the foundation of the world, when they behold the beast how that he was, and is not, and shall come." Referring to the adherents of the Lamb as persons "with him," it is said in ver. 14, "They . . . that are with him called and chosen and faithful." Rev. 21 : 27 : "And there shall in no wise enter into it anything unclean, or he that maketh an abomination and a lie : but only they which are written in the Lamb's book of life."

b. The passages which distinctly declare that this, which may be thus inferred to have been an eternal election, is really such : Eph. 3 : 11 : "According to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord." 2 Tim. 1 : 9 : "Who saved us, and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before times eternal."

(3) *Election to salvation, and not to mere external privileges.* The next point to be proved is that this is an election to salvation, and not to mere external privileges. This is proved by such passages as the following. John 10 : 16 : "Other sheep I have which are not of this fold ; them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice ; and they shall become one flock, one shepherd." John 10 : 26 : "Ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep." Ver. 27 : "My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me." Rom. 8 : 28-30 : "We know that to them that love God all things work together for good, even to them that are called according to his purpose." Paul now proceeds to tell who these are. "For whom he foreknew, he also foreordained to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren : and whom he foreordained, them he also called : and whom he called, them he also justified : and whom he justified, them he also glorified." This passage shows that foreknowledge, foreordination to holiness, calling, justification, and a state of glory, are inseparably connected, and hence that

the election from which they proceed is to salvation. Eph. 1 : 4-9 : This passage speaks of our being chosen before the foundation of the world, "That we should be holy and without blemish before him in love : having foreordained us unto adoption as sons through Jesus Christ unto himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace, which he freely bestowed on us in the Beloved : in whom we have our redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses, according to the riches of his grace, which he made to abound toward us in all wisdom and prudence, having made known unto us the mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure which he purposed in him." 2 Thess. 2 : 13 : After referring to others who were to have the same outward privileges, but upon whom God would send strong delusion, the apostle says in this verse, "For we are bound to give thanks to God alway for you, brethren, beloved of the Lord, for that God chose you from the beginning unto salvation," etc. 1 Peter 5 : 10 : "The God of all grace who called you unto his eternal glory in Christ," etc. Here the apostle is speaking of that effectual calling, which is the result of election, and tells us that it is a call unto eternal glory.

(4) *An election of individuals and not of classes.* This position needs to be explained. It is not denied that the elect are to be true believers, and that true believers are the elect. The character of the elect does not, therefore, enter into this question. The issue is simply, Does God choose all who shall believe? and are they as such, his elect? or, Does he choose his elect, and will they, as such, believe? Is belief the result of God's election, or is God's election the result of man's faith? Upon this point the proof is very clear. Acts 13 : 48 : "As many as were ordained to eternal life believed." This is a historical statement made subsequent to the event, not by man's knowledge, but by inspiration. Eph. 1 : 4, 5 : "Even as he chose us in him, . . . having foreordained us unto adoption as sons." 2 Thess. 2 : 13 : "But we are bound to give thanks to God alway for you, brethren, beloved of the Lord, for that God chose you from the beginning unto salvation in sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth." Here the choice is made to salvation, and the means to salvation, sanctification and faith, are indicated, no prerequisite or means being stated as to election. It is not as believers that they are elected, but as elected, that they are saved. Rom. 8 : 29 : "Whom he foreknew he also foreordained to be conformed to the image of his Son." The foreknowledge here is of persons, not of personal

acts, not of those whose faith he foreknew, nor, as would be essential to their theory, is it of the class of believers as such. The Arminian theory would require the substitution of the words "as believers," or "you as believers," instead of those which are used. It is not, therefore, to the class of believers, but to individuals, that election refers. But, it may be asked, does it not refer to them in that character? Did not God choose those whose faith he foresaw? This will be fully answered before this discussion is closed.

(5) *Without respect to the action or merits of the persons elected.* This is merely a negative form of the same fact stated by the next point affirmatively. It is better, therefore, to unite this with the succeeding one, which is,

(6) *Simply according to God's own good pleasure.* The last point to be noticed in this theory is that the election was made through the mere good pleasure of God. Of course it is not meant that God acted arbitrarily or capriciously in electing certain persons out of the universal ruin to make them the objects of his special constraining grace. God never acts without good and sufficient reasons. And if God had seen fit to tell us why he chose some, with the purpose that whatever the rest might do, these at least should certainly be brought to salvation, we should, doubtless, magnify and extol his wisdom in so electing. But he has not seen fit thus to explain. He has acted of his own sovereign will, according to his own good pleasure. One thing we do know, he has not made the election because of any action or merits of the persons elected. He has made it because, as sovereign, he had the right so to make it, and because, for reasons satisfactory to himself, it was his good pleasure so to do. Several classes of passages may be cited in proof of this point. Some of these simply affirm a choice by God's sovereign will; others, while asserting this, also deny merit in those elected; and still others represent the fact of sovereignty by asserting a choice of such persons as would not ordinarily be chosen. The following are some of the passages which prove these points:

a. Such as simply assert sovereign will. Such are Matt. 24 : 40-41 and Luke 17 : 33-36. These declare the sovereign choice of God by showing such choice exercised as to persons in the same situation, so that the one shall be taken and the other left; "two men on one bed"; "two women grinding at the mill"; "two men shall be in the field"; one of each shall be taken and the other left. John 3 : 3-8 : Regeneration is here spoken of as

essential to entrance into the kingdom of God. This precedes any act on which election is said by any to depend. Yet the sovereignty of God in this is declared in ver. 8: "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the voice thereof, but knowest not whence it cometh, and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit." John 6: 37, 39, 44, 64, 65: "All that which the Father giveth me shall come unto me. . . This is the will of him that sent me, that of all that which he hath given me I should lose nothing. . . No man can come to me except the Father which sent me draw him. . . Jesus knew from the beginning who they were that believed not, and who it was that should betray him. And he said, For this cause have I said unto you, that no man can come unto me, except it be given unto him of the Father." John 15: 16: "Ye did not choose me, but I chose you, and appointed you, that ye should go and bear fruit." The object to be attained cannot be the cause. John 17: 2: "As thou gavest him authority over all flesh, that whatsoever thou hast given him to them he should give eternal life." (See also ver. 6-12.) Acts 22: 14: Ananias says to Paul, "The God of our fathers hath appointed thee to know his will." Eph. 1: 5: In the fourth verse having referred to God's choice of us before the foundation of the world, he says in this fifth verse: "Having foreordained us unto adoption as sons through Jesus Christ unto himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace." In ver. 11 we are said to be predestinated to our inheritance "according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his will." James 1: 18: "Of his own will he brought us forth by the word of truth."

b. Such as deny merit in the persons elected as well as assert the sovereign choice of God. Ezek. 36: 32: In this passage, after describing the blessings connected with the new dispensation and the gift of the Spirit and the new heart which he would give them,—gifts which the Calvinistic theory regards as the result of election, but which the Arminian maintains to be its cause,—God adds: "Not for your sakes do I this, saith the Lord God, be it known unto you: be ashamed and confounded for your ways, O house of Israel." John 1: 11-13: "He came unto his own, and they that were his own received him not. But as many as received him, to them gave he the right to become children of God, even to them that believe on his name; which were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." In Rom. 9: 11-16 election is illustrated by

the case of the twins : " The children being not yet born, neither having done anything, good or bad, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth. . . So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy." Rom. 11 : 5, 6 : " Even so then at this present time also there is a remnant according to the election of grace. But if it is by grace, it is no more of works ; otherwise grace is no more grace."

c. Such as so describe the persons chosen as to imply this. Matt. 11 : 25, 26 : " At that season Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou didst hide these things from the wise and understanding, and didst reveal them unto babes ; yea, Father, for so it was well pleasing in thy sight." Luke 4 : 25-27 : Christ illustrates this sovereignty of God by mentioning that many widows had been in Israel, yet had only a heathen widow been blessed ; and again many lepers, and yet only a heathen leper cured. " Of a truth I say unto you, There were many widows in Israel in the days of Elijah . . . and unto none of them was Elijah sent, but only to Zarephath in the land of Sidon, unto a woman that was a widow. And there were many lepers in Israel in the time of Elisha the prophet ; and none of them was cleansed, but only Naaman the Syrian." Acts 26 : 12-23 : Paul's description of his personal condition at his conversion shows that God chose him not for his merits but from his own good pleasure. 1 Cor. 1 : 26-30 : " For behold your calling, brethren, how that not many wise after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called ; but God chose the foolish things of the world that he might put to shame them that are wise ; and God chose the weak things of the world, that he might put to shame the things that are strong ; and the base things of the world, and the things that are despised, did God choose, yea, and the things that are not, that he might bring to naught the things that are, that no flesh should glory before God. But of him are ye in Christ Jesus," etc. Gal. 1 : 15, 16 : Paul says, " When it was the good pleasure of God, who separated me even from my mother's womb, and called me through his grace, to reveal his Son in me, that I might preach," etc. Eph. 2 : 1-13 : The description of the condition of those who were dead in trespasses and sins, and in that state were quickened, proves that the quickening and salvation was due to no merit of their own.

The texts thus exhibited under these three classes prove con-

clusively that not on account of their own merits, but because of the good pleasure of God, does he choose men. They have been presented at some length, because this is after all the point upon which all that is important in this controversy turns. For, although other matters are equally essential to the doctrine, the whole opposition arises from an unwillingness on the part of man to recognize the sovereignty of God, and to ascribe salvation entirely to grace. This proof, however, has been by no means exhausted, the attempt having been to select some only of the numerous passages, and mainly such as from their conciseness allow of presentation in full. Let the Scriptures be read with reference to this doctrine, and every passage marked which indicates God's dealing with men as an absolute sovereign, and also every declaration which ascribes election or the fruits of it to his choice and not to the will or acts of men, and every illustration afforded that this is God's usual method, and it will appear that scarcely any book of Scripture will fail to furnish testimony to the fact that in the acts of grace, no less than those of providence, God "doeth according to his will in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth" (Dan. 4 : 3-5).

SECTION II. NON-ELECTION, OR SO-CALLED REPROBATION.

[From the doctrine of election the doctrine of non-election inevitably follows. If some are elected out of the mass of mankind for the purpose of bestowing upon them the special blessings of grace, then others are, of course, *not elected*, that is, are passed by in the bestowment of these special favors. Reason teaches that this must be true. It is clearly taught, as we shall see, in the Scriptures also.

This doctrine of non-election has been unfortunate in having been designated by the word *reprobation*. This word has come to carry with it a certain harshness and severity which do not at all pertain to the real doctrine of non-election. This doctrine has been equally unfortunate in the treatment given to it by some theologians. It has been made to look as if God really willed, of his own good pleasure, the death of the non-elect, just as he does the salvation of the elect. This is not the Scripture teaching as to non-election. God distinctly declares that he has "no pleasure in the death of him that dieth" (Ezek. 18 : 32). "As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked ; but that the wicked turn from his way and live" (Ezek.

33:11). And the Holy Spirit makes Paul, the great preacher of election and eternal decrees, expressly declare, in 1 Tim. 2:4, that "God, our Saviour, will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth." There can be no scriptural justification, therefore, for presenting the doctrine of non-election to salvation as if it were a special election of God's good pleasure to damnation.

1. THE DOCTRINE STATED. All that is meant by non-election, or so-called reprobation, is that for some reason, unknown to us, God does not bestow upon the non-elect certain special constraining grace as he bestows it upon the elect. Up to a certain point he seems to treat all precisely alike. He provided an atonement for all, he sends an unlimited offer to all; he issues a universal call; the invitation is to every one alike, "Whosoever will, let him come." But from this point we may see a difference. God becomes, so to speak, partial. He makes some—those whom he has elected—the objects of special grace. He sees to it that they are saved. Others, the non-elect, he leaves to their own choice and to all the consequences of their choice.]

There are two points involved in God's decree as to non-election: First, the decree not to elect some; and secondly, the decree to pass by in bestowing special constraining grace.

2. THE DOCTRINE PROVED. (1) *Decree not to elect some.* *a.* As already said, this is involved in the doctrine of election. The choice of some, and not of the whole, involves the non-election and thus the rejection of others. *b.* It is plainly taught in the Scriptures: (*a*) In such passages as declare salvation not to be attained because God has not given the means. These will be presented under the next general head. (*b*) In such as declare salvation not to be attained because men are not of the elect, as John 6:65: "No man can come unto me, except it be given unto him of the Father"; John 10:26: "Ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep"; 1 Cor. 1:26: "For behold your calling, brethren, how that not many wise after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called: but God chose," etc. (*c*) In all such passages as declare the preordination, or appointment, by God of these persons either to condemnation or destruction. Though not the direct result of this decree so as to be efficiently caused by it, these things yet prove the rejection of some who, under the circumstances thus accidentally arising, are thus preordained. 1 Peter 2:8: "A stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence; for they stumble at the word, being disobedient; whereunto also they

were appointed"; Jude 4: "There are certain men crept in privily, even they who were of old set forth unto this condemnation"; 1 Thess. 5:9: In this chapter the apostle tells of the evil that in the last day shall come upon certain ones, and then says: "For God appointed us not unto wrath but unto the obtaining of salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ." (d) In the illustrations from the twins, the potter, and the clay in the ninth chapter of Romans. (e) In the same chapter the words used are expressive directly of the truth involved. Rom. 9:18: "So then he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth." (f) The apostle was teaching this doctrine in the ninth chapter of Romans and in ver. 20 and 21 anticipated and answered the objection of one inquiring why God should punish those who are thus fulfilling his will, by saying: "Nay, but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why didst thou make me thus? Or hath not the potter a right over the clay, from the same lump to make one part a vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?"

(2) *Decree to pass by in bestowing special constraining grace.* That God does bestow many of the means of grace on many not to be saved is admitted; but what needs to be shown is that there are special effective means which distinguish the elect, and which are not bestowed on others.

The language of Scripture on this point is two-fold. There are passages which simply speak of the withholding of privileges, and others which seem to go beyond this and assert even a positive influence exerted apparently to keep men from the truth. The meaning of this latter class of passages will be examined when we come to speak of another point. At present they are presented as though they meant no more than the mere neglect to bestow these spiritual advantages. Deut. 29:4: "The Lord hath not given you an heart to know, and eyes to see, and ears to hear, unto this day." Job 17:4: "For thou hast hid their heart from understanding, therefore shalt thou not exalt them." 1 Sam. 2:25: After Eli had exhorted his sons to refrain from making the people of the Lord transgress, it is said, "Notwithstanding they hearkened not unto the voice of their father, because the Lord would slay them." Isa. 6:9: "Go, and tell this people, Hear ye indeed, but understand not; and see ye indeed, but perceive not." Rom. 11:7, 8: "That which Israel seeketh for that he obtained not, but the election obtained it, and the rest were hardened according as it is written, God gave them

a spirit of stupor, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear unto this very day." Matt. 13 : 11-15 : "Unto you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it is not given. For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have abundance; but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that which he hath. Therefore speak I to them in parables, because seeing they see not, and hearing they hear not, neither do they understand. And unto them is fulfilled the prophecy of Isaiah, which saith, By hearing ye shall hear, and shall in nowise understand; and seeing ye shall see, and shall in nowise perceive. For this people's heart is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes they have closed; lest haply they should perceive with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and should turn again, and I should heal them." The parallel to the first part is Luke 8 : 10, and to the last Mark 4 : 12. Similar passages also are in John 12 : 39, 40; Acts 28 : 25-27. 2 Cor. 3 : 15 : "But unto this day, whensoever Moses is read, a veil lieth upon their heart."

These texts will suffice when it is remembered that to the plain declarations here made, may be added the proof afforded by all those passages which, teaching that God bestows on the elect alone salvation, with such attendant blessings as without fail lead to it, show that these blessings are also withheld from the non-elect. At present it is assumed that this is done simply as an act of withholding. What is meant by this will be shown hereafter.

The question has been raised as to the two points considered above, whether the decree which has respect to them is positive or negative. By a positive decree is meant one which involves an actual direct exercise of the will of God. A negative decree is one in which the effect purposed flows as the result of the actual exercise of the will on something else.

The answer to this question depends upon the nature of the union of the different parts of the decree of non-election. By some theologians reprobation means the actual preordination to damnation of certain persons, just as effectively as the preordination of others to salvation by election. Others, conceiving this to be a false statement, have given to it the name of preterition. The great difficulty which these had to encounter, arose from the fact that while it is true that the mere neglect to bestow certain blessings on some, may take place without their being conceived of as in the mind, and may, therefore, be a mere negative act, the choice of some so necessarily involves the rejection of others as to require that rejection to accompany the act of choice. Rejection must, therefore, have accompanied election. In the very fact that some were chosen, was involved the rejection of others. (But even here it is not to be overlooked that rejection was not rejection from God's favor,

not from salvation, not from hope of mercy. Rejection has nothing to do with any of these. The loss of these results from sin.) But the intimate connection between chosen and not chosen does not exist in the bestowment of gifts and graces. These were simply conferred on those chosen, and not conferred on those not chosen. Hence no positive act of God occurs as to those not chosen. Consequently, it is better to divide this part of the decree and regard rejection as a positive act, and preterition in bestowing grace as a negative one.

(AA) SPECIAL DEALINGS WITH THE NON-ELECT.

CHAPTER XV. LEFT TO THEMSELVES.

[We have seen that, in God's work of salvation, he deals with men according to the principles of election and non-election. After reaching a certain point, his dealings with the elect are shown by the Scriptures to be very different from those with the non-elect. We will now undertake to follow God's special dealings with each of these two classes. We will take up first the case of the non-elect.

I. POINTS ALREADY NOTICED.

We shall do well to recall here the points already noticed as to the non-elect :

1. AMPLE ATONEMENT FOR THEM. First of all we saw, in studying the doctrine of the atonement, that ample atonement or expiation of sin had been made for them as well as for the elect. Whatever abundance of provision may have been made in the atonement for the elect, there was no lack of atonement for the non-elect. Christ is declared to be "the propitiation for our sins ; and not for ours only, but also for the whole world " (1 John 2 : 2). Special choice there may have been even in the atoning work of Christ, but lack of provision for any one there was not. "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish but have eternal life " (John 3 : 16).

2. UNIVERSAL INVITATION. So too, as we saw, there is a universal invitation. There is in the invitation to accept Christ not even a semblance of partiality. The command is to go into all the world ; the invitation is to every one alike. It is to any and every one who will hear. "Whosoever will, let him come." It could not possibly be made more general and more impartial than it is. Neither can there be any question that God is as sin-

cere in his offer of the gospel to the non-elect as he is in the offer to the most highly favored of all the elect. Whatever may be the difficulties that come to our minds on account of man's inability, and the certainty from God's point of view that the non-elect will not accept, we cannot for a moment impugn God's integrity by supposing that this commanded offer of the gospel to all men is not made by God in good faith and sincerity. There must be, there is, a true sense in which God has made provision for the possible salvation of all men, and for a generous, sympathizing invitation to all men to be saved.

II. WORK OF THE HOLY SPIRIT UPON THE HEARTS OF THE NON-ELECT.

As has been intimated heretofore also, there is even a direct work of the Holy Spirit upon at least some of the non-elect, moving them powerfully toward the acceptance of the gospel invitation. Few, if any, can say that they have never been under the Holy Spirit's influence. Some of those who are not saved have at times been the subjects of powerful conviction. So far as we can judge, the conviction in some of these cases has been as pungent and as deep as any conviction that we have ever known in persons who have accepted Christ. We cannot, of course, say that there is absolutely no difference between the conviction wrought by the Spirit in the hearts of those who are not brought to repentance and faith and that wrought in those who are thus brought. But there cannot be any question that the work upon the hearts of some of these who are thus moved, and yet never saved, is the convicting work of the Holy Spirit. The Scriptures give us cases of men under deep conviction asking what they must do. They abound in recognitions of the striving of God's Spirit with some who resisted and grieved him (Gen. 6 : 3 ; Acts 7 : 51 ; 24 : 25 ; *cf.* Ps. 51 : 11).¹

III. ABANDONMENT BY THE HOLY SPIRIT.

At this point of conviction, and sometimes before any real conviction is produced, the difference begins between God's dealings with the elect and the non-elect. The elect are not left to the natural results of their unwillingness to choose God. As we shall see, the Spirit of God strives with them, bringing them

¹ *Cf.* Buchanan, pp. 131-138; Strong's "Theology," p. 483; Andrew Fuller's "Letter to a Convicted Friend," in Fuller's Works.

always to conviction, regeneration, repentance, faith, justification, adoption, sanctification, and final perseverance. Not so with the non-elect. Concerning these God says, "My Spirit shall not always strive." After doing all for these that any one could claim, and far more, they are left to their fate. One of the most pathetic verses of the Bible is 1 Sam. 15 : 35, which says : "And Samuel came no more to see Saul until the day of his death, but Samuel mourned for Saul." For years this faithful servant of God had labored with this fickle and stubborn king of Israel. Time after time God sent his servant to Saul to bring him to his senses. Time after time impressions were made that seemed deep and powerful. There can be little doubt that Saul had been many times the subject of the moving of God's Spirit. But he resisted, he grew more and more stubborn, and hardened his heart against this pleading of God's messages and this working of that Spirit. At last the day came when God rejected him, and when messages of mercy and pleadings of the Spirit ceased. Samuel came no more to Saul to the day of his death. He was abandoned of God—left to his fate. Whatever may be thought of this individual case, we are bound to believe that God thus deals with souls in purely spiritual matters. There are men all about us who are given over of God to blindness and hardness of heart. They are left to their own courses and the consequences of their own choices. God is still able to save them ; his arm is not shortened that he cannot save them. But he does not. He leaves them to go their own way, to their own place. Had they been the subjects of election he would never have permitted them thus to go down to everlasting death. The resources of omnipotence would have been drawn upon to make them willing in the day of his power, and to save them from their doom. But for some reason he chose not to follow them up with his constraining grace to the point of bringing them to salvation. He elected to let them go their way. He leaves them to their fate. It is his sovereign right to do this. And he exercises this right. Why he does this we do not know. We are sure he does not act capriciously. He has some reason for so doing. But this reason he does not declare. It is to us an inscrutable mystery. But it is none the less a fact. God leaves some to perish, when as certainly as that he is God, he could save them if he saw it was best to do so.¹ If this seems to us in any way hard, we

¹ It will always, in this life, be an inscrutable mystery to us that, when God started

need to remember that it seems hard only by way of contrast with God's treatment of the elect. Had there been no elect, had God treated all exactly as he treats the non-elect, then there would have been no complaint of hardness. All would have said, here is justice, and that too not untempered with countless mercies.]

IV. THOSE THUS ABANDONED CONDEMNED FOR THEIR SINS.

This point does not need to be proved at present. Condemnation of man for the sins that he commits is too plainly taught in the word of God to admit of question. From this condemnation the elect are rescued by special grace, the non-elect are left liable to it, and consequently suffer from it. Subsequent chapters will abundantly sustain both of these positions.

V. HARDENING AND CONFIRMATION IN SIN.

1. PERMITTED AS TO ALL. One of the natural results of willful rejection of God and of sinning against him is the hardening of the heart and the confirmation of the nature in sin. This is a law of nature as certainly established as is any other law. The more the rejection of God is practised the greater becomes the indisposition for God's service, and the more set the soul becomes in sinning.

2. SPECIALLY EFFECTED AS TO SOME. As to some of the non-elect it has even to be said that their hardening is, in some sense at least, to be attributed to God himself. The language used in Scripture on this point is very decided. The only question is in regard to the meaning to be put upon it as to a single point. It is best to state the two positions recognized as true and then to add the other about which the discussion arises. The two positions admitted by all are: (1) That God is represented as hardening the heart, and (2) That this is done to the extent of permitting it to work out its own destruction, and not interfering to prevent the evil influences which would have that tendency. It is not necessary to present here the Scripture proof of these points, which is abundant, because it will plainly appear in connection with the one that follows.

(3) The third position, concerning which, as already intimated, discussion has arisen, is that God himself operates upon and af-

upon the work of saving the lost, he did not save all instead of some. He certainly was able to do this. But as Dr. Hovey says: "It is clear that God's purpose was not to see how many he could save." For there is no limit to his power.

fects the heart and faculties of individuals so that they are hardened against the acceptance of the truth of the gospel. This point is supported by many passages of Scripture and should be at least briefly considered. Concerning this position, it may be said :

a. If, upon examination of the Scriptures, this is seen to be God's teaching, we are bound in the simplicity of faith not only to receive it, but also to continue with firm confidence to believe and maintain that it is perfectly consistent with the character of God. The fact that we cannot show it to be so ought not to make us hesitate a moment after we are convinced that God has taught it.

b. But if so taught, it may be made to appear perfectly consistent with God's righteous action, and should be recognized as such. The contrary has been argued from the alleged fact that thus the sinner is prevented from accepting the gospel plan of salvation. But this is not true. His previous condition has already caused this. It is not any action of God withholding grace or conferring further disability that leads any man to reject the gospel. All are already in such a state of depravity that they will certainly refuse it. This is proved from the fact that those who reject the gospel are not only not confined to the hardened, but comprise all sinners, and that nothing can prevent this result but a positive act of God by which he rescues man from his evil nature as well as from its effects. The only evil then that arises to the sinner is that under these influences, he sins more freely or more flagrantly than he would otherwise have done, or that his sinful nature more rapidly develops itself. But if it be wrong in God to do anything by which this shall be accomplished, it will be wrong to cast man into hell ; for the change of state from this life to that undoubtedly has this tendency. This illustration suggests, indeed, what God under these circumstances is doing, which is nothing more than inflicting punishment on the individual because of his sin. He is a sinner in God's sight. His sin deserves punishment, and God punishes him by making his increased power to do wrong the punishment of the wrong already done. In this view of the doctrine it is nothing worse than one very commonly taught by Arminians as well as by Calvinists of all kinds, that of the closing of a day of grace, when the time comes at which the line is passed beyond which God no longer shows favor. That doctrine which asserts an eternal shutting out of light as the penalty of resistance to truth is of precisely the same nature

as this, the most objectionable form in which this point of reprobation can be presented.¹

c. But, again, the objections to this form of the doctrine arise simply from want of consideration as to the method of God's action, as well as from overlooking the language of Scripture elsewhere. Let these be regarded, and it will appear that God does not teach us that he directly hardens the heart of any. We must remember: (a) That there is a sense in which God is said to do everything that is done. Whatever happens must either be done by him or permitted by him, and must be done or permitted directly or indirectly, according as his action is immediate or through secondary means. Now it is the custom of the Scriptures to speak of God as doing whatever is done in any of these ways. If, therefore, we have no indications of the mode of his action, we cannot, from the mere declaration that the Lord did it, decide that he did it directly or indirectly, efficiently or permissively. Thus, Joseph said to his brethren, "It was not you that sent me hither, but God" (Gen. 45 : 8); and yet we know that these men were willing instruments of God. The Scripture declarations as to reprobation, or hardening, are not stronger than these which are thus used relative to other matters where we know that God only acted indirectly and permissively. (b) There are causes at work fully sufficient to accomplish all that God would thus purpose without requiring efficient and causal action. There are the sinful depravity of the heart and the wiles of Satan. It can hardly be supposed that, when the work to be done could thus be effected, God would not leave it to be thus done. (c) In James 1 : 13, 14, the apostle uses language inconsistent with the

¹ The following has been omitted from the text. It hardly helps one to accept the doctrine. It seems rather to make it needlessly harsh: "But again, whence are the influences which thus tend to salvation? Do they arise from the rights of man or from the claims which he as man may be said to have upon his Creator? Not at all. They are involved, not in creation, but in redemption. They are influences, therefore, which belong in the purpose of God to the elect only. This is true, whether we regard the atonement as particular or as general with a particular application. These influences, therefore, come to man simply as the chosen of God. God may withhold them from all others. He does withhold them from the heathen. He might withhold them from those to whom they are thus given. But if God may justly withhold them from any, he may, with equal justice, stay the hand that would be stretched out to take what he has intended shall not be given. So long as the things which he withholds or prevents man from taking are not things on which man has any claim, God cannot be charged with injustice in thus acting. Admitting this doctrine, therefore, in its worst form, it may be defended." The trouble about this statement is that God has invited all to accept the gospel. And it can hardly be said that God might *justly* "stay the hand stretched out to take," when he has made *special invitation* to stretch forth and receive.

idea that God efficiently leads to sin. "Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, and he himself tempteth no man: but each man is tempted, when he is drawn away by his own lust and enticed." (*d*) Whenever the heart is hardened as the result of any action of God, it is always as the result of merciful action, which should have had an opposite tendency. Thus was it with Pharaoh, and thus was it with the Jews in the time of Christ.

d. An examination of the passages which refer to the hardening of the heart will show that *some* expressly declare this hardening to have been by *means*, or by *the individuals* themselves; that *others* are explained by parallel or allied passages to have this meaning; and that in *others* there is nothing inconsistent with this view: (*a*) Passages which affirm this hardening to be the work of the individuals themselves. 2 Kings 17:14: The people of Israel carried away by the Assyrians are said to have hardened their necks like their fathers. (See also Neh. 9:16-29; Jer. 7:26.) (*b*) Passages which furnish explanations. To these belong the famous passages concerning Pharaoh. There could be no stronger expressions than those there used: *aa.* God foretells that he will harden Pharaoh's heart (Exod. 7:3). *bb.* It is expressly said that Pharaoh's heart was hardened (Exod. 7:13). *cc.* God declares that for this very purpose did he raise up Pharaoh that he might show his glory (Exod. 10:1, 2). *dd.* And yet Pharaoh is expressly declared to have hardened his own heart (Exod. 8:15, 32). Notice in this case the way of hardening: whenever the curse was sent, Pharaoh yielded; whenever it was removed, his heart was hardened. And that this was not an accidental connection is seen by the fact that in Exod. 9:34 it is said of Pharaoh that "when Pharaoh saw that the rain and hail and the thunders were ceased, he sinned yet more, and hardened his heart."

Another passage which has often been commented on is that in 1 Kings 22, where Ahab calls on his prophets and receives assurance of success (ver. 6). He sends for a prophet of God (ver. 7-9), who gives him the same answer (ver. 15), probably ironically, as Ahab immediately turns and says to him, "How many times shall I adjure thee that thou speak unto me nothing but the truth in the name of the Lord" (ver. 16). The prophet then proceeds to tell of the scattered house of Israel, as sheep that have no shepherd, thus foretelling evil. The king says to Jehoshaphat, "Did I not tell thee that he would not prophesy good concerning me, but evil?" (Ver. 18). Then the prophet proceeds to tell a vision wherein God is represented as wishing to destroy Ahab, and asking of all his hosts, who will persuade Ahab that he may

go and fall at Ramoth Gilead. And after various replies one spirit came and said that he would persuade him by being a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And the prophet adds: "Now, therefore, behold, the Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy prophets; and the Lord hath spoken evil concerning thee." This 1 Kings 22 : 21-23 is the place that is frequently referred to as a case of God's misleading Ahab. Independently of the fact that the prophet uses drapery for what he says, he tells the king distinctly God's will, and as his prophet who ought to be heard, declares the truth. This passage ought not to weigh for a moment in favor of the idea that God seeks effectively to harden, and thus to destroy.

Again we have a class of passages, for they are many, such as the one before referred to as showing reprobation (Matt. 13 : 11-15). This passage follows the Septuagint translation. The corresponding passages, Mark 4 : 11, 12 and Luke 8 : 10, follow the Hebrew of Isa. 6 : 9, 10, and are still stronger than Matthew. But Matthew may be taken as explanatory of the parallel and other like passages. The doctrine meant was so plainly understood that the language is not always guarded. It may not have been by Christ in its utterance. But we have here the intended meaning manifested in a single phrase, "and their eyes they have closed lest haply they should perceive," "and should turn again and I should heal them." The passage in Isa. 63 : 17 is easily explained in like manner: "O Lord, why dost thou make us to err from thy ways, and hardenest our heart from thy fear?"

c. Passages not inconsistent with this interpretation. There are yet other passages which, at first view, seem to throw the responsibility for the hardening upon God. But upon closer examination, and in view of what has been said, they are not at all inconsistent with the above ideas as to God's responsibility. The following are fair examples. Deut. 2 : 30: "But Sihon, king of Heshbon, would not let us pass by him: for the Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his heart obstinate, that he might deliver him into thy hand, as at this day." Acts 19 : 9: "But when some were hardened, and disobedient, . . he [Paul] departed from them." Rom. 9 : 18: "So then he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth." The example referred to here is that of Pharaoh, which, as we have seen, is a case of self-hardening under mercies.

(BB) SPECIAL DEALINGS WITH THE ELECT.

CHAPTER XVI. CONVICTION AND REGENERATION.

We have now seen the special dealings of God with the non-elect. We take up next his special dealings with the *elect*. At this point it may be said that partiality begins. God does far more for the elect than he does for the non-elect. As has already

been remarked, he does not leave the elect to the natural results of their unwillingness to choose God. "Having begun a good work" in them "he will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ." The Spirit of God strives with them, making them "willing in the day of his power." They are brought always, not only to conviction, but to regeneration, repentance, faith, justification, adoption, sanctification, and final salvation in heaven.

[SECTION I. CONVICTION.]

I. NEED FOR CONVICTION.

The first direct work of the Holy Spirit upon a soul for its actual salvation must be conviction for sin. Until this is done no attention is paid to the outward call, or invitation. An unawakened soul is callous to its own state. It has no real sense of needing a Saviour. It can hear the most tender invitations without any disposition to respond. It can hear the most terrible warnings without any sense of danger. Unregenerate sinners have often found entertainment and amusement only in the most graphic and fearful pictures of hell and eternal death. The soul dead in trespasses and sins needs to be brought under conviction before it can be saved. "When he is come, he will convict the world in respect of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment" (John 16 : 8). "Now when they heard this they were pricked in their heart, and said unto Peter and the rest of the apostles, men and brethren, what shall we do" (Acts 2 : 37). This was when the Holy Spirit was with them in mighty power.

II. NATURE OF CONVICTION.

I. NOT REGENERATION. Conviction is not regeneration. No one ever thinks of speaking of a soul under conviction of sin as a *regenerated* soul. As we have seen, a soul may experience conviction without ever being brought to regeneration. Some of the non-elect have been under terrible conviction of sin. We are apt to be misled here by our ideas of "*death*." Conviction is a certain sort of *quicken*ing, or making alive, so to speak. And there is a tendency to think that when this is the case the soul is no longer *dead*, but alive, regenerated. But spiritual death is not, like bodily death, a state in which there can be no sort of feeling or activity. The Bible shows that in spiritual death there may be intense feeling and activity of certain kinds. At the judgment and in perdition those who are dead spiritually are

keenly alive to suffering and deeply convicted of sin. The same may be true of a soul here. The Spirit of God may do much work upon a soul and produce much movement in a soul before that soul is brought to regeneration. There may be intense conviction without regeneration.

2. AWAKENING TO ITS TRUE CONDITION. A convicted soul is a soul awakened by the Spirit of God to a sense of its true condition. The eyes of the understanding are opened to appreciate the truths of God's word, and to see its own lost condition; the conscience is quickened so that it experiences a sense of sin; the feelings are aroused; and the cry comes, "What must I do to be saved?"

3. ALWAYS ANTECEDENT TO REGENERATION. This conviction of the soul is always antecedent to regeneration so far as adults are concerned. It may, as we have seen, stop short of regeneration. But regeneration never takes place without it.]

SECTION II. REGENERATION.

I. ITS NATURE.

1. VARIOUS TERMS USED. It is best first to collect together the various terms and expressions in which this whole matter is taught. (1) Forms of the verb *γεννάω* (*gennao*), which means "to beget" (John 1 : 13; 3 : 3, 4 (two places), 5, 6, 7, 8; 1 Cor. 4 : 15; Philem. 10; 1 John 2 : 29; 3 : 9 (two places); 4 : 7; 5 : 1 (three places); 5 : 4, 18 (two places)). (2) Compound forms of *γεννάω* (*gennao*). 1 Peter 1 : 23 : "Having been begotten again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, through the word of God, which liveth and abideth." Titus 3 : 5 : "He saved us through the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost." (3) The word *ἀπεκύησεν* (*apekuesen*) is used in James 1 : 18, and means to bring forth or bear young, and there evidently means to bring to the condition of sonship. (4) *κτίσις* (*ktisis*) and *κτίζω* (*ktizo*), which mean creation and create, are found in 2 Cor. 5 : 17; Gal. 6 : 15; Eph. 2 : 10, 15; 4 : 24. (5) *Συνεζωοποίησεν* (*sunezoopoiesen*), he quickened together with Christ (Eph. 2 : 5; Col. 2 : 13). (6) In addition to the above uses of single words are the following passages which speak of the word of God as an effective instrument, but not as a creative power. These, however, do not connect this instrument with either regeneration or conversion necessarily; but speak of it, *a.* as a

means of partaking of the divine nature (2 Peter 1 : 4); *b.* as a means of purifying (John 15 : 3); *c.* as a means of Christian defense (Eph. 6 : 17); and *d.* as an instrument of powerful conviction and destruction of the wicked (Heb. 4 : 12).

[2. WHAT SIGNIFIED. From the various terms and from the full teaching of the Scriptures we learn that regeneration is :

(1) *A work of God.* There is no co-operation on man's part. The regenerated soul is said to be "born again," "born from above," "born of water and of the Spirit," "born of the Spirit" (John 3 : 3 ff.); "born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God" (John 1 : 12).

(2) *A radical change of disposition.* In this work of God upon the soul a change is effected in the radical or ruling principle or disposition of the soul. "The carnal mind is enmity against God," "it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." The prevailing disposition of the unregenerate soul is opposed to God. But this is changed in regeneration from *opposition* to *loyalty*, "Wherefore if any man is in Christ, he is a new creature: the old things are passed away; behold they are become new. But all things are of God, who reconciled us to himself through Christ" (2 Cor. 5 : 17, 18). Regeneration is understood by some to mean the actual addition of some kind of new nature—the addition of some new *substance* to the nature of man. This, however, seems to be a mistake. As Dr. E. H. Johnson well says: "It is not a quantitative, but a qualitative change." There is the same soul, there are the same faculties and powers. There is only some kind of radical change or transformation in the character or disposition of the soul. The ruling principle of the soul is *changed*. The prevailing motive or tendency is *changed*. There is a reversal of the natural sinful disposition, and henceforth the controlling principle is love and loyalty to God. The regenerate person becomes a temple for the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.]

II. HOW EFFECTED.

The Scripture teaching is that God operates *immediately* upon the heart to produce the required change, by which it is fitted to receive the truth, and *mediately*, through the word and other agencies, in its reception of that truth.

I. IMMEDIATELY UPON THE HEART. He operates immediately upon the heart to prepare the way for the truth. This is evident from the following considerations :

(1) From the description given of man's spiritual condition. *a.* As spiritually dead (Eph. 2 : 1). *b.* As blind (Eph. 4 : 18). *c.* As slaves to sin (John 8 : 34 ; Rom. 6 : 17, 19). *d.* As needing deliverance from the powers of darkness (Col. 1 : 13). *e.* As incapable of knowing or discerning the things of the Spirit (1 Cor. 2 : 14 ; Eph. 4 : 18). *f.* As incapable of changing himself (Jer. 13 : 23). *g.* As defiled in conscience (Titus 1 : 15). These passages show man in a condition from which he must be rescued even to understand and appreciate the truth of God.

(2) The Scriptures attribute the birth to the will of God exclusively, thus showing that in some aspect it is not to be regarded as due to the reception of the truth (John 1 : 13).

[For sections (3), (4), (5), and (6), see Hodge's "Outlines," p. 451.]

(3) The influence of the Spirit is distinguished from that of the word (John 6 : 45, 64, 65 ; 1 Cor. 2 : 12-15 ; 1 Thess. 1 : 5, 6).

(4) A divine influence is declared to be necessary for the reception of the truth (Ps. 119 : 18 ; Acts 16 : 14 ; Eph. 1 : 17-20).

(5) Such an internal operation on the heart is attributed to God (Matt. 11 : 25 ; Luke 10 : 21 ; Phil. 2 : 13 ; 2 Thess. 1 : 11 ; Heb. 13 : 21).

(6) The nature of this influence is evidently different from that effected by the truth (Eph. 1 : 19 ; 3 : 7 ; 2 Tim. 2 : 25).

(7) This influence is spoken of as a preparation of the heart for the truth ; which therefore must be distinct from the truth or its reception (Luke 8 : 8, 15 ; Acts 16 : 14). And there can be no doubt that this preparation of the heart comes from God (1 Chron. 29 : 18, 19 ; Ps. 119 : 18 ; Prov. 16 : 1 ; Acts 16 : 14 ; Rom. 9 : 23).

2. *MEDIATELY.* (1) *Through the word.* The Spirit acts mediately through the word. *a.* He inspired that word and sends it forth for the accomplishment of the ends designed (John 14 : 16 ; 2 Tim. 3 : 16). *b.* He aids the ministry and others in making it known (1 Cor. 4 : 7 ; 2 Thess. 3 : 1). To the extent that these are his agents he uses the word.

The instrument thus used is in itself effective as truth (Heb. 4 : 12). Therefore Christians are commanded in their spiritual warfare to take the word of God as the sword of the Spirit (Eph. 6 : 17). It is, however, made especially so to the heart prepared for it by his illuminating influences, which reveal its beauties and its suitableness, and by the aid of the memory which recalls, and the conscience which applies, and the affections which lay hold upon it (2 Tim. 3 : 15, 16, 17).

Christians are therefore said to be "brought forth by the word of truth" (James 1 : 18), because that is the seed sown in the prepared ground through which they are led by repentance and faith to union with Christ and sonship of God.

(2) *Through other agencies.* The Spirit of God is not limited to the word alone, but uses such other truth and such events of life as may be effective toward the contemplated end. Thus any events in God's providence, such as afflictions, or dangers, or personal sins, or the conversion of others, or aught else that may lead to seeking God, are used as a means of awakening, or of giving deeper conviction, or of enforcing the Scripture truths which lead to regeneration and conversion.

This is especially true of the ordinances of baptism and the Lord's Supper duly set forth before mankind. So far as these ordinances are fitted to convey truth, or to impress duty, they are instrumental in regeneration. But neither of these regenerates or confers regeneration.

The Lord's Supper does not regenerate. It has been argued from John 6 : 51-58, where Christ promises eternal life to those who shall eat his flesh and drink his blood, and denies it to all who shall not. The language used refers to spiritual participation in his salvation. It is similar to the promise to the woman at Sychar that, "Whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him shall never thirst ; but the water that I shall give him shall become in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life" (John 4 : 14). It is argued that Christ must have meant the partaking of his real body, because he did not correct the Jews who, because they so understood him rejected him. But in John 8 : 51-53 he did not correct a similar mistake which led to a similar result when he said in ver. 51 : "If a man keep my word he shall never see death."

Baptism does not regenerate. Spiritual effects are indeed spoken of in connection with this ordinance. Thus we have "the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost" (Titus 3 : 5). We have Paul exhorted by Ananias in Acts 22 : 16 : "Arise and be baptized and wash away thy sins," and the language of Christ in John 3 : 5 : "Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." But the first of these has reference to the cleansing influence of regeneration by the Spirit in like manner as his renewing, which is spoken of in the immediate context, and has no reference to baptism. That the last refers to baptism is at least doubtful ; but admitting that it does, which is doubtless true of the second, we have here outward baptism, only as symbolizing an inward change and not producing it. The following reasons plainly show that neither of these ordinances has regenerating power :

- a. The ordinances can only be signs of grace and cannot confer it.
- b. They may convey truth symbolically, and only such truth is fitted to affect the mind. But nothing symbolized by these two can confer regeneration upon those receiving them.
- c. They are appointed to be used only by those who have been regenerated.

Baptism is an act of obedience, symbolizing the death of believers to sin, and resurrection to new life, and setting forth their union with Christ in his death and burial. The Lord's Supper is to be partaken of by those already, as Christian believers, united together in church fellowship. (a) That this was the use of baptism is evident from the practice of the apostolic Christians (Acts 2 : 41). The baptized had received his word. This followed repentance and preceded baptism. The addition to the text in Acts 8 : 37 could not have taken place had it not been for the universal prevalence of the idea that faith necessarily precedes baptism. Paul before his baptism had received the Lord Jesus, and his eyes had been opened and the Holy Ghost given (Acts 9 : 18). Cornelius and his house also received the Holy Ghost and spake with tongues before their baptism (Acts 10 : 44-48). The jailer at Philippi manifestly believed before he was baptized. Baptism without antecedent faith was treated as invalid in certain disciples at Ephesus (Acts 19 : 1-5). (b) That this was also true of the Lord's Supper is shown by the fact that it was partaken of only by churches, and the members of churches are everywhere spoken of and treated as converted persons ; also by the further fact that it was a memorial service ("in remembrance of me"), and a memorial implies previous knowledge of the persons and facts remembered. But only such a knowledge and remembrance could be blessed as involved faith in Jesus (1 Cor. 11 : 28, 29).

d. The Spirit does not make truth effective by giving it additional force to that which it has naturally, but by so affecting the mind that the man is prepared to receive it with its own due force. Thus he changes the mind, illuminates the mind, helps it to appreciate and lay hold of truth. Only thus does he make truth effectual. Therefore the outward washing or partaking can have no effect to renew or regenerate the heart, which must itself have been prepared, before it can even appropriate the truths conveyed by these ordinances.

The above statements are only intended to meet the views of Romanists, and such others as claim regenerating influence of sacraments, and not those of such as make baptism only a condition of pardon. The latter claim that regeneration is through the word only, and are met by the proofs that the Spirit acts independently of the word.

CHAPTER XVII. CONVERSION, OR REPENTANCE AND FAITH.

The term conversion is not technically applied to any change, except that which follows upon regeneration, and consists in the Godward turning of one heretofore turned entirely away from God. The return of men who have backslidden, or fallen into grievous sin, is also called "a return to God," and such a return is possibly what is called "conversion" in Peter's case (Luke 22 : 32). But conversion is theologically used exclusively of the first act.

This conversion is the result of regeneration. The new heart is prepared to turn to God and does actually so turn. Without regeneration the sinfulness of man keeps him away from

God, causes him to set his affections upon self and his own pleasure, and to find gratification in things which are opposed to God and holiness. The regenerated heart has new affections and desires and is, therefore, fitted to seek after God and holiness.

Unlike regeneration, which is a work of God alone upon the soul, conversion is described as the act both of God and of man co-operating with him.

1. IT IS THE ACT OF GOD. It is thus described in the Scriptures. 1 Kings 18 : 37 : "Thou hast turned their heart back again." Ps. 80 : 3 : "Turn us again, O God ; and cause thy face to shine, and we shall be saved." Ps. 85 : 4 : "Turn us, O God of our salvation." Song of Sol. 1 : 4 : "Draw me ; we will run after thee." Jer. 30 : 21 : "I will cause him to draw near, and he shall approach unto me." Jer. 31 : 18 : "Turn thou me, and I shall be turned." Ezek. 36 : 27 : "And I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments, and do them." John 6 : 44 : "No man can come to me, except the Father which sent me draw him."

2. IT IS THE ACT OF THE REGENERATED HEART actively co-operating in thus turning. Deut. 4 : 30 : "Thou shalt return to the Lord thy God." Prov. 1 : 23 : "Turn you at my reproof." Hosea 12 : 6 : "Therefore turn thou to thy God." Isa. 55 : 7 : "Let him return unto the Lord." Joel 2 : 13 : "Rend your heart, and not your garments, and turn unto the Lord your God." Acts 11 : 21 : "A great number that believed turned unto the Lord."

So far as conversion is the willing activity of man it comprises, or is made up of, the two acts of scriptural repentance and faith. It is not a mere outward reformation. Neither is it a simple return from backsliding. It is the turning of the heart from sin in sincere repentance and the turning of the soul to God in simple Christian faith.

A man in one sense may be called converted as soon as he has truly turned to God and is also seeking to know and do his will. This is that amount of conversion which is so nearly contemporaneous with regeneration as to be liable to be supposed to exist at the same moment with it, and which indeed in a being capable of thought on such subjects must be its immediate effect. But what the Scriptures and our common language comprise in this work is repentance and trust in God's saving power, and, in connection with Christian knowledge, trust in Jesus Christ as a Sav-

our. The attainment of the fullness of such conversion is by the gradual appreciation of truth, resulting not only from regeneration and knowledge, but from spiritual illumination of the mind.

SECTION I. REPENTANCE.

I. ITS NATURE.

The Scripture doctrine of repentance is to be learned in part from the meaning of the original Greek word used to express it, and in part from the general teaching of the Scriptures concerning it.

I. THE WORDS USED. There are two forms of words used in the New Testament which are translated repent and repentance. Only one of these is used of the repentance associated with salvation from sin. This is the verb *μετανοέω* (*metanoëo*), and the corresponding noun *μετάνοια* (*metanoia*). The other verb is *μεταμέλομαι* (*metamelomai*), the noun of which does not appear in the New Testament, but occurs in the Septuagint in Hosea 11 : 8. The verb is used in the Septuagint in Ps. 110 : 4 and Jer. 20 : 16. It is also the word used in the New Testament in Matt. 21 : 29, which says of the son who refused to obey his father's command to work in the vineyard, "Afterward he repented himself and went." It likewise is found in Matt. 21 : 32 and 27 : 3, this latter being the case of Judas. Paul uses it in Rom. 11 : 29, and 2 Cor. 7 : 8, 10. It is also the word used in Heb. 7 : 21. In all other places, translated "repent" and "repentance" in the New Testament, the original is *metanoëo*, or *metanoia*.

(1) *Μετάνοια* (*metanoia*). This word means to reconsider, to perceive afterward, and hence to change one's view, mind, or purpose, or even judgment, implying disapproval and abandonment of past opinions and purposes, and the adoption of others which are different. In all cases of inward change there is not necessarily a change of outward conduct, nor is such inward change accompanied necessarily by regret. These results of the inward change would flow from the nature of that about which that change has risen.

(2) *Μεταμέλομαι* (*metamelomai*). This word means to change one's care, to regret, the idea of sorrow always accompanying it. The two words are nearly synonymous in their secondary meaning, and each is used in this secondary meaning in the New Testament. *Μετανοέω* (*metanoëo*), however, traces the feeling of sorrow and the change of life back to an inward change of opinion

and judgment as to the nature of sin and holiness, and of the relations of man and God. It is perhaps on this account that it is exclusively used for true repentance in the New Testament. This is not simply sorrow or remorse, which may pass away, or lead in despair to other sins, or fill the soul with anxiety; but a heartfelt change in the inward soul toward God and holiness, which is lasting and effective, and which may be associated with peace and joy in believing.

[2. GENERAL SCRIPTURE TEACHING. From the general teaching of the Scriptures concerning repentance, in connection with the words just referred to, we may gather that it is:

(1) *An intellectual act.* There is, as we have seen, a change of mind—a change of opinion as to one's condition or course. The natural state of the sinner is well portrayed in the lines:

In evil long I took delight,
Unawed by shame or fear.

But the time comes when there is a change. This life of sin and the sinner's relations to God are viewed differently. There is a change of mind as to these things.

(2) *A change of feeling.* One cannot really change his opinion about a thing without having also a corresponding change of feeling. The feelings are bound to correspond with the intellectual beliefs and convictions. Of course the intensity and the strength of feeling will depend largely upon the peculiar nature of the person who has the experience. But a change of feeling must inevitably follow a change of mind.

(3) *A change of will.* If the feelings, or emotions, become strong enough, there will follow a change of action. Just here lies the test of any change of mind on the subject of sin. If the change does not reach to the production of a change in the life, it cannot be called scriptural repentance. A soul may see things very differently from the way in which it once saw them; and, as the result of this, its feelings may be very different. But unless the change of opinion and the change of feeling lead to a change of will and a change of living—a turning away from sin—there is no true repentance. The prodigal not only "came to himself," that is, *saw things differently*, he not only *felt differently*, but he said, "I *will* arise and go to my Father." And he arose and went to his Father. He turned away from sin. The change of mind and of feeling led to a change of purpose and of action. Here

we find the answer to the question, How much feeling must one have in order to have true repentance? Enough certainly to make him arise and go to the Father. Nothing short of this will do. More than this is not *required*, however natural more of it may be. An analysis of the general teaching of the Scriptures on this subject will show that the above is the nature of true scriptural repentance.]

II. ITS AUTHOR.

The Scriptures teach that the author of true repentance is God, operating by truth upon the renewed heart. Acts 5 : 31 : Christ is said to have been exalted "to give repentance to Israel, and remission of sins." Acts 11 : 18 : "Then to the Gentiles also hath God granted repentance unto life." The means used is the preaching and other exhibition of the truth. Repentance, like faith, comes through the hearing of the word. By this men are exhorted to that duty and gain the knowledge of the truths taught by God, through spiritual apprehension of which men are led to the truth.

SECTION II. FAITH.

As disbelief was so prominent in the sin of the first Adam, so faith is most prominent in the redemption through the second Adam. It holds an important connection with every act and condition of salvation. It is by faith that men come into vital union with Christ, through faith that they are justified, through faith that they can acceptably worship, through faith that the Christian lives, through faith that his sanctification progresses, it being the means of his conquering the world, of his exercising hope in the future, and becoming more and more identified with Christ in his spiritual reign here and hereafter. These facts evince its importance and the necessity of fully understanding what is meant by it.

I. ITS NATURE.

Faith corresponds with our words belief and trust : with belief, so far as it refers to the acceptance of facts and statements, or of the veracity of a person ; with trust, so far as a person or object is made the foundation of reliance. We believe a fact, a statement, a person ; we trust or rely upon that fact, statement, or person as something upon which we build. In the one case we have faith in, in the other we put faith in.

The noun *πίστις* (*pistis*) and the verb *πιστεύω* (*pisteuo*) are used in each of these senses in the Scripture, and also in the two unitedly. In the sense of mere *belief of the truth* either savingly or otherwise: 2 Thess. 2 : 13 ; Heb. 10 : 39 ; John 2 : 22 ; John 5 : 46 ; Acts 26 : 27 ; James 2 : 19. In the sense of reliance or trust : John 2 : 24 : "Jesus did not trust himself unto them." John 7 : 5 : "For even his brethren did not believe in him." 2 Tim. 1 : 12 : "I know him whom I have believed."

But *the almost invariable usage of the New Testament includes both elements*, the belief of a person and of the facts about him, and reliance upon them and him for salvation.

The difference between these three forms of belief is apparent.

1. Mere belief may be weak and motiveless, and thus it may result in indifference as to action ; or it may be a mere opinion, the holding or not holding of which is not felt to be a matter of consequence ; or it may be a mere notion, taken up without sufficient evidence.

2. Mere trust in a person or thing may result from confidence in the word of another, or in the actions of others, or from something in our experience teaching us that we may venture, though we know no reason why we should thus trust. Thus some one tells us that this is the train we wish to take, or we go over a bridge over which others have gone, or we ford a stream through which we see by tracks that others have driven. Here our trust is much more, if not altogether, in the testimony of others than in any knowledge of or confidence in that to which we commit ourselves.

3. It is only through the combination of the two that we have faith, which must be an intelligent trust. By it we believe not only in him upon whom we trust, but we do so because we believe the facts which make him trustworthy.

Hence it is that the Scriptures use it in the two-fold sense, uniting the two ideas in the case of believers in Christ, because not only do they rely upon Jesus, but, from the belief of the facts concerning him taught in God's word, they know whom they have believed and why they should believe him.

Christian faith, therefore, is *personal reliance upon Christ for salvation because of belief of God's testimony both as to our sinful and ruined condition, and as to what Christ has assuredly done to save us*.

It is sometimes referred to in Scripture in the following figurative ways : As looking to Christ (Isa. 45 : 22 ; Micah 7 : 7). As illustrated by the uplifted serpent (John 3 : 14, 15). As coming to him (Isa. 55 : 1 ; Matt. 11 : 28 ; John 6 : 37, 44, 45, 65). As fleeing to him and laying hold upon him (Heb. 6 : 18). As eating and drinking him (John 6 : 51-58). As receiving him (Col. 2 : 6).

[II. AMOUNT OF BELIEF AND TRUST NECESSARY.]

We have seen that true faith involves *belief of* certain truths and *personal trust* in God, and in the Lord Jesus Christ. An important question arises in this connection as to *how much of God's truth* one must believe, and as to *how fully one must trust* in order to be saved.

I. AMOUNT OF BELIEF NECESSARY. It is very clear that the belief of *some* truth about God and Christ is necessary. For without this there can be no personal trust. But how much must one believe? Is it necessary that one have actual conscious belief of every truth taught in God's word? If so then there are few that are saved indeed. It must be true that there are certain great fundamental and essential truths which one must believe. There are certain truths in God's word as to which it will be ruinous for one to make a mistake. A person may fail to grasp, or possibly even fail to believe, some things that are taught, and yet not lose his soul. But failure to believe some things—a *mistake even* as to some things, will be fatal. For example: "He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him" (Heb. 11 : 6). One cannot possibly be saved who does not believe that there is a God in whom he may trust or a Saviour to whom he can look for salvation. Again, the duty of repentance and faith is made, in God's word, so plain that one who does not have practical belief in this requirement cannot possibly be saved. "Except ye repent ye shall all likewise perish" (Luke 13 : 3). "Without faith it is impossible to please God" (Heb. 11 : 6). "He that believeth not the Son shall not see life" (John 3 : 36). From passages like these, and from the very nature of the case, it is clear that there are certain great fundamental truths which absolutely must be believed, if one is to be saved. For, as already stated, the possibility of personal trust in God and Christ is conditioned upon an acceptance of such truths. And herein perhaps we have the suggestion of a sufficient answer to the question, "How much of truth must one believe in order to be saved?" He must believe, at the least, enough to enable him to exercise personal trust. Without this there can be no salvation. When one reaches this point of personal trust in the Lord Jesus Christ for salvation, he is saved, although the rest of his creed may be very defective or erroneous. "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life" (John 3 : 36).

2. AMOUNT OF TRUST NECESSARY. It is a serious question with many as to how fully Christ must be trusted in order to be saved. They are conscious of imperfect trust, and they ask, Can I be saved when my trust is so far from what it ought be? They sing :

'Tis a point I long to know ;
 Oft it causes anxious thought :
 Do I love the Lord, or no ?
 Am I his, or am I not ?

And there is too, as much anxiety about the *trust* as there is about the love, oftentimes even more.

To this question it may be answered that the Bible nowhere requires *perfect* faith that one may be saved. Christ had occasion many times to rebuke his immediate disciples for their imperfect trust in him, as well as for their imperfect belief of his truth, and yet there is no hint that their actual salvation was endangered on this account. Complete trust is very important for personal peace and comfort, but it is not made anywhere a condition of salvation.] That this is true is evident from the following considerations : (1) This fullness of trust is not usually the experience of an early, but of an advanced stage of Christian life. (2) It is not *perfection of trust* that is the object of Christian faith. That object is Christ and the statements of God's truth concerning him and salvation. We are nowhere told to believe in the *perfection of our trust*, but simply to trust Christ for our salvation. That trust may be strong or it may be weak. The real question, and the only question, so far as salvation is concerned, is, Are we *really trusting Christ to save us* ? Are we actually depending upon him ? (3) The Scriptures give an example in Paul of a true Christian who could say : " I buffet my body and bring it into bondage ; lest by any means, after that I have preached to others, I myself should be rejected " (1 Cor. 9 : 27 ; see also Phil. 3 : 12-14). (4) The exhortations addressed to those who were already believers, to attain to assurance as a degree of faith beyond that which they already enjoyed, are proof that some were recognized as saved who did not have perfect faith.¹ (5) This has also been the experience of God's people in all ages.²

Before leaving this subject it should be remarked :

First. This fullness of trust, although not a part of saving faith, may be

¹ Hodge's "Outlines," p. 478.

² *Ibid.*

attained by Christians, and it has no doubt been frequently attained. For, *a.* This is directly asserted (Rom. 8 : 16 ; 2 Peter 1 : 10 ; 1 John 2 : 3 ; 3 : 14 ; 5 : 13). *b.* Scriptural examples are given of its attainment, as Paul (2 Tim. 1 : 12 ; 4 : 7, 8). *c.* Many eminent Christians have enjoyed an abiding assurance, of the genuineness of which their holy walk and conversation was an indubitable seal.¹

[*Secondly.* Although not essential to salvation, it is nevertheless a thing greatly to be desired and sought after. For, *a.* In proportion to the largeness of trust will be the personal peace and joy of the believer. Fear or doubt means torment. No Christian can be at peace, and less still can any Christian be in the enjoyment of religion, who is tormented by the question of his personal salvation. It is only when one can "bid farewell to every fear" that he can sing :

'Tis religion that can give
Sweetest pleasures while we live ;
'Tis religion must supply
Solid comfort when we die.

b. As a rule also the efficiency of a Christian for service depends largely upon the boldness and fullness of his trust.]

Thirdly. The grounds upon which this assurance of salvation and the consequent peace and joy can be secured are : *a.* Belief in the divine promises of salvation. *b.* Inward evidences of those graces because of which those promises are made. *c.* The testimony of the Spirit of adoption (Rom. 8 : 15, 16), witnessing with our spirits that we are children of God, which Spirit (Eph. 1 : 13, 14 ; 2 Cor. 1 : 21, 22) is the earnest of our inheritance, whereby we are sealed to the day of redemption.²

"This genuine assurance," says Hodge,³ "may be distinguished from that presumptuous confidence which is a delusion of Satan, chiefly by these marks : First, true assurance begets unfeigned humility (1 Cor. 15 : 10 ; Gal. 6 : 14) ; secondly, leads to ever-increasing diligence in practical religion (Ps. 51 : 12, 13, 19) ; thirdly, to candid self-examination and a desire to be searched and corrected by God (Ps. 139 : 23, 24) ; and fourthly, to constant aspirations after nearer conformity and more intimate communion with God" (1 John 3 : 2, 3).

III. RESULT OF FAITH.

Through this saving faith we attain vital union with Christ. It is, however, not a meritorious ground nor a procuring cause of such union, but only the simple act of clinging to him and trusting in him ; and as such it becomes the instrumental cause of such union (Rom. 4 : 16).

I. BELIEVERS SAID TO BE IN CHRIST. There are several senses in which believers are spoken of as in Christ. (1) By election ; "Chosen in him." (2) By federal representation in his atoning work. (3) From the union of believers with him by faith.

¹ Hodge's "Outlines," p. 478.

² "West. Conf.," Chap. XVIII., quoted in Hodge's "Outlines," p. 479.

³ "Outlines," p. 479.

Rom. 16 : 7 : "Who also were in Christ before me." 2 Cor. 5 : 17 : "Therefore, if any man is in Christ, he is a new creature."

2. NATURE OF THIS UNION WITH HIM. (1) This being in Christ, or union with him, is represented in the Scriptures by the figure of the vine and its branches, in John 15 : 1-6 ; by that of a living stone unto which as lively stones Christians are built up a spiritual house, in Peter 2 : 4-6 ; by Christ as the head, of whom Christians are the members, in Eph. 4 : 16 ; and as husband and bride (the church), in Eph. 5 : 25-32.¹

(2) On the one hand this union does not involve any mysterious confusion of the person of Christ with the person of his people ; and on the other hand it is not such a mere association of separate persons as exists in human societies. But it is a union which determines our legal status on the same basis with his, and which revives and sustains, by the influence of his indwelling Spirit, our spiritual life from the fountain of his life, and which transforms our bodies and souls into the likeness of his glorified humanity. It is, therefore : "*a.* A spiritual union. Its actuating source and bond is the spirit of the head, who dwells and works in the members" (1 Cor. 6 : 17 ; 12 : 13 ; 1 John 3 : 24 ; 4 : 13). "*b.* A vital union, *i. e.*, our spiritual life is sustained and determined in its nature and movement by the life of Christ through the indwelling of the Spirit" (John 14 : 19 ; Gal. 2 : 20). "*c.* It embraces our entire persons, our bodies through our spirits" (1 Cor. 6 : 15, 19). "*d.* It is a legal or federal union, so that all of our legal or covenant responsibilities rest upon Christ, and all his legal or covenant merits accrue to us." "*e.* It is an indissoluble union" (John 10 : 28 ; Rom. 8 : 35, 37 ; 1 Thess. 4 : 14, 17). "*f.* This union is between the believer and the person of the God-man in his office as Mediator. Its immediate instrument is the Holy Spirit, who dwells in us, and through him we are vitally united to and commune with the whole Godhead, since he is the Spirit of the Father as well as of the Son" (John 14 : 23 ; 17 : 21, 23).²

IV. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FAITH AND HOPE.

That faith and hope are not the same is evident from 1 Cor. 13 : 13, where they are plainly distinguished from each other ; also in Rom. 5 : 2-5 ; 1 Peter 1 : 21 ; Heb. 11 : 1 ; *cf.* Rom. 4 : 18. It is objected that the view taken, that saving faith involves

¹ Hodge's "Outlines," p. 483.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 483, 484.

trust, makes it the same as hope, and therefore faith must be of such a nature as not to include trust. But Christian faith and hope differ :

1. IN THEIR NATURE. (1) *Faith is reliance upon something now present as known or believed.* Hope is looking forward to something in the future with more or less expectation of receiving it. Faith may become the assurance of things hoped for, but not the hope that looks forward to them. Faith is belief ; hope is expectation. Each involves the idea of trust, but with the use of different prepositions. Faith is trust in or reliance upon any person or thing ; hope is trust of some person or thing or expectation of the happening of something desirable. See every passage in "Cruden's Concordance" where "hope" occurs, of which the following are specimens : Acts 23 : 6 ; 24 : 15 ; 26 : 6 ; 28 : 20 ; Rom. 8 : 24 ; 15 : 4 ; 1 Cor. 15 : 19 ; 2 Cor. 3 : 12 ; Col. 1 : 5, 27 ; 1 Thess. 5 : 8.

(2) *Joyful expectation enters into the nature of hope, but not into that of faith.* It is only because the things believed beget a joyful hope that the Christian's trust can be mistaken for hope.

2. IN THEIR OBJECTS. They differ also in their objects. Faith rests upon Christ and his work for our salvation, and upon the promises made of blessings. Hope rests in the blessings resultant from that work and those promises. Its object is salvation, freedom from sin, heaven, glory hereafter. We cannot say we have faith in salvation, but in the Saviour and his work ; we have not faith in future freedom from sin ; but we have it in the promised deliverance. Likewise we have not faith in heaven or glory ; but in these as promised to us.

3. AS CAUSE AND EFFECT. Hope is really the result or effect of faith ; it grows out of and depends upon faith, hence it cannot be identical with faith itself. (*Cf.* Rom. 5 : 2-5 ; 15 : 4-13 ; Gal. 5 : 5 ; Heb. 11 : 1).

V. ATTEMPTED SUBSTITUTES FOR FAITH.

Before closing our discussion of Christian faith we should notice briefly certain attempts that have been made to substitute something else in place of the faith required in the word of God.

1. SO-CALLED IMPLICIT FAITH. Romanists claim that faith must be in the church—*simply in it* ; in its doctrines so far as known ; but in them as believed upon the church's authority, and not upon any other apprehension of their truth. One's faith must be *that which the church teaches*, whether the teaching is

understood, or even known, or not. This is really to make the church a fetich, a mere charm which gives salvation simply to one who trusts salvation in its hands. It is as though, with our belief implicitly in the Bible, we should say that one who believes the Bible is saved, whether he knows its contents or not.

Our trust, whether in Christ or in the Bible, is not of this kind. It is based upon an intelligent, not a blind, confidence of the truths taught. If we put blind faith in anything we do not comprehend, it is because God has taught it. But our whole hope of salvation is in *what* we believe. This hope does not rest in our belief that the books of the Bible teach the truth, but in our belief of the things which they teach.

2. SO-CALLED HISTORICAL FAITH. This is a mere intellectual belief of the truths taught in the Scriptures as *historical* facts; as that there was such a person as Jesus, who, being the Son of God, wrought out salvation and has now commanded all men to repent and be baptized for the remission of sins. One fact that favors the substitution of this for the faith which trusts in Christ with the heart, is that in the apostolic days such was the danger of professing Christ that none would be apt to do so who did not heartily believe in him. Another is that as the new religion presented itself in salient points in opposition to the old, the acceptance of these points could be due only to a heartfelt belief in Jesus. Hence the language of 1 John 4 : 15 : "Whosoever shall confess that Jesus is the Son of God, God abideth in him, and he in God," and other similar passages. Fortunately, however, we have sufficient teaching to show what is the true faith. There is the case of Simon Magus (Acts 8 : 13-24). Manifestly he had historical faith, and yet the apostle is led to say to him (ver. 21) : "Thou has neither part nor lot in this matter : for thy heart is not right in the sight of God." The case of Judas also is one of bare historical faith. That faith, however, is a work of the heart is manifest from the following passages : Acts 2 : 37 : "They were pricked in their heart" ; Rom. 10 : 8-10 : "Shalt believe in thy heart that God raised him from the dead, . . with the heart man believeth unto righteousness." See an illustration of the difference between historical faith and hearty acceptance of the truth in John 12 : 42, 43 and Rom. 10 : 16-21. 2 Cor. 3 : 3 : "In tables that are hearts of flesh," also ver. 6, "the letter killeth, but the Spirit giveth life." Heb. 10 : 22 : "Let us draw near with a true heart." 2 Tim. 2 : 22 : Christians are described as those who "call on the Lord out of a pure heart." It is also

proved by all we have seen of the necessity and nature of regeneration, conversion, and repentance. Hodge¹ gives this further proof from the effects of faith. "The Scriptures declare that by faith the Christian 'embraces the promises,' 'is persuaded of the promises,' 'out of weakness is made strong,' 'waxes valiant in fight,' 'confesses himself a stranger and pilgrim seeking a better country.'" As faith in a threatening necessarily involves fear, so faith in a promise necessarily involves trust. "Besides, faith rests upon the trustworthiness of God and, therefore, necessarily involves trust. Heb. 10 : 23 and the whole eleventh chapter."

3. TEMPORARY OR DELUSIVE FAITH SO CALLED. This has many marks of true faith. Hence it is not only the intellectual reception of historical facts, but a joyful acceptance of them. This is the case of the seed in the stony places which represents the man that heareth the word and anon with joy receiveth it. But the parable teaches us that the soil was not prepared. It is, therefore, not in the regenerated heart that it arises. The evidence of its temporary character, therefore, will soon appear. It lacks the following characteristics of saving faith and may thus be distinguished from it : (1) Continuance in trusting Christ and in devotion to him and his service. (2) Desire to be useful in the work of Christ. (3) Attendance to Christian duty. (4) Love of prayer and the word of God, and of the meetings with his people for worship. (5) Devoted love to the children of God as such. (6) Progress in knowledge of self and sin, and of Christ as a Saviour. (7) Progress in loving holiness and hating sin, with increased conviction of and humility concerning sinfulness.

4. ASSURANCE OF FAITH. The effort has often been made to substitute for genuine faith *assurance of faith*. There is a constant temptation, as we have seen, with timid believers to do this. There have not been wanting also those assuming to be teachers who have advocated this doctrine, and boldly proclaimed that there can be no genuine, saving faith unless there is actual assurance of personal salvation. It is said that one must be able to say : "I know that Christ died for me, that I am one of his elect, that my sins were removed by him, and that I have been reconciled to God by him," etc., etc. The falsity of this teaching has already been made clear under the second general head of this section, and need not be noticed further.

¹ "Outlines," p. 473.

QUERY I. WHICH PRECEDES, REGENERATION OR CONVERSION?

The question is often discussed as to which precedes in order of time, regeneration or conversion.

I. REGENERATION ALWAYS FIRST. The relation of regeneration to conversion must be one of invariable antecedence. Wherever the appropriate truth is at the time present, its relation is almost that of producing cause, for the prepared heart at once receives the truth. Hence, as this is so generally the case, they have been usually regarded as contemporaneous, and by some even as identical. But that regeneration is the invariable antecedent is seen : (1) From the fact that the heart is the soil in which the seed, the word of God, is sown, and that seed only brings forth fruit in the good soil. The heart is made good soil by regeneration. (2) Regeneration (as in infants) may exist without faith and repentance, but the latter cannot exist without the former. Therefore, regeneration precedes. (3) Logically the enabling act of God must, in a creature, precede the act of the creature thus enabled. But this logical antecedence involves actual antecedence, or the best conceptions of our mind deceive us and are not reliable ; for this logical antecedence exists only because the mind observes plainly a perceived dependence of the existence of the one on the other. And if so, one must be actually prior to the other.

2. MAY BE AN APPRECIABLE INTERVAL. There is not only antecedence, but in some cases even an appreciable interval. (1) This is true even of conversion regarded as a mere turning to God. Between it and regeneration must intervene, in some cases, some period of time, until the knowledge of God's existence and nature is given, before the heart turns, or even is turned toward that God. *a.* This must be true of all infants and of all persons otherwise incapable of responsibility, as for example idiots. *b.* There is no reason why it should not be true of some heathen. The missionaries of the cross have been sought by men who knew nothing of Christianity, but whose hearts, unsatisfied with the religion of their fathers, were restlessly seeking that for which their soul was crying out. (2) It is still more manifestly true of full Christian conversion. *a.* The Scriptures teach this in many examples of persons pious, holy, and fearing God, yet unacquainted with the full truth which secures union with Christ. Ethiopian Eunuch : Acts 8 : 26-40. Paul : Acts 9, 22, and 26 ; Gal. 1 and 2. Cornelius the Centurion : Acts 10 : 2. Lydia : Acts 16 : 14. *b.* The experience of ministers in all ages with persons seeking and attaining salvation confirms this idea. The attainment of conversion may be marked by stages. The sinner is at first totally indifferent. The word produces on him no effect. Then (*a*) There is an evident willingness to give serious attention to the truth of God. God has opened the heart as he did that of Lydia. (*b*) There is conviction of sin, sense of its vileness, and of its dangerous effects. (*c*) The soul, oppressed by these, strives to do something by which to attain salvation, but finds all in vain. (*d*) At last accepting the truth of God's word, it rests in trust of a personal Saviour.¹

¹ The reviser feels little doubt that the author is mistaken in the position that he takes here as to the chronological relation of regeneration and conversion to each other. Regeneration must, indeed, be a *logical* antecedent to conversion. But it can hardly be a chronological antecedent. Least of all does it seem possible for an

[QUERY II. WHICH PRECEDES, REPENTANCE OR FAITH.]

Another query which is often raised in connection with this subject is : Which precedes, repentance or faith ? The almost idle, and oftentimes silly, discussion of this question has grown out of a failure to recognize that faith is a compound act, involving, as we have seen, "*belief of truth*" and personal "*trust in Christ*." When this is remembered it is plain that the first element of faith, "belief of the truth," must precede repentance. For one who does not believe the truth as to sin will not repent. But the second element in faith, "personal trust" in Christ, must come after repentance. For no one who does not repent will ever put personal trust in Christ for salvation. It ought to be borne in mind always that the effort to separate sharply between the various elements of the work of the Holy Spirit upon the soul may easily involve one in error. As a ray of light may be refracted so that its constituent elements can be noticed separately, so the phases of the Spirit's work upon the soul may be held apart in the mind for special consideration. These are all, however, in a true sense, one work, and they cannot be treated as if isolated, and independent one of another. They will not admit of too close analysis.]

CHAPTER XVIII. JUSTIFICATION.

No doctrine of Scripture is more important than that of justification. It involves the whole method of the salvation of sinners. It is vitally connected with all other fundamental doctrines. A correct conception of it cannot exist when other truths are ignored, or only partially received. The opinions held upon this point control in great part the other theological views of all Christian individuals and parties. The importance of a correct knowledge of what God has taught on this subject cannot, therefore, be exaggerated.

An examination of the Scriptures will show that justification is a judicial declarative act of God, by which, on account of the meritorious work of Christ, imputed to a sinner, and received by him through that faith which vitally unites him to his substitute

"appreciable interval of time" to come between them. If this were true, then one could be a regenerated person without repentance or faith. For repentance and faith are the elements of conversion. But one cannot be a saved person without these. How then can one be regenerated, in point of time, before one has faith or repentance ? Can a regenerated person be an unsaved person ? The true idea seems to be that regeneration has logical antecedence, but not chronological antecedence. Logical antecedence does not necessarily involve chronological antecedence, as the author seems to think. For example, logically the sun must exist before it can give light. But chronologically the light may be synchronous with the existence of the sun. So with regeneration and conversion. The state of certain souls in the examples cited by the author does not seem to be a state of *regeneration* at all, but only a state of *conviction*, which we have seen is a state always antecedent to regeneration in adults.

and Saviour, God declares that sinner to be free from the demands of the law, and places him in such a position that he is entitled to the rewards due to the obedience of that substitute. In this definition we have involved the following points, viz, the real nature of justification, the ground or basis upon which it rests, the means and method by which it is secured, and the practical results or benefits that are derived from it. We will take up these points in the order named. After that certain special queries will be answered.

I. THE REAL NATURE OF JUSTIFICATION.

1. IT IS AN ACT OF GOD THE FATHER. That God the Father is its author is emphatically declared by Paul in Rom. 8 : 33 : "It is God that justifieth." The language of the context shows conclusively that it is the Father that is here referred to. As he is the lawgiver and judge, so must he be the justifier also.

The act is not one of sovereignty, as is election, because he does not justify merely of good pleasure, but because the demands of the law have been met. Yet his act is free, and of grace, because it is of his own choice that he accepts a substitute, and because Christ and his meritorious work have been graciously secured and given by God himself. (See Rom. 3 : 24.)

2. IT IS A JUDICIAL ACT. The virtue of the act consists in its being his judicial act. Any one might perceive or declare the demands of the law to be satisfied upon knowledge of that fact. Any one might proclaim that the rewards of Christ's merit have been secured. But whether declared of the value and efficacy of Christ's work in itself or of its application to an individual, such a declaration would not be justification. It only becomes so when uttered by God in his capacity as judge. All others could only recognize or declare the fact. It is only the judicial declaration of the judge that sets the sinner free from all demands of the law, and confers upon him all the blessings appertaining to this new condition.

3. THIS ACT IS ONLY DECLARATIVE AS TO THE SINNER'S STANDING BEFORE THE LAW. This judicial act of God does not make the sinner personally holy. It does not even declare him to be personally holy. It only declares that the sinner stands *acquitted* of any and all charges under the law. So far as the law is concerned, he is declared just, whether he really is just and righteous or not.

Some misapprehension has arisen on this point, and it is necessary to give the proof that the above statement is correct. It is said by some that if God declares one justified that must mean that he is personally just or holy. Either that he has this in and of himself, or else that in justifying him God gives or infuses personal holiness, so that in some way the person justified is a holy person. It is indeed evident that this is a *possible* use of the word *justify*, or *justification*. One may be declared to be justified because, forsooth, he is all that he ought to be, and the law therefore has nothing against him. In this sense wisdom is said to be justified of her children. And in this sense any man is justified who is charged with a crime, if he proves that he is in no wise guilty. In this sense could God justify the accused sinner if he could see that the charge against the sinner was false, and that, instead of being a sinner, he was really a righteous person. It has to be admitted also that the Scriptures frequently use the word "just," *δικαίος* (*dikaïos*), of one who is, in some one, or in all respects, perfectly conformed to the law by his own acts, and who is, to that extent, therefore, personally holy, applying the term not to men only, but to Christ, who was made under the law, and also to God himself. (See Matt. 1 : 19 ; 5 : 45 ; 9 : 13 ; Luke 23 : 50 ; Acts 3 : 14 ; 7 : 52 ; 22 : 14 ; Rom. 3 : 26.)

But it is perfectly evident that the justification by faith in Jesus Christ which is taught in the Bible is neither a declaration that the justified one is personally righteous, nor that there has been an infusion into that one of actual righteousness. To be justified by faith is simply to be *declared* free from the claims of the law. In proof of this the following points are submitted : (1) The fact that justification is presented as the opposite of condemnation (Rom. 8 : 33, 34), and not as the opposite of sinfulness. Condemnation is never spoken of as the infusion of a corrupted nature, and consequently justification would not involve that of a holy nature. (2) That the justified are not declared in Scripture to be free from sin or possessed of holy natures, but are represented as still struggling against sin, and not only sin which arises from outward temptation, but that proceeding from the motions of sin within. (3) The change of nature which causes that of character is called in the Scriptures "regeneration," and differs essentially from justification. The former is the special work of the Holy Spirit. The latter is the act of God the Father. The former is an effect wrought inwardly, which develops itself in a continuous and progressive process which the Scriptures call sanctification. If justification includes an infused righteousness as the opposite of sinfulness, then it includes sanctification, and there is no ground for the scriptural distinction between them. (4) The usage of other words in connection with justification shows it to be a forensic act. The term "righteousness," *δικαιοσύνη* (*dikaïosune*), which, like "righteous," *δικαίος* (*dikaïos*), is used in connection with personal righteousness, as of God in Acts 17 : 31, and of Christ "the Faithful and True" in Rev. 19 : 11, and of the martyrs in Heb. 11 : 33, and of human obedience to the law in Rom. 10 : 3, 5 ; Phil. 3 : 6, 9, is, in connection with God's justification of sinners, applied, though chiefly by the Apostle Paul, to "the righteousness which God bestows or accepts," and which is imputed to the sinner or reckoned to his account.

Another term, *δικαίωσις* (*dikaïosis*), signifies "the act or process of declaring righteous," viz, justification. The word *δικαίωμα* (*dikaïoma*), which means "that which is declared righteous," and hence a statute or command, as something which the law of God declares to be a righteous requirement,

is used in connection with justification for "the deed by which one declares another righteous, and is partially equivalent to *dikaiosis*. The principal word which is used for expressing the nature of God's action in justification is *δικαίω* (*dikaioo*, "to justify"), which means everywhere "to declare righteous," "to regard and represent as righteous," and not "to make righteous" in the sense of conferring personal righteousness. This usage of terms shows plainly that justification is a judicial act of God, in which he does not confer holiness, but only declares the relation occupied to the law by the one who is in Christ.

II. THE GROUND OF THIS JUSTIFICATION.

It is manifest from what has already been said that the justification of the sinner must depend on something not personally his own. The Scriptures teach that it is due, not to his own good works, but to the meritorious work of Christ which is imputed to him, or put to his account.

1. NOT TO THE SINNER'S OWN WORKS. The Scriptures teach us negatively that it is not due to the sinner's own good works: (1) They expressly deny that justification can be by the works of the law (Rom. 3 : 20 ; Gal. 3 : 11 ; Eph. 2 : 9). (2) They assert that, could it thus have been attained, Christ's death has been useless (Gal. 2 : 21 ; 5 : 4). (3) Sinfulness is declared to be the condition of every man, which excludes the possibility of works untainted by sin (Rom. 3 : 10). (4) The law is said to demand such complete obedience that "whosoever shall keep the whole law and stumble in one point, he is become guilty of all" (James 2 : 10). (5) We are told that "if there had been a law given which could make alive, verily, righteousness would have been of the law" (Gal. 3 : 21). (6) It is likewise stated as necessary to the certainty of attaining salvation that "it is of faith, that it may be according to grace" (Rom. 4 : 16). These statements show that not only are men not saved by works alone, but not even by works combined with grace. Justification cannot arise, therefore, from the good works of men. Not even has its condition been so modified that a partial obedience can be accepted, whether this stands alone or is supplemented by or is supplementary to the merits of Christ. Something entirely outside of man must constitute the basis of justification.

2. TO THE MERITORIOUS WORK OF CHRIST. The word of God declares this outside something to be the meritorious work of Christ:

(1) *In general.* It declares that the righteousness of God is connected with our relations to or belief in Christ. *a.* By

stating that redemption is in Christ Jesus (Rom. 3 : 24). *b.* By setting him forth as the only foundation of salvation. *c.* By asserting salvation to be found only in Christ (Acts 4 : 12). *d.* By asserting a definite relation between our sin and Christ, and his righteousness and ourselves (2 Cor. 5 : 21).

(2) *More specifically.* It connects the salvation and justification of man with Christ's merits. This is done : *a.* In connection with his sufferings, or what is usually called his *passive* obedience, that is, his obedience in suffering. (*a*) Christ is presented as "the Lamb of God" (John 1 : 29), in evident allusion to the sacrificial offerings of the olden days; and Paul speaks of him as one "whom God set forth to be a propitiation, through faith, by his blood" (Rom. 3 : 25). (*b*) He is presented as one who has died for us (Rom. 5 : 6, 8 ; 8 : 34 ; 14 : 15 ; 1 Cor. 8 : 11 ; 2 Cor. 5 : 14, 15 ; 1 Thess. 5 : 10); and specifically as having died for our sins (1 Cor. 15 : 3). (*c*) We are said to be justified by his blood (Rom. 5 : 9), and reconciled by his death (Rom. 5 : 10), and by his cross (Eph. 2 : 16). *b.* In connection with his life of perfect obedience, or what is usually called his *active* obedience. Many persons think of justification as due only to his obedience in the things that he suffered. This is a mistake. It is due as truly to his active obedience as to his sufferings. (*a*) In 2 Cor. 5 : 21 we read that he "who knew no sin was made sin on our behalf : that we might become the righteousness of God in him." (*b*) The gracious salvation he brings is said to establish the law. (*c*) He assures us that he came to fulfill the law (Matt. 5 : 17). (*d*) The obedience of Christ is not only contrasted with the disobedience of Adam, but is declared to be the means by which many shall be made righteous (Rom. 5 : 19).¹ It thus appears that the ground of justification is the whole meritorious work of Christ. Not his sufferings and death only, but his obedience to and conformity with the divine law are involved in the justification which is attained by the believer.

The question is here sometimes asked, how the active obedience of Christ can avail to us, when he was himself a man and under the law, and owed obedience personally on his own behalf? The answer to this is two-fold, in each case depending upon the doctrine of the incarnation of the Son of God. On the one hand

¹ The proof for this point does not seem to be satisfactory. All the references may be explained quite naturally as referring to the satisfaction which Christ made in his sufferings. Hence, many hold, quite plausibly, that the ground of justification is the *passive obedience* only.

the position was one voluntarily assumed by the Son of God. He was under no obligation to become man. He was not and could not be made man without his own consent. In thus voluntarily coming under the law his obedience would have merit to secure all the blessings connected with the covenant, under which he assumed such relations. But besides this the fulfillment of the law would not simply be that fulfillment due by a mere man, which is all the law could demand of him on his own behalf. The merit secured is that due to the Son of God, thus, as man, rendering obedience to the law. That merit is immeasurable and is available for all for whom he was the substitute.

III. THE MEANS AND METHOD BY WHICH JUSTIFICATION IS SECURED.

The question next arises as to how this justification through the merit of Christ's works is to be secured. How can Christ's merits meet the claims of the law against the sinner so that God can declare that he stands justified before the law, as if he had never sinned? The apostle declares very plainly in the fourth chapter of Romans, and elsewhere, that the faith of the sinner is reckoned for righteousness. The justification or righteousness which the sinner has is declared to be a "righteousness of God through faith," that is, a righteousness which God provides for him upon the exercise of faith.

I. THROUGH FAITH. The Scriptures teach plainly that faith is reckoned for righteousness. "Abraham believed God, and it was reckoned unto him for righteousness. . . . To him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reckoned for righteousness" (Rom. 4 : 3, 5).

(1) *This cannot mean that faith is accepted in the place of righteousness as the cause of justification*, for the Scriptures everywhere show that this place is occupied by the meritorious work of Christ.

(2) *It cannot mean that the righteousness of God has so lowered the law that something less than obedience can be accepted by him as a full satisfaction of that law*, because the demands of the law have not been lowered, but have been completely fulfilled by Christ. Besides, this would be to make of faith a work, by which salvation is secured, and the Scriptures deny that it has this character (Rom. 4 : 16). "We are never said to be justified, διὰ πίστεως (*dia pistin*), on account of faith, but only διὰ πίστεως (*dia pisteos*), through faith, or ἐκ πίστεως (*ek pisteos*), of

faith, εἰς πίστιν (*eis pistin*), unto faith, and ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει (*epi te pistei*), by faith. The fact that faith is counted for righteousness shows that in itself it is not righteousness and has no merit, but is only so "reckoned on the ground of something outside of itself, viz, the saving work of Christ."

(3) *It can only mean that faith is the condition for receiving justification.* Faith is so reckoned for righteousness only because by faith the sinner appropriates to himself the work of Christ and becomes vitally united with him. "Faith," says Dr. Charles Hodge, "is the condition of justification. That is, so far as adults are concerned God does not impute the righteousness of Christ to the sinner, until, and unless, he (through grace) receives and rests on Christ alone for salvation."¹ It is a condition which has in it no merit in itself, but which only seizes upon merit in another. It is also an act of the sinner, to which he is graciously disposed and led by God himself through the power of the Holy Spirit.

2. BY IMPUTATION. We have seen above that while the Bible says "faith is reckoned for righteousness," it cannot mean that faith is accepted *in the place of righteousness* as the cause of justification; we have also seen that the true ground of justification is the obedience of Jesus Christ. We are now prepared to see what is meant by the expressions, "justified through faith" and "faith reckoned for righteousness." Upon the exercise of faith by the sinner, God *imputes* to him the merits of Christ's righteousness. That is, God reckons to him Christ's obedience, and treats him as though he, the sinner, had himself done that which Christ has done for him. And because this is always his upon the exercise of faith, his faith is said to be "reckoned to him for righteousness," and he is said to be "justified by faith." There is, however, no ground given anywhere in Scripture for the claim that faith is meritorious before God, or is in any sense the real ground of the justification. Faith itself is represented as the gift of God, and every vestige of claim to merit in believing is ruled out by the plainest teaching of Scripture.² The real ground of the justification is the imputed righteousness of God's own Son. Faith, as we have seen, is only the condition which

¹ "Systematic Theology," Vol. III., p. 118.

² Mr. Spurgeon quaintly compares the man who claims merit before God on account of his faith to a beggar who has taken a part of what had been given to him, and therewith purchased a pair of white kid gloves in which to prosecute his begging for yet further favors.

makes it possible for man to have the merit of Christ's work imputed to him. This imputation is in accordance with the action of God throughout the economy of human affairs. Adam, as the representative of man, sinned, and his sin has been imputed to all of his descendants, and they are treated as though personally sinners. Christ stood also as the representative of his people, and their sins were imputed to him, and he was treated as though personally a sinner. Likewise his righteousness is imputed to them, and they are treated as though personally righteous. In each of these cases there is, however, no such transfer as makes one personally what he is representatively. It is not the imputed sin of Adam which makes men personally sinners. The corrupted nature is one of the natural consequences of that sin, and is a punishment of it. So the imputation of our sin to Christ did not make him personally a sinner. He was still of himself "the holy and righteous one." In like manner the imputation of Christ's righteousness does not make man holy and righteous personally. In each of these cases it is only relation to the law which is expressed.

IV. THE BENEFITS, OR BLESSINGS, OF JUSTIFICATION.

The benefits conferred by justification are many :

1. FREEDOM FROM THE CONDEMNATION OF THE LAW. This includes: (1) *Forgiveness of all sin*. Not for the past only, but throughout the Christian's life. (2) *Discharge from his relation to the law* as a rule of bondage, for which is now exchanged his service to it in the newness of the spirit (Rom. 7 : 6). (3) *Peace with God*,—assured peace,—because dependent on the merits of Christ, and not those of himself. These and all other blessings which may be included under the general idea of pardon are necessary results of justification.

2. THE POSSESSION OF CHRIST'S RIGHTEOUSNESS. But justification confers righteousness as well as pardon. Not only are sins remitted but men are made partakers of the righteousness procured by Christ which is imputed to them. They are thus recognized before the law as righteous persons, not simply as persons pardoned for breaking the law, but as those who are rewarded for having fulfilled all its demands.

3. THE POSITION AND THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE OTHER BLESSINGS. But there are other blessings which arise from the relation to Christ of those whom God justifies. That relation was shown in the section on faith (pp. 342, 343). It is a vital and

spiritual as well as a legal and federal union between Christ and his people. By virtue of this they are identified with him in his relation to God as their representative and covenant head, and are made partakers of all the blessings which he has obtained as an inheritance. It is thus that they are adopted into the family of God and become his sons and daughters ; thus are they sanctified by the Holy Spirit partly in this life, and progressively advance until complete holiness shall be theirs in heaven. Thus also do they persevere in the divine life, being preserved or kept by God through faith unto complete salvation. The same act of faith which is the condition of justification secures to those united to Christ the privilege of complete participation in the rewards of their federal head. They shall be heirs with him, shall reign with him, shall be partakers of his glory. No imagination can compass the reward which shall be theirs together with Christ. The Scriptures seem to teach that whatever Christ shall be or possess in his human nature they also shall be and possess.

V. SUNDRY QUERIES.

We have now considered the doctrine of justification as a doctrine of Scripture. In connection with this presentation of the doctrine certain questions arise. The points involved are not of the essence of the doctrine, but they press themselves upon us in connection with it.

I. THE TIME OF THE JUSTIFICATION. When is it that this justification of the sinner may be said to have taken place?

(1) *It is when the sinner believes.* We have seen in the presentation of the nature of justification that it is a judicial act of God which declares the sinner free from the condemnation of the law. If this is so, justification of the sinner must be an instantaneous thing, as truly so as is the act of an earthly judge declaring that an accused man is free. The sinner is under condemnation until justified. As soon as justified his condemnation ceases. He cannot be partly condemned and partly justified. He is under condemnation until brought into that condition which secures his justification. When that moment comes God must justify. But when is that moment? The Scriptures teach that it is when man believes. It is in the moment of trust in a personal Saviour. It was not at the time that Christ finished his work and laid the foundation of justification in his merits and satisfaction. By these justification was secured but not bestowed. It was not in eternity as is election by which the subjects of the

future justification were chosen. It is at the moment of belief when faith, which is its condition, is experienced. Then is consummated that which was purposed in eternity and which was made possible and certain by the work of Christ. The hour of faith was even the period of justification before the incarnation of Christ, because of the faith which rested personally upon him through the promises of God, and the acceptance by God of the meritorious work of Christ as though already existing, because of the absolute certainty that it would be performed.

(2) *It is never repeated.* This act of justifying a sinner is once for all time. It does not occur periodically. It is a single act, and not one repeated with reference to new sins. This arises from its nature as an act of God declaring the relation of the believer to the law, and from the ground of that act, the never-failing merits of Christ. The pardon which the Christian seeks of God for sins after his justification is that of a child for offenses against a father's love, and not of a culprit before an avenging judge. The sufferings which Christians endure are not avenging punishments for sin, but chastisements from a Father who chastises those whom he loves and scourges those whom he receives.

2. [IS THE JUSTIFIED SINNER CONSCIOUS OF HIS JUSTIFICATION? Strictly speaking, a soul cannot be conscious of its justification. For, as we have seen, justification is *an act of God*. It is something which, as judge in heaven, God declares concerning a soul on earth. That soul neither sees God nor hears him speak when he pronounces or declares it justified. It is, therefore, a misuse of language to say that a soul can be conscious of its justification. It *believes in* its justification upon the testimony of God that faith is reckoned for righteousness. It may *feel as sure* of its justification as of its existence. But if so, it feels sure on *the testimony of God's word* that "there is now therefore no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus." As to our justification, "we walk by faith and not by sight." There is, however, all the evidence for this fact of justification, all the testimony of God and of the Spirit, that there is for anything else of which we feel sure in our Christian experience.]

3. WHAT IS THE RELATION OF HUMAN WORKS TO JUSTIFICATION? In connection with justification this question also forces itself upon us.

(1) *They are in some way associated with justification.* We have already seen that works cannot enter meritoriously into jus-

tification as its procuring cause. But the Scriptures evidently associate works in some manner with justification. Paul himself says that "love is the fulfillment of the law" (Rom. 13 : 10), and declares that that which avails in Christ Jesus is "faith working through love," and that "the whole law is fulfilled in one word, even in this: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" (Gal. 5 : 6, 14). There is here an evident correspondence with, if not allusion to, the frequent teachings of our Lord, and especially to his answer to the Pharisee about the great commandment of the law (Matt. 22 : 34-40). The teaching of the Apostle James is not, therefore, to be held to be opposed to the other Scriptures when he speaks of a justification by works. His language is very strong. He says that "faith apart from works is dead." He asks, "Was not Abraham, our father, justified by works, in that he offered up Isaac, his son, upon the altar?" He inquires, "Thou seest that faith wrought with his works, and by works was faith made perfect," and especially declares, "Ye see how that by works a man is justified, and not by faith only" (James 2 : 20, 21, 22, 24).

(2) *Their true relation to justification is:* *a.* Certainly not as a procuring cause or a meritorious ground. The faith with which James associates works, and upon a level with which faith he seems to place them, does not itself occupy this position. *b.* The works are not such as precede justification nor are they contemporaneous with it, and hence cannot be a cause, nor even a condition, such as we have seen faith to be. Even in the case of Abraham the justifying work referred to occurred long after the justification which he attained by faith. (*Cf.* Rom. 4 : 9-11; Heb. 11 : 8; Gen. 15 : 6; 17 : 1-27; 22 : 1-19.) *c.* The works are referred to as means of manifesting as well the faith as the justification claimed to be by faith (James 2 : 18). *d.* The apostle's object is to deny the living character of any faith which has not wrought with works, and has not been perfected through works. It is thus evident that works occupy the position of subsequent, not antecedent, accompaniments of justification. They manifest that justification has taken place, because they are invariable consequents. They do this, however, not before man only, but God also, and consequently he, as well as man, perceives them, and because of them the believer, performing these good works, is justified before God. But such justification is not that actual justification which takes place in connection with faith, which is the judicial act of God declaring the relation of the believer to the

law, but that declarative or manifesting justification, which cannot exist except as the result of the actual justification, but which is so inseparably connected with the latter that by its presence or absence the existence or non-existence of justification is distinctly established.

CHAPTER XIX. ADOPTION.

Adoption is that privilege, bestowed upon those who are united with Christ and justified by faith, by which they are admitted into the family of God, adopted as his children, given the spirit of adoption, and made joint-heirs with his own Son. In the strict sense of the word "Son," this title can be given only to the Eternal Son of God, who is the only begotten of the Father (John 1 : 14), and is exclusively "the effulgence of his glory, and the very image of his substance" (Heb. 1 : 3). But others are called participatively sons of God, as probably the angels (Job 1 : 6 ; 38 : 7), as Adam (Luke 3 : 38), and as Israel (Exod. 4 : 22 ; Hosea 11 : 1 ; *cf.* Rom. 9 : 4). The sonship of angels and of Adam manifestly proceeds from their creation by God in his image and likeness. That of Israel, however, is to be ascribed to the typical relation which that nation occupied to the true people of God. The application to Christ in Matt. 2 : 15 of the sonship declared of Israel in Exod. 4 : 22 and Hosea 11 : 1, together with the adoption to which Paul refers (Rom. 9 : 4), shows that Israel's sonship, like Israel's election, was but a type, the fulfillment and reality of which were to be found only in the antitype. So far as Israel itself was concerned, the title could mean no more than that this nation had been chosen by God to be outwardly his people, the depositaries of his holy oracles, and the means through which his salvation would come to man (John 4 : 22). The sonship ascribed to the believer in Christ will be best understood by considering its gracious origin, its peculiar nature, and the wondrous blessings which it confers. The difference between adoption and justification will also be pointed out.

I. GRACIOUS ORIGIN.

1. NOT A RELATION OF NATURE. It is not due to any natural relation, either originally possessed or restored through justification.

2. NOT DUE TO GOD-LIKENESS. Nor does it arise from any

new image or likeness of God, which has come through regeneration.

3. **SIMPLY GOD'S GRACIOUS GIFT.** It is the simple gift of God's love to those who by faith are brought into union with his proper Son. It is an act originating entirely in the good pleasure of God (Eph. 1 : 5).

4. **DUE TO CHRIST'S WORK.** It is due meritoriously only to the work of Christ. It could be founded thus upon nothing else. It is bestowed at the beginning of the Christian career, when there could be no ground for supposing it due to the character or acts of the recipient.

5. **FOR THOSE WHO BELIEVE.** It is conferred like justification upon all who by faith receive Christ (John 1 : 12).

II. PECULIAR NATURE.

1. **MADE CHILDREN OF GOD.** It is an act by which God chooses to take those who are not his children, and to make them such by adopting them into his family. Because of this they are "no more strangers and sojourners, but ye are fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household of God" (Eph. 2 : 19).

2. **ASSOCIATED WITH CHRIST.** They are thus united in this sonship with God's own Son, who "is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation" (Col. 1 : 15), "the beginning of the creation of God" (Rev. 3 : 14). Their sonship, however, partakes of the nature of his, not in his divine relations, but in his human relations in which he is also the Son of God as truly as he is in his divine nature (Luke 1 : 35).

3. **AN EVERLASTING SONSHIP.** It is an everlasting sonship ; because its continuance depends not upon what they do and are, but upon what he has done and is.

4. **WITH THE FULLNESS OF CHRIST.** It is one in which Christ Jesus "is made unto us wisdom from God, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption" (1 Cor. 1 : 30). Thus are all their deficiencies removed and exchanged for the glory of his abundant fullness.

5. **A UNITED FAMILY.** It is one in connection with which is fulfilled the prayer of Christ, "that they may all be one ; even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be in us ; . . . that they may be one, even as we are one ; I in them, and thou in me, that they may be perfected into one" (John 17 : 21-23).

6. **PARTAKERS OF THE DIVINE NATURE.** To such a perfection

of sonship do they consequently attain, that not of nor through themselves, but solely through Christ Jesus, do they thus become "partakers of the divine nature" (2 Peter 1 : 4), attaining as near as creatures may to the position and character of proper sonship to God.

III. WONDROUS BLESSINGS.

The blessings connected with this sonship are scarcely less wonderful than is its nature.

1. FELLOWSHIP WITH CHRIST AND GOD. Intimate fellowship with Christ and God. "Wherefore," says the apostle, "thou art no longer a bond-servant, but a son" (Gal. 4 : 7). "No longer," said Jesus, "do I call you servants ; . . but I have called you friends" (John 15 : 15).

2. GIFT OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. The guidance of the Holy Spirit : "As many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God" (Rom. 8 : 14) ; also the witnessing presence of the Holy Spirit : "The Spirit himself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are children of God" (Rom. 8 : 16).

3. SENSE OF GOD'S FATHERHOOD. The conscious recognition in our hearts of God's relation to us as Father. "God sent forth the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying Abba, Father" (Gal. 4 : 6 ; also Rom. 8 : 15).

4. ASSURED LIKENESS TO CHRIST. Unknown glory in future likeness to Christ : "It is not yet made manifest what we shall be. We know that, if he shall be manifested, we shall be like him" (1 John 3 : 2).

5. HEIRSHIP. "If children, then heirs ; heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ" (Rom. 8 : 17). The inheritance includes all things : "He that overcometh shall inherit these things ; and I will be his God, and he shall be my son" (Rev. 21 : 7 ; cf. 1 Cor. 3 : 21-23).

IV. DIFFERS FROM JUSTIFICATION.

It has been contended that "adoption cannot be said to be a different act or grace from justification."¹ "It appears to me," says Dr. Dick,² "to be virtually the same with justification, and to differ from it merely in the new view which it gives of the relations of believers to God, and in the peculiar form in which it exhibits the blessings to which they are entitled." Turretin says also that "adoption is included in justification as a part which,

¹ Dabney's "Theology," p. 627.

² Lecture 73, "Theology," Vol. II., p. 224.

with the remission of sins, constitutes this whole blessing ; nor can justification be distinguished from adoption, unless so far as it is taken strictly for the remission of sins ; while in its own formal conception it includes also acceptance unto life which flows from the imputation of the righteousness of Christ.”¹

1. ONE EXTREME TO MEET ANOTHER. The position taken by these writers is a contrary extreme to that which some have held, viz, that justification consists only of pardon. It is not to be doubted that justification is more than this, and includes restoration to the favor of God, and to eternal life. But these might have been bestowed without conferring upon the justified the peculiar blessings contained in adoption. “Adoption,” says Buchanan,² “is distinct in some respects from justification. For although both denote a change of relation, it may be affirmed that, according to the Scriptures, pardon, acceptance, and adoption are distinct privileges, the one rising above the other in the order in which they have been stated,—that if it be conceivable that a sinner might have been pardoned without being accepted to eternal life, it is equally conceivable that he might have been both pardoned and accepted without being adopted as a son,—and that, while the first two properly belong to his justification, as being both founded on the same relation, that of a Ruler and subject, the third is radically distinct from them, as being founded on a nearer, more tender, and more endearing relation, that between a Father and his son.”

2. MAY BOTH HAVE THE SAME GROUND AND YET DIFFER. Dabney argues that there is no difference between the two because the “instrument is the same—faith—and because the meritorious ground of adoption is the same with that of justification, viz, the righteousness of Christ.” But these facts, which are admitted, are due to another, which is, that the faith by which we are justified is one which secures to us union with Christ. It would not necessarily follow that this union confers upon us only a single blessing, or a number of blessings which may be combined together under one name. We can only learn this by examination. If, therefore, it shall appear that there are distinctions between the accompanying blessings, to the extent that these exist, must those blessings be regarded as different.

3. REAL DIFFERENCE. That there are distinctions appears to be plain from the following considerations : (1) The Scriptures

¹ Turretin's "Theology," Bk. XVI., Chap. VI., Sec. 7.

² "On Justification," p. 262.

speak separately of justification and adoption, and do not state that the latter is, in whole or in part, the same as the former. (2) Justification is ascribed to the righteous character of God as its formal ground. In it he is only gracious in accepting and providing a substitute. Adoption is expressly referred to the love of God (1 John 3 : 1). The fact that these cannot be interchanged and justification referred to love, or adoption to justice, shows a decided distinction between them. (3) While there is a change of relation in each of them, in justification it is a change of relation to the law, and only through that to the law-giver and judge; in adoption it is a change of relation to the family of God and thus to God as the Father. (4) While faith is that through which each is attained, in justification it is a condition precedent to a forensic act, which we are assured that God will do because of righteousness as well as faithfulness (1 John 1 : 9); while in adoption it is merely receptive of Christ, securing that union through which the paternal love of God flows freely on no other ground than faithfulness to his promises. (5) The act of justification is never ascribed to the Son, and is seen to be plainly a prerogative of the Father as God; but it is said of the Son that "as many as received him, to them gave he the right to become children of God, even to them that believe on his name" (John 1 : 12). In some sense, therefore, which is not true of justification, adoption is connected as a gift with the Son as well as the Father.

The above considerations are sufficient to show that there is a real basis of distinction between justification and adoption, and that the latter is not included in the former. They are separate effects which flow from the union with Christ attained through faith, because of which we are made partakers of all the benefits of his meritorious work. Justification is one of these, and by it we obtain pardon and favor with God, which is eternal life. Adoption is yet another, which confers upon us the special privilege of children and heirs of God. It is no more to be confounded with justification than is sanctification, which is also an effect of the same union with Christ, for although its distinctions are not so many nor so broad, yet to the extent that they exist they are as real.

"This closer and more endearing relation to God, which is constituted by adoption, is necessary, in addition to that which is included in our justification, to complete the view of our Christian privileges, and to enhance our enjoyment of them, by raising us

above the spirit of bondage which is unto fear, and cherishing the spirit of adoption whereby we cry, Abba, Father. It is necessary also to explain how the sins of believers are not visited with penal inflictions, properly so called, but are nevertheless treated in the way of fatherly chastisement; and still further, to show that the kingdom of heaven hereafter will not be bestowed as wages for work done, but as an 'inheritance,' freely bestowed on those, and those only, who are 'joint heirs with Christ.'"¹

CHAPTER XX. SANCTIFICATION.

Those whom God has regenerated by his Spirit and justified and adopted into his family, he also sanctifies. This is another of the privileges bestowed upon the people of God as the result of their union with Christ.

I. WHAT IS MEANT BY SANCTIFICATION.

I. PERSONAL HOLINESS. While to justify, as has been seen, means simply to declare just or to treat as just, to sanctify means *to make holy*. The usage of Scripture is as clear in this case as in that. The word "holy" in Scripture has, however, various meanings. It is sometimes applied to things, and not to persons only. (1) It is used in the sense of that which is set apart or dedicated to any special use. Thus God threatens that instruments of vengeance will be "prepared" (sanctified) against "the king's house of Judah" (Jer. 22 : 7). But the dedication is most frequently for some holy use. Thus "holy" is applied to the Sabbath day (Exod. 31 : 14); and to the house of God (Lev. 16 : 33); and to the water (Num. 5 : 17); and to the vessels of the young men (1 Sam. 21 : 5). (2) Things are also called holy from their connection with holy persons. Thus the "place" on which Moses stood was proclaimed "holy" on account of its connection with Jehovah (Exod. 3 : 5); likewise the mount of Transfiguration (2 Peter 1 : 18). (3) As descriptive of an act free from sin and performed with holy motives. Thus the kiss of Christian salutation, called in 1 Peter 5 : 14 a kiss of charity, is in several other places called a "holy kiss" (1 Cor. 16 : 20; 2 Cor. 13 : 12; 1 Thess. 5 : 26). (4) "Holy," as tending to produce holiness; as "most holy faith" (Jude 20). (5) It is most generally used as

¹ "Buchanan on Justification," pp. 263, 264.

descriptive of personal character, whether the holiness be perfect, as in God, or angels, or glorified saints, or partial, as seen in his people on earth. A few of the many instances of its application to this last class are 1 Sam. 2 : 9 ; Acts 9 : 13 ; Rom. 15 : 25, 26 ; Phil. 4 : 21 ; Eph. 1 : 1 ; Col. 1 : 2 ; Rev. 18 : 24.

The doctrine of sanctification has reference to the first and last of these usages of "holy"; to the last more especially, as including the character of holiness produced by the continuous working of the Holy Ghost through the word of truth; but also to the first, as involving that dedication of person and life to God which constitutes that "living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God," which is the believer's "reasonable service" (Rom. 12 : 1). Christian holiness includes both character and life. "Sanctification" is the process by which these are accomplished. The "sanctified" are those who are thus made holy. To "sanctify" is to make them thus holy. This holiness is not simply an imputed holiness, as we saw was the case with righteousness. It is a real holiness or sanctification. Holiness becomes the actual characteristic of the nature. It is habitually exercised in the life, and will, as we shall see, be eventually possessed in perfection.

2. IT IS OF THE ENTIRE NATURE. The renewed nature, given in regeneration, shows that sanctification includes the whole spiritual part of man. It is not to be confined to mere outward actions. God's spiritual nature demands not only spiritual worship, but holy spiritual emotions and affections; and these belong to the heart. Hence the need of inward conformity to his will and commands is so especially set forth in the New Testament as to mark its teachings as essentially spiritual. We are also plainly taught that between the outward fruit and the inward condition is such a connection that the latter is the actual producing power of the former, and is manifested by it (Matt. 12 : 33-35 ; Luke 6 : 43-45).

But sanctification is to be extended to the body likewise. Its appetites and passions are to be controlled, wicked actions are to cease, and unholy habits to be put away, the members of the body are to be mortified, all filthiness of the flesh to be cleansed, good works are to be exhibited to mankind, and such high moral duties to be performed as are imposed upon Christians as obligatory toward each other and the world.

The Scriptures exhort to sanctification of the whole nature, both body and soul. (See 2 Cor. 7 : 1 ; Eph. 4 : 17-24 ; Col. 3 :

5-10; 1 Thess. 5 : 23.) That of the body alone is urged (Rom. 6 : 12, 13; 1 Cor. 6 : 20; 1 Thess. 4 : 3, 4). The apostle tells the Ephesians about his prayers for their spiritual sanctification (Eph. 1 : 17-19).

3. IT IS PROGRESSIVE. Sanctification is not a certain degree of attainment, possessed by all alike, and remaining always in this life the same; it is a growth from the seed planted in regeneration, which is constantly bringing forth new leaves and new fruit; it grows with increased intellectual knowledge of God's truth, with a clearer perception of human sinfulness and corruption, with stronger faith and brighter hope, and more confident assurance of personal acceptance with God, with a more heartfelt conception of the sacrificing love of Christ, and with a more realizing belief in his constant presence and knowledge of what we do. It even increases from its own acquired strength and through the suffering and doing in which it is developed. In these and many other ways do Christians grow in grace, and in the knowledge of Christ, and in conformity to his image, "cleansing themselves from all defilement of flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of God" (2 Cor. 7 : 1).

When, however, this sanctification is said to be progressive, it is not meant to assert that there is a constant rise upward to God and toward his holy perfection. The Christian life on earth is a warfare with sin, and the believer is not always without failure. He often yields to temptation, sometimes falls even into most grievous sin. The personal experience presented by Paul, in the seventh chapter of Romans, is so strong a statement of such struggles that some have been inclined to confine its application to a time prior to acceptance of the gospel. But there can be no question of the applicability to Christians of the declaration made to the Galatians: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are contrary the one to the other; that ye may not do the things that ye would" (Gal. 5 : 17).

But the progress of sanctification is nevertheless continuous. These temptations and struggles enter into that progress, and not only they, but even the sins and falls which mar the Christian life. The process of sanctification is like the ascent of a mountain. One is always going forward, though not always upward, yet the final end of the progressive movement of every kind is the attainment of the summit. Sometimes, because of difficulties, the road itself descends, only more easily to ascend again. Sometimes certain attractions by the way cause a deviation from

the route most suitable for ascent. Often it is feared that there has been no higher attainment, often that it has been but a continual descent, until, perchance, some point of view is gained from which to look down upon the plain whence the journey was begun and behold the height which has already been overcome. Often, with wearied feet and desponding heart, the traveler is ready to despair, because of his own feebleness and the difficulties which surround him. But he earnestly presses forward until the journey is completed, the ascent made, and the end attained.

4. IT IS, HOWEVER, NEVER COMPLETED IN THIS LIFE. The work of sanctification goes on throughout the lifetime of the believer. It is not completed before his death. (1) This is manifest from the frequent exhortations to sanctification addressed to those who are already believers in Christ, and who are actually called saints. Many of the passages containing these have been given in the preceding section. (2) It is also shown by the warnings, about the danger of backsliding, addressed to Christian believers. Such was that to Peter by our Lord, the reality of the danger of which was shown by his subsequent grievous fall (Luke 22 : 31, 32). See examples of other such warnings in 1 Cor. 10 : 12 ; Col. 1 : 23 ; Heb. 3 : 12, 13 ; 12 : 15. (3) The fearful condition of actual apostasy is presented for the purpose of teaching the true people of God the extent to which knowledge of his grace may be possessed without the attainment of actual and final salvation (Heb. 6 : 4-6 ; 10 : 26-29 ; 2 Peter 2 : 20). The object of this instruction is to warn against committing sins, and indulging habits to which they are still prone. (4) Christians are not presented in the New Testament as completely pure and holy, but on the contrary, the very best of them acknowledge the existence of sinful tendencies and pronounce any idea of freedom from the presence of sin to be a delusion. The faults of good men, such as Peter, James, and John, and Thomas and Paul and Barnabas (Acts 15 : 37-40) are especially mentioned, and John, who declares that "whosoever is begotten of God sinneth not" (1 John 5 : 18) is the very apostle who, in a previous part of that very same Epistle, teaches that "if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us" (1 John 1 : 8). Paul constantly speaks of himself as still struggling against the power of sin, as not counting himself to have attained, as buffeting his body and bringing it into bondage lest he should be rejected, and thus he gives us, in his descrip-

tions of his own experience, a pattern of what has been almost universally acknowledged as that of every other Christian.

5. IT WILL NOT ALWAYS BE INCOMPLETE. But while sanctification is thus progressive and never complete in this life, it will not always be incomplete. In heaven perfect purity and holiness will be the portion of the believer. (1) The purpose of God, in the foreordination of those whom he foreknew, is that they shall "be conformed to the image of his Son" (Rom. 8 : 29). This conformity shall be attained in heaven, for "if he shall be manifested, we shall be like him ; for we shall see him even as he is" (1 John 3 : 2). Such likeness involves personal sinless purity. (2) Paul's triumphant language as to the resurrection shows that this will be true of the body no less than of the soul (1 Cor. 15 : 50-57). (3) The Scriptures declare as to the New Jerusalem that "there shall in no wise enter into it anything unclean, or he that maketh an abomination and a lie : but only they which are written in the Lamb's book of life" (Rev. 21 : 27). Peter says that the inheritance reserved in heaven for the saints is incorruptible and undefiled (1 Peter 1 : 4).

II. WHO ARE SANCTIFIED ?

The sanctified are those only who are in Christ Jesus, who have been regenerated, and have been justified through faith.

1. NO MAN CAN CLEANSE OR PURIFY HIS HEART OR LIFE. Every one lacks especially the will to do so. If one should determine to attempt it, the temptations which will assail him would soon overcome that will.

2. THE LAW CANNOT SANCTIFY. The law cannot furnish controlling power to this result ; not because of its own deficiencies, but because of its weakness through the flesh (Rom. 8 : 3). The difficulty of the work to be done consists in its not being a mere reformation of a bad life and habits, which is measurably within the power of man and is sometimes accomplished so far as the mere outward life among men demands, but in its including the destruction and removal of man's sinful condition and habits and action, which he by nature ardently loves, and the substitution for them of their very opposites in every respect.

3. REGENERATION NECESSARY FIRST. Regeneration, therefore, is necessary as antecedent to the work of sanctification. A new nature must be attained which will love and seek after holiness and struggle forward, dissatisfied until it shall be perfected. The Scriptures, therefore, represent sanctification as occurring only

in those who have been regenerated, and to whom a new heart and a new spirit have been given.

4. JUSTIFICATION ALSO MUST PRECEDE. But not only regeneration, but justification also, must precede sanctification. Yet certainly not for the same reasons; for regeneration is, like sanctification, a change in nature and character, and justification a change only in relation to the law. There is, therefore, no such natural connection of sanctification with justification as there is with regeneration. Nor is there anything meritorious in the position of the justified person. For the meritorious ground of all blessings can be found only in the person and work of Christ. But as the merit of Christ becomes that of the believer only in justification, and as the faith by which we are united with him is also the condition of justification, so must justification precede the blessings which flow from that union and from justification itself. The same necessity for precedence arises because in justification are furnished the motives by which the Christian is led through the Spirit. The psalmist of old sang, "There is forgiveness with thee, that thou mayest be feared" (Ps. 130 : 4), and the Apostle John declares, "Every one that hath this hope [of sonship and likeness to Christ] set on him purifieth himself, even as he is pure" (1 John 3 : 3). Paul also teaches that the condition of obedience with the newness of the spirit, is that we have been discharged from the law (Rom. 7 : 6). This precedence of justification to sanctification is distinctly set forth by the apostle in the order in which the parts of salvation are arranged in Rom. 8 : 29, 30 and Phil. 3 : 9-12.

III. THE AUTHOR OF SANCTIFICATION.

1. THE REAL AUTHOR IS GOD. From what we have learned of the persons who are sanctified and of the nature of the work performed, it is evident that the real author of it must be more than man. The Scriptures teach that it is God. The work is sometimes attributed to God without reference to any distinction of persons (1 Thess. 4 : 3 ; 5 : 23). It is also sometimes ascribed to the Father (John 17 : 17 ; Heb. 13 : 21) ; and sometimes to Christ (Eph. 5 : 26 ; Titus 2 : 14). But it is the special work of the Holy Spirit, who is the author of the process of sanctification, as he is also of the act of regeneration (1 Cor. 6 : 11 ; 2 Cor. 3 : 18 ; 2 Thess. 2 : 13 ; 1 Peter 1 : 2).

(1) *He enlightens the mind* (John 14 : 26 ; 1 Cor. 2 : 9-16 ; Eph. 1 : 18 ; 3 : 18, 19 ; 1 John 2 : 20, 27). On this account he

is called "the Spirit of truth" (John 14 : 17 ; 15 : 26 ; 16 : 13) ; and the "Spirit of wisdom" (Eph. 1 : 17).

(2) *He gives spiritual strength* (Eph. 3 : 16), lusting against the flesh (Gal. 5 : 17), enabling the believer to mortify the deeds of the body (Rom. 8 : 13), leading the sons of God (Rom. 8 : 14), and enabling them to purify their souls in obeying the truth (1 Peter 1 : 22).

(3) Inasmuch as he dwells within them (Rom. 8 : 9), so that they are his temple (1 Cor. 3 : 16), with whom they are sealed as the earnest of their inheritance (Eph. 1 : 13, 14), so also does *he bear witness with their spirits that they are the children of God*, and removing the spirit of bondage to fear, bestows on them the spirit of adoption, whereby they cry Abba, Father (Rom. 8 : 15, 16). The fruit of this indwelling Spirit is declared to be "in all goodness and righteousness and truth" (Eph. 5 : 9). It is specifically stated to be "love, joy, peace, longsuffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, temperance" (Gal. 5 : 22).

2. THE BELIEVER MUST CO-OPERATE. But while there is such need of a divine author of sanctification, it is not a work in which the believer is passively a recipient, but one in which he actively co-operates. This is exhibited in various ways in the word of God :

(1) *Christians are called upon to recognize this presence of the Spirit* (1 Cor. 3 : 16, 17). They are exhorted to "walk by the Spirit," and assured that in so doing they "shall not fulfill the lust of the flesh" (Gal. 5 : 16). They are taught that "they that are after the flesh do mind the things of the flesh ; but they that are after the Spirit the things of the Spirit" (Rom. 8 : 5). They are told that because of the indwelling Spirit, "we are debtors, not to the flesh to live after the flesh," and thus, by implication, that we are debtors to live after the Spirit (Rom. 8 : 12). They are charged to "grieve not the Holy Spirit of God, in whom ye were sealed unto the day of redemption" (Eph. 4 : 30). In these and in other ways their co-operation with the Spirit in the work is quite plainly implied.

(2) They are *exhorted to engage in the work of self-purification*. The apostle exhorts the Ephesians not to "walk as the Gentiles also walk, in the vanity of their mind, . . . to put away . . . the old man, which waxeth corrupt after the lusts of deceit ; and be renewed in the spirit of their mind, . . . and to put on the new man, which after God, hath been created in righteousness and holiness of truth" (Eph. 4 : 17-24).

(3) This self-purification is *declared to be the work of every one that has the hope of likeness to Christ* (1 John 3 : 3).

(4) *Direct promises and commands and exhortations* to perfection and holiness *imply co-operative action* in those who are in process of attaining sanctification (Matt. 5 : 48 ; 2 Cor. 7 : 1).

(5) *All warnings* against the power of temptation, the lust of the flesh, the subtlety of Satan, the influence of the world, the grievous character of sin ; *all exhortations* to lead a virtuous and godly life, to set the affections on heavenly and divine things, to consecrate soul and body to God ; *all motives to these ends* drawn from the work of Christ as an exhibition of divine love and mercy, as an example of purity of life and of patient suffering, or as personally connected with the believer because of his union with the Lord—in short, *all that the Scriptures contain fitted to lead the Christian to a higher spiritual life*, is evidence of his co-operation with the Holy Spirit in the work of sanctification.

The author of sanctification is indeed the Divine Spirit, but the Christian actively unites with that Spirit, “working out his own salvation with fear and trembling,” being exhorted and encouraged to do so, because “it is God which worketh in you, both to will, and to do, for his good pleasure” (Phil. 2 : 12, 13).

IV. THE MEANS OF SANCTIFICATION.

The manner in which the Spirit operates in sanctification is beyond our knowledge. In none of the acts of God, indeed, can we tell how he exerts his power, not even in creation. “As thou knowest not,” says the preacher, “what is the way of the wind, nor how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child ; even so thou knowest not the work of God who doeth all” (Eccl. 11 : 5). In sanctification the Spirit moves as mysteriously as he does in regeneration (John 3 : 8). In general, undoubtedly, it is in accordance with the laws of mind and of spiritual life. Yet we know no reason why there is not a place for supernatural action in sanctification, as well as in regeneration. We can only know the effects produced and the means which are revealed in the word of God and in Christian experience.

I. THE PRIMARY MEANS USED IS THE WORD OF GOD. The primary means which the Spirit uses for our sanctification, as both of these sources of information teach, is the truth of God. “Sanctify them in the truth ; thy word is truth” (John 17 : 17), was the prayer of the Lord, in which the whole work, both of consecration and cleansing, is set forth as thus to be accom-

plished. (See also John 17 : 19.) "Growth in the grace" is inseparably connected with growth "in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ" (2 Peter 3 : 18).

This is further taught in Scripture by such passages as the following : (1) Those that declare its usefulness in preventing sin, as Ps. 119 : 11. (2) Those that associate it with cleansing from sin, as Ps. 119 : 9 ; 1 Peter 1 : 22. (3) Such as state that it produces hatred of sin, as Ps. 119 : 104. (4) Those that ascribe quickening power to the word of God, as Ps. 119 : 50, 93. (5) Such as teach that truth is promotive of obedience, as Ps. 119 : 34, 43, 44. (6) Those that assert its power to lead to salvation, as 2 Tim. 3 : 15-17. (7) Such as imply that growth in grace is due to greater knowledge, as Heb. 5 : 12-14. (8) Those that connect spiritual life with truth, as John 6 : 63 ; 8 : 32. (9) Such as say that "all things that pertain unto life and godliness" have been given through the knowledge of God and Christ, as 2 Peter 1 : 2, 3. (10) Such as account for inability to accept higher doctrinal truth, by such weakness as should be characteristic only of those who are babes in Christ, as 1 Cor. 3 : 1-3. (11) Such as set forth the word of God as "the sword of the Spirit," as Eph. 6 : 17. (12) Such as announce that all the ministerial gifts bestowed by Christ are "for the perfecting of the saints, unto the work of ministering, unto the building up of the body of Christ ; till we all attain unto the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a full-grown man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ," Eph. 4 : 11-16.

2. VARIOUS SECONDARY MEANS. In connection with this primary means of divine truth others are presented. But they are not only secondary, but actually subordinate means to the word of God. They rather furnish occasions for the exercise of the means of sanctification contained in the truth of God than are proper means in themselves to that end. In themselves they have no efficacy, and only accomplish the end of sanctification by bringing the believer into connection with the truth of God.

(1) *Such are the providences of God*, which tend in various ways to arouse and move his children. These avail unto sanctification, however, so far only as they recall and lead to the apprehension of divine instructions. They are frequent and effective means of such apprehension and through this of the believer's growth in holiness. Such especially are the afflictions sent as chastisements by the Heavenly Father upon his children. Such also are the temptations and trials to which they are subjected. Such, likewise, are the infirmities of the flesh and perplexities of the spirit which God permits to remain or causes to arise in his own elect. In these and in numerous other ways of what is called good, as well as of what is called evil, does God surround his people with the acts of his providence. But these acts them-

selves avail not unto their sanctification. They are only made effective through the truth of God apprehended amid such events, and received as spiritual food for the growth of the believer.

(2) *The good works of the Christian* furnish another secondary means for his sanctification. By these are not meant works that are good in a legal sense, for such goodness would require a perfection and freedom from taint which no work of fallen man can possess. But it is the privilege of the Christian to live unto the Lord, and the name of good works is given in Scripture to such outward actions as are the results of his life through the Spirit. These good works are the result of sanctification; but in their performance they naturally become the means of further sanctification (John 14 : 23 ; Eph. 3 : 16-20). Yet is this accomplished not apart from, but in connection with the truth of God. The new development will always be in the direction of the particular truths contemplated in their performance. These will furnish the motives to further action, the strength for additional duty, the earnest purpose of deeper consecration or whatever else the Spirit may graciously use for a more complete sanctification of the believer.

(3) *Prayer* is a still further means to the same end, which, from its nature, can be effective only through the believer's apprehension of divine truth. Hence the worthlessness of mere lip service (Isa. 29 : 13 ; Ezek. 33 : 31 ; Matt. 15 : 8) or vain repetitions (Matt. 6 : 7). Not only are they offensive to God, but without value to the soul. Hence also the necessary spirituality of divine worship, because that only is true worship which is the service of the soul (John 4 : 23, 24). Prayer which is a mere formal or mechanical utterance of words can have no value, because the one that offers it does so in ignorance or forgetfulness of the truth of God appropriate to accompany it.

(4) *The Lord's Day* is another secondary means of sanctification, which manifestly becomes such only in the Christian's use of divine truth; either such as is suggested by God's appointment of such a day, or such as is attained through the opportunity for such purposes which it affords.

(5) *The association of believers in church relations* is another of the means ordained by God for the increase of individual spiritual life and consequently of sanctification. This is attained not only through social prayer and the preaching of the word, but also by Christian watchcare and discipline, and by the mutual

sympathy and aid of believers in matters both temporal and spiritual. Whatever in these pertains to sanctification must be connected with the recognition of divine truth in the moving influences which bestow or the accepting thankfulness which receives.

(6) *The ministry given by Christ* is also a means for the sanctification of his people in the preaching of his truth, in the spiritual guidance and rule of the flock, and in the sympathizing bestowment of the consolations of his grace. But even these, though officially appointed, cannot either of themselves or by virtue of their office, confer or increase spiritual grace. Their ministry is one only of the word of God, and it is only through his inspired truth "that the man of God may be complete, furnished completely unto every good work" (2 Tim. 3 : 17). What these works are is shown by ver. 16, viz, "for teaching, for reproof, for correction or instruction which is in righteousness." Ministers are in no other sense vehicles of grace. They are not appointed as personal channels of access to God or of the bestowment of blessings by him, except so far as he has made it their duty to make known his truth. In connection with that truth they are means of sanctification to his people, and only thus are to be regarded as occupying relations between their fellow-men and God.

(7) *The ordinances of baptism and the Lord's Supper* are also means of sanctification. It is especially important, however, to understand in what respects they are so. Upon this subject there are several opinions, and some of these have led into very serious error. See these various opinions as stated and discussed below.

a. By the Papal Church these two ordinances, with five others (confirmation, penance, matrimony, extreme unction, and orders), are regarded as the Sacraments of the New Law. As to their efficacy as means of grace, this church maintains that the sacraments are, in and of themselves,—wherever conferred with the intention of the church, and where the recipient does not put obstacles in the way,—active causes to produce the grace which they signify, by virtue of the sacramental action itself, instituted by God for this end. The sufferings of Christ concur as the meritorious, but not as the efficient cause, which also depends neither upon the merit of the agent nor upon that of the receiver. They make distinctions, however, as to the necessity of these two sacraments, regarding baptism as absolutely necessary to justification, in which they include sanctification, but the Lord's Supper as only necessary because commanded and eminently useful. The efficacy which is thus ascribed to the sacraments is that of what is called an *opus operatum*, in which grace is conferred *ex opere operato*, viz, from the mere act done. It denies that faith alone in the divine promise suffices to obtain the grace.

Will, faith, and repentance in the adult are necessarily required as dispositions on the part of the subject, but only to remove obstacles, for as fire burns wood, not because the wood is dry nor because fire is applied to it, but because of the power in fire to consume, so they maintain that a sacrament, by its own inherent power, confers the grace when no obstacle prevents, such as would be dampness in wood to the power of fire to burn.¹ The objections to this explanation of the use of the sacrament as means are, (a) That the ordinance is thus regarded as effective in itself, disconnected from any divine truth which may be symbolized in it or taught in its objective presentation or suggested through the Christian experience which accompanies its reception. The Scriptures nowhere teach such efficacy apart from the truth of God. (b) To no immediate connection of God with these is ascribed their effective power. They are held to be mere appointments of God to be applied through man, and grace is taught to be as inherent in them as is, in any merely physical substance, any natural quality which God has bestowed upon it. (c) The faith which is declared requisite to remove obstacles is "mere assent" to receive, and not the appropriating faith of personal trust in Christ which alone is the saving faith of the Bible.² (d) This doctrine of the sacraments places the salvation of every one entirely in the power of others. Whatever his own faith, unless some one else will baptize him, he cannot attain justification and sanctification. (e) Inasmuch as the sacraments are valid to convey grace only when performed with "the intention of doing what the church does," no one can know that the grace has been conferred, since he cannot know the mind of the administrator.

b. A second opinion, different in many respects as to the efficacy of the sacraments, has been held by almost all Protestants: (a) In opposition to the doctrine of Rome they teach that the sacraments, which are but two, Baptism and the Lord's Supper, are not in themselves means of grace and have no separate inherent power to convey it. (b) They say, however, that these are "real means of grace," that "they are not, as Romanists teach, the exclusive channels, but they are channels."³ (c) They also assert that they are "sacred signs and seals of the covenant of grace."⁴ (d) They hold that the efficacy of the sacraments depends "upon the work of the Spirit and the word of institution, which contains, together with a precept authorizing the use thereof, a promise of benefit to worthy receivers."⁵

This position is preferable to that of the Romanists inasmuch as: *aa.* It recognizes the necessary presence of the Spirit in connection with the grace bestowed, and thus denies that this proceeds exclusively from any natural inherent power. And *bb.* The benefits are said to be conferred only upon those "who worthily receive the sacraments." By this is possibly meant persons receiving them through the exercise of true faith in Christ. Such is generally the position assumed by the various theologians of these churches as to the adult recipients of these sacraments. But it should have been more clearly stated in their creeds. The language used could mean this in adult receivers only. Yet it is almost certain that the intention was to include infants among those who "worthily receive." He, however, who "worthily receives" through faith must be capable of personal faith. If the receiver is

¹ See statements and extracts from the Canons of the Council of Trent, and from Bellarmine, contained in Hodge's "Outlines," pp. 597-600.

² Hodge's "Systematic Theology," Vol. III., p. 512.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 499.

⁴ "Westminster Confession," Chap. XXVII., sec. 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*, sec. 3.

not himself a believer, he does not receive "through faith." He may receive *because* of the faith of another, but it is *through* the personal exercise of faith, and not on account of its exercise by others, that the Scriptures teach that the Christian is blessed in connection with the ordinances.

The objections to this form of doctrine are : (aa) The continued use of the word sacrament. This has no scriptural authority. It has led many to attach a superstitious sacredness to these ordinances.

(bb) The use of the word "seal" is also objectionable. A seal is a visible stamp or impression which is made upon a paper or some other substance for the purpose of certifying to the truth of some fact thus implied. It may either be attached personally by the one whom it represents or by some person authorized by him ; but its presence by his authority is his testimony to the genuineness or correctness of what is witnessed. Now neither of the ordinances makes a visible mark upon its recipients. They are thus without an important characteristic of the seal. Neither of them is affixed to a designated individual by divine authority. The authority to administer is only a general one. No man can put marks upon the elect of God which shall authoritatively certify that they are his. Neither baptism nor the Lord's Supper becomes such an authentication either to the recipient or to others. This is found only in the conscious possession of true faith or in the manifestation of that faith by the good works of his life. This common usage of the word "seal" in connection with the ordinances has no other scriptural support than the reference to Abraham in Rom. 4 : 11 : "He received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the righteousness of the faith which he had while he was in uncircumcision." (Cf. Gen. 17 : 11.) But the rite then performed had the characteristics of a seal which have been denied of baptism and the Lord's Supper. It was a visible mark, and not only so, but it was applied to the individual man Abraham by direct divine authority.

(cc) Objection may also be made to the word "sign" in the sense in which it is used. These two ordinances are indeed "signs" ; but signs of what Christ did and suffered and not of what is done to his people. Yet it is in the latter sense that the word "sign" is exclusively used by those holding this opinion.

(dd) The use of these two words has led to the mistake about the manner in which these two ordinances are means of grace, which constitutes the fatal error of this opinion. They are means of grace as they set forth truth, as they teach something, and only in this way do they convey grace. In the act of receiving, that grace may be conferred either from the consciousness of an act of obedience or through the apprehension and comprehension of the truth symbolized. It can come in no other way. The strongest expression in Scripture in favor of the grace-conveying power of an ordinance, that in 1 Peter 3 : 21, in which the apostle speaks of "water : which also after a true likeness [in the antitype] doth now save you, even baptism," is at once explained by him to be not the ordinance, but the spiritual condition in which it is received, viz, "not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the interrogation [inquiry, appeal] of a good conscience toward God through the resurrection of Jesus Christ." Serious has been the error which has resulted from these expressions and the doctrine taught in connection with them. It has led men actually to teach that the grace of God has been really conferred upon or pledged to a recipient by the agency of the administrator. In the Anglican Catechism the question is put to the child : "Who gave you

this name?" to which it is taught to reply: "My God-father and God-mother, in my baptism, wherein I was made a member of Christ, the child of God, and an inheritor of the kingdom of heaven." Here the ordinance performed upon an unconscious subject is taught to have produced regenerating power. This doctrine of baptismal regeneration has been commonly regarded as unscriptural and false by evangelical Christians. Equally unwarranted is the result ascribed by an eminent Presbyterian theologian to the baptism of the child of a believer? He says: "And so when a believer adopts the covenant of grace he brings his children within that covenant in the sense that God promises to give them, in his own good time, all the benefits of redemption, provided they do not willingly renounce their baptismal engagements."¹

c. The true statement of the sanctifying power of these ordinances seems the rather to be: (a) A denial of all inherent power in them as means of grace. (b) Recognition of them as conveying truth by symbolical instruction. (c) The fact that they are partaken of because of the command of Christ makes the act of obedience to him a means of grace to the recipient. (d) But only as truth is in some way or other brought by them to the acceptance of the heart and mind can they have sanctifying power.

It is thus seen that all the means of sanctification are connected with the truth, and are secondary to it. They only become such as they convey truth or as they suggest truth or as they are employed in the recognition of some truth.

CHAPTER XXI. THE FINAL PERSEVERANCE OF THE SAINTS, OR PRESERVATION.

I. THE DOCTRINE STATED.

The doctrine of the final perseverance, or preservation, of the saints teaches that those who are effectually called of God to the exercise of genuine faith in Christ will persevere unto final salvation. This is not taught of a class of mankind as something that will usually be true of the persons composing that class, but of each individual in it—so that not one will finally apostatize or be lost, but each will assuredly persevere and be saved. The doctrine of the perseverance of the saints does not deny that Christians are liable to sin, nor that they do sin, nor that they do turn away from God and backslide from their Christian profession and even fall into grievous wrong, by which they displease God and lose confidence and hope in him and become barren and unfruitful in good works; nor does it deny that final apostasy would be possible to the Christian if he were left to the exercise of his own will, subject, as he would be, not only to the natural

¹ Hodge's "Systematic Theology," Vol. III., p. 555.

fallibility of a creature, but to the still continuing lusts of his flesh, and tempted not only by these but by the attractions of the world and the malice of Satan. But it asserts that it is the purpose of God that none shall finally be lost who have been given to Christ by the Father and have by faith been vitally united with him and justified through him, and that for the fulfillment of this purpose the power of God is sufficient to keep them unto final salvation, and the love of Christ is so invincible in his forbearance, mercy, and grace that nothing can separate them from it. It also teaches that they are not saved that they may indulge in sin and walk after their own lusts, but that they are sanctified through the work of the Holy Spirit, which enables them so to persevere in the divine life in co-operation with his influences that their life and salvation is not a mere gift without effort on their part, but a growth through perseverance unto the end in the use of the appointed means.

II. THE DOCTRINE PROVED.

I. BY DIRECT SCRIPTURE REFERENCES. The psalmist sang : "Though he fall, he shall not be utterly cast down : for the Lord upholdeth him with his hand. . . The Lord loveth judgment, and forsaketh not his saints ; they are preserved for ever" (Ps. 37 : 24-48). The wise man said : "The path of the righteous is as the shining light, that shineth more and more unto the perfect day" (Prov. 4 : 18). Isaiah, referring to the true Israel of God, said : "Fear not, for I have redeemed thee ; I have called thee by thy name ; thou art mine. When thou passest through the waters, I will be with thee ; and through the rivers, they shall not overflow thee : when thou walkest through the fire, thou shalt not be burned ; neither shall the flame kindle upon thee. For I am the Lord thy God, the Holy One of Israel, thy Saviour. . . Every one that is called by my name, and whom I have created for my glory ; I have formed him ; yea, I have made him" (Isa. 43 : 1-7). "Israel shall be saved by the Lord with an everlasting salvation ; ye shall not be ashamed nor confounded world without end" (Isa. 45 : 17). "The heavens shall vanish away like smoke, and the earth shall wax old like a garment, and they that dwell therein shall die in like manner : but my salvation shall be forever, and my righteousness shall not be abolished" (Isa. 51 : 6). "Incline your ear, and come unto me ; hear, and your soul shall live ; and I will make an everlasting covenant with you, even the sure mercies of David" (Isa. 55 : 3). "I will make an everlasting cove-

nant with them, that I will not turn away from them, to do them good; and I will put my fear in their hearts, that they shall not depart from me" (Jer. 32 : 40).

Christ himself, referring to the "false Christs and false prophets" who shall arise professedly in his name, teaches the impossibility of deceiving the elect of God by saying: "So as to lead astray if possible even the elect" (Matt. 24 : 24). He likewise declared: "He that heareth my word, and believeth him that sent me, hath eternal life, and cometh not into judgment, but hath passed out of death into life" (John 5 : 24). To the Samaritan woman he said: "Whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him, shall never thirst; but the water that I shall give him shall become in him a well of water springing up unto eternal life" (John 4 : 14). He also affirmed even more expressly the final salvation of each of his people by declaring: "My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me: and I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, and no one shall snatch them out of my hand. My Father which hath given them unto me, is greater than all; and no one is able to snatch them out of the Father's hand. I and the Father are one" (John 10 : 27-29).

The Apostle Paul presents the effectual calling of those whom God had foreordained to be conformed to the image of his Son, as connected absolutely with their being glorified by him (Rom. 8 : 30). In the same chapter (ver. 35-39) he declares their separation from the love of Christ impossible. Writing to the Corinthians, he assures them that Christ will "confirm" them "unto the end," so that they shall be "unreprovable in the day of our Lord Jesus Christ," adding: "God is faithful, through whom ye were called into the fellowship of his Son Jesus Christ our Lord" (1 Cor. 1 : 8, 9). To the Philippians he also declares himself "Confident of this very thing that he which began a good work in you will perfect it until the day of Jesus Christ" (Phil. 1 : 6). In like manner he says to the Thessalonians: "The Lord is faithful, who shall stablish you and guard you from the evil one" (2 Thess. 3 : 3). Peter also writes to the "sojourners of the dispersion" as unto persons who had been "begotten unto a living hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, unto an inheritance incorruptible, and undefiled, and that fadeth not away, reserved in heaven for you, who by the power of God are guarded through faith unto a salvation ready to be revealed in the last time" (1 Peter 1 : 3-5).

2. FROM ITS NECESSARY CONNECTION WITH OTHER DOCTRINES. This doctrine is inseparably associated with the other doctrines of grace which we have found taught in God's word. So true is this that they are universally accepted or rejected together. The perseverance of the saints is a part of every Calvinistic Confession. It is rejected by Romanists, Lutherans, and Arminians. All the evidence, therefore, of the truth of the doctrines already examined may be presented in favor of this, which is a necessary inference from them. In like manner all the independent proof of this doctrine confirms the separate doctrines and the system of doctrine with which it is associated.

III. HOW EFFECTED.

The question next arises as to how this final perseverance, with its certain attainment of ultimate salvation, is effected.

1. PARTLY THROUGH DIVINE AGENCY. (1) *The Scriptures make it plain* that the final perseverance of every believer is due, first of all, to God. They attribute it to the purpose and the power and the grace of God.

a. Due to the purpose of God. This would be naturally inferred from some of the doctrines to which reference has just been made. But it is also distinctly asserted. Those who believe are said to have been "ordained to eternal life" (Acts 13 : 48). Those finally glorified are said to have been foreordained to be conformed to the image of his Son, and, therefore, called (Rom. 8 : 29). Referring to the falling away of some, the apostle writes to Timothy declaring that nevertheless the "Firm foundation of God standeth, having this seal, The Lord knoweth them that are his" (2 Tim. 2 : 19), thus establishing the identity of those that are thus known with those who shall remain steadfast. Our Lord himself declared this final salvation to be the will of God : "This is the will of him that sent me, that of all that which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up at the last day" (John 6 : 39).

b. Due to the power of God. It is the power of Christ, and of God, which makes it impossible that the sheep shall be snatched from their hands (John 10 : 27-29). It is God that will perfect the good work which he has begun (Phil. 1 : 6). "It is God which worketh in you," says the apostle to the Philipians, "both to will and to work for his good pleasure" (Phil. 2 : 13). Peter addresses his readers as those "Who by the power of God are guarded through faith unto a salvation ready

to be revealed in the last time" (1 Peter 1:5). He likewise invokes that "Grace . . . and peace be multiplied" to those who "have obtained a like precious faith," "seeing that his divine power hath granted unto us all things that pertain unto life and godliness" (2 Peter 1:1-3). The Apostle Paul declares that it is God that is to be thanked because of the growth of faith (2 Thess. 1:3). In the same chapter he says: "We also pray for you, that our God may count you worthy of your calling, and fulfil every desire of goodness, and every work of faith, with power" (2 Thess. 1:11). It was in reliance upon this power that Paul triumphantly wrote to Timothy: "I know him whom I have believed and I am persuaded that he is able to guard that which I have committed unto him against that day" (2 Tim. 1:12).

c. Due to the grace of God. The final salvation is also ascribed to the grace of God. Not only is the power of God exercised, but it is graciously exercised. His aid is a gift of unmerited favor. The Epistle to the Romans asserts that salvation must needs be of faith, that it might be of grace, "to the end that the promise may be sure to all the seed" (Rom. 4:16). It is only "as many as are led by the Spirit of God" that "are the sons of God" (Rom. 8:14). "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that hath mercy" (Rom. 9:16). This gracious character, which is ascribed to the whole work of salvation, is not less true of it in the end than in the beginning. Hence, when the apostle prays for his brethren at Thessalonica, "may your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire without blame at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ," he immediately adds, "faithful is he that calleth you, who will also do it" (1 Thess. 5:23, 24). That faithfulness consists in the fulfillment of gracious promises, and not of matters of obligation and duty.

(2) *It is argued further from the natural weakness of Christians.* That the perseverance of believers depends necessarily upon the purpose and power and grace of God will still further appear from consideration of the natural weakness of the Christian and his liability to fall. *a.* Even an innocent and pure human being must be fallible, because he is a mere creature, and may therefore choose evil instead of good. We have a sad illustration of this in the fall of our first parents. It may be doubted whether the confirmation of holy angels, or saints, is due to anything in themselves or in their condition or state. It is most

probable that their only ground of confidence is in the purpose and promise of God. *b.* But the Christian is not free from sin. He does not in this life attain to perfect sanctification. There are in him constant tendencies to sin, constant liabilities to temptations, and he must ever live in entire dependence upon the grace of God for his progress in the divine life. The Scriptures teach very clearly this weakness and helplessness of the Christian while on earth, in such passages as John 1 : 8-10 and 2 : 1. The same thing is to be inferred from the frequent warnings against the power of temptation. They teach our danger and our need of divine help by their references to Satan as a spiritual enemy who is constantly going about seeking the destruction of God's children. The experience of individual Christians bears the same testimony to natural weakness and to the need of divine help if we are to persevere unto the end. This weakness, thus experienced by Christians and fully recognized in the word of God, is not confined either to those who have just begun their career of faith or who are babes in Christ, but it is found also in the best instructed and most sanctified to such an extent as to make necessary their continued watchfulness and prayer. It was to those to whom the apostle wrote, "in everything ye were enriched in him, in all utterance and all knowledge . . . so that ye come behind in no gift" (1 Cor. 1 : 4-7), that he found it necessary to say "let him that thinketh he standeth, take heed lest he fall" (1 Cor. 10 : 12). The extent to which this weakness of man is seen to exhibit itself is evidence not only of what, but for the intervention of God, might occur in each case, but also that, so far as man is concerned, the final apostasy of each one is not only possible, but probable, nay certain. We thus have additional proof that the final salvation is due to the purpose, power, and grace of God.

2. PARTLY THROUGH HUMAN EFFORT. This final perseverance and certain attainment of salvation are secured, however, only through the co-operation of the believer. It is not merely preservation by God, but also perseverance of the believer, in faith and holiness, unto the end. It is the good work begun in the Christian which is performed until the day of Jesus Christ (Phil. 1 : 6). The confirmation to the end secures that they shall be "unreprovable in the day of our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Cor. 1 : 8). The preordination is unto conformity to the image of his Son (Rom. 8 : 29). This co-operation of the believer is in various ways and along various lines.

(1) *By faith.* Christians "by the power of God are guarded through faith unto a salvation" (1 Peter 1 : 5). "Whatsoever is begotten of God overcometh the world: and this is the victory that hath overcome the world, even our faith" (1 John 5 : 4). "As many as received him, to them gave he the right to become children of God, even to them that believe on his name" (John 1 : 12). "These are written, that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye may have life in his name" (John 20 : 31).

(2) *By consecration to God.* This is earnestly enjoined upon the people of God because of the great privileges bestowed upon them. Paul besought the Romans by the mercies of God to present their bodies a living sacrifice unto God (Rom. 12 : 1). He urged the Ephesians to be followers of God, as dear children, and walk in love, not allowing certain sins which he mentioned to be once named among them, as they were unbecoming to saints (Eph. 5 : 1-4). The writer to the Hebrews, also, surrounding himself and his brethren with a cloud of martyrs, exhorts: "Lay aside every weight, and the sin which doth so easily beset us, and let us run with patience the race that is set before us, looking unto Jesus the author and perfecter of our faith" (Heb. 12 : 1).

(3) *By self-purification from sin.* We find Paul urging upon his brethren at Rome: "Neither present your members unto sin as instruments of unrighteousness; but present yourselves unto God, as alive from the dead, and your members as instruments of righteousness unto God" (Rom. 6 : 13). So also, in view of their adoption by God, he exhorts the Corinthians, "Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of God" (2 Cor. 7 : 1). "They that are of Christ" are said to "have crucified the flesh with the passions and the lusts thereof" (Gal. 5 : 24). The Apostle John declares that "every one that hath this hope set on him purifieth himself, even as he [Christ] is pure" (1 John 3 : 3).

(4) *By attention to warnings.* The warnings of God's word are also means to the same end. They imply the importance of Christian exertion and the value of effort as well as the possibility of danger. The Hebrews were warned that they should fear lest, a promise being left of rest, any of them should seem to come short of it (Heb. 4 : 1). They are especially warned to go on unto perfection, upon the statement that "As touching those who were once enlightened, and tasted of the heavenly gift, and

were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, and tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the age to come, and then fall away, it is impossible to renew them again unto repentance; seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh, and put him to an open shame" (Heb. 6 : 4-6). This was a description of such persons as they themselves were; of real Christians. They were, *in themselves*, in real danger of such a fall. This danger was therefore a fit cause for exhortation to them to push forward unto perfection, however secure they might be in the purpose and power and grace of God.

It is thought by some that this passage shows the possibility of a fall from grace, and therefore is contrary to the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints. It is admitted that, *regarded in their own strength only*, there was this possibility of fall in the persons thus addressed. But the doctrine we are considering does not regard the believer as preserved and as persevering only through himself. He is thus kept by God, not by his own power. One of the means by which this is done is that he is warned of the danger in which he is of himself, that he may co-operate with God, so as not only to be preserved, but also to persevere in the divine life. Of like purpose and to the same effect are the other warnings found in the tenth chapter of this Epistle in ver. 26-29, 38, and those in 2 Peter 2 : 20, 22, and elsewhere in the Scriptures. The means mentioned are only some of the numerous ways in which the Christian is led to persevere in the divine life, actively co-operating with the grace of God. It is because God bestows and man attains, as the Apostle Peter so completely sets forth in his preceding remarks, that he exhorts his brethren to "give the more diligence to make your calling and election sure," adding, "for if ye do these things, ye shall never stumble: for thus shall be richly supplied unto you the entrance into the eternal kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ" (2 Peter 1 : 10, 11). It is because of the divine help afforded through the incarnation and humiliation and consequent exaltation of Christ Jesus, that the apostle could urge the Philippians, "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God which worketh in you both to will and to work for his good pleasure" (Phil. 2 : 12, 13).

IV. OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE.

It is well to notice briefly some of the objections presented to this doctrine.

I. THE APOSTASY OF ISRAEL. One of the most plausible of these is based upon the apostasy of the nation of Israel despite the many promises with which it was blessed.

(1) But the analogy of God's dealings with his ancient people favors, rather than opposes, the doctrine of final perseverance. Their history presents to us just such cases of backsliding and recovery as have been pointed out as true of Christian believers.

The backsliding was through their sin, the recovery through the power and grace of God. The one followed the other at greater or less intervals, but always followed it. Is it said, however, that Israel is now entirely cast away? But such is not the teaching of the word of God. Paul expressly denies this, and teaches their restoration to God when the fullness of the Gentiles has come in (Rom. 11 : 26). It is to be remembered also that the calling of Israel was that of the nation, and not of the individuals within it. The fact that many Israelites have been lost eternally and beyond rescue does not affect the fulfillment of any gracious purpose of God toward the nation as such.

(2) But even if the above view is not correct, and if it should turn out that God has actually cast off forever the nation of Israel as a nation, still there would be nothing in this contrary to our doctrine of final perseverance. For the promises to natural Israel were all based upon the condition of their faithfulness to God ; and it may be claimed that they were not faithful, and hence could not claim the promise. Or yet again, it may be claimed with great force that these promises do not pledge God to effect the final perseverance of Israel as a nation ; indeed, many hold that the promises as to the future of Israel are made simply of the gathering of the spiritual Israel.

(3) However this may be, certain it is that the promises to *spiritual Israel* include not only the promised blessings, but also the *establishment in them of the conditions* upon which these blessings depend. These promises are different from those of the old covenant with *natural Israel*. They are the promises of a new covenant made in Christ Jesus. The nature of this new covenant is set forth in the prophecy of Jeremiah, and with its statements many other passages of Scripture concur. From its very nature it is impossible that the blessings promised in it should not be given to all the real people of God. "Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah : not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers in the day that I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt ; which my covenant they brake, although I was an husband unto them, saith the Lord. But this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, saith the Lord ; I will put my law in their inward parts, and in their heart will I write it ; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people : and they shall teach no more every man his neighbour, and every man his

brother, saying, Know the Lord : . . for I will forgive their iniquity, and their sin will I remember no more" (Jer. 31 : 31-34. See also Jer. 32 : 38-40).

2. THE WARNINGS AGAINST APOSTASY. It is again objected that the warnings against apostasy and exhortations to perseverance imply the possibility and danger of fall on the part of those to whom they were addressed. But even if this were absolutely true, it would not be proof that any have fallen away or shall fall away. These very warnings might become effective to guard against the danger, as the signs set up in hazardous places are the means by which the danger is avoided. But as has been already explained, this danger arises solely from the believer if left to himself ; the certainty that he will not finally fall away depends upon God's purpose to preserve him. These warnings are, therefore, consistent with his safety, and are the signs of danger which God sets up to prevent the fall of his servants.

3. CASES OF APPARENT FAILURE. It is objected, however, that while we have instances of some who are rescued from their grievous sins and backslidings, the Scripture also gives examples of others who are left to perish. But the doctrine of God's word is that of the perseverance of believers, of the elect of God, of those called to be saints. An examination of the cases mentioned will show no reason for believing those who thus fell away to have been of this class. Indeed, in most cases the contrary is taught. The case of Judas is the most prominent. It would seem more nearly to correspond than any other with the privileges referred to in Heb. 6 : 4, 5, and yet Christ proclaimed his condition as not that of a Christian about a year before his betrayal. "Did not I choose you the twelve, and one of you is a devil? Now he spake of Judas, the son of Simon Iscariot" (John 6 : 70, 71). We need no better proof that this man, in the betraying of our Lord, did not fall from a state of grace and salvation into the perdition to which he was doomed. So also as to Simon Magus, Peter expressly declared : "Thou hast neither part nor lot in this matter : for thy heart is not right before God. . . I see that thou art in the gall of bitterness and in the bond of iniquity" (Acts 8 : 21, 23). The Apostle John seems, in general terms, to state the truth as to all those who finally depart from the faith : "They went out from us, but they were not of us ; for if they had been of us, they would have continued with us ; but they went out, that they might be made manifest how that they all are not of us" (1 John 2 : 19).

CC. ESCHATOLOGY.

CHAPTER XXII. DEATH, IMMORTALITY, AND THE INTERMEDIATE STATE.

We have traced thus far God's providential dealings with man in the matter of providing for him a Saviour and in the efforts put forth by God to make the provisions for salvation effective. We now come to the closing of man's career on earth and God's dealing with him in the world to come. This part of theology is usually called eschatology. It is so called because it has to do with what are regarded as *last things*. In the present chapter we will discuss the subjects of death, the immortality of the soul, and the intermediate state, or the condition of the soul between the hour of death and its reunion with the body.

I. DEATH.

1. MEANING OF TERM AS HERE USED. The term death is most commonly applied to that separation of soul and body which is the most manifest form in which the penalty of sin is seen among men. That there is a death of the soul also, and that it is something far more terrible than the death of the body, has been shown in the chapter on the "Effects of the Fall of Man." But this death of the soul is spiritual in its nature and does not forbid the continued existence of the soul, and its dread realities will be more plainly evinced in the unseen hereafter. Consequently, the separation of body and soul makes a more profound impression among living men, and to it the term death is almost exclusively appropriated. It is in this latter sense that the term is now used. It is sometimes called "natural" or "physical" death, to distinguish it from that which is "spiritual"; the death "of the body," as opposed to that "of the soul"; and "temporal" death, in contrast with that which is everlasting.

2. ITS UNIVERSALITY. This separation of body and soul is the almost universal destiny of men. The Scriptures, however, teach that Enoch did not die but "God took him" (Gen. 5 : 24), and that he "was translated that he should not see death" (Heb. 11 : 5); also that Elijah "went up by a whirlwind into heaven" (2 Kings 2 : 11). Some have supposed that in like manner Moses escaped death, but it is expressly stated that he died and was buried in the land of Moab (Deut. 34 : 5, 6). But Paul declared that at the second coming of the Lord "we that are alive,

that are left, shall together with them be caught up in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air: and so shall we ever be with the Lord" (1 Thess. 4 : 17). Even more explicitly he said: "We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed" (1 Cor. 15 : 51, 52). This is the fashioning anew of "the body of our humiliation that it may be conformed to the body of his glory," foretold in Phil. 3 : 21.

3. A MARKED DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE DEATH OF THE RIGHTEOUS AND WICKED. But while death comes thus almost universally to all, there is a marked difference between its connection with the righteous and with the wicked.

(1) *The death of the wicked is easily accounted for.* It constitutes a part of the penalty of sin, to which the Scriptures teach all men are liable (Rom. 5 : 12, 14; 1 Cor. 15 : 21, 22, 53-56), but from which, as such, the people of God are exempted because Christ has redeemed them from the curse of the law. The "death of the saint," instead of being accursed, is "precious in the sight of the Lord" (Ps. 116 : 15), and this because he has redeemed them (Ps. 72 : 14). His death is a death "unto the Lord" (Rom. 14 : 8). Death is his (1 Cor. 3 : 22). Its sting has been removed (1 Cor. 15 : 56). But no one of these things is true of the wicked. He has neglected or rejected the offer of salvation through Christ Jesus. There is no other method of escape from the penalty and it rests upon him in all its fullness.

(2) *It is not so easy to account for the death of the righteous.* As he is no longer liable to the penalty of sin, there is no legal ground upon which he must endure death and because of which he cannot be released. This is confirmed by the fact that some righteous have not died and others will only be changed. It ought not to be forgotten, however, that this is not the only dealing of God with his people which evidently arises from some wise purpose which he has not fully revealed. They might have been taken out of the world as soon as they were justified. Yet that this is graciously and wisely prevented is evident from Christ's declining to pray for it (John 17 : 15). They might have been preserved from affliction and persecution and similar inflictions from God or man. That these are blessed to them is no proof that they would not have been more blessed without them, for they are taught to look forward to greater bliss in their exemption from them in heaven. Our Lord prayed that they

might be kept from the evil one, and they are doubtless protected from his power in answer to this prayer, but they are still left subject to his influences and temptations, and are very far from escaping the presence and pollution of sin. In all of these things we see some reasons for the action of God, though our knowledge is imperfect and incomplete. It ought not to be thought strange, then, if in like manner we can only account partially for the death of true believers. Various theories on the subject have arisen, which we may proceed to notice, although no one of them is entirely satisfactory :

a. Some have thought that for the attainment of perfect sanctification it is necessary that the soul and body be separated and the body reduced to its original elements. That this is not necessary is manifest from the examples of exemption from death already stated. But it may be admitted to be the ordinary method which God has ordained for such sanctification. For the desired perfection there must be removal of the passions and appetites of the flesh by which man is tempted not only from himself but through himself. The "change" at the last day accomplishes this in an extraordinary manner. The more ordinary method of God seems to be through death, in which, by its separation from the sinful body, the soul is freed from these temptations and enabled to live perfectly the life of holiness for which it longs.

b. Another opinion which has been expressed is that death is natural to man, and that it, from its nature, becomes the means of his passing from a lower to a higher condition, in which through a more advanced organism the soul may live a more exalted life.

This opinion may be held either about the original or the fallen condition of man. If about the original condition, it involves the position that the body of man was created mortal, and that its death, as a penalty, was not something superadded when man sinned, but is simply the natural condition of man's life used by God as penalty and so made known to man. If held, however, only as to man's present natural condition, it would not necessarily involve an original mortality.

As to this opinion it is necessary that it recognize death simply as the *ordinary* method of man's passing into another life, for the exemption of some shows that the end may be by other means accomplished. It derives some support from the analogy of the necessity of death in the seed for its change to a higher form, presented in 1 Cor. 15 : 36-38.

c. Death is supposed by some to be necessary for a life of faith

rather than of sight in the Christian. It is thought that it would be injurious to make so marked a distinction between the righteous and the wicked as would exist in the death of the latter and the change of the former in some other way. But the reason for this opinion is not apparent. It might be true, were the Christian personally changed in body as soon as he believes. But it would not be if the change should occur only at the time when otherwise his death would take place. Doubtless the translation of Enoch was one fitted to produce a profound impression on his contemporaries. It certainly had had no evil influence on his own life. So if the Christian should have no other certainty of exemption from death than he now has of salvation he could derive no motives from that exemption which would militate against his life of faith. It is much more probably because God does not choose to continue the miraculous testimony to the truth of Christianity throughout all time. But had he done this the lives of Christians in the later ages would have been no less lives of faith than were those of apostolic times.

d. It has been more generally stated that death is a means of chastisement. It has been shown that, while suffering is common to both, it is inflicted in punishment by an *angry God* in the way of penalty and in chastisement, but by a *loving Father* only for correction and discipline; and thus that the same event, death, may be a curse to the wicked and a blessing to the righteous. It has been argued that this is the reason why even a Christian man must die. This may, indeed, be true so far as the death of the Christian is a cause of suffering and pain, either in death itself or in his contemplation of it. And it undoubtedly often produces this effect. For even to the Christian it does not always assume an aspect altogether pleasant. He naturally shrinks from its loathsome embrace. It is an enemy, even if it is "the last enemy," and one over which he is "more than conqueror." But death is not always a matter of dread to a Christian. His thoughts sometimes leap forward to it with exultant joy. Especially is it true that seldom, if ever, in the hour of death is the true Christian filled with apprehension and gloom. His own death becomes no chastisement in the event itself. God in that hour gives such sustaining grace that each of his servants is hopeful, peaceful, joyful, even sometimes triumphant.

But in conclusion we remark that, whether we can give a correct theory or not as to why the Christian is subjected to death, we know that it is a blessing to him. The inquiry into its cause and

the various reasons suggested proceed apparently on the supposition that it is an evil which we could wish the Christian had been spared. But the Scriptures speak of death as among the "all things" which belong to the Christian (1 Cor. 3 : 22). This does not deny its possibly painful character, but asserts that, however painful, it has nevertheless been made his possession and that it is therefore used for his benefit. This is in accordance with the universal law of blessing to him which the apostle announces in Rom. 8 : 28 : "We know that to them that love God all things work together for good, to them who are the called according to his purpose." The principle of this law, however, admits either blessing or suffering. The suffering in connection with death was pointed out under the previous division. It will suffice briefly to indicate here some of the blessings also associated with it: Death is a blessing to the Christian because through its contemplation his sanctification and purification in this life is carried forward. This contemplation of it includes all the aspects in which it presents itself, whether painful or otherwise. It is a blessing because in it he looks forward to the attainment of final freedom from sin and to perfect sanctification. It is a blessing because he recognizes it as the portal to the possession of eternal life. Death is a blessing because it gives him an opportunity of giving strong testimony in favor of Christ and his religion. It is felt to be a blessing because it opens the doors to immediate conscious personal presence with his Saviour.

These points are obvious and need not be elaborated.

II. IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

When the immortality of the soul is spoken of, its unending future life is usually meant. This is the immortality which is common to the righteous and the wicked. The righteous, however, possess also that true immortality which the Scriptures teach to be that of the true life of the soul.

I. UNENDING FUTURE LIFE. The unending life of the soul has been argued upon various grounds.

(1) *Reason alone has been supposed by many to furnish adequate arguments in proof of its truth.* a. The longing of the soul for immortal existence has been deemed to be an instinct implanted within, which gives assurance of its gratification. But while with a few there may have been aspirations after a nobler and better life than that of earth, it may be questioned whether, in the vast multitude of men, there is more than a shrinking from

the loss of such life as is possessed in the present stage of existence. The instinct seems, therefore, to be rather that dread of death which is not unknown to the mere animal, and which is given for the protection of the life that now is, and not as a basis of hope of that which may be hereafter.

b. The inequality which is so manifest in the apportionment of good and evil to the characters and conduct of men on earth has almost universally led to the belief of a future life, in which these will be duly adjusted. But by these facts is taught merely a future life; not one necessarily of an unending duration, but only of sufficient length for such adjustment. It is the word of God alone that teaches that the bliss or woe which is the portion of man at death will continue forever. It must be acknowledged, however, that as universal as has been the belief in a state of future rewards and punishments, equally so has been the opinion that it shall never end.

c. This general belief in an unending life has also been accounted for on the supposition that it is an intuitive perception of the mind. But it does not appear that such knowledge as reason can give of what the soul is and of what endless existence means awakens at once the conviction that the soul must exist forever. The most thoughtful men, who have been guided by nature only, have been afflicted with doubts and alternate hopes and fears without attaining more than earnest, or at most, confident expectations, much less such knowledge of a continuous future as would result from the existence of an intuitive conception.

d. The capacity of indefinite progress in the mental and moral powers of men has seemed to many to indicate a stage of being in which it may be developed. But no one will assert that there is here more than an indication, which is opposed by the evidence of the great waste in the productions of nature, and which, therefore, needs confirmation from some more decisive source to become other than a mere expectation.

e. Some metaphysicians have argued the indestructible nature of the soul from its pure simplicity. They have believed it to be un compounded, and therefore incapable of dissolution and consequent destruction. This is based upon the belief that it is purely spiritual, and that simplicity is a necessary attribute of spirit. But these facts are difficult to prove. They are by no means undisputed among those who rely on reason alone. It is from the Scriptures that we learn the different origin of body and soul,

and that the latter came not from matter. Philosophy has not always regarded the soul as a unit. The terms "soul," "mind," and "spirit," indicate a tendency to recognize at least some three-fold aspects in the human spirit, in accordance with which, even while asserting the absolute unity of the soul, mental philosophy has recognized the three-fold division of the will, the understanding, and the affections. It is well known that the most of the Grecian philosophers, following Plato, held to a distinction between *ψυχή* (*psuche*, the animal life or soul), and *νοῦς* (*nous*) and *πνεῦμα* (*pneuma*, the rational spirit). Even some Christian writers of our own day have maintained the same views. In this state of uncertainty, therefore, reason cannot speak convincingly of an ever-continuing life of man, on the ground of the simplicity and consequent indestructibility of his spiritual nature.

It appears, therefore, that from reason alone all that can be attained, even as to a merely future state, is expectation; or at most, belief upon uncertain grounds. It is true that if it could be established that the soul dies with the body, certain hopes and fears would remain unaccounted for and certain problems of divine government would be unexplained; but these could, at most, only produce conviction of some future state, and would prove nothing as to its unending or even indefinite duration.

(2) *The Scriptures, however, teach plainly the continued existence of all men after death.* a. It is everywhere assumed as a fact, neither to be doubted nor proved, but one that will be at once received without question.

b. The cases of Enoch and Elijah gave signal proof of another world than this into which even men might enter. But they furnished no evidence that any other than these two would go thither. They simply showed that the possible existence of men otherwise than on this earth, has been actually realized in these servants of God. But so far from thus furnishing conclusive proof of the future life of other men, the fact that these were not removed through death, but by extraordinary means, naturally suggested the possibility that exemption from death is necessary to that life, and that all those who go down to the grave perish altogether. It was only to those otherwise taught of the continued existence of the soul that their removal gave confirmatory proof of such immortality. In like manner we are taught the same truths by the presence of Moses and Elijah at the scene of the transfiguration. The appearance at various times of angels to men furnishes additional proof of another world. The resur-

rection and ascension of Jesus Christ confirm most conclusively the doctrine of a future life.

c. The Scriptures teach, in the account of the creation of man, that his soul did not originate from the dust, but was a direct spiritual creation of God (Gen. 2 : 7). They make further statements about the difference between soul and body confirmatory of the distinction made in their creation (Gen. 25 : 8 ; 35 : 29 ; Eccl. 12 : 7 ; Matt. 10 : 28 ; Acts 7 : 59).

d. They make express reference to the existence of the soul after death (2 Sam. 12 : 23 ; Job 19 : 25-27). Conant translates this passage: "But I, I know my redeemer lives, and in aftertime will stand upon the earth ; and after this my skin is destroyed, and without my flesh, shall I see God. Whom I, for myself, shall see, and my eyes behold, and not another, when my reins are consumed within me." See also Matt. 22 : 32 ; 25 : 46 ; Luke 16 : 19-31 ; John 11 : 25 ; 2 Cor. 5 : 1-4.

e. They make known that this future life is the lot of the wicked as well as of the righteous, teaching that it is one of happiness to the latter and of condemnation and misery to the former (Matt. 25 : 46 ; John 6 : 47 ; 12 : 25 ; 1 Cor. 15 : 17-20).

f. They declare the continuance of this at least until the day of the resurrection and final judgment (Job 21 : 30 ; Eccl. 3 : 17 ; Luke 14 : 14 ; John 5 : 28, 29 ; Acts 24 : 15 ; Rom. 14 : 10 ; 1 Cor. 15 : 51, 52 ; 2 Cor. 5 : 10 ; 1 Thess. 4 : 13-17).

g. They represent the decisions of the judgment day as fixing the destinies of men for an unending existence. The evidence of this teaching will be given in the discussion of "The Judgment Day."

The Scriptures are thus seen to teach conclusively the doctrine of an unending future life of all men. This, as has been stated, is what is commonly referred to as the immortality of the soul.

2. THE TRUE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. The immortality which has been thus far discussed is that which is common to both the righteous and the wicked. In the beginning of this part of this chapter it was stated that the righteous possess also that immortality which is the true life of the soul. The soul is declared in God's word to be dead spiritually. This spiritual death has been described in the chapter on "The Effects of the Fall of Man," as something different from natural death, and as constituting the most fearful of the penalties inflicted because of sin. It was there shown that the Scriptures describe it in the various aspects of alienation from God resulting

in loss of God's favor and corruption of the moral nature. The true immortality of the Christian consists in the removal of all these evils and the bestowment upon him of their corresponding blessings. That this is done and that this is the condition into which he is thus brought will abundantly appear from the following passages of Scripture: Matt. 10 : 39; 16 : 25 (*cf.* Mark 8 : 35); 18 : 9 (parallel passages, Mark 9 : 45; Luke 9 : 24; 17 : 33; John 12 : 25); 19 : 17; John 3 : 36; 5 : 24, 40; 6 : 33, 35, 50-58, 63; 20 : 31; Rom. 6 : 4; 8 : 6, 13; 2 Cor. 3 : 6; Eph. 4 : 18; 1 John 3 : 14; 5 : 12.

The contrast at this point between the immortality of the righteous and that of the wicked is very marked. "The wicked is thrust down in his evil doing : but the righteous hath hope in his death" (Prov. 14 : 32). "When a wicked man dieth, his expectation shall perish" (Prov. 11 : 7). But "blessed are the dead which die in the Lord . . . for their works follow with them" (Rev. 14 : 13).

The happiness of this immortality of the Christian is the greater because it is a state in which he is confirmed forever. The law of this condition, both of the righteous and the wicked, is laid down in Rev. 22 : 11 : "He that is unrighteous, let him do unrighteousness still : and he that is filthy, let him be made filthy still : and he that is righteous, let him do righteousness still : and he that is holy, let him be made holy still." As the wicked shall not change his state, so shall not the righteous his. The day of his trial and probation is over and he stands secure of the bliss of heaven, confirmed by the unfailing promises of God. The scenes through which he has passed on earth fill him with no apprehensions that his weakness and insufficiency will disable him from performing the perfect service of heaven. The recollection of Adam's trial will suggest to him no possibility that he will be subjected to a test which will dissolve forever the bonds which unite him to God. Even the sin of the angels will not alarm him. For he is now assured of that "eternal life which God, who cannot lie, promised before times eternal" (Titus 1 : 2). This is immortality indeed. This, and not mere continued life, is what he confers "who abolished death, and brought life and incorruption to light through the gospel" (2 Tim. 1 : 10).

III. THE INTERMEDIATE STATE.

The Scriptures teach that there is a state intermediate between that of our existence in the present time and that of the race

after the judgment. At death the body crumbles into dust and appears to be totally destroyed. The spirit returns unto God who gave it (Eccl. 12 : 7). Hence, at his martyrdom, we hear the first dying Christian "calling upon the Lord, and saying, Lord Jesus, receive my spirit" (Acts 7 : 59). It is not in accordance with the methods of God in his revelations to man to answer the many inquiries which curiosity might suggest as to this intermediate state of the soul. But much more is taught about it than would at first be imagined. Such facts as are given are valuable to confirm and strengthen faith and to give consolation. Those may be mentioned first which are common to the righteous and the wicked, and these may be followed by separate statements of the things wherein they differ.

I. FACTS COMMON TO THE RIGHTEOUS AND THE WICKED. (1) *The soul exists without a body.* Unquestionably it has not the body which it had on earth. But some have thought that it has some kind of a body, some spiritual body, which merely corresponds to and is only thus identified with that of this life. But Paul's discussion of the resurrection shows that the "spiritual" body is one that is to be raised out of the grave in which the natural body was buried, and that it is "at the last trump" that "the dead shall be raised" (1 Cor. 15 : 44, 52-54). Some have argued that body of some kind is necessary to give location to these spirits. But a spirit may have location without occupying space as a body does. Here may be recalled the quotation made by Hodge from Turretin as to the different relations that bodies, created spirits, and God sustain to space, given on p. 115 of this volume.

(2) *The condition is consequently one of an imperfect life.* It is the life of the spirit only and not that of the man. Human nature is composed of both body and spirit, and his body is as truly a part of a man as is his soul. The condition, therefore, in which disembodied spirits exist is not that of perfect men, but only of human spirits. This, which is an inference which may be drawn from the two-fold nature of man, is supported by the manner in which the Scriptures refer to persons in this intermediate state. They are not spoken of as "men," but as "souls" and "spirits" (Heb. 12 : 23 ; Rev. 6 : 9 ; 20 : 4). Another proof of this want of perfection of this condition is seen in the fact that the saints attain full entrance into their joy and the wicked full infliction of their woe only after the resurrection (Matt. 13 : 40-43, 49, 50 ; 25 : 34, 41, 46 ; 1 Cor. 15 : 44-54.)

(3) *Both righteous and wicked have conscious life.* This might have been inferred from the nature of spirit, which must always be in a state of conscious existence. But it is a plain teaching of the Bible (Luke 16 : 22-31). The word "hades" here means the place of departed spirits, and as the scene occurs after the death of Lazarus and before the final judgment, so must it be assigned to the intermediate state. In this the rich man is represented as in conscious torment. The conscious condition of the righteous is taught in 2 Cor. 5 : 1-8 ; Phil. 1 : 21-24 ; and also in the passages connected with paradise : Luke 23 : 42, 43 ; 2 Cor. 12 : 4 ; Rev. 2 : 7 ; 22 : 2.

(4) *Neither the righteous nor the wicked are under probation in this intermediate state* (Luke 16 : 22-31 ; 2 Cor. 5 : 10 ; Rev. 22 : 11). Even if the language in 1 Peter 3 : 19, 20 and 4 : 6 teaches, as some have thought, that our Lord went to the place of departed spirits and preached to them, so that to those who had died up to the time of his death was given a probation in the gospel preached to them by him, that would be but a single instance of a favor shown to those who had died before his crucifixion ; and so far from proving a probation beyond the grave would, from its exceptional character, imply the contrary.

2. FACTS PECULIAR TO THE RIGHTEOUS. The following are aspects of the intermediate state peculiar to the righteous :

(1) *It is a condition of happiness.* Paul declared that "to die is gain" and to depart this life far better than to remain in it (Phil. 1 : 21-24). He wrote to Timothy, looking forward exultingly to the hour of his death (2 Tim. 4 : 6-8). He also referred to his longing for this future as possessed by him in common with his brethren (2 Cor. 5 : 1-8). In the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, the happiness of the latter is described by his being in Abraham's bosom (Luke 16 : 23).

(2) *It is a condition in which the believer is present with Christ.* This is also taught in all the passages referred to in the previous paragraph except the last, and constitutes in each of them the ground of the happiness which they declare.

(3) *The believer is also said to be in paradise.* Whatever this may mean, whether only a condition or a place, it is unquestionably true that it is intended to convey the idea of the enjoyment of very great happiness. The passages in which paradise is mentioned are Luke 23 : 43 ; 2 Cor. 12 : 4 ; Rev. 2 : 7. That these teach that it is a place can only be denied on the ground that very highly figurative language is used. Only the first of these,

however, refers to the presence of Christ with any one, and this contains only his promise to the thief on the cross, "To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise." But the location of paradise, as made known by the Apostle Paul (2 Cor. 12 : 1-4), taken in connection with this first passage, makes it more than probable that it is the place where the saints are with Christ. The Scriptures teach that "Christ was received up into heaven, and sat down at the right hand of God" (Mark 16 : 19 ; Luke 24 : 51 ; Acts 1 : 11 ; 2 : 33, 34 ; 7 : 55, 56 ; Eph. 1 : 20 ; Heb. 10 : 12 ; 1 Peter 3 : 22). We are also taught that he must there remain "until the times of restoration of all things" (Acts 3 : 21). Now, in the account Paul gives of his ecstatic vision in 2 Cor. 12 : 1-4, he tells us that he was "caught up even to the third heaven," and "caught up into paradise," which locates paradise either in or above the third heaven or makes the two identical. So also Rev. 2 : 7, taken in connection with Rev. 22 : 2 and 21 : 10-27, states that the tree of life, "which is in the paradise of God," is "in the midst of the street" of "that great city, the holy Jerusalem, descending out of heaven from God, having the glory of God," in which was no temple, "for the Lord God the Almighty and the Lamb are the temple thereof," and is "on either side of the river," which is described as "a river of water of life, bright as crystal, proceeding out of the throne of God, and of the Lamb." The place of the abode of the saints is with Christ, who is in the heavens with God. It is to that place that most probably the name of paradise is given in the Scriptures.

(4) *In that abode the saints are not probably inactive.* Some have thought this because their condition is spoken of as one of "rest" and "sleep." But evidently the former of these terms is used simply to declare the end of the toils and labors of this life and the enjoyment of exemption from their present spiritual as well as temporal trials. This does not imply that there are not intellectual and spiritual duties and meditations suitable to that abode, such as may give due scope to that activity which seems essential to personal conscious spirits. The "sleep" more probably refers to the appearance of the body in death, and is beautifully expressive of the calm repose with which the Christian sinks into final dissolution.

(5) *Neither is the intermediate state a place of cleansing from sin.* That it is so is held by the Church of Rome. That church teaches that at death all unbaptized adults and all who have fallen into and continued in mortal sin after baptism, go imme-

diately to hell. All who have been baptized and remain in union with that church and have attained a life of Christian perfection, go immediately to heaven. Unbaptized infants occupy what is called "the *Limbus infantum*," a place in the higher part of hell which the flames do not reach, and suffer only a "*pœnam damni*" (penalty of loss), and have no share in the "*pœnam sensus*" (penalty of actual suffering) which afflicts adult sinners. But "the great mass of partially sanctified Christians, dying in fellowship with the church, yet still encumbered with imperfections, go to purgatory, where they suffer more or less intensely for a longer or shorter period until their sins are both atoned for and purged out, when they are translated to heaven, during which intermediate period they may be efficiently assisted by the prayers and labours of their friends on earth."

"They confess that this doctrine is not taught distinctly in Scripture, but maintain, first, that it follows necessarily from their general doctrine of the satisfaction for sins; second, that Christ and the apostles taught it incidentally. . . They refer to Matt. 12 : 32; 1 Cor. 3 : 15." ¹

But the first of these passages is manifestly only a strong way of declaring that the sin referred to shall never be pardoned, without authorizing the inference that there are other sins which will be pardoned in the world to come. The second passage, by the various things which are built upon the true foundation which, if false or insufficient, shall be burned, refers not to personal character, but to teachings.

This doctrine of purgatory is based upon the very unscriptural theory of salvation through personal works and sufferings which the Church of Rome holds, in connection with sacramental grace, to be supplementary to the meritorious work of Christ. While it has no support from Scripture, it is opposed to all that the Scriptures teach about the intermediate state of the righteous.

3. FACTS PECULIAR TO THE WICKED. The Scripture teaching here is much more meagre. The four statements already mentioned in which their condition and that of the righteous are similar, comprise almost all that is said. As peculiar to them, however, may be added the following facts gathered from the word of God :

(1) Christ, in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, speaks of their condition as: *a*. One of torment (Luke 16 : 23-25, 28);

¹ Hodge's "Outlines of Theology," pp. 556, 557.

b. from which there is no escape to the condition of bliss of the righteous (ver. 26); and *c.* as endured in a place of torment (ver. 23, 28).

(2) Those who interpret 1 Peter 3 : 19, 20 as referring to a personal preaching by Christ to the dead in hades necessarily hold that the wicked are "in prison." Luke 16 : 26 speaks of them as being separated from the righteous by an impassable gulf.

(3) It is a place in which they are reserved for punishment in the day of judgment (2 Peter 2 : 9).

(4) The only place spoken of in connection with the wicked during the intermediate state is hades, or the place of departed spirits, which is always translated hell in the King James version, but is transferred in the Canterbury revision. The passages in which hades is used are Matt. 11 : 13 ; 16 : 18 ; Luke 10 : 15 ; 16 : 23 ; Acts 2 : 27, 31 ; Rev. 1 : 18 ; 6 : 8 ; 20 : 13, 14.

CHAPTER XXIII. CHRIST'S SECOND COMING AND THE RESURRECTION.

The incarnation of the Son of God is not his last manifestation in the flesh to men on earth. The Scriptures speak of another appearing in connection with which is taught the resurrection of the dead and the final judgment. Each of these subjects demands special discussion. In some works on theology the doctrine of the resurrection is first treated because of its intimate connection with death and immortality and because it terminates the intermediate state. But inasmuch as the coming of Christ will precede the resurrection of the dead it seems best that it be first considered.

I. THE SECOND COMING OF CHRIST.

I. THE FACT DISTINCTLY REVEALED. Whatever doubts any may have about the passages sometimes quoted as teaching it in the Old Testament, there can be none that it is clearly made known in the New.

(1) *It was taught by our Lord* (Matt. 16 : 28 ; 24 : 36-40 ; 26 : 64 ; Mark 13 : 26 ; 14 : 62 ; Luke 21 : 27).

(2) *It is the teaching of the apostles and other inspired writers* (1 Cor. 1 : 7 ; 15 : 23 ; 1 Thess. 2 : 19 ; 3 : 13 ; 4 : 15 ; 5 : 23 ; 2 Thess. 2 : 1, 8 ; Heb. 9 : 28 ; James 5 : 7, 8 ; 2 Peter 3 : 4 ; 1 John 2 : 28).

2. THE MANNER AND ASPECTS OF IT DISTINCTLY SET FORTH.

(1) *A personal appearance.* It will be a personal appearance. It is not questioned that Christ may be said to come in other ways than personally. The hour of death is admitted to be the way in which he comes at present to his saints at what is to them the end of time. But the Scriptures teach such a special personal final coming as can only be fulfilled in the bodily appearance of Christ to men (Mark 8 : 38 ; Acts 1 : 11 ; Heb. 9 : 26-28 ; 1 Thess. 4 : 16).

(2) *Apart from sin.* His coming will be "apart from sin to them that wait for him unto salvation," as contrasted with that time in which "he hath been manifested to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself," and was "offered to bear the sins of many" (Heb. 9 : 26-28).

(3) *As Son of Man.* Christ always spoke of his coming as that of the Son of Man. By this he himself taught the same truth with which afterward the angel at the ascension reassured the disciples who stood "gazing up into heaven," namely, that he that will come then will be the "same Jesus" which was taken up. It will then be in human form that he will appear and with the same sympathizing human as well as divine love toward his own which he so wonderfully displayed while on earth.

(4) *As Lord in power.* The apostles speak almost exclusively of Christ as Lord in connection with his second coming. This was their common name for Christ, and thus they recognized the glorious reward bestowed upon him for the salvation wrought for them and the "all power" given unto him in heaven and on earth. "For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven, with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God" (1 Thess. 4 : 16) ; "in the glory of his Father" (Matt. 16 : 27) ; and "in his glory, and all the angels with him" (Matt. 25 : 31) ; fulfilling to believers their expectation of "the appearing of the glory of our great God and Saviour, Jesus Christ" (Titus 2 : 13).

(5) *As Judge.* It is as the Judge of the whole earth that he shall appear both as Son of Man and as Lord, thus giving confidence to those who know him and have believed in him, and striking with terror those who have rejected his love.

(6) *As King.* He shall also come as King to take final possession of his kingdom, to share its blessings and glory with all his willing subjects, and to inflict punishment upon all who have refused to have him reign over them.

3. THE TIME OF CHRIST'S COMING. (1) *Unknown.* This is

represented as peculiarly unknown. Christ declared that even the Son knew not when it would be. It is hidden from all men (Matt. 24 : 36 ; Mark 13 : 32). Our Lord rebuked the disciples just before his ascension for questioning him again upon this subject (Acts 1 : 7). The Apostle Paul indeed wrote to the Philippians, "The Lord is at hand" (Phil. 4 : 5), and Jesus Christ announced, "The time is at hand" (Rev. 1 : 3), and to the church at Philadelphia sent the message, "I come quickly" (Rev. 3 : 11). This is again repeated unto his servants in Rev. 22 : 7, 12, 20. But that these expressions, if they refer, as they apparently do, to his second coming, were not intended to teach what man would call an early coming, is evident from the fact that this second coming has been delayed over eighteen hundred years. The Apostle Peter gave those in his day who were troubled about this delay the true solution, writing them : "But forget not this one thing, beloved, that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day" (2 Peter 3 : 8).

(2) *Instantaneous and unexpected.* It will be instantaneous and unexpected. It is, indeed, to be preceded by signs both spiritual and physical. But as with those in the days of Noah and Lot, few will recognize these signs (Matt. 24 : 37-39 ; Luke 17 : 28). Even to these the coming will be instantaneous, as a flash of lightning (Matt. 24 : 27), as a thief in the night.

4. THE SIGNAL EVENTS WHICH THAT COMING WILL INTRODUCE. These are the resurrection of the bodies of the dead and the change of those of the saints who are still alive, the judgment of all men, and the bestowment, according to the highest equity, of his due reward or punishment upon every one of mankind. These will be separately and specially considered.

II. THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY

The first in point of time of the events which accompany the second coming is the resurrection of the bodies of the dead.

1. TAUGHT BOTH IN THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS. This fact is the teaching both of the Old and the New Testaments. It is admitted that some places in which resurrection is mentioned may speak only of a reappearance upon the stage of being of those who have died, and do not necessarily assert the final resurrection of the body. Thus our Lord's reply to the Sadducees (Luke 20 : 37) only involves the idea of continued life ; so also his language in Luke 14 : 14 ; John 6 : 39, and that to Martha and her reply (John 11 : 23, 24). It may also be acknowledged

that sometimes the life and death in connection with which resurrection is taught is only spiritual and that of the soul only. This seems to be the case in John 5 : 24-26, although the resurrection of the body is not unnaturally spoken of in the verses immediately succeeding. There are also places in which the resurrection of the body is spoken of, but not the general or final resurrection. These may be quoted only as showing that such a resurrection is not impossible. Thus the writer to the Hebrews refers to the faith of Abraham in the power of God "to raise" Isaac "up even from the dead" (Heb. 11 : 19). We are also told that after the death of Christ "the tombs were opened; and many bodies of the saints that had fallen asleep were raised; and coming forth out of the tombs after his resurrection they entered into the holy city and appeared unto many" (Matt. 27 : 52, 53). The resurrection of Christ himself is taught to be a fulfillment of prophecy (Acts 2 : 24-31 ; 13 : 34-37), and a proof not only of the possibility of a resurrection from the dead (1 Cor. 15 : 12-18), but even an assurance and earnest of the resurrection of the bodies of his people (1 Cor. 15 : 20-23, 35-45, 48-54). But there are enough passages of no doubtful import both in the Old and New Testaments which establish a general resurrection of the bodies of all men, as Isa. 26 : 19; Dan. 12 : 2-13; Hosea 13 : 14; John 5 : 28, 29; Rom. 8 : 11-22, 23; 1 Cor. 15 : 20-23, 42-45, 48-54; Phil. 3 : 21; 1 Thess. 4 : 13-17. The last two passages refer, indeed, to the change in the body only; the last one also to the change in those who shall not die, but remain at the coming of Christ. Their appositiveness is readily recognized.

2. NOT CONFINED TO THE RIGHTEOUS ONLY. The resurrection will not be confined to the righteous only, but will include the wicked also. The New Testament treats sometimes, indeed, exclusively of the resurrection of the righteous. Nor is it unnatural that it should do this, for all hope connected with it is confined to them. And so blessed is that hope that it was fit that it should be frequently held out for their encouragement and comfort. Especially did the connection between their resurrection and that of Christ, as the firstfruits of them that sleep, tend to lead them into the joys produced by the consciousness of union with him and their triumph with and through him. Then too, objections to the resurrection from the dead arose in connection with Christian hope. It was denied by some, even among the people of God, as the apostle wrote to the Corinthians

(1 Cor. 15 : 12). With some the doctrine was almost too wonderful to be believed. Perhaps also they had scientific objections to it in that day, as has been the case in other ages of Christianity, even down to our own times. Again, it was declared that it was passed already, and thus the faith of some was overthrown (2 Tim. 2 : 18). It became necessary, therefore, that it should be especially emphasized to the Christian believers of that day.

But that this teaching about the righteous was not intended to exclude the resurrection of the wicked is plain enough from other places. Thus our Lord said: "All that are in the tombs shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done ill, unto the resurrection of judgment" (John 5 : 28, 29). What is also especially significant, in view of his teachings elsewhere as to the resurrection of the just exclusively, is that Paul, in his address before Felix, confessed that he had "hope toward God, . . . that there shall be a resurrection both of the just and the unjust" (Acts 24 : 15). In the vision of John of the day of judgment he saw that "the sea gave up the dead which were in it; and death and hades gave up the dead which were in them, . . . and if any one was not found written in the book of life, he was cast into the lake of fire" (Rev. 20 : 13-15). These passages show distinctly a resurrection of the wicked also from the grave, and therefore a resurrection of their bodies.

3. NATURE OF THE RESURRECTION BODY. We are told nothing as to the nature of the resurrection bodies of the wicked. But enough is said as to those of the saints to show that their change will be most blessed. The all-embracing fact is distinctly declared that they shall be like unto that of their Lord. If we knew the precise nature of his body we should know the nature of those of all his saints. But it is enough to know that he will "fashion anew the body of our humiliation, that it may be conformed to the body of his glory" (Phil. 3 : 21). We are taught many things, however, about the resurrection body; the chief source of information being the fifteenth chapter of First Corinthians, where Paul states: (1) That it will be incorruptible. (2) That it will be immortal. (3) That it will be a glorified body. (4) That it will be raised in power. (5) That it will be identical with the present body. That which is raised is the "it" which is sown. It is "this corruptible" that "puts on incorruption," this "mortal" that "puts on immortality." (6) That this identity, however, is one which exists not without a great change (ver. 51). (7) Yet

there is no greater change than occurred in the body of Christ. It is his image which is to be borne instead of that of Adam (ver. 49). (8) And so it may possibly be *material* still. When Paul asserts that "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God" (ver. 50), he means only to deny that a corrupt and mortal body can thus inherit, and not to assert that such inheritance is not true of a glorified body of material substance, from which all corruption and mortal elements have been removed. This is most likely what he means by the spiritual body in ver. 44-46, where he contrasts it with the "natural," and declares the resurrection body to be "spiritual." It is not spiritual in the sense that it is not material, for it is composed of matter. But it is spiritual as being fitted for the spiritual life hereafter, as it had previously been natural as fitted for the animal life of this world. This is the pneumatic body as opposed to the psychical. As the first body had been suited to the present life and could not be used in the life to come without change, so the resurrection body is suited to the life to come, and not to the present stage of being. Hence it is that the change, with or without death, does not take place until the time of reunion, in which the pneumatic life is to begin.

4. OF ALL AT CHRIST'S COMING. There shall be a general resurrection of all the bodies, both of the *righteous* and of the *wicked*, at the coming of Christ to judgment. (1) The rewards of the *righteous* are especially associated with Christ's coming in the great day: Matt. 16 : 27 ; Luke 12 : 37 ; 1 Cor. 1 : 7, 8 ; 1 Thess. 3 : 13 ; 2 Thess. 1 : 7, 10 ; 1 Peter 5 : 4 ; 1 John 2 : 28 ; 4 : 17. (2) The suffering and punishment of the *wicked* are also intimately connected with the day of Christ's coming to judgment: John 12 : 48 ; 2 Peter 2 : 9 ; Rev. 1 : 7. (3) There are passages also in which both the reward of the righteous and the punishment of the wicked are set forth unitedly in connection with the second coming of Christ : Matt. 16 : 24-27 ; 24 : 36-51 ; Mark 13 : 24-27 ; Rom. 2 : 1-16 ; 1 Cor. 4 : 5 ; 2 Peter 2 : 9 ; 3 : 7-9. (4) The righteous and the wicked are judged together: Eccl. 3 : 17 ; Dan. 12 : 2 ; Matt. 16 : 27 ; Acts 17 : 31 ; Rom. 2 : 1-16 ; 2 Cor. 5 : 10 ; Heb. 9 : 27. (5) The resurrection of the dead occurs at the same time with the judgment : Dan. 12 : 2 ; Rev. 20 : 12, 13. (6) The resurrection and the change that occurs in it are also associated with the coming of Christ : 1 Cor. 15 : 52 ; Phil. 3 : 21 ; 1 Thess. 4 : 16. (7) The judgment and the coming of Christ take place in immediate conjunction : Matt. 16 : 27 ; 25 :

31-46; 2 Peter 3:7-10. (8) The resurrection of both just and unjust shall occur at the same time: Dan. 12:2; John 5:28, 29; Acts 24:15. (9) The unrighteous are kept unto the day of judgment: 2 Peter 2:9. (10) At the time of Christ's coming the world is to be destroyed and the promise fulfilled of "new heavens and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness" (2 Peter 3:8-13). But that day is also the day of "judgment and destruction of ungodly men"; for which "the heavens that now are and the earth by the same word have been stored up for fire" (ver. 7).

These statements show that the general teaching of the word of God is that the Lord will come; that at his coming there will be a general resurrection of the just and unjust, who shall be judged according to the deeds done in the body. Not only is it not taught that there are two resurrections of the body, the one of the righteous at the second coming of the Lord, and the other of the wicked at the general judgment after an interval of one thousand years; but the judgment and the coming of the Lord are recognized as contemporaneous. The day of both events is called by various names, some of which are repeated more than once: as "the day" (1 Cor. 3:13); "that day" (Matt. 7:22); "the day of judgment" (2 Peter 2:9); "the day of God" (2 Peter 3:12); "the day of the Lord" (1 Thess. 5:2); "the day of our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Cor. 1:8); "the day of Jesus Christ" (Phil. 1:6); "the day of Christ" (Phil. 2:26); "the day of the Lord Jesus" (1 Cor. 5:5); "the last day" (John 6:39); "the great day" (Jude 6); "the great day of their wrath" (Rev. 6:17); "the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God" (Rom. 2:5); "that great and notable day of the Lord" (Acts 2:20); "the day when God shall judge the secrets of men . . . by Jesus Christ" (Rom. 2:16); "the day that the Son of man is revealed" (Luke 17:30); "the coming of our Lord Jesus" (1 Thess. 3:13); "the appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Tim. 6:14); "the revelation of Jesus Christ" (1 Peter 1:13); the "appearing of the glory of our Great God and Saviour Jesus Christ" (Titus 2:13), etc.

THE THEORY OF TWO RESURRECTIONS.

There is one passage of Scripture which some claim teaches one resurrection of the bodies of the just and another of those of the unjust, and places them at a wide interval apart, with numerous intervening events. Those who maintain this view hold that the thousand years of the millennium suc-

ceed the second coming of Christ and the resurrection of the righteous. This passage constitutes the twentieth chapter of the book of Revelation. It is the record of that vision in which John saw the angel bind Satan in the bottomless pit for a thousand years, during which the souls of the saints lived and reigned with Christ. "This," says John, "is the first resurrection" (ver. 5). On those having part in it "the second death hath no power" (ver. 6). When the thousand years are expired Satan shall be loosed out of his prison and go out to deceive the nations. When the number of the forces which he gathers, which are like the sands of the sea, surround the camp of the saints, these forces will be devoured by fire from heaven and the devil cast into the lake of fire and brimstone. Then appear the great white throne and the judgment of the dead, according to their works, and the resurrection of the dead, both small and great, and the judgment of the dead out of the books. And then death and hades are cast into the lake of fire. "This," says John, "is the second death" (ver. 14).

It is readily admitted as to this passage that whatever is truly taught in it must be accepted as the word of God. But :

1. We must be careful how we receive any interpretation which does not accord with the rest of Scripture. Before doing so we should examine thoroughly both the interpretation which we wish to accept and the views attained from other parts of the word of God. We know that Scripture cannot contradict itself when rightly interpreted. All its parts must, therefore, be carefully compared to see in what interpretation they agree.

2. If after the best efforts to harmonize this with the other portions of God's word it should seem to be irreconcilable with them, the apparent interpretation of this passage should yield to that of others, not so much because it is one only as compared with a greater number, but because it is found in a book of highly figurative prophecy, in which the literal interpretation is not so justly to be pressed as in others, which are not of this character, and in which the literal meaning is more apt to be the mind of the Spirit.

3. The language of this passage, however, is, at least in some respects, opposed to the idea of two resurrections of the body ; the first, that of the saints to reign with Christ for a thousand years, and the second, that of the wicked to judgment.

- (1) *Not clothed in resurrection bodies.* Because those who are represented as belonging to the first resurrection are not spoken of as clothed in resurrection bodies, but on the contrary, John declares simply that he saw "the souls of them that had been beheaded for the testimony of Jesus," etc. (ver. 4).

- (2) *Implication as well as declaration.* It is not only not said that those who partake of the first resurrection are not among the dead, who are subsequently delivered up by death and hades to be judged (ver. 13), but it is implied that they are among these by the universal terms used when John says that he "saw the dead, small and great, stand before God" (ver. 12.) But if this be true, then there must be either two resurrections of the bodies of the saints, or one of the resurrections at least cannot be of the body.

- (3) *Resurrection to judgment not confined to wicked.* Especially is it not taught that the resurrection to judgment is confined to the wicked, nor that the first resurrection is of the bodies of all the saints ; because along with the books "which were opened," "another book was opened, which is the book of life : and the dead were judged out of the things which were written

in the books, according to their works" (ver. 12); "and if any was not found written in the book of life, he was cast into the lake of fire" (ver. 15). This language implies that among those then raised and judged there were some whose names were written in the book of life. Consequently, reference must here be made to the general resurrection and judgment taught elsewhere as contemporaneous, and the first resurrection cannot be that of the body; or only some of the saints partake of the first resurrection; or there must be two resurrections of the bodies of the saints. The first of these is the only interpretation that accords with what is elsewhere taught.

4. There is an interpretation of this passage possible which makes it harmonious with all other Scripture. It is the following:

(1) *First resurrection spiritual.* That the first resurrection is a spiritual resurrection of the soul from the death of sin, of which the Scriptures elsewhere speak so plainly as being a passage from death unto life. (See John 5 : 24-26; Rom. 6 : 2-7; Eph. 2 : 1, 5; 5 : 14; Phil. 3 : 10, 11; Col. 2 : 12, 13; 1 John 3 : 14; 5 : 11, 12.)

(2) *Second death no power.* That the second death, which has no power over those which have part in the first resurrection, constitutes the punishment of those condemned at the judgment day, which consists in their being cast, both body and soul, into a lake of fire.

(3) *The thousand years an uncertain period.* The thousand years of the binding of Satan is a period of time, of unknown, perhaps of indefinite length, possibly from the time of Christ's conquest of Satan in his death, resurrection, and ascension, or possibly from some other period, even perhaps of a later epoch in the history of Christianity, during which Satan is restrained from the exercise of the power he might otherwise put forth against man; the thousand years terminating at some time prior to the day of Christ's second coming, at which time Satan shall be loosed to consummate his evil deeds by such assaults upon the saints as shall bring down the final vengeance of God at the appearing of Christ in glory.

(4) *Judgment and resurrection general.* The judgment and the resurrection in Rev. 20 : 12, 13 are general, and are those of the last day which immediately follow the coming of Christ.¹

¹ There are very grave difficulties in the way of accepting either the pre-millennial or the post-millennial theory. There can be little doubt that the prevalence of post-millennial ideas has practically almost banished from our lives all expectancy as to the promised second coming of Christ. Post-millennialists, as a rule, show little concern about the second coming of Christ except to refute the theories of the pre-millennialists. And yet there can be no doubt whatever that the New Testament lays stress upon the idea that the Saviour may come at any time, and it encourages his people to be always looking for him. The only expectation of an imminent coming which seems to be actually encouraged by post-millennial views is a coming to us in providences or in death. But this is not the coming that Christians are urged by the New Testament to be always watching for.

On the other hand, it appears almost impossible for the pre-millennialist, without going into wild and fanciful theories, to explain the passages that seem to put the second coming and the resurrection of the righteous and the wicked and the final judgment all in immediate connection with each other. So too, he finds himself confronted by difficulties as to the asserted thousand-year reign of Christ on earth which he cannot satisfactorily meet. Still, it has to be said that pre-millennialists can make a very plausible, and a very strong argument from the word of God for the *essential* features of their theory. The truth is that the teaching of the Scriptures on this doctrine, as in other cases of prophecy, are not so clear that one can feel perfectly

CHAPTER XXIV. THE FINAL JUDGMENT.

The partial processes of God's judgments are not only constantly occurring, but are often distinctly manifested. Hence many expressions of Scripture in which his judgments are spoken of have no certain reference and others no reference at all to the final judgment of all men. But in numerous other places such a judgment is made known. We are taught the appointment of a time when there will be a public general judgment of all the righteous and the wicked.

I. A SPECIAL TIME APPOINTED FOR IT.

1. EXPRESSLY DECLARED. It is expressly declared that "he hath appointed a day in the which he will judge the world in righteousness" (Acts 17 : 31). The numerous designations of the day of the coming of Christ and of his judgment of men were pointed out in the preceding chapter. Among those peculiar to the judgment are "the day of judgment" (2 Peter 2 : 9); "the great day" (Jude 6); "the great day of their wrath" (Rev. 6 : 17); "the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God" (Rom. 2 : 5), and "the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ" (Rom. 2 : 16).

2. DURATION UNCERTAIN. The duration of the time thus appointed cannot be determined. The indefinite meaning of the word "day" forbids any statement of even its probable length. It has been argued that, from the vast numbers to be judged and the many events connected with the life of every man, it will comprise a long period of time. But the rapidity with which, in some conditions, the mind will run over the course of a long life in a moment of time, shows that a period of even exceeding brevity may suffice for a full revelation and judgment

sure as to details. This much seems to be clear : (1) Christ is coming again audibly and visibly. It is not merely a coming in various judgments or at death, as many seem to think. (2) That personal coming is held up as a thing to be constantly expected. Cautions are given, indeed, against fanaticism in the indulgence of this expectation ; but the whole tendency of the New Testament teaching is to awaken expectation that it may occur at any moment. (3) It seems pretty clear also that when Christ comes he will not find the world presenting such a picture of millennial bliss as many seem to hope for. How much faith he will find on the earth is a matter of doubt. (4) His coming will be the signal and the occasion for his glorious triumph over Satan and sin. (5) Whether he will first achieve this triumph and then reign a thousand years, or whether the thousand years is some period that will close with his coming, it is impossible to say. Neither is it very important for us to know. Our hope is in his coming. Our theology should somehow lead us to expect it.

of all persons and events. The indefiniteness of the word, however, should caution us against the assumption that the day must be of only a few hours duration. The fact that there is a special time appointed is beyond question.

II. THE JUDGMENT WILL BE PUBLIC AND GENERAL, OR UNIVERSAL.

I. IT WILL BE PUBLIC. This has been denied by some who think that the judgment of each man occurs at death. These hold that to confine the judgment to that at death only is not contrary to the real meaning of Scripture, which they suppose is not to be found in the literal language used, but in such an interpretation as will accord with the fact that the destiny of each man is fixed and, that consciously to himself, at death. They think that the indefiniteness of the word "day" permits a continuous process of judgment extending over the whole period connected with the deaths of men.

The chief basis of this theory is that the certainty attained at the death of each man as to his position toward God makes unnecessary any further judgment, because his case has thus been already judged. But we have very little knowledge of the amount of that certainty, especially in the case of the wicked. The righteous man, because of his presence with Christ, doubtless knows that his salvation is secure; but who can tell what alternate hopes and fears may constitute a part of the torture of the wicked man in the intermediate state? But even if he is also certain of his fate, there may be weighty reasons for a public manifestation of his position. Even "the angels, when they sinned," whose condition in this respect is certainly equally ascertained, are said to be "reserved unto judgment," as well as unjust men whom the Lord keeps "under punishment unto the day of judgment" (2 Peter 2 : 4, 9). It may be that the day of judgment is appointed in order that the full sentence as to the reward or punishment of each man may be uttered when he stands clothed in the resurrection body in which these are to be suffered or enjoyed during all the future. Other purposes will be subsequently suggested in connection with the vindication of God and the manifestation of the causes and circumstances of his action, which, independently of any relation of the judgment to any individual man, make a public judgment day not unsuitable. The certainty of that publicity will appear from the person of the judge. But, in addition to all other considerations, the Scriptures use language about the judgment day and its events which cannot

justly be interpreted otherwise than as teaching it to be public in the sight of all and general to all, not particular to each man. The declarations of its universally sudden appearance, of the angels and the glory which shall attend the descending Judge, of the convulsions of nature, of the burning up of the world, of such a gathering of all nations as permits a separation before all into two distinct classes, and the fact that some will rise up in special condemnation of others; these and other statements are utterly inconsistent with only a particular judgment of each at death. Especially is it impossible to reconcile the statement that the resurrection of men will precede the final judgment with any theory which makes this occur at death.

2. IT WILL BE GENERAL, OR UNIVERSAL. It is scarcely necessary to add that this judgment will be so general as to include all mankind. Whatever different opinions may be held as to its being at death to each one, or at one special time to all, or that the time is longer or shorter, or long enough to include the thousand years which the Millenarians suppose to intervene between the judgment of the righteous and the end of judgment in that of the wicked, it is admitted by all that the judgment will be universal. The Scripture asserts this very plainly. Before the judge "shall be gathered all the nations" (Matt. 25 : 32); "each one of us shall give account of himself to God" (Rom. 14 : 12). It states that it shall even include all the true people of God (1 Cor. 3 : 12-15), and shall even be so universal as to embrace the angels who kept not their first estate. (2 Peter 2 : 4 ; Jude 6).

III. THE PERSON OF THE JUDGE.

1. GOD THE JUDGE. God alone is competent to perform this office of judge in the great day. He alone has the right to judge. He alone has the necessary qualifications. Chief among these is that perfect rectitude of character by which only can justice be exercised with due regard to the law and those under it according to strict principles of equity. Equally important, however, is that complete knowledge of the law which leaves unknown neither its requirements, nor its penalties, nor its rewards, nor its possible relaxations. He also has that omniscience by which all things are known to him, even the innermost secrets of men,—not their actions only, but their inward thoughts and hidden motives, even their natures and the possibilities of those natures. This, which is essential to due judgment, can be found only in him who searcheth the reins and hearts and thus knows

what is in men. His too is the infinite wisdom which can make due application of the law in all its aspects to the whole conduct and character of those to be judged, and his the infinite power to execute that law, as well in the bestowment of its rewards as in the infliction of its punishments.

Hence the Scriptures speak of God as "the judge of all" (Heb. 12 : 23), and of his judgment according to truth and righteousness, which cannot be escaped (Rom. 2 : 2, 3, 5). In the Apocalyptic vision John "saw the dead, the great and the small, standing before the throne" when the books were opened for judgment (Rev. 20 : 12, 13).

2. BUT GOD IN CHRIST. But this judgment is not by God as God. Jesus told the Jews that "neither doth the Father judge any man, but he hath given all judgment unto the Son" (John 5 : 22). Christ, therefore, taught his disciples that the judge would be the "Son of Man" (Matt. 16 : 27, 28 ; 25 : 31-34), and declared to the Jews that the Father "gave him [his Son] authority to execute judgment, because he is the Son of Man" (John 5 : 27). Indeed, it would seem that the judgment is to be exercised peculiarly by Christ as man, for it is at least especially announced of him in this nature. Peter preached to Cornelius, concerning Jesus of Nazareth, "that this is he which is ordained of God to be the judge of quick and dead" (Acts 10 : 42). Paul wrote of "the day when God shall judge the secrets of men according to my gospel by Jesus Christ" (Rom. 2 : 16), and encouraged the Corinthians by declaring that "we must all be made manifest before the judgment seat of Christ" (2 Cor. 5 : 10), and on Mars' Hill announced that God had "appointed a day in the which he will judge the world in righteousness by the man whom he hath ordained" (Acts 17 : 31).

We cannot hope to understand all the reasons for this appointment of Christ, as Son of Man, to the judgment of all. They are connected in part, with the position of King and Lord, to which he has been assigned for the complete triumph of his kingdom, and the manifestation of God's power and grace. They are also doubtless associated with the relation which, as man, he occupies to mankind, and especially to the church of "first-born ones." But it is certain that, by the connection of the office of judge with Christ as man, is removed every obstacle in the way of a public, visible judgment. Since it is the Son of God who is the Son of Man, all that makes it necessary that God be the judge is found in him. But as man, the judge is no longer

the invisible God, who can only be seen in his works of creation and providence; but God in Christ, the God-man, in his visible material form, who, therefore, can be manifested before the eyes of all, in a judgment which is not simply general, as inclusive of all, but public, as openly manifested before all.

IV. THE PURPOSES OF THIS PUBLIC JUDGMENT.

1. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS LIFE. The belief in such a judgment to come produces a decided influence for good upon the conduct of men in this life. Doubtless it is on this account that it is taught so plainly and so frequently and in so many ways. It is intended that all should be impressed with the certainty of its occurrence. This would, indeed, in no small degree, be accomplished by the knowledge of a private and individual judgment at the hour of death. But it is manifest that this effect is greatly enhanced by the terrors and solemnities with which the Bible clothes the scenes of that day. That its publicity is in itself fearful is evident from the extent with which even those shrink from a revelation of their sins, who, as believers in Jesus, confidently hope for a favorable sentence from God. The question so frequently asked, whether the sins, as well as the good works, of God's people will then be revealed is the fruit of this apprehension.

2. IN CONNECTION WITH THE DAY ITSELF. It is probable, however, that the influence of the expectation of this judgment is unimportant, as compared with the purposes connected with its actual occurrence. These are to be found in the manifestations of God and Christ and of men in that great day.

(1) *As to God.* a. It will furnish a worthy arena for the display of the attributes of God. A continuous purpose of God, in connection with his intelligent creatures, has been to make known to them the glory of his character. This is assigned as a reason even of his spiritual quickening of his people together with Christ (Eph. 2 : 4-7). Now, no mention can be made of any one of his attributes which he has thus far revealed which will not at the judgment day be signally displayed. This will be especially true of his vindictory justice, the perfection of which has been in some degree dimmed while, because of his forbearance and grace, he has delayed the due punishment of sin. Hence, this day is called "the great day of their wrath" (Rev. 6 : 17), and "the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God" (Rom. 2 : 5). Yet how signally will then also appear the wisdom of his

purpose, the truth and faithfulness of his promises, his power to accomplish his will, his universal benevolence, his sacrificing love, his unbounded mercy, his delivering power, his conquering grace, and not to attempt to enumerate further, everything that can be imagined as constituting that holiness which, in one word, embraces all moral perfection.

b. The wisdom and equity of God in his providential and gracious dealings with men will then also be apparent. These often give rise to perplexity, even in those who most firmly believe in God as one who does all things justly and well. In this life men are called to exercise faith in God in all these matters. That faith will be vindicated by the manifestations at that time both of his character and acts. The inequalities of this life and the prosperity of the wicked and the adversity of the righteous, will then be not only equalized, but all will clearly see the wisdom, justice, and goodness of God in giving them a place here in his providential government. It is more than probable that in the full exhibition of all his purposes in creation and grace, that insoluble problem of this life, the presence of sin in a world created and governed by an almighty and holy God, will become a manifestation of unspeakable glory in God. Then too will appear, even more plainly than now, the righteousness of his choice of some to salvation and condemnation of others for sin; and also the full responsibility of men for every sin, even when their circumstances and previous action have rendered certain the things which they will do. Then too will be seen such sufficiency in each man of the light possessed (if he had walked therein) and of his power for good (if he had exercised it) as makes him guilty in the sight of God, and worthy of the punishment which he will inflict.

(2) *As to Christ.* But it is not simply the revelation of God, but of God in Christ.

a. The glorious person of Christ will be manifested—that wonderful combination by which the created spirit, and even the created matter of Christ's human nature were, through union with the divine Logos, enabled to do that work which neither man nor God could separately do (John 1 : 14). Where but on the throne of judgment could this personage be seen by any except those who are made partakers of his glory? How fit is his appearance to fill with anguish those who have rejected him, and with exultation and praise all those who have trusted in him. He appears not only as Judge, but as King and Lord, whose dominion

as Lord is now shown to be universal, and whose kingship in the hearts of his people he now rewards by welcoming them to entrance into his joy, and participation in his glory.

b. The glory of Christ's work also will then appear. This will be seen in its displays of the divine attributes ; of truth, in the fulfillment in him of the threatened curse of sin for all those saved by him ; of inexorable justice, which requires that honoring of the law, not only in obedience, but also in penalty, exacted even from the Son of God, from him that is the fellow of Jehovah ; and of love and mercy, which demand to be exercised even at the cost of the most fearful sacrifice. Pre-eminently will the glory of that work be seen in the harmony displayed in the exercise of these attributes ; of justice in a way of mercy and love ; of each of these in a way of justice, and of all of them in a way of holiness and truth. The judgment day will clearly exhibit these perfections, and their harmony to all the intelligences of God.

The glory of that work will also be seen in the manifested conquest of Satan. For the accomplishment of the purpose of God he has long been permitted to exercise power and malignity. It will at the judgment day appear that it was always done by the sufferance of God, who chose not to conquer and punish him and his angels except through the Son of Man. The fact that this victory over Satan has not been one of divine power, but has been wrought out by the Son of God in his human nature, renders his defeat more signal and humiliating to him. It is a complete avengement of the temptation of the first Adam.

The delivering power from sin shown in the work of Christ will also exhibit its glory in a peculiar manner. We can imagine an angel willing to undertake the conquest of Satan at the command of God. But here was work which no angel would have attempted, nor even had any hope of accomplishing. There were many problems in connection with it which could not be solved. How is the penalty which has been incurred to be endured or to be escaped ? How is the righteousness demanded to be fulfilled now that man has become a sinner ? How can sin be eradicated and an unholy nature be restored to its purity and original righteousness ? How is another to secure these things in men ? And if not secured in them, how can the sin of a sinner be hidden from God ? How can God be just and yet justify the ungodly ?

Christ has solved all these problems and more than done all the work which was needed. The sinner, united by faith to Christ, has now an assured safety, an unfailing righteousness, a

more than sufficient satisfaction, a covert utterly impenetrable by the wrath or justice of God; and he will stand before the judgment seat of Christ, in the presence of men and angels, to manifest his Saviour's power in eradicating sin, by the good works wrought out by that Saviour's disciple in mortal flesh, even under the higher law of Christian duty.

(3) *As to man.* *a.* It is to be as a day when "each one of us shall give account of himself to God" (Rom. 14 : 12), which account shall comprise "every idle word that men shall speak" (Matt. 12 : 36). This is to be at that time "when God shall judge the secrets of men" (Rom. 2 : 16). The object of this trial is not to ascertain what men have done, but to make manifest to those who are judged, as well as to all others, the things which are already known to God. To this end, even sins unknown to the offenders and good deeds forgotten by the righteous will be brought to light (Matt. 25 : 31-46). We are told that the Lord "will both bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and make manifest the counsels of the hearts: and then shall each man have his praise from God" (1 Cor. 4 : 5).

b. Then will judgment be made as to each individual. For this cause is it that "we must all be made manifest before the judgment seat of Christ; that each one may receive the things done in the body according to what he hath done, whether it be good or bad" (2 Cor. 5 : 10; Rom. 14 : 12). The very name of the day shows the object of its appointment, and the nature of the transactions in this direction, which will then occur. The descriptions of the judgment day, however figurative they may be supposed to be, mark this as an undoubted teaching of God's word. The wicked are condemned, both because of character and conduct. How this may be can easily be understood. But the righteous are accepted and rewarded upon the same grounds. The reason of this is not so apparent. It doubtless is based upon the meritorious work of Christ, through which, by faith, they have been justified by God even in this life. But the references to their own personal acts show also a personal justification in that great day. This is the justification by works, seen in them even while on earth. It is the manifestation of the life-giving principle imparted to them on earth in regeneration, and exhibited by them during the processes of sanctification. The good works are the fruits of that vital union with Christ, by which "the life also of Jesus" is "manifested in our body" (2 Cor. 4 : 10; cf. Gal. 2 : 20; Rom. 8 : 1-4).

In the judgment, unto which men will thus be brought in the last day, there will be account taken of the light and knowledge which they have possessed. The heathen will be judged by a different law from that which will be applied to those who have had the light of revelation. Paul plainly teaches that the former have a law under which they live (Rom. 2 : 14, 15), in want of conformity to and violation of which they are "worthy of death" (Rom. 1 : 32); and that they are judged only by the law which they have (Rom. 2 : 12). Christ taught the same truth generally as applied to all the various degrees of knowledge when he spoke of the servants to be beaten with few or many stripes, according to their knowledge of their Lord's will (Luke 12 : 47, 48). He also taught it especially in comparing the degrees of guilt and condemnation of those who enjoy the knowledge of the gospel and those who lived before its proclamation (Matt. 12 : 41, 42; Luke 11 : 29-32; cf. John 12 : 47, 48).

c. It will be a time for the public bestowment of rewards and punishments. The nature of these rewards and punishments will be subsequently considered. What is now referred to is only the publicity of their bestowment. The language here may perhaps be figurative, but must mean something, and can mean no less than the publicity of the awards Christ will give. No private judgment at death would account for the statements that all are to be gathered before Christ, and are to be separated by him into those on the right hand and those on the left (Matt. 25 : 32, 33); nor for the declaration that, "in the end of this world the Son of Man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that cause stumbling and them that do iniquity" (Matt. 13 : 41); nor for that further teaching in ver. 49, that "the angels shall come forth and sever the wicked from among the righteous."

V. THE PLACE OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT.

1. A PLACE SOMEWHERE. It is evident from what we have already seen that the judgment scenes will occupy some place in the universe of God. Christ is to appear as the Son of Man, and therefore clothed in the body of his human nature, although that body will then have been glorified. The bodies of men, both of the righteous and the wicked, will have been previously raised, so that they shall be judged in the body for the deeds done in the body. The bodies then, both of the Lord and of all men, will not only occupy space, but will so occupy it as to be mutually recognized as being in space.

2. MOST LIKELY IN CONNECTION WITH THIS EARTH. The place may also be believed to be in some connection with our present

earth. It is fit that this which has been the scene of all the events which will culminate in the judgment day shall also be the place of that final trial. It is natural to suppose that as the first coming of the Lord was to this earth, to bear sin for the redemption of man, so his second coming in triumph, without sin unto salvation, will be to that part of the universe which has been thus signally distinguished as the theatre of God's most gracious work. The statements of the Scriptures are indeed meagre, but they say nothing which would conflict with this opinion.

3. MAY POSSIBLY BE ELSEWHERE. Yet, after all, the conclusion that the trial will be in connection with this earth is so much a matter of inference only as not to forbid that it may be at some other point in the universe. All that we are definitely told is that "we that are alive, that are left, shall together with them be caught up in the clouds to meet the Lord" (1 Thess. 4 : 17), and that "the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall be dissolved with fervent heat, and the earth and the works that are therein shall be burned up" (2 Peter 3 : 10). But while this does not deny, it does not necessarily teach the destruction of the whole universe. The catastrophe may be limited to this earth and its atmosphere, and yet all the phenomena mentioned may occur. We also know that combustion of matter is not its destruction, but only a change in its form. This accords with the prediction of a new heavens and a new earth (2 Peter 3 : 13), and with those expressions which refer to it as a "restoration of all things" (Acts 3 : 21), and teach "that the creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God" (Rom. 8 : 21). But whether the earth alone is to be purified by fire, or as seems not so probable, the whole universe; or whether the judgment scene is to be connected with earth, or with some other point in the present, or in the renewed universe, it seems certain that it must be in some place. The place which is most probable is in connection with the point of space now occupied by this earth, and either in the atmosphere above it, during or after the conflagration, or on the earth itself before it.

CHAPTER XXV. THE FINAL STATES OF THE RIGHTEOUS AND THE WICKED.

In the last chapter nothing was said specifically of the awards of the judgment day. Yet the public bestowal of these is the

culminating point of interest in that occasion. Judgment without the expression of its results in rewards and punishment would be empty and vain. Hence the Scriptures do not leave us ignorant of what sentences will be pronounced upon the righteous and wicked, and of what will be the final state of each. Of necessity these must in some respects resemble those of the intermediate state, of which the condition of the righteous and wicked after judgment will be an enlargement and a culmination. It is not strange, therefore, that the Scriptures teach more fully and emphatically upon these awards of the judgment.

I. THE FINAL STATE OF THE RIGHTEOUS.

There is upon this point little dispute as to the meaning of the Scripture statements. As they are numerous, they will best be presented under several classes of description.

I. RECOGNITION AT THE JUDGMENT. Our Lord declared that "Then shall the king say unto them on his right hand, Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world" (Matt. 25 : 34). This is called "eternal life" in ver. 46. As this is probably a description of the nature of the blessings to be attained rather than a declaration of the literal language that will then be used, other statements may here be added which are of the same nature. One is that given in the parable of the talents, in which his lord said to him of the five talents, "Well done, good and faithful servant: thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will set thee over many things: enter thou into the joy of thy Lord" (Matt. 25 : 21; *cf.* Matt. 24 : 47). The righteous are spoken of as "wheat," and it is said that the householder at the harvest time will say to the reapers, "gather the wheat into my barn" (Matt. 13 : 30). Our Lord, in his explanation of this parable, says of those thus represented by the wheat, "Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father" (ver. 43). Corresponding to this language is the declaration of Peter, that "when the chief shepherd shall be manifested, ye shall receive the crown of glory that fadeth not away" (1 Peter 5 : 4). There may be added also the promises made in Revelation to "him that overcometh," viz: to "eat of the tree of life which is in the paradise of God" (2 : 7); "that he shall not be hurt of the second death" (2 : 11); "that he shall be given of the hidden manna," and "a white stone, and upon the stone a new name written" (2 : 17), and given authority over the nations (2 : 27) to "rule them with

a rod of iron" (2 : 27); to "be arrayed in white garments" (3 : 5), and "walk with me [Christ] in white" (3 : 4), to be made "a pillar in the temple of my God," having the name of God, and of the city of God, the new Jerusalem, and the new name of Christ, written upon him (3 : 12); to sit down with Christ in his throne (3 : 21); "to inherit these things," with the promise, "I will be his God, and he shall be my son" (21 : 7). These declarations, however figurative, are descriptive of the condition of the saints in glory, and may, therefore, be appropriately added to the sentence of their Lord.

2. CONTRAST WITH PAST CONDITION. The future state of the righteous is also stated, with reference to his past condition on earth, as salvation (Mark 16 : 16; 1 Thess. 5 : 9; 2 Tim. 2 : 10); deliverance from every evil work (2 Tim. 4 : 18); redemption (Rom. 8 : 23; Eph. 4 : 30); liberty (John 8 : 36; Rom. 8 : 21); rest (Heb. 4 : 10; Rev. 14 : 13); deliverance from earthly sufferings, such as hunger, thirst, tears, etc. (Rev. 7 : 16, 17); no night (Rev. 21 : 25; 22 : 5); no uncleanness (Rev. 21 : 27).

3. CONTRAST WITH PRESENT POSSESSIONS. It is also described, in contrast with present possessions, as blessedness (Matt. 25 : 34); perfect knowledge (1 Cor. 13 : 12); holiness (1 Thess. 3 : 13; Rev. 21 : 27); glory (Rom. 8 : 18; 2 Cor. 4 : 17; 2 Tim. 2 : 10; 1 Peter 5 : 4); life (Mark 8 : 35; 9 : 43, 45, 47; John 5 : 29; Rom. 8 : 13); crown of life (James 1 : 12); eternal life (Matt. 19 : 29; 25 : 46; John 6 : 27, 47, 54; Rom. 2 : 7).

4. CONNECTION WITH CHRIST. Declarations are made which connect the believer with Christ, viz: as of his being with Christ (1 Thess. 4 : 17); in the presence of his glory (Jude 24); beholding his glory (John 17 : 24); conformed to the body of Christ in his glory (Phil. 3 : 21); Christ showing him the riches of his grace (Eph. 2 : 7); Christ glorified in them (2 Thess. 1 : 10); entering into the joy of their Lord (Matt. 25 : 21, 23); reigning with Christ (2 Tim. 2 : 12), etc.

5. ACTIVITIES. Statements are made about the activities of the heavenly life. The rest of heaven is not a state of inactivity. This is pointed out in the very passage which speaks of this rest as a peculiar blessedness: "Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord from henceforth: yea, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labours (toil, trouble, suffering, pain, weariness); for their works (deeds, works, especially those of necessity or duty)¹

¹ See "Lexicon" of Liddell-Scott.

follow with them" (Rev. 14 : 13). Here we are taught that, while they rest from onerous and painful toil, they continue to be actively employed. We may not know what all of these employments shall be. They will be such as will be suited to their intellectual and moral nature and position. The statements of the book of Revelation give us an insight into what some of them may be. The servants of God are there depicted as serving God (Rev. 7 : 15 ; 22 : 3) ; as giving praises in song (Rev. 14 : 2, 3 ; 15 : 3, 4 ; 19 : 5, 6) ; as engaged in prayers of adoration (Rev. 6 : 9-13 ; 7 : 11, 12) ; of thanksgiving (Rev. 11 : 17) ; and in acts of humiliation (Rev. 4 : 10).

6. IN HEAVEN. The blessedness of the future state of the righteous is also set forth in connection with the place of their abode. This is usually called heaven. It is readily admitted, indeed, that the word "heaven" is used otherwise than for the abode of God, and Christ, and angels, and the future dwelling place of the saints. But in numerous places it has only this special signification. The following selection of passages will suffice : Matt. 5 : 12, 45 ; 6 : 20 ; Luke 6 : 23 ; 15 : 7 ; 22 : 43 ; John 3 : 13 ; 6 : 38 ; Rom. 1 : 18 ; 1 Cor. 15 : 47 ; 2 Cor. 5 : 1 ; Eph. 1 : 10 ; 3 : 15 ; Phil. 3 : 20 ; 1 Thess. 1 : 10 ; 4 : 16 ; 2 Thess. 1 : 7 ; Heb. 9 : 24 ; 1 Peter 1 : 4 ; 3 : 22. The plain teaching of these passages, and of others that might be mentioned, is that heaven is a place and not merely a state or condition of happiness. It is called elsewhere "a better country, that is a heavenly" (Heb. 11 : 16). It is the place in which we shall have "a building from God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens" (2 Cor. 5 : 1, 2), and "a place" among the "many mansions" in the "Father's house" (John 14 : 2). It is called "the kingdom" (Matt. 13 : 43 ; 25 : 34). It is possible that heaven is also meant by the "Jerusalem that is above" (Gal. 4 : 26), and "the new Jerusalem which cometh down out of heaven" (Rev. 3 : 12), and "the holy city Jerusalem" (Rev. 21 : 10) ; as well as by paradise (Luke 23 : 43 ; 2 Cor. 12 : 4 ; Rev. 2 : 7 ; cf. Rev. 21 : 10-27). It is impossible for us to ascertain where heaven will be located. The Scriptures give no certain teaching upon this point. That this earth in its renewed condition may be the future heaven is favored by Rom. 8 : 19-23 ; 2 Peter 3 : 5-13 ; Rev. 21 : 1-3. But these passages are entirely too indefinite and doubtful to give any certainty, or even very strong probability, on this point.

7. FOREVER. The blessedness of this state of the righteous is

made supreme by the fact that it will last forever. It will never end; it will never be diminished. If there be any change it will be from its increase: because of better intellectual perception and knowledge of God and of divine things; because of a constantly and increasingly endearing communion with God in Christ; because of an increased capacity to behold the glory of Christ; and because of a greater exaltation of the spiritual nature in the worship and service of the Lord. There is no reason why there may not be such increase in beings whose natures can never attain the infinity of excellence and the complete fullness which belong only to God. This perpetuity of the happiness of the saints is stated in various ways: (1) It is called "eternal life" and "everlasting life" in the King James version, which are translations of the same Greek words. They are translated "eternal life" or "life eternal" in Matt. 25 : 46; Mark 10 : 30; John 3 : 15; 10 : 28; 12 : 25; 17 : 2; Acts 13 : 48; Rom. 2 : 7; 5 : 21; 6 : 23; 1 Tim. 6 : 12, 19; Titus 1 : 2; 3 : 7; 1 John 1 : 2; 2 : 25; 5 : 11-13; Jude 21. They are translated "everlasting life" or "life everlasting" in Matt. 19 : 29; Luke 18 : 30; John 3 : 16, 36; 4 : 14; 5 : 24; 6 : 27, 40, 47; Rom. 6 : 22; Gal. 6 : 8; 1 Tim. 1 : 16. The Greek should have been translated in all these places by the same word, and the better word would have been everlasting, because only a relative eternity, or what is called eternity *a parte post*, belongs to created things. God alone has true eternity. (2) It is declared to be "for ever" (John 6 : 51, 58), and "for ever and ever" (Rev. 22 : 5). (3) Similar expressions are also used, as "everlasting tabernacles" (Luke 16 : 9); "eternal weight of glory" (2 Cor. 4 : 17); "glory in the church and in Christ Jesus unto all generations for ever and ever" (Eph. 3 : 21); eternal comfort" (2 Thess. 2 : 16); "salvation which is in Christ Jesus with eternal glory" (2 Tim. 2 : 10); "eternal salvation" (Heb. 5 : 9); "eternal redemption" (Heb. 9 : 12); "eternal inheritance" (Heb. 9 : 15); "eternal glory" (1 Peter 5 : 10); "eternal kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ" (2 Peter 1 : 11). (4) In John 4 : 14; 8 : 51, 52, and 10 : 28, it is declared of believers that "they shall never thirst," "never taste of death," "and never perish," by which is taught the same everlasting condition expressed in the three preceding classes. Reference is made in these passages to the spiritual life of the soul.

The numerous declarations of everlasting life and happiness thus classified above make certain what might have been inferred

from the scriptural statements of the natural immortality conferred upon spirit, which forbids its annihilation, and from the security against the spiritual death of the soul arising from the gracious work of Christ wrought out for and in the believer, through which he is forever delivered from the condemnation and presence of sin and clothed in the unfailing righteousness of God. The same blessing is unquestionably attained through the relation borne to Christ by the saints, as constituting the church of first-born ones, which is his bride (Eph. 5 : 23-33), and also that body of which he is the head, which is declared to be "the fullness of him that filleth all in all" (Eph. 1 : 23). The vital connection between Christ and his people has no elements of dissolution, and must, therefore, be everlasting. For he has said : "Because I live, ye shall live also" (John 14 : 19).

II. THE FINAL STATE OF THE WICKED.

The judgment day is no less signally to be marked by the punishment decreed against the wicked than by the blessings conferred upon the righteous. These, also, are set forth in the Bible and in fearful words of warning, and should be effective for driving men to Christ for salvation while the day of probation continues.

I. PROOF OF THEIR PUNISHMENT. (1) *The sentence against them.* We have the sentence to be uttered against those who are still in sin. It occurs in the same chapter with that of the righteous. Christ tells us that, "Then shall he [the king] say also unto them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye cursed, into the eternal fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels, . . . and these shall go away into eternal punishment" (Matt. 25 : 41, 46). A similar sentence occurs in Luke 13 : 27 : "I tell you, I know not whence ye are ; depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity."

The different elements included in this sentence are also taught of the wicked elsewhere in the Scriptures, some examples of which may be here added : *a. Punishment* : "He that disbelieveth shall be condemned" (Mark 16 : 16) ; "the resurrection of judgment" (John 5 : 29) ; "rendering vengeance to them that know not God . . . who shall suffer punishment" (2 Thess. 1 : 8, 9) ; "keep the unrighteous under punishment unto the day of judgment" (2 Peter 2 : 9). *b. Pain* : (*a*) as expressed by fire (Matt. 13 : 42, 56 ; 18 : 8, 9 ; Mark 9 : 43-48 ; 2 Thess. 1 : 8 ; 2 Peter 3 : 7) ; (*b*) fire and brimstone (Rev. 14 : 10 ; 19 : 20 ;

20 : 10; 21 : 8; (c) flame (Luke 16 : 24); (d) "the unquenchable fire" (Mark 9 : 44, 48; cf. Luke 3 : 17); (e) "tribulation" (Matt. 24 : 21, 29; Rom. 2 : 8, 9). *c. Deprivation*: severed from among the righteous (Matt. 13 : 49); "outer darkness" (Matt. 25 : 30); "cast forth without" (Luke 13 : 28); "shall not inherit the kingdom of God" (1 Cor. 6 : 9); "no rest" (Rev. 14 : 11); "blackness of darkness hath been reserved forever" (Jude 13). *d. The punishment and suffering are recognized by those punished*, and that recognition is shown by their "weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth" (Matt. 8 : 12; 13 : 50; 25 : 30; Luke 13 : 28). The rich man is represented as acknowledging his torments (Luke 16 : 24).

(2) *The nature of this punishment.* *a. Physical suffering.* We are not warranted in taking for granted that it will not be in part physical. The wicked will go from the judgment seat with the bodies which belong to them in their resurrection state. We know not what will be the nature of these bodies, and therefore have no right to affirm that they may not be capable of physical pain. That the language of Scripture as to fire and brimstone is figurative is true. But men are not authorized on that account to deny that some physical pain, and that of a most excruciating and agonizing character, will form a part of the agony and woe of the hereafter of the sinner. So far from men drawing comfort from any conviction they may have that there will not be a literal fire, they should only the more be filled with dread and apprehension of some fearful condition which the Scriptures here attempt to describe by terms which express the severest anguish men can endure in the body; the statements made evidently fall far short of telling the nature of a punishment which our present condition forbids that we should understand. In the range of animal life here on earth we know that the higher the organism the more keenly is it alive to suffering as well as enjoyment. This teaches us to expect that the bodily enjoyments of the saints will far surpass anything ever experienced on earth. If the resurrection bodies of the wicked are in any degree higher than those of this world, the only result will be to make them capable of anguish utterly inconceivable by men in their present state.

b. Spiritual agony. The spiritual agony then to be endured is equally beyond the possibility of present expression. We may say that it will necessarily consist in certain evils; but who can tell how great those evils will then be realized to be. Some of

them may be suggested, such as consciousness of an unclean and unholy nature, when there is no way to cleanse or escape it; conviction of the nature and ill desert of sin, when sinful habits have such prevalence and control that sin must still be committed willingly, yet with horror of what is done. (Indications of this are seen in men in this life, who by debauchery or drunkenness are driven forward to evil even against their will); remorse for past indulgences, for neglected opportunities, for rejections of Christ (especially as then will be seen how nigh unto each one had come the kingdom and grace of God); knowledge of banishment perpetually from the presence of Christ, and deprivation of the favor and love of God. These, and evils like unto them, with the mutual reproaches of the damned for the influences of each other by which such evil has come, will make a hell compared with which all the torture men have ever known in this life will be looked back to as though it were heaven itself.

(3) *The place of this punishment.* There are three words used in Scripture which are translated "Hell" in the King James version, viz: Hades, Tartarus, and Gehenna.

a. "Hades" is simply transferred in the Canterbury revision. It is used for the general place of departed spirits, both righteous and wicked. In no place is punishment or torment associated with it, except in Luke 16:23, in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus. This is to be explained, in accordance with the use of the word in all other passages, by the fact that as hades contains the wicked as well as the righteous, and as the wicked there are in a state of suffering, so the rich man in hades was tormented, while Lazarus who was in the same general abode, was enjoying the blessed state expressed by his being in Abraham's bosom.

b. The word "Tartarus" appears only as a participle *ταρταρώσας* (*tartarosas*) of the verb *ταρταρόω* (*tartaroo*), which means to cast down to Tartarus. The place in which it is found is 2 Peter 2:4, which is translated: "For if God spared not the angels when they sinned, but cast them down to hell, and committed them to pits of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment." The revisers point out in the margin that the word hell is expressed in the Greek by Tartarus. This passage evidently has respect to the condition of these angels before the judgment day.

c. The places in which Gehenna occurs are Matt. 5:22, 29, 30; 10:28; 18:9; 23:15, 33; Mark 9:43, 45, 47; Luke 12:5; James 3:6. All of them refer to torture and punishment

hereafter. This is distinctly associated with the punishment of the judgment day in Matt. 18 : 9, by the preceding verse where "eternal fire" is used as the equivalent term to gehenna; in Matt. 23 : 33, where Christ asks the scribes and Pharisees : "How shall ye escape the judgment of hell (gehenna)"; in Mark 9 : 43, where the language is "to go into hell (gehenna), into the unquenchable fire," and in Luke 12 : 5, in which Christ says, "Fear him which, after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell (gehenna)."

It has been remarked, not inaptly, that gehenna is used by Christ himself in all of the twelve passages in which it occurs in the New Testament, except James 3 : 6.

(4) *The duration of this punishment.* The New Testament teaching upon this subject is that it will endure throughout all the infinite future. This is expressed in various ways :

a. By the term εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα (*eis ton aiona*), "forever." This occurs about thirty times in the New Testament. An earnest and learned opponent of the doctrine of eternal punishment,¹ has been able to point out only one place in the New Testament where he thinks the meaning of "forever" cannot be applicable to this form of words. It is the language of Paul in 1 Cor. 8 : 13, translated, "I will eat no flesh for evermore." For any other use Oxenham is obliged to refer to the Septuagint, where he claims that it is used of "duration, throughout the age of the Mosaic dispensation," "of the world," "of a family," and "of the political condition of slavery." But this application accords with that very derivation, made by the best lexicographers, that makes αἰών (*aion*) equivalent to the Latin *aevum*, which word, however, is the basis of the very idea of eternity, which is the sole meaning of εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα (*eis ton aiona*) in the later Hellenistic Greek of the New Testament. This term is applied to the punishment of the wicked in Jude 13.

b. By other similar expressions. Other expressions similar to the first are used where plural forms of αἰών (*aion*) are used instead of the singular, as εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων (*eis tous aionas ton aionon*), "for ever and for ever," in Rev. 19 : 3 and 20 : 10, and εἰς αἰῶνας αἰώνων (*eis aionas aionon*) (Rev. 14 : 11). These plural forms only intensify, they certainly do not diminish, the duration.

c. By the word αἰώνιος (*aionios*). This word occurs about

¹ Oxenham, "What is Truth as to Everlasting Punishment?" p. 101.

seventy times in the New Testament, and invariably in the sense of eternal or everlasting duration. Just as the English word "eternal" refers to the true eternity which is in God alone, so is this word applied to God in Rom. 16 : 26, and to the Holy Spirit or to the divine nature of Christ, in Heb. 9 : 14. In like manner, as we inadequately divide eternity into eternity *a parte post*, and eternity *a parte ante*, meaning by each indefinite, unlimited, and illimitable duration in the past or in the future, from the present, or some other fixed period of time—as from the time of Christ's appearance on earth—so this word is used for each of these two kinds of eternity. It has no other application in the New Testament than to one or other of these three forms of eternity. As applied to the endless life of the righteous or wicked, it signifies the future eternity, or eternity *a parte post*.

Those who oppose the doctrine of eternal punishment suppose that there are many ages, or periods of existence of man, and they attempt to explain the language used accordingly. But while the phrases upon which this opinion is based, might as a matter of language mean this, there is no evidence from Scripture of the existence of any such several periods. The only distinction clearly made is between the dispensation prior to the time of Christ, and that since his day; the Scriptures evidently regarding that as the central point, unto which all things tended in the past, and from which all things proceed in the future.

d. By the use of precisely the same words which are used to declare the eternal life of the righteous. It is not to be overlooked that these words, which express the eternity of the punishment of the wicked, are precisely those by which the eternal life of the righteous is also made known. As that is unending in its happiness, so this is in its punishment and suffering. These words express as strongly as the Greek language can, the everlasting duration of the destiny assigned to each at the judgment day.

This is questioned by Oxenham, who says, p. 114 : "There are several ways in which Almighty God could have expressed this endlessness of future punishment, if he desired to tell us that it would be endless ; ways, about the meaning of which there could be no mistake ; ways, in which in Holy Scripture he has expressed the endlessness of things which will be endless : *e. g.*, of his own dominion God declared by the prophet Daniel that it was 'an everlasting dominion, *which shall not pass away*, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed' (Dan. 7 : 14). Of the endless life of the blessed, our Lord declared (Luke 20 : 36), *neither can they die any more*. By the angel Gabriel (Luke 1 : 33), God announced that of the kingdom of

Jesus Christ *there shall be no end*. Where is any such language used of the kingdom of darkness, or of future punishment, or of the wicked? Where is it said of the lost that they can live no more? Where of future punishment, that of it there shall be no end?"

To this it may be replied :

(a) That, if no similar instances can be given relative to future punishment and the wicked, yet so far as any of these expressions are used of the righteous, they are explanatory of the kind of eternity ascribed to their happiness ; and as this is described by the same words as that of the misery of the wicked in all other cases, these instances teach us the meaning of these common words when applied to the wicked by thus explaining them when applied to the righteous.

(b) That the same ingenuity and quibbling which attempts to deprive the expressions used of their true meaning would be applied in like manner to such terms as these.

If a similar passage to that from Daniel could be presented, we should immediately have pointed out to us that it was to the Son of Man that the kingdom was given, and that of this very kingdom which "shall not pass away" we are told that "then cometh the end when he shall deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father ; when he shall have abolished all rule, and all authority and power" (1 Cor. 15 : 24).

(c) But there are like instances which may be adduced. In Luke 20 : 36, "neither can they die any more," the impossibility of dying is expressed by οὐδὲ δύνανται (*oude dunantai*). Corresponding to this is the language used by our Lord to the Pharisees in John 9 : 21, "Ye shall seek me and shall die in your sin : whither I go ye cannot come," οὐ δύνασθε ελθεῖν (*ou dunasthe elthein*).

Parallel to the expression in Luke 1 : 33, "there shall be no end," οὐκ ἔσται τέλος (*ouk estai telos*), is "the endless genealogies," γενεαλογίαις ἀπεράντοις (*genealogiais aperantois*), in 1 Tim. 1 : 4 ; for, although different words are used to express endlessness in the Greek, they are of substantially equal force. Oxenham is himself authority for the strong meaning of ἀπεράντοις (*aperantois*), for he refers to ἀπειρον (*apeiron*), α and πέρας, from which ἀπεράντος (*aperantos*) is likewise formed, as meaning "without a limit," and says of it and others : "By these and by several other words and expressions of unmistakable meaning, Almighty God could have expressed the endlessness of future punishment if he had desired to do so" (p. 115). Yet had he used this word, or others of the same form, how quickly should we have been referred to the endless genealogies as exegetical of them.

With respect to the two final questions of Mr. Oxenham, as to where we may find it said that the lost cannot live any more, and that of future punishment there shall be no end, it may be said that the passage in 1 Cor. 6 : 9 may be suggested as one that fully meets them. "Know ye not that the unrighteous *shall not inherit* the kingdom of God." (See also ver. 10.) The same expression occurs in Gal. 5 : 21. The insincerity with which such questions are asked is seen in the fact that when these and similar passages are presented these opponents resort to the assumption that the unrighteous will not always be unrighteous, and that only so long as unrighteous shall they not inherit ; but that they may do so after their unrighteousness has passed away. They will attempt to maintain the possibility of this in the face of such a passage as Rev. 22 : 11 : "He that is unrighteous, let him do unrighteousness still : and he that is filthy, let him be made filthy still."

c. By yet other expressions which convey the same idea. We may properly add three other expressions which are used in the Scriptures as to the unending nature of the punishment of the wicked.

(*a*) Ἄιδιος (*aidios*) which appears in the "eternal Godhead" of Rom. 1 : 20, and in the everlasting chains of the angels which kept not their first estate in Jude 6. As the wicked are to be sentenced to the "eternal fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels" (Matt. 25 : 41), this passage has probable reference to the duration of the punishment of both devils and wicked men.

(*b*) Ἀσβέστος (*asbestos*), unquenchable fire. Oxenham claims that all that is involved in this word is that the fire "is unquenched," and that the language does not forbid a time when it may be quenched. This word occurs in three undisputed places in Scripture, Matt. 3 : 12 ; Mark 9 : 43, and Luke 3 : 17, and in three others, Mark 9 : 44, 45, 46, which Westcott and Hort omit from their text, and which are also omitted in the Canterbury Revision. Mark 9 : 48 has a different form of the same word. Oxenham objects to the translation "unquenchable," and insists upon the meaning, "is unquenched"; but the duration of the punishment and the propriety of the translation "unquenchable" is shown by the words, "where their worm dieth not," used in connection with the expression in ver. 48.

(*c*) Οὐ τελευτᾷ (*ou teleuta*), "does not end," "ceases not," is declared of the worm in Mark 9 : 48. Τελευτᾷ (*teleuta*) corresponds exactly in meaning, as well as in root, with the τέλος (*telos*) in the οὐκ ἔσται τέλος (*ouk estai telos*) in Luke 1 : 33, which Oxenham regarded as so strongly expressive of endlessness as to challenge the finding of such a term applied to the future punishment of the wicked.

2. OBJECTIONS AND OPPOSING THEORIES. The objections to this doctrine of eternal punishment and the opposing theories may be briefly stated and replied to.

(1) *Objections.* *a.* It is objected that the punishment is disproportioned to the sin. But, (*a*) no one but God can know what is the real desert of sin, and if he has plainly taught us that it deserves eternal punishment, we may be sure that the infliction of such punishment must be right and in accordance with what it merits. The question is simply, What does God say? and upon this point he has taught us plainly. (*b*) The objection is based upon the idea that all the sin that will be punished is that

committed in this life. It is true that men will be only judged for the deeds done in the body. But these will not constitute all the sins which will be punished hereafter. A part of the penalty of the sins of this life is such a corrupted nature as will make men sin in the life to come. The Scriptures teach that there will be sinful acts and habits after death (Rev. 22 : 11). Ever-continuing sin will deserve ever-continuing punishment. If sin is worthy of any punishment at all, and if at every moment sin is committed, punishment may be forever, without assuming that any one or more sins will cause everlasting infliction. (c) Mark 3 : 29 tells of "an eternal sin."¹ (d) The objection supposes that the punishment of the damned is something actively inflicted by God and not the working out and result of the natures of men. It will doubtless consist in great part in their sinful and corrupt natures, which will still work out sin and thus continue to separate from the favor and complacent love of God. The only probable exception will be "remorse," arising from the memory of past sins and neglected opportunities ; and these are not active inflictions of God, but the results of former sin.

b. It is said that God is too merciful to inflict everlasting punishment. But, (a) God, in declaring that he will inflict it, thus declares that he is not too merciful to do so. (b) God teaches us that, while he takes no delight in such punishment, it is demanded by justice, which is as unbounded an attribute of his nature as mercy. (c) God has given signal exhibitions in his providential government that he can and will punish severely. As a moral governor, his punishment must be proportioned to the offense. His merciful disposition cannot interfere with his righteous action. Even in the salvation of those saved through Christ it is necessary that he should be just in justifying the believer in Jesus.

c. It is claimed that provision has been made in Christ for the certain salvation of all men. If this be so, there is no difficulty in God's justice in the bestowment of salvation upon all. But that such is not the case is manifested, (a) By the fact that salvation is offered only on the condition of repentance and faith. None, therefore, can have part in that salvation except those who fulfill this condition. (b) Regeneration is declared to be essential to entrance into the kingdom of Christ. Those who are not thus born again can therefore have no part in his salvation. (c) Not

¹ See Greek text of Wescott and Hort.

only is holiness declared to be essential to admission to heaven, but it is foretold expressly that certain classes of unholy men shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone; and at the head of the list given are "the fearful and unbelieving" (Rev. 21 : 8). (*d*) While the value of Christ's work is indeed ample for all, we are taught that its benefits are not bestowed upon all. There are special sins mentioned which will exclude those who commit them from all hope of salvation (Matt. 12 : 31; Luke 12 : 10; Heb. 6 : 4-6, *cf.* ver. 9; 10 : 26, 27, *cf.* ver. 28-31). But the assertions made about the certain punishment of those who commit these particular sins are not stronger than the declarations of the certain damnation of all the finally impenitent and unbelieving.

d. Inasmuch as it is asserted in 1 Tim. 2 : 3, 4, that "God our Saviour . . . willeth that all men should be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth," it is even claimed that it is the purpose of God to save all. That the word *θέλει* (*thelei*), translated "willeth," often involves purpose or determination on the part of God, is readily admitted, as well as that, if it mean this here, then all men will be saved according to that purpose. But such purpose cannot be concluded from this passage alone, unless it accords with what is elsewhere taught; much less when it is in direct opposition to the general tenor of the Bible, as well as to distinct statements to the contrary. And it is clear that this word does not necessarily mean "will," in the sense of "purpose." There are many cases in Scripture in which God is said to wish what he not only does not purpose to accomplish, but what actually fails to take place. Some of the cases in which this word has only this meaning of "wish" are as follows: In general of men only, Matt. 7 : 12; 12 : 38; 15 : 28; of Christ, Matt. 23 : 37; Mark 14 : 36; Luke 13 : 34; John 17 : 24; and of God, 1 Cor. 15 : 38; Heb. 10 : 5, 8. *θέλημα* (*thelema*), the corresponding noun, is used as expressive simply of this "wish" of God in Mark 3 : 35; Rom. 2 : 18; Eph. 6 : 6; and in other places.

e. It is further objected that God must forgive those who are truly penitent, and that the wicked, in the full knowledge of God and sin afforded by the next world, must certainly repent.

(*a*) This objection arises from a misconception of the nature of the repentance acceptable to God. It is not mere sorrow for sin, especially for its effects, of which probably hell will be full; it is reformation of character, turning away from sin, and seeking holi-

ness. Sorrow accompanies it, but does not constitute it. It is not awakened by the painful effects of sin, but by conviction of its evil nature. How can such sorrow arise in those who have learned to love sin? or such reformation in those who are confirmed in habits of sin? Remorse for the past, loathings of their then condition, even desires to overcome the power which enchains them may abundantly exist; but as often occurs in this life, where passion and appetite get the mastery of men, pleasure will be taken in sin and evil appetites indulged, even when it is hated with all the bitterness of a despairing soul.

On the other hand, what is the teaching of Scripture as to God's readiness to accept the penitent after the day of opportunity has passed away? What does the case of Esau teach? (Heb. 12:16, 17.) What is meant to be taught by the language of Wisdom? (Prov. 1:24-28.) Did Christ accept, did God forgive the wretched, sorrowing, remorseful Judas? or was his penitence permitted to plunge him into the further sin of suicide? Even here on earth, where the day of probation ordinarily ends only in death, such rejection of such sorrow for sin is possible. Who shall dare to say that it is impossible in the hereafter? "For if they do these things in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry?" (Luke 23:31.)

(*b*) Punishment appears to have very little, if any, tendency to work reformation in offenders. It often deters from crime, but it rarely brings one to genuine repentance.

(*c*) During the middle state, if at any time after this life, a return to God might be expected; yet the language of Scripture does not permit us to expect it then.¹

(*d*) The experience of this life shows that for any violation, even of physical law, the penalty attached to it must be endured, and that no sorrow for what has been done, nor determination to avoid such action in the future, will release from the evil which follows. Why should it be supposed that after the judgment law will be less inexorable than now, or that penitence and reformation will then, of themselves, avail any more than they do now? Even in this life, repentance and faith have no value nor power in themselves, but are only effective as conditions upon which the salvation in Christ is offered. But the Bible carefully warns men that this offer, on these conditions, is only made in this life. To suppose it possible in the hereafter requires not only the

¹ Hovey's "Manual of Systematic Theology," p. 362.

possibility of repentance and faith then, but also that salvation through Christ will then be still attainable. This can only be upon the supposition that men will have a future probation, and the same means of grace as those here afforded, or yet other means.

f. In further objection, therefore, it is assumed that another probation will then be enjoyed. The strongest form in which this objection is urged is that inasmuch as, despite his positive threatenings to our first parents that they should die, God had purposed to provide redemption for at least a part of mankind; therefore, despite the positive statements as to the future condemnation and punishment of the wicked, there may still be mercy in store, and final deliverance from the presence and taint of sin, as well as its punishment.

The replies afforded to this are obvious: (*a*) The case quoted affords a warning to those who teach contrary to what God teaches. Our first parents were even then, before their sin, assured that the threatened sentence would not be executed. But this came from Satan, who is declared by Christ to be "a liar and the father thereof" (John 8 : 44). Those who, upon any other authority than God, call in question any statement which he makes, should feel that they do it at the peril of their own souls and that of those whom they teach (Matt. 15 : 8, 9, 13, 14 ; 23 : 13, 15, 16 ; Luke 6 : 39). Those who deny a doctrine which they know is taught in God's word, or attempt by any subterfuge or mere supposition to induce others to reject it, act precisely the part of Satan in the transaction of the fall.

(*b*) The penalty which God threatened has actually been inflicted upon all mankind. Even the death of the body has only thus far been escaped by two of the race. But spiritual death, the death of the soul, manifestly the especial death of the curse (for this alone was inflicted upon the day of transgression) has, in the corrupted and sinful nature, become the so-called "natural" state of mankind. The objection evidently supposes that eternal death was also threatened against Adam. But this is not true. It becomes a part of the penalty only because it is the consequence of moral corruption and depravity, which must continue to deserve punishment, and also to work out sin deserving of still further punishment, unless some means of deliverance from this corruption shall arise. Eternal death, therefore, was not a penalty threatened against Adam, but only a consequential penalty resulting from what was threatened, and which, therefore, may be escaped through the deliverance in Christ.

But eternal death is threatened against the finally impenitent of the present probation. The case of Adam, therefore, teaches us that it will assuredly be inflicted upon them. As God did not withhold the flood of corruption and misery which the corrupted nature has brought upon mankind,—the deliverance of any from which demanded the gift and the sufferings of his own Son,—we may be assured that in like manner he will inflexibly allow eternal punishment to come upon all against whom he has threatened it.

(c) When all suspicion that God may intend something different from what he says in his threats to prevent sin, has been removed by perceiving that he has to the letter fulfilled his threat against Adam, we are prepared to give due weight to what he teaches about the possibility of future probation. To the question of one asking, "Lord, are there few that be saved?" Christ replied, "Strive to enter in by the narrow door, for many, I say unto you, shall seek to enter in and shall not be able" (Luke 13 : 24). (See the context, which shows reference to entrance into the kingdom in the future world.) The exhortation of Isa. 55 : 6 : "Seek ye the Lord while he may be found," implies a time when he may not be found. This exhortation has reference to the new and everlasting covenant of the sure mercies of David. (See ver. 3.) How distinctly does the hortatory question of Heb. 2 : 1-3 apply here, when we see not merely how steadfast has been the word spoken by angels, but how literally fulfilled has been that uttered by God. Well may all ask, "How shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation?" The intimate connection between this passage and the exhortation against the hardening of the heart in the present moment, in Heb. 3 : 7-11, are worthy of especial note, as well as the warning of ver. 12, and the continued exhortations and warnings, as far as and beyond 4 : 7, which declares of the present period of probation : "He again defineth a certain day, saying in David, after so long a time, To-day, as it hath been before said, To-day, if ye shall hear his voice, harden not your hearts." The declaration, "Behold now is the accepted time; behold now is the day of salvation" (2 Cor. 6 : 2), with the context, in like manner teaches that the present is the only period of probation.

(d) It may be questioned whether very many persons who die impenitent do not come under some one of the forms of sin which are specifically declared unpardonable, viz : willful sins (Heb. 10 : 26); falling away (Heb. 6 : 4-6); and the blasphemy against the

Holy Ghost (Matt. 12 : 32). Certainly they all come under the declaration of Christ of everlasting punishment.

(e) Nor should such passages be forgotten here as Luke 16 : 26, which teaches that even in hades there is an impassable gulf between the righteous and the wicked ; as John 8 : 21, in which Christ told the Pharisees that they could not come to him in the future world ; and Rev. 22 : 10, 11, which teaches the continued unrighteous and unholy condition and conduct of the finally impenitent. The language of Christ about Judas (Matt. 26 : 24) is not quoted against all, because spoken of one man only, though none can tell of how many others it may be true. But there are doubtless very many liable to the similar woe denounced by Christ ; that "it is profitable for him that a great millstone should be hanged about his neck and that he should be sunk in the depth of the sea" (Matt. 6 : 6 ; Mark 9 : 42 ; Luke 17 : 2).

(2) *Opposing theories.* There are different forms in which the objections to the eternal punishment of the wicked take the shape of doctrinal theories :

a. The theory of annihilation. This does not deny that the punishment will be eternal, but only that there will be eternal conscious pain. It supposes, however, that the death of the sinner is absolute annihilation of being, and that in this sense only is it an eternal punishment. This theory admits that the soul may suffer hereafter for a longer or shorter time according to its deserts, but that there will be a time when existence will absolutely cease. The object of those who hold this theory is not opposition to everlasting punishment on the ground that God cannot justly punish so severely or is too merciful to do so, but to escape the idea that sin and misery will always exist under the government of God.

This theory claims scriptural support from the use of such words as speak of the condition of the wicked hereafter. One of these is *ἀπώλεια* (*apoleia*), translated sometimes "perdition," and sometimes "destruction," in both the King James version and the Canterbury revision. It appears, in reference to the future punishment of the wicked, among other places, in John 17 : 12 ; Rom. 9 : 22 ; Phil. 3 : 19 ; Heb. 10 : 39 ; 2 Peter 3 : 7.

But this word is very far from having the idea of annihilation. It is simply an equivalent to our English words destruction, loss, ruin, misfortune. In Matt. 26 : 8 and Mark 14 : 4 it is used of the ointment poured upon Christ's head and translated "waste." In all other passages it apparently refers to the future

condition of the wicked. But these two show that it does not mean annihilation, as indeed it does not elsewhere, either in classic or Hellenistic Greek. The verb ἀπόλλομι (*apollumi*) signifies no more than to destroy utterly, and is chiefly used in Homer for death inflicted in battle.¹

Another word is ὀλεθρος (*olethros*). This occurs in connection with the punishment of the wicked in three or four places in the New Testament, viz: in 1 Thess. 5 : 3 ; 2 Thess. 1 : 9 ; 1 Tim. 6 : 9. In none of these does it mean more than destruction, by which word it is translated not only in these places but also in 1 Cor. 5 : 5. This last place is that in which Paul directs the Corinthians to "deliver" the incestuous man "unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus." Surely, no one imagines that the annihilation of the flesh is meant. Neither does this word mean any greater destruction than is involved in death.

Another expression is "the second death": "And death and Hades were cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death; even the lake of fire" (Rev. 20 : 14). The lake of fire, the casting into which is said to be the "second death," is expressly set forth as the place in which "the beast and the false prophet" are, and in which "they shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever" (verse 10). There is certainly no annihilation here, for annihilation is inconsistent with torment continued forever.

It may be stated, in general, as to all the places which speak of the destruction and death of the soul, that reference is made to its spiritual loss of God's favor and of holiness and not to the extinction of its being. This extinction would be contrary to the natural immortality conferred on spirit. It is not even true, so far as we can know, that even matter will ever be annihilated. What is called its destruction is simply such change of form as makes it unfit for the uses for which it had been so formed. Thus we speak of the utter destruction of a house, of machinery, of an animal, not meaning the annihilation of the matter which composed it, but the destruction of the form in which that matter appeared and which was essential for its use. In like manner the death of the soul means its becoming unfit for the uses for which it was made, viz: for happiness, for holiness, for the service of God, for the complacent love of God, and for the reflection

¹ See Liddell and Scott's "Lexicon."

of his image. Such an utter deprivation of all the faculties for which the moral nature of man was made may well be called its death, even its utter destruction.

b. Restorationism. This is based upon three different grounds, each of which may be held separately, or any two, or all of them together. Two of these have been sufficiently considered in the replies already made to the objections against the scriptural doctrine. One of these is that reformation of life will hereafter take place among some, at least, of the condemned, through natural ability and sufficient grace and the influences of the Spirit, and that thus these will be made holy and therefore acceptable to God. The other is that the benefits of the work of Christ will, after this life, also be for the first time imparted to many men, and if this is done salvation must ensue.

It is to be noticed, however, that when the objections previously answered are put in the form of a theory, the idea that there can be no everlasting punishment is modified so as to assert only that all but a few will be saved. This is done to escape the cases of Judas and others already mentioned. But in so doing all the principles upon which the possibility of such future salvation is based have to be abandoned, and the theory becomes a mere supposition, without any support, presented in the face of positive declarations of the word of God to the contrary.

The third ground upon which restorationism is imagined is that the Scriptures speak of such restoration. The chief passage supposed to teach this is Acts 3 : 20, 21, "that he may send the Christ who hath been appointed for you, even Jesus : whom the heaven must receive until the times of restoration of all things." The passage itself fixes the period of the time of restoration, which is at the second coming of the Lord. This precedes the judgment, and thus necessarily that of the restoration supposed by these parties.

Another passage is Eph. 1 : 9, 10, which speaks of God "having made known unto us the mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure which he purposed in him unto a dispensation of the fulness of the times, to sum up all things in Christ, the things in the heavens, and the things upon the earth." The fullness of times here is probably the present dispensation, and has nothing to do with some new period. See Gal. 4 : 4 : "When the fulness of the time came, God sent forth his Son," etc. (*cf.* Heb. 1 : 2 ; 9 : 10 ; 1 Peter 1 : 20). So again, in Col. 1 : 19, 20, it is said to have been the good pleasure of the Father, "through

him [Christ] to reconcile all things unto himself, having made peace through the blood of his cross ; through him I say, whether things upon the earth or things in the heavens." This place is also quoted to show that all will be finally saved.

This use made of these two passages (Eph. 1 : 9, 10 and Col. 1 : 19, 20) to build up a doctrine, without other support from the word of God, and so contrary to so much that is therein taught, is a warning against the pernicious manner in which isolated passages of the word of God are separated from their contexts and used to establish preconceived theories. Both of them occur in Epistles written exclusively to professed Christians. The subject of both of them is the church of Christ. The "all things in heaven or earth" mentioned in each of these Epistles are those only which are connected with the church. So far as persons are referred to, they are those who constitute "every family in heaven and on earth" (Eph. 3 : 15), called also "the general assembly and church of the first born who are enrolled in heaven" (Heb. 12 : 23). They have, therefore, not the remotest reference to any future restoration to holiness and happiness and God of those condemned at the judgment.

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